FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Spring 1980 *$3.00 a copy*

Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

Human Rights and Foreign Policy—*William F. Buckley, Jr.*

Yugoslavia
David Andelman—Milovan Djilas

Germany in a Semi-Gaullist Europe—*Fritz Stern*

A Strategy for Peace in the Middle East—*Shimon Peres*

Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea
Elliot L. Richardson

China in the 1980s—*Ross Terrill*

The Great Game in Asia—*David Fromkin*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SPRING 1980

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: A Proposal
William F. Buckley, Jr. 775
Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 797
Yugoslavia: The Delicate Balance ..... *David A. Andelman* 835
Yugoslavia and the Expansionism of the Soviet State
Milovan Djilas 852
Germany in a Semi-Gaullist Europe ..... *Fritz Stern* 867
A Strategy for Peace in the Middle East ..... *Shimon Peres* 887
Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea ..... *Elliot L. Richardson* 902
China in the 1980s ..... *Ross Terrill* 920
RECONSIDERATIONS
The Great Game in Asia ..... *David Fromkin* 936
Comment and Correspondence ..... *Rita E. Hauser, Eugene V. Rostow, Beinesh Epstein, Edward J. Derwinski, John Borawski* 952
Recent Books on International Relations 970
Source Material ..... *Janet Rigney* 998

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Editor

JAMES CHACE
Managing Editor

JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER
Associate Editor

LUCY EDWARDS DESPARD
Book Editor

EMILY SUESSKIND
Assistant to the Editor

DAVID IVES
Assistant Editor

MAE BENETT
Assistant to the Managing Editor

DORIS ELIZABETH FOREST
Publisher

GRACE DARLING GRIFFIN
Director, Advertising and Promotion

MARGARET K. KABLE
Assistant to the Publisher

MARK GAUTHIER
Editorial Assistant

NINA V. COHEN
Staff Assistant

Editorial Advisory Board

A. DOAK BARNETT
JAMES H. BILLINGTON
HARVEY BROOKS
PHILIP C. HABIB
CARL KAYSEN
JOHN J. MCCLOY
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
WILLIAM M. ROTH
FRITZ STERN

Vol. 58, No. 4, Copyright © 1980, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITOR'S NOTE

As a book publisher might say, the authors in this issue represent an unusually distinguished list. That their articles separately came to fruition at this particular time is in part coincidence; certainly it does not reflect some sudden rush to names for their own sake. Quite simply, each of the articles seems to us to meet the timeless criteria of freshness and importance laid down by my predecessor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong. We are proud to bring them to our readers.

At the same time, we venture the hope that readers will not run out of steam before they reach the Reconsiderations piece by Mr. Fromkin. Justice Holmes once wrote that an ounce of history is worth a pound of logic, and this look at the past record of Russian behavior in Central Asia may be as good a guide to present policy problems as a dissection of the fast-changing actions under way today.

Moreover, the Comment and Correspondence section in this issue is not only highly topical to these same problems but the longest and fullest we have had—and is only a selection from a growing mailbag. We welcome this trend in the habits of our readers from every standpoint, and hope it keeps up. While so far we have confined the section to letters commenting on articles, the flow of comment on our editorial policies and choices may soon find its way into print—and in the meantime will always get our personal attention and reply.

One reminder only: to receive proper consideration, letters should reach us by May 1 for the Summer issue, by August 1 for the Fall issue, and so on. These are, naturally, later than our normal deadlines for manuscripts; they mean that getting proper replies from our authors tends to become a scramble. But we want debate and difference, as well as the "correction, amplification and abuse" made famous by one of our sister publications.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Editorial Office, 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Cable address Foraffairs, New York. Payments and inquiries concerning subscriptions should be sent to *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, Colorado, 80322. Subscription price (until April 30) U.S. $15.00—Foreign $18.00 per year. Subscription air mail rates are available upon request. Inquiries concerning permissions and reprints should be sent to the New York office.

Foreign Affairs is a member of The Leadership Network advertising group located at 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Telephone Robert F. Sennott, Jr., (212) 682-4500, in Suite 321.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

William F. Buckley, Jr.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY: A PROPOSAL

> The Soviets in Geneva [to negotiate SALT II] never even hinted at the Kremlin's resentment of the Carter human rights policy, and the Americans were equally careful not to echo their Government's criticism of Soviet human rights abuses. Unaware of this rule, a newcomer to the U.S. team brought up the dissidents in an informal tête-à-tête with his Russian opposite number. When he reported the exchange later in a 'memcon,' his superiors told him never again to mix business with displeasure.
>
> —*Time* Magazine, May 21, 1979, a Special Report on the history of the negotiation of the SALT II treaty.

A great deal has been written about human rights and foreign policy in the recent past.[1] With much of what I propose to discuss below, before arriving at a policy proposal, I expect there will not be substantial disagreement, with some of it inevitably there will be. We are all agreed that the movement for human rights, politically expressed, is quite new; that U.S. involvement in that movement has been uneven; that the advent of the United Nations Covenant on Human Rights slightly altered the juridical international picture; that the Soviet Union came recently to a policy of manipulating the West's campaign for human rights; that the Vietnam War brought on a general disillusionment with

[1] The curious should prepare to read *American Dream/Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy*, by Sandra Vogelgesang. The book will be published in April 1980 by Norton. I have read the manuscript, courtesy of Ms. Vogelgesang. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and I both wrote books about service with the Third Committee (Human Rights) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and his book is also an account of his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. The books are, respectively, *A Dangerous Place*, Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1978; and *United Nations Journal: A Delegate's Odyssey*, New York: Putnam's, 1974. *Freedom in the World, Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1978* is a Freedom House book edited by Raymond D. Gastil, New York, G.K. Hall and Company. I found four articles particularly helpful. They are, in chronological order of their publication, "A Reporter at Large—Human Rights," by Elizabeth Drew, *The New Yorker*, July 18, 1977; "The Politics of Human Rights," by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Commentary*, August 1977; "Human Rights and the American Tradition," by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Foreign Affairs*, "America and the World 1978"; and "Human Rights Muddle," by Irving Kristol, *The Wall Street Journal*, June 27, 1978.

William F. Buckley, Jr. is Editor of *National Review*. His most recent book is a novel, *Who's On First*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American idealism; that the Realpolitik of Nixon-Kissinger generated first congressional resistance and then, through candidate and later President Jimmy Carter, executive resistance to adjourning official U.S. concern for human rights. And, of course, everyone knows that Mr. Carter's human rights policy is now in a shambles. This is the case, in my judgment, not because of executive ineptitude, but because of morphological problems that can't be met without an organic division of responsibility.

II

Although the very idea of human "rights" is firmly rooted in biblical injunction, which asserts a metaphysical equality ("Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself") and enjoins altruism ("Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me"), biblical insights made little political progress over the centuries in which church and state joined in accepting, and even underwriting, civil class distinctions at the extreme of which were self-assured kings and self-abnegating slaves, never mind that the political phenomenon never challenged, let alone diluted, the theological conviction that both kings and slaves would eventually answer to the same divine tribunal.

Human rights, including a measure of political rights, were asserted and to a degree explicated, in the documents that led to, and flowered from, the American and French Revolutions. The Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, enumerated individual rights which the state might not impinge upon, save by due process. The respect paid to these rights by sponsoring governments varied with the vicissitudes of the historical season, an ambivalence by no means outdated. Negro slaves in America coexisted with the Bill of Rights; the Reign of Terror in France with the Declaration of the Rights of Man; Gulag with Helsinki. There are few surviving commentators, let alone historians, who are inclined to defend the proposition that the articulation of a human right leads to its realization.

In short, though inchoately an ancient idea, human rights are a relatively new political objective, and as often as not, only a nominal political objective.

The United States has had cyclical romances with the notion of responsibility for the rights of extranationals, an insight also biblical in origin ("Am I my brother's keeper?" asked Cain, who, having drawn the wrong conclusion, slew Abel), cosmopolitanized

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by John Donne's resonant assertion that we are, as individuals, involved in mankind. Professor Schlesinger nicely summarizes the episode involving Louis Kossuth, driven from Hungary by the Austrians during the repression following the convulsions of 1848.[2] There were those in Congress who came close to advocating a punitive expedition against Austria; others considered lesser sanctions; but, all in all, Congress engaged in a feisty bout of moral indignation. The prevailing voice, however, was Henry Clay's. His argument was in two parts, the first that the United States, with its fitful record, uneasily judged the delinquencies of other nations; the other, that condemning Austria while ignoring such conspicuous transgressors on human rights as Turkey, Spain, Great Britain (yes, Great Britain!) and Russia, was simply... eccentric.

Several years before Professor Schlesinger reminded us of it, George Kennan, in his exasperation over the Vietnam War, had called attention to the tranquilization of rambunctious American idealism by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, delivered, appropriately enough, on the Fourth of July (in 1821). "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled," Adams said, "there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."[3]

The rhetorical exaltation of what is still known as Wilsonianism reached its apogee in the inaugural address of President John F. Kennedy. It is painful to repeat those ingenuous strophes, so dissonant to the ear after the Vietnam War, but a narrative of U.S. attitudes toward human rights abroad is simply incomplete without them. We will, declared the freshly anointed President, "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

Did Mr. Kennedy, in uttering those words, recognize the *weight* of the responsibility he was assuming on behalf of the United States? The answer is that he *gloried* in that responsibility: "In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it."

[2] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*

[3] George Kennan, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 10, 1966. *Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966—Vietnam.* Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington: GPO, 1966, p. 336.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Was this pure bombast? Or was the listener entitled to assume that the new President had actually given thought to the practical consequences of his words? "The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world." A few months later that glow lit up the Bay of Pigs, but by no means the world, or even the Capitol steps from which these quixotic—potvaliant?—words had been spoken.

In short, U.S. involvement in the movement to universalize human rights has been episodic, but, even early on, it evidenced an inchoate disjunction between the power to affirm, and the power to dispose.

Yet the scaffolding on which President Kennedy had spoken was not insubstantial. There were the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, which he coupled to his antecedent crusade to make the world "safe for democracy." There came then, in 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms. These—in passing—were significant for transmuting human rights into something much more than the negative injunctions on government activity conveyed in the Bill of Rights. FDR did not exactly discover, but he and Winston Churchill gave declamatory voice to positive, but not readily achievable, obligations of government: something called Freedom from Want, which seven years later gave birth to about 30 importunate children (e.g., "Everyone has the right . . . to free choice of employment") in the Universal Declaration and related documents—children who, for the most part, have lived unhappily ever since.[4] But while Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy were merely American Presidents, giving voice to an erratic, yet progressively universalist, statement of American idealism, the birth of the United Nations and the subscription by member states to its Charter gave near-universal codification to the notion of the obligation of the state to acknowledge the human rights of its own citizens, and hinted at the mutual obligation of states to ensure each other's fidelity to these obligations. Because the Charter itself—and this before the ensuing elaboration in the Universal Declaration and other comments—committed its members to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights."

[4] For convenience's sake I group together the following instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Protocol.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In short, the United Nations transformed human rights into something of an official international paradigm, and began to suggest an obligation by member states to modify their foreign policy accordingly.

The Universal Declaration's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Political Rights, were announced on September 26, 1973 as having been ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus under the Soviet Constitution became the supreme law of the land. The Soviet ratification aroused little popular notice. To this day there is no universally accepted explanation for Soviet timing. Probably it had to do with the Soviet Union's efforts to ingratiate itself with those European countries with which, two years later, it concluded the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords). "Basket Three" of this pact became the most emphatic juridical validation of certain individual rights in Soviet history. The Universal Declaration, after 25 years of desuetude, had become, for most nations, mere liturgy; safe, therefore, to ratify without giving rise to international expectations. Basket Three was widely held to be the indispensable moral quid pro quo by the Soviet Union to the Helsinki Accords that gave the Soviet Union what it had wanted for so long, namely de jure recognition of the postwar frontiers.[5] To have accepted Basket Three while ignoring the Universal Declaration would have posed problems for Soviet negotiators.

As it happened, most of the Soviet citizens who undertook actively to monitor compliance by the Soviet Union with the terms of Basket Three are in jail, psychiatric hospitals, exile; or mute. Their Czechoslovakian counterparts have been tried, convicted, and sent to jail.

In short, the Soviet Union in due course recognized the necessity to cope with, and therefore manipulate, the human rights dimension as an aspect of its own foreign policy.

III

Nobody knows exactly what impelled Jimmy Carter to seize on human rights as the touchstone of U.S. foreign policy. Mr. Carter's

[5] Two months before the announcement of Soviet ratification of the Universal Declaration, Lord Home had spoken at one of the opening sessions at Helsinki with these words: "If your conference is essentially about people and about trust, then it is essential that we should do something to remove the barriers which inhibit the movement of people, the exchange of information and ideas." And on September 26, addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations as British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home spoke hopefully, "I trust that the Communist countries will be able to prove that they are for the basic freedom of people everywhere."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposition to the Vietnam war could be classified as ritualistic: i.e., he was not one of its early critics. Now the U.S. venture in Vietnam has been disgraced by most moralists, which is to say less than that it has been disgraced by history. Its relevance here is that Jimmy Carter on several occasions spoke ill of it. In his acceptance speech at Madison Square Garden upon being nominated for President, he spoke of it as an "immoral" war. At Notre Dame University in 1977, he stated that our "inordinate fear of communism" led us to the "intellectual and moral poverty" of the Vietnam War. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's comment is here relevant not merely for the job it does of effective contention, but in shedding light on the confused provenance of Jimmy Carter's stated redirection of U.S. foreign policy with emphasis on human rights. Moynihan said, "This causal connection can . . . be challenged. Some of us said at the time that the enterprise was doomed because it was misconceived and mismanaged. Are we to say now—in this, echoing what our enemies say of us—that it was also wrong or immoral to wish to resist the advance of totalitarian communism?"[6]

Carter's reference to Vietnam, together with Moynihan's demurral, catapult us into the awful complication posed by the Vietnam War, coming on the heels of the attempted liberation of Cuba. The *moral* disavowal of the Vietnam War took us a long way toward the Platonization of the spirit of our concern for human rights. Elizabeth Drew reminds us that Jimmy Carter came to the whole subject of human-rights-as-an-integral-part-of-foreign-policy in a haphazard way—not to be compared, say, with the evolution of Lincoln's structured approach to slavery.[7] In an address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York in 1976, Carter said that "we . . . can take the lead in . . . promoting basic global standards of human rights,"[8]—a statement that might have been made, and has been, by an orator in the United Nations. But by the time he reached his Inaugural Address he was speaking of his commitment to human rights as "absolute."

The opposition to the war in Vietnam did more than implicitly to disavow any generic responsibility by the United States to resist totalitarian aggression in such terms as had been advanced by President Kennedy. So bitter was the opposition to the war that it was transmuted in some quarters into a tacit disavowal of the modus operandi of American culture, recalling Henry Clay's arguments against U.S. moral effrontery. The process began by

[6] Moynihan, *op. cit.*
[7] Drew, *op. cit.*
[8] Jimmy Carter, Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, June 23, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stressing the imperfections of our ally Ngo Dinh Diem; went on to the immorality of our military procedures (napalm, bombing); and ended by concluding that the United States was so tainted, that there was nothing really to say about the superiority of our own society over that against which we had set out to defend the South Vietnamese.[9]

The effect of this self-denigration must be supposed to have had a great impact on the perception of the People's Republic of China. Barbara Tuchman, for instance, came back from China to write a paean on Mao Zedong, conceding only perfunctorily that, to be sure, there were certain "negative aspects," which, however, "fade in relative importance" alongside the accomplishments of the regime.[10] John Kenneth Galbraith managed an entire book about the new China in which he could find to criticize only the excessive use of tobacco, though, to be sure, he made it clear that Maoism wouldn't work over here.[11] Others—for example, James Reston, Seymour Topping and Ross Terrill—wrote in a similar vein.[12] One must conclude that the hectic enthusiasm for a society that observed not a single provision of the U.S. Bill of Rights must have reflected the low opinion of the United States, its paraphernalia of rights notwithstanding, that prevailed among the most intense critics of the Vietnam War.

In brief: the retreat from Vietnam was not merely a disavowal of Wilsonianism as a foreign policy, but a disavowal of Wilsonianism as metaphor. Who is to say that the society that grants such liberties as we grant, and is nevertheless so rotten, is necessarily to be preferred over such a society as Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong created, without human rights, to be sure, but otherwise so wholesome? Surely utopia lies somewhere beyond the rights of Coca Cola to operate—or even of the Bill of Rights to guarantee individual inviolability in the face of social *force majeure*? Although the intellectual community is retreating from its position on Mao Zedong ever so slowly, indeed one might say *pari passu* with the retreat of the present rulers of China from idolization of Mao, it is doing so. The events in Cambodia and the phenomenon of the boat people have likewise injured the perception of North Vietnam as a kind of godfatherly presence in Indochina. The prominence given to Carter's position on human rights was a reaction to the

[9] There is a vast body of literature to sustain this statement. A heavy concentration of it may be found in *Authors Take Sides on Vietnam*, Cecil Woolf and John Bagguley, eds., New York: Simon and Shuster, 1967. See especially the entry by Herbert Read.

[10] *The New York Times*, September 4, 1972.

[11] John Kenneth Galbraith, *A China Passage*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973.

[12] James Reston, *The New York Times*, July 8, 1971; Seymour Topping, *The New York Times*, June 25, 1971; Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000," *The Atlantic*, November 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

radical ideological egalitarianism brought on by the Vietnam War—the criticism whose base was, in effect, "Who says we-all are better off than them-all?"

During these years (1969–76) our foreign policy was given over to the balance-of-power politics of Nixon, Kissinger and Ford. Critics of the war became hard investigators of executive military and paramilitary procedures. Of all things, the CIA under Kennedy (leave aside the tangentially relevant question whether at his instructions) apparently expressed a velleity (it cannot have been more than that) to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro; failing which, to make his beard fall off; failing which, to contrive to give him laughing gas or whatever, that would activate in the middle of one of his speeches (one wonders, what would be the resulting difference?). The investigators learned that the U.S. government had intervened, however indirectly, to help those in Chile who resisted President Salvador Allende. And, of course, we continued our alliances with random dictators, in South Korea, in the Philippines, in Iran and Pakistan; all over. President Carter, joining the critics even as he plunged headlong into his crusade for human rights, summed it all up at Notre Dame a few months into his presidency by saying that "our inordinate fear of communism" had driven us (the President at this point was referring to preceding administrations) "to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear."

The political Right, meanwhile, staggered from a succession of shocks absorbable only because their longtime attachment to Richard Nixon appeased their strategic misgivings (how could *he* betray the cause?). The first of these was the triumphant opening to Beijing. Whatever its usefulness as strategy, a public that had been brought up to believe that Mao Zedong combined the vices of the theoretician Lenin and the executioner Stalin saw their champion on television toasting the health of Mao in the Great Hall of the People and returning to Washington to give personal testimony to "the total belief" of the Chinese leaders in "their system of government." A few months later Nixon was off to Moscow where he participated openly, indeed effusively, in the apparent *Gemütlichkeit*, with leaders who were simultaneously provisioning the North Vietnamese who were continuing their workaday slaughter of American soldiers in Vietnam.

Then, in the summer of 1975, Solzhenitsyn came to Washington—and President Gerald Ford, on the advice of Henry Kissin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ger, declined to receive him.[13] The impurity of that gesture resonated in the consciousness of those who felt that morality had at least a symbolic role to play in foreign policy.

Two events give historic importance to the second of the three debates between President Gerald Ford and Candidate Jimmy Carter. The subject was foreign policy, and the Carter entourage were anxious that their candidate not give the impression of being too soft to cope with the Soviet Union, too good-natured, too manipulable. It is reported that Zbigniew Brzezinski advised the candidate to revise his position on the Helsinki Accords, which he had theretofore merely criticized as giving the Soviet Union legal standing in Eastern Europe. Why not go soft on the treaty, which was popular in Europe and in much of the United States, and bring up the Soviet Union's failure to live up to its obligations under Basket Three? "According to a number of witnesses, it was in San Francisco that Carter first heard of Basket Three—a term that in the course of the debate he dropped on what must have been a puzzled nation, as if he had been familiar with it for some time."[14] On the same program in which Candidate Carter showed a deft familiarity with an outstanding, if already forlorn, mechanism designed to protect certain rights of citizens living under Soviet domination, the President of the United States announced that Eastern Europe was free of "Soviet domination." The questioner, Max Frankel of *The New York Times*, could no more believe his ears than the millions of listeners, and thought it a slip of the tongue, asking the question one more time: "I'm sorry, could I just follow—did I understand you to say, sir, that the Russians are not using Eastern Europe as their own sphere of influence in occupying most of the countries there and making sure with their troops that it is a communist zone?" President Ford answered emphatically, "I don't believe, Mr. Frankel . . . that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union."[15]

[13] Kissinger acknowledges the mistake (personal conversation).

[14] Drew, *op. cit.*

[15] One viewer (it was I) expressed the general sense of disillusion: "There is a television series running that features someone called a Bionic Man. He is reconstructed from an airplane wreck, or something of the sort, and after umpteen operations by ambitious doctors, runs now faster than a gazelle, lifts weights heavier than a crane could lift, sees further than a telescope—a miracle of scientific reconstruction. It is as if, somewhere along the way, the Bionic Man, sitting by the fireside, discussing poetry with his staff, suddenly reached down, picked up the cocker spaniel, and ate it. "Curses!" the scientists say. "We forgot to program him not to eat dogs!" (Syndicated column, "Mr. Ford's Polish Joke," October 14, 1976.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In a single broadcast, Jimmy Carter had shown himself sensitive to human rights and to Soviet infidelity to a treaty commitment, while his opponent gave the impression that he was not even aware that a whole people were being routinely deprived of their rights. It is a subjective judgment that Gerald Ford's gaffe, alongside Carter's thrust, affected the outcome of the election. In any event, Carter did win and human rights, as U.S. policy, were back in the saddle, though reconciliations that were to prove impossible lay ahead.

In short, Realpolitik crowded out human rights during the Kissinger years, but the momentum of the criticism of the Vietnam War drove critics to superordinate the right of the sovereign nation (e.g., Chile, Cuba) over any responsibility by the United States to frustrate totalitarianization. Jimmy Carter detected, in his random emphasis on human rights, a popular political response that issued from (a) conservatives affronted by the collapse of the social face of diplomatic anti-communism, and (b) liberals who felt that the denigration of human rights in the tidal wave of anti-Americanism required reconsideration.

IV

Another reason for Executive assertiveness in the matter of human rights was the mounting activity of Congress, motivated once again by the momentum that had been generated against Executive unaccountability during the Vietnam War. Inevitably, a branch of government losing power to other branches of government attempts to redress the balance. The lesion of power to Congress during 1969–76, expressed in such legislation as the Cooper-Church Amendment and the War Powers Act (measures designed to limit the power of the Executive to take the country into protracted military engagements like Vietnam), had the effect on the Executive that daily calisthenics by a contender would have on a prospective competitor. Professor Schlesinger quotes Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, warning Kissinger in 1974, "If the Department did not place itself ahead of the curve on this issue [human rights], Congress would take the matter out of the Department's hands."[16]

Indeed Congress had been busy. A profusion of human rights legislation began with the passage of the Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973,[17] multiplying enormously the scattered bits of law enacted previously.

[16] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*

[17] For convenience, I shall refer to "U.S. human rights legislation" without singling out the relevant act. The acts are in several categories: (1) Economic Assistance—Section 116 of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The showcase legislation is the amendment passed in 1976 to the Foreign Assistance Act, and for this reason I quote extensively from the language of the Act, to give an indication of the temper of Congress before President Carter was inaugurated.

Section 502B provides flatly that: "The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations [note the obvious effort by Congress to suggest that it is about to do something in no sense different from what every member of the United Nations is implicitly bound to do] and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries." (The operative de-energizer of that sentence is the phrase "a principal goal." There cannot be "a" principal goal. The word principal denotes primacy. Since in foreign policy there can only be the principal goal of securing the safety of the state, other goals are by logical requirement secondary, or even tertiary.)

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (FAA) (22 U.S.C. 2151n) (1975); development assistance—Sections 101 and 102 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2151) (1961) and (2151-1) (1978); agricultural assistance—Section 112 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended—(ATDA) (7 U.S.C. 1711) (1977); International Financial Institutions (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Fund, Asian Development Bank)—Title VII of PL 95-118 (22 U.S.C. 262g) (1977) and (262c note) (1977); Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)—Sections 239 (1) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2199) (1969); Section 240 A of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2200a) (1969); Export—Import Bank—Section 2 (b) (1) (B) of the Export-Import Bank Act, as amended, (12 U.S.C. 635 (b) (1) (B)) (1977); Section 2 (b) (8) as amended (12 U.S.C. 635 (b) (8)) (1978); Section 402 of PL 93-618 (19 U.S.C. 2432) (1975) (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment); Security Assistance—Section 502B of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304) (1974); Section 543 (3) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2347b) (1976); Country-Specific Restrictions—Section 4 (m) of the Export Administration Act of 1969 as amended, (50 U.S.C. App. 2403) (1969); Section 5 of PL 95-435, 1978 Amendments to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, (22 U.S.C. 2151 note); Section 602 of PL 95-424, International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note) (1978); Section 610 of PL 95-426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, (22 U.S.C. 2151 note); Section 406 of PL 94-329, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (22 U.S.C. 2370 note) (1976); Section 35 of PL 93-189, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note); Section 620B of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2372) (1977). Anti-Discrimination Provisions—Section 666 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2426) (1975); Section 505 (g) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2314 (g)) (1976); Section 5 of the Arms Export Control Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2755) (1976); Section 5 of the Arms Export Control Act as amended (22 U.S.C. 2755) (1976); Section 121 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1977 (22 U.S.C. 2661a) (1976); Section 113 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2151k) (1973); Miscellaneous—Section 624 (f) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2384 (f)) (1976); Section 408 of PL 94-329, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (22 U.S.C. 2291 note) (1976); Section 32 of PL 93-189, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note) (1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With respect to security assistance, the President of the United States is, by Section 502B, "directed to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the United States, through such programs with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States as expressed in this section or otherwise." Security assistance is to go forward only as restricted by this mandate, and crime control and detection equipment cannot be exported, nor can security assistance to the police or any military education and training assistance be provided, to a country "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights"—unless (you guessed it)—the President "certifies in writing that extraordinary circumstances exist."

Ensuing provisions require the Secretary of State to furnish Congress with a report on U.S. assistance to any country, giving details of that country's behavior in respect of human rights. Congress may then, if it disagrees with the Executive, by joint resolution suspend further security assistance to the country concerned. The Act also establishes an Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The incumbent, Patricia Derian, has a staff of ten which helps to prepare the annual reports for Congress.

Now all this legislation is at once a comprehensive assertion of U.S. interest in human rights, and an invitation to philosophical and diplomatic chaos. It reflects most of the weaknesses of our public policy in its practical deviousness and in the selective indignation it encourages. Congress has ruled that no economic assistance may be extended to any country engaged in gross violations of "internationally recognized" human rights—"unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country." It is difficult to imagine a situation in which economic assistance, particularly in kind, would not in fact help needy people, or fail so to represent itself. The act goes on to require of the State Department a yearly report, one that would take into account the probings of relevant international organizations on the status of human rights within all countries receiving assistance.

The legislation is interesting in that there isn't (to my knowledge) any record of any congressional review of assistance given to a delinquent country which actually led to the official congressional conclusion that such assistance was illegal on the grounds

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that (a) the country was a gross violator of human rights, while (b) U.S. aid did not in fact help needy people. The impact of the yearly reports is, then—assuming the President elects not to act on them—purely psychological: to hold in obloquy those nations that are gross violators of human rights. To let them, so to speak, twist slowly, slowly in the wind of moral displeasure, even if their stomachs are full. All this figures substantially in the conclusions to which I have been drawn, below. A second, and perverse, feature of the annual report is that it tends to highlight the villainies of countries to which we routinely give aid. Since we do not give aid to the communist countries they are officially exempted from the annual pathological examinations—an interesting means of achieving immunity.

Congress, moreover, directs U.S. representatives in the international financial institutions to "seek to channel assistance" toward countries other than those that are gross violators of human rights; but—again—unless such credits serve "basic human needs."

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is not supposed to insure (against confiscation) U.S. investments in any country that grossly violates human rights—again, with the standard exception, that the needs of the needy shall be the primary consideration. With respect to the Export-Import Bank, the President is required to determine that favorable consideration by U.S. officials to applicants be conditioned on advancing U.S. policy "in such areas as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection and human rights." The President hasn't existed who couldn't get around that one.

On the other hand, we saw in the legislative season before Carter's inauguration the beginning of a so-called country-specific procedure. South Africa—by name—may not receive credits except under extraordinary circumstances; and purchasers, in order to qualify for economic advantage, must prove, in South Africa, that fair employment principles are practiced. In addition to South Africa, action has been taken (whether by the Executive or by "country-specific" restrictions set by Congress itself) against Uganda, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Chile, Argentina and Brazil.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment—denying most-favored-nation treatment to countries that deny their citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate—is the most celebrated of the congressional human rights enactments. Although clearly aimed at one country (the Soviet Union) for the benefit of one class of aspirant-emigrés (Jews), the language is generically drawn. The amendment, by the way, preserves the usual waiver granted to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President under specified circumstances. The Soviet Union objected violently to its passage, cancelled a trade negotiation and, after the bill's passage, retaliated by reducing the number of Jews to whom it issued exit visas. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon have on more than one occasion cited the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and its consequences as clear evidence that "quiet diplomacy" works better than legislation when the objective is an actual change in policy rather than moral rodomontade.[18]

In brief: the encyclopaedic intervention by Congress into the international human rights market has by practical necessity needed to provide for executive waiver. But the residual effect is to encourage specific pressures against (a) countries of less than critical strategic importance; and (b) countries without U.S. constituencies sufficient to exert effective influence on the U.S. government. The resulting mix is ineffective in respect of the enhancement of human rights, and unedifying in respect of a consistent regard for human rights.

V

Although President Carter, as we have seen, had been generally bland on the subject of human rights, he was a tiger by the time of his inaugural address: "Our commitment to human rights must be absolute." The real problem, of course, is where to fix our commitment to human rights on this side of absoluteness.[19] President Carter's inaugural address presaged the ensuing chaos. For a while there was great excitement. However short-lived, it was breathcatching. In a few days Jimmy Carter actually answered a letter addressed to him by Andrei Sakharov. A few weeks after that he contrived to meet and shake hands (no photographs) with the valiant Vladimir Bukovsky, among the most illustrious of Soviet dissidents. The Soviet Union exploded. Within a year, the United States ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva was being privately instructed by President Carter's Secretary of State *under no circumstances* even to mention the name of Yuri Orlov, who had just been packed off to jail for the crime of monitoring Soviet non-compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Accords' Basket Three, which Candidate

[18] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979, pp. 1271–72. Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, p. 876.

[19] The President is plagued by verbal imprecision. It does not really mean anything at all to say that one's commitment to human rights "must be absolute." Since it *cannot* be absolute (an absolute commitment would require us to declare war against China and the Soviet Union, just to begin with), then it has to be something less than absolute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Carter had castigated the Soviet Union for failure to live up to. Jimmy Carter was crestfallen, the great Human Rights Band laid down its instruments, and everyone has been struggling ever since plausibly to give the theme of our policy on human rights.

An attempt to say what is operative U.S. policy in respect of human rights requires a survey of the behavior of the principal Executive of U.S. foreign policy. President Carter's position is best attempted not by reasoning a priori from his general commitment ("absolute") to human rights, but a posteriori from his actions. Almost immediately it transpired that the State Department bureaucracy was apprehensive about the impact of Carter's human rights declarations on concrete questions being negotiated or prospectively in negotiation.[20] The military, in pursuit of its own concerns for U.S. security, was similarly troubled. The State Department and the disarmament folk feared that an antagonized Soviet Union would behave more militantly at the bargaining table. The military was quite unwilling to trade Subic Bay in the Philippines for a moral boycott of President Marcos. An opportunity arose for President Carter to begin to make critical distinctions. Fogbound, he did not do so.

In a speech delivered March 25, 1964 in the Senate, Senator William Fulbright, at the time Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a useful distinction, even if he went too far with it: "Insofar as a nation is content to practice its doctrines within its own frontiers, that nation, however repugnant its ideology, is one with which we have no proper quarrel." That distinction is geopolitically appealing. Thus in 1965, to guard against what President Johnson perceived as the threat of a communization of the Dominican Republic (it is immaterial whether the threat was real or fancied), we landed armed forces in the Dominican Republic. The western half of Hispaniola had been for eight years under the domination of a murderous Haitian doctor who routinely practiced all the conventional barbarities on his people, and not a few unconventional ones. It did not occur to us to send the marines (as once we had done during this century, though our motives were eclectic) to put down Papa Doc—tacit recognition of the intuitive cogency of Fulbright's doctrine. At its most menacing, Franco's Spain threatened nothing more than Gibraltar, which was in any event a nostalgic fantasy in irredentism, and excusable, if you like, under the various anti-colonialist covenants, save for the disconcerting fact that inhabitants of

[20] See Drew, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gibraltar preferred to remain a crown colony. As it happened, Franco satisfied himself to lay economic siege to Gibraltar, and however persistent the criticism of his regime from its inception at the end of the civil war, no U.S. administration—from Roosevelt's forward—ever proposed collective action against Spain. By contrast, we very nearly went to war to protest the communization of Cuba, less because Castro's doctrines were inherently repugnant than because a Soviet salient deep within the womb of territory putatively protected by the Monroe Doctrine was deemed intolerable.

But President Carter not only failed to remark Fulbright's distinction, he agitated to blur it. "I have never had an inclination to single out the Soviet Union as the only place where human rights are being abridged," he said at his press conference of February 23, 1977. And again on March 24 at a press conference, "I've tried to make sure that the world knows that we're not singling out the Soviet Union for abuse or criticism." By June, he was sounding defensive.[21] Not only had the phrase become formulaic ("We've not singled out the Soviet Union for criticism"), he went on to say exactly the opposite of what all his rhetoric required: "and I've never tried to inject myself into the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. I've never made the first comment that personally criticized General Secretary Brezhnev."

Human rights everywhere was the President's Theoretical Objective. And so it remained, even if there were to be no more letters to Sakharovs, or visits with Bukovskys. He clung tenaciously to his theoretical position: "I've worked day and night to make sure that a concern for human rights is woven through everything our Government does, both at home and abroad," he said at a press conference at the end of his first year in office (December 15, 1977); and one year later, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 6, 1978), he pronounced, "As long as I am President, the Government of the United States will continue, throughout the world, to enhance human rights. No force on Earth can separate us from that commitment."

It became clear, as time went on, that specific as distinguished from omnidirectional, censorious presidential declarations would become scarce, indeed might end altogether, leaving to the State Department the clerical duties Congress had legislated before Carter came to office. In due course, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and

[21] Press conference, June 13, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Paraguay were singled out for criticism, based on the annual reports by the State Department required in the 1976 law: economic credits and military assistance, in varying forms, were withheld. In other countries, notably South Korea and the Philippines, the President invoked the authority given him by Congress to subordinate the concern for human rights to a concern for security interests, and aid continued uninterrupted.

But the President, although he summoned the necessary discipline to restrain himself from criticism, found it difficult to avoid diplomatic hyperbole. Arriving in Warsaw on December 30, 1977, he greeted the communist proconsul Gierek with the astonishing news that Poland was a "partner in a common effort against war and deprivation." He recalled that at the end of World War I Herbert Hoover ("a great American") "came to Poland to help you ease the suffering of an independent Poland. Circumstances were different and the struggle was long, but Hoover said, and I quote, 'If history teaches us anything, it is that from the unquenchable vitality of the Polish race, Poland will rise again from these ashes.' And," said Carter—jubilantly?—"his prediction came true." These words were perfectly congruent with the picture of Poland described during the famous debate by Gerald Ford. They would not have needed changing if it had happened that during the week before Carter's touchdown in Warsaw, Poland had suddenly wrested its independence from the Soviet Union. The press did not have long to wait. Later in the day:

> Q. During the Presidential debates, in a celebrated exchange, President Ford claimed that Eastern Europe was not under Soviet domination. And you replied, 'Tell it to the Poles.' Well, now that you're here, is it your view that this domination will continue almost into perpetuity, or do you see a day when Poland may be actually free?

The President replied that "our nation is committed to the proposition that all countries would be autonomous . . . and . . . free of unwanted interference and entanglements with other nations . . . . I think . . . it's a deep commitment of the vast majority of the Polish people, a desire and a commitment not to be dominated."[22]

> Q. You don't deny that they are dominated here?
> A. I think I've commented all I wish on that subject.

Four months later, on April 12, 1978, President Carter wel-

[22] Press conference, December 30, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comed President Ceausescu of Romania to the White House. At the ceremony, Carter announced that "the people of the United States are honored by having as our guest a great leader of a great country." And he went on to say, "Our goals are also the same, to have a just system of economics and politics, to let the people of the world share in growth, in peace, in personal freedom." In Civil Liberties, Freedom House gives a rating of six to Romania (seven is the lowest rating). In its Ranking of Nations by Political Rights, it gives Romania a seven.

In greeting Yugoslav President Tito (March 7, 1978), Carter said: "Perhaps as much as any other person, he exemplifies in Yugoslavia the eagerness for freedom, independence, and liberty that exists throughout Eastern Europe and indeed throughout the world." Freedom House on Yugoslavia: Civil Liberties, five; Political Rights, six.

It was not until April 21, 1978 that Carter got around to criticizing Cambodia. When he did, he called it the world's "worst" violator of human rights. "America," he said, "cannot avoid the responsibility to speak out in condemnation of the Cambodian Government, the worst violator of human rights in the world today." America, through its President, precisely *had* avoided the responsibility to speak out in condemnation of the Cambodian government about whose practices as much was known by the end of 1975 as by the spring of 1978.[23]

In brief: by his own example as President, and by the letdown that followed his exalted rhetoric on the subject, Mr. Carter, with some help from the 93rd Congress, has reduced the claims of human rights in U.S. foreign policy to an almost unparalleled state of confusion.

VI

My proposal is to separate two questions. The first is: How do human rights fare in a given country? The second: What should the United States do about it? It is the commingling of the two that has brought forth existing confusions and distortions. The question whether we collaborate with the Soviet Union in order to avoid a world war is unrelated to any commitment a civilized nation ought to feel to human rights. Although the avoidance of a world war and the safety of the American state are primary objectives, the ethical imperative requires us as a nation, journey-

[23] Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, denounced Cambodia on September 5, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing through history, regularly to remark the brutality of the Soviet system—even if we make no commitment, thereby, to do anything concrete to mitigate those conditions.

On the whole we are better off stating, at all those international conferences, what it is we believe that sovereign states owe to their citizens in the way of recognizing individual rights—and let it go at that—than to collaborate in rituals of efficacy which we know will be without operative meaning. By the same token a constant encephalophonic reading, uninfluenced by distractions of diplomatic concern, of the condition of human rights in a given country, to the extent that this can be accomplished (the difficulty in ascertaining these conditions obviously varies) gives a gyroscopic steadiness of judgment which is the enemy of hypocrisy, dissimulation, and such other inventions as have disfigured the idealism of the human rights movement.

Congress should repeal existing legislation on the question of human rights (although, because of the loopholes, it would not really need to do so in order to promulgate the Commission described below). It should then establish a Commission on Human Rights composed of a Chairman and four members, with provisions for a staff of a dozen persons (approximately the size of the staff of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs). For symbolic reasons primarily, but also for practical reasons, the Commission should not be affiliated with the Department of State. It might plausibly be affiliated with the judiciary, or perhaps even with the Department of Justice. What matters most is that its mandate should be distinctive, unrelated to policymaking, whether by the executive or the legislative branches of government.

The Commissioners should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Act should recommend to the President that the Commissioners be selected from a roster of candidates nominated by existing agencies devoted to the internationalization of human rights including—but not restricted to—the International Commission of Jurists, Freedom House, Amnesty International, the Anti-Defamation League, the several religious committees and the Red Cross.

The mandate would most severely restrict the Commission's public role to the reporting of factual conditions: never to the recommendation of policy. Policy would continue to issue from Congress and the Executive. The Commission would report publicly, once a year, to the President and to Congress—in the nature of the event, to the world—on the condition of human freedom in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

every country, using the Universal Declaration of the United Nations as the paradigm. For administrative purposes, much as Freedom House does in its annual report, these freedoms might be grouped together, e.g., in such a way as to distinguish usefully between the right (Number 5) not to be tortured, and the right (Number 24) to "rest and leisure."

The Commission would be available to the Executive, or to Congress, for such questioning as the government chose to direct to it, e.g., on any special knowledge acquired about human rights in any given country; movements within that country to improve conditions; whatever. However, the tradition should vigorously be nurtured that no policy of the Executive, or of Congress, would flow from any initiative of the Commission, even if that policy resulted from legislative or executive reaction to data collected by the Commission.

The Chairman of the Commission, or any other Commissioner designated by him, would represent the United States government in several relevant posts within the United Nations, occupying there the chair in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The Commission's restrictions would carry over: i.e., the representative would make the case for human rights, answer questions about human rights in the United States, and describe their findings, insofar as they were relevant. He would leave to the representative of the regular U.S. delegation the exercise of the vote (in favor, against, or abstaining) on any concrete proposal concerning, e.g., the treatment of terrorists, hijackers and so forth. This division of duties would not be so difficult as the reader might suppose. Most of the argumentation before the Third Committee is over trivial points, forgotten the day after they engage the delegates' attentions; and in any event, recommendations of the committees are subject to acceptance or rejection by the General Assembly, where the permanent representative of the United States votes on instructions from the Department of State.

By the same token the Commissioner (or his representative) would sit at the Geneva sessions of the standing United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Once again, his role would be to report on the condition of human rights in any country under discussion; once again, he would decline to vote on recommendations that called for policy decisions. A vote condemning, let us say, racial discrimination, or a condemnation of bondage, or of sex discrimination, or religious persecution is not a vote on U.S. policy toward those countries guilty of such misconduct. The Commissioners would, clearly, be permitted to express themselves

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in favor of the human rights the very existence of the committee ostensibly seeks to augment.

The Commission would have the right of access to a fixed number of broadcast hours per country per year, for the purpose of factual reporting of its findings. These reports—again, without policy recommendations—would go out over the Voice of America, and affiliated broadcasters in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such reports, though unaccompanied by policy recommendations, would not need to go out as dry-as-dust statistics. They could, indeed should, engage the dramatic attention of the listener by, for instance, permitting refugees to tell their own stories. An appropriate term of office for the Commissioners, and for the Chairman, might be seven years.

VII

It should be unnecessary to explain that the existence of a United States Commission on Human Rights could not constitutionally deprive either Congress or the Executive of powers that inhere in those institutions. No one has the power to tell the President he should not make a fool of himself on landing in Warsaw—he would still be free to do so. But the silent, yet omnipresent, countenance of the Commission on Human Rights, with its lapidary findings on the condition of human rights in Poland, would make it less likely that the President, in pursuit of diplomacy, would traduce idealism. Congress can vote to deny arms or soybeans or "Saturday Night Fever" to any country Congress chooses to punish or victimize or bully or wheedle; but the existence of the Commission, with its findings, would provide certain coordinates that might guard against such caprice as nowadays tends to disfigure country-specific legislation.

And—viewed from the other end—for the wretched of the earth, in their prisons, with or without walls, in the torture chambers, in the loneliness they feel as they weigh the distortions of diplomacy, there would be something like: a constant. A Commission mute while the United States collaborates with Stalin in pursuit of Hitler, or Mao in pursuit of Brezhnev, but resolutely unwilling to falsify the record of Josef Stalin or Mao Zedong in their treatment of their own people.

"The great enemy of clear language is insincerity," Orwell wrote, in the same essay in which he lamented that "in our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sible."[24] To say the truth—says Solzhenitsyn—is the single most important thing of all. Politicians cannot always say the truth and pursue policies organic to their profession. But the saying of the truth about human rights, as distinguished from the superordination of human rights over all other concerns, is not incompatible with the mechanics of foreign policy.

Finally the question is asked: Would such a Commission, with its yearly findings, its reports to the nation, its testimony before Congress, its international broadcast of its findings—would it enhance human rights? It is quite impossible to assert that it would do so—or that it would not do so. With the best will in the world, Wilsonianism succeeded in making the world most awfully unsafe for democracy. But, as mentioned earlier, there is an encouraging survival, through it all, of the idea of the inviolable individual, and that idea needs watering, not only by the practice of human rights at home, but by the recognition of their neglect abroad. It is a waste of time to argue the inefficacy of telling the truth, the telling of which is useful for its own sake.

[24] George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," in *A Collection of Essays*, New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1953.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT RUSSIA ARE A THREAT TO AMERICA

Anyone not hopelessly blinded by his own illusions must recognize that the West today finds itself in a crisis, perhaps even in mortal danger. One could point to numerous particular causes or trace the specific stages over the last 60 years which have led to the present state of affairs. But the ultimate cause clearly lies in 60 years of obstinate blindness to the true nature of communism.

I am not concerned here with those who cherish, glorify and defend communism to this day. To such people I have nothing to say. Yet there are many others who are aware that communism is an evil and menace to the world, but who have nevertheless failed to grasp its implacable nature. And such individuals, in their capacities as policy advisors and political leaders, are even now committing fresh blunders which will inevitably have lethal repercussions in the future.

Two mistakes are especially common. One is the failure to understand the radical hostility of communism to mankind as a whole—the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, that there exist no "better" variants of communism; that it is incapable of growing "kinder," that it cannot survive as an ideology without using terror, and that, consequently, to coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible. Either it will spread, cancer-like, to destroy mankind, or else mankind will have to rid itself of communism (and even then face lengthy treatment for secondary tumors).

The second and equally prevalent mistake is to assume an indissoluble link between the universal disease of communism and the country where it first seized control—Russia. This error skews one's perception of the threat and cripples all attempts to respond sensibly to it, thus leaving the West disarmed. This misinterpre-

---

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is the author of *The First Circle*, *Cancer Ward*, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956*, *Warning to the West* and other works, and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970. He was forcibly deported from the U.S.S.R. in 1974 and has lived in the United States since 1975. This article has been translated from the original Russian by Alexis Klimoff and Michael Nicholson. Copyright © Aleksandr Solzhenitysn.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tation is fraught with tragic consequences; it is imperiling every nation, Americans no less than Russians. One will not have to await the coming of future generations to hear curses flung at those who have implanted this misapprehension in the public awareness.

I have written and spoken at length about the first of these errors, and in so doing have aroused considerable skepticism in the West, but agreement seems to be increasing with the passage of time and as the lessons of history are assimilated.

The present essay is mainly devoted to the second fallacy.

II

To begin with, there is the careless and inaccurate use of the words "Russia" and "Russian" in place of "U.S.S.R" and "Soviet." (There is even a persistent emotional bias against the former: "Russian tanks have entered Prague," "Russian imperialism," "Never trust the Russians" as against "Soviet achievements in space" and "the triumphs of the Soviet ballet.") Yet it ought to be clear that these concepts are not only opposites, but are *inimical*. "Russia" is to the Soviet Union as a man is to the disease afflicting him. We do not, after all, confuse a man with his illness; we do not refer to him by the name of that illness or curse him for it.

After 1917 the state as a functioning whole—the country with its government, policies and armed forces—can no longer be referred to as Russia. It is inappropriate to apply the word "Russian" to the present authorities in the U.S.S.R., to its army or to its future military successes and regimes of occupation throughout the world, even though the official language in each case might be Russian. (This is equally true of both China and Vietnam, only in their case no equivalent of the word "Soviet" is available.) A certain American diplomat recently exclaimed: "Let Brezhnev's Russian heart be run by an American pacemaker!" Quite wrong! He should have said "Soviet heart." Nationality is determined not by one's origins alone, but also by the direction of one's loyalties and affections. A Brezhnev who has connived at the ruin of his own people in the interests of foreign adventures has no Russian heart. All that his ilk have done—to destroy the national way of life and to pollute nature, to desecrate national shrines and monuments, and to keep the people in hunger and poverty for the last 60 years—shows that the communist leaders are alien to the people and indifferent to its suffering. (This is equally true of the ferocious Khmer Rouge, the Polish functionary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who may have been reared by a Catholic mother, the young communist activist, taskmaster over a group of starving coolies, or the stolid Georges Marchais with his Kremlin-like exterior—each has turned his back on his own nationality and has embraced inhumanity.)

For present-day purposes the word "Russia" can serve only to designate an oppressed people which is denied the possibility of acting as one entity, or to denote its suppressed national consciousness, religion and culture. Or else it can point to a future nation liberated from communism.

There was no such confusion in the 1920s when progressive Western opinion exulted over bolshevism: the object of its enthusiasm was then named "Soviet" outright. During the tragic years of the Second World War, the concepts "Russian" and "Soviet" seem to have merged in the eyes of the world (a cruel error, which is discussed below). And with the coming of the cold war, the animosities generated were then directed principally toward the word "Russian." The effects are being felt to this day; in fact, new and bitter accusations have in recent years been leveled against all things "Russian."

III

The American reader receives his information about, and forms his understanding of, Russian history and the present-day Soviet Union chiefly from the following sources: American scholars (historians and Slavists), American diplomats, American correspondents in Moscow, and recent émigrés from the U.S.S.R. (I am not including Soviet propaganda publications, to which less credence is given lately, or the impressions of tourists, which, thanks to the skillful efforts of Intourist, remain altogether superficial.)

When American historical scholarship is confronted with the paucity of Soviet sources and with their Marxist distortion, then, for all its apparently unlimited scope and freedom from prejudice, it often unwittingly adopts the procrustean framework provided by official Soviet historiography and, under the illusion of conducting independent research, involuntarily duplicates the approach and sometimes even the methodology of Soviet scholarship, in imitation of which it then duly skirts certain hidden and carefully hushed-up topics.

It is sufficient to recall that until the most recent times the very existence of the Gulag Archipelago, its inhuman cruelty, its scope, its duration, and the sheer volume of death it generated, were not acknowledged by Western scholarship. To take a further example,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the mighty outbreaks of spontaneous popular resistance to communism in our country between 1918 and 1922 have been quite disregarded by scholars in the West, and where they have been noted, they are termed "banditry," in line with Soviet parlance (for example, by Moshe Lewin).[1] In overall evaluations of Soviet history we still encounter the raptures with which "progressive" public opinion in Europe greeted the "dawning of a new life," even as the terrorism and destruction of 1917–21 were at their height in our country. And to this day many American academics seriously refer to "the ideals of the revolution," when in fact these "ideals" manifested themselves from the very first in the murder of millions of people.

Nor has Russia's distant past been spared the distorting effects of fervent radical thought in the West. In recent years American scholarship has been noticeably dominated by a most facile, one-dimensional approach, which consists in explaining the unique events of the twentieth century, first in Russia and then in other lands, not as something peculiar to communism, not as a phenomenon new to human history, but as if they derived from primordial Russian national characteristics established in some distant century. This is nothing less than a racist view. The events of the twentieth century are explained by flimsy and superficial analogies drawn from the past. While communism was still the object of Western infatuation, it was hailed as the indisputable dawning of a new era. But ever since communism has had to be condemned, it has been ingeniously ascribed to the age-old Russian slave mentality.

This interpretation currently enjoys wide support, since it is so advantageous to many people: if the crimes and vices of communism are not inherent to it, but can be attributed entirely to the traditions of old Russia, then it follows that there exists no fundamental threat to the Western world; the rosy vistas of détente are preserved, together with trade and even friendship with communist countries, thereby ensuring continued comfort and security for the West; Western communists are freed from incrimination and suspicion ("they'll do a better job; theirs will be a really good communism"); and a burden falls from the conscience of those liberals and radicals who lent so much of their fervor and their assistance to this bloody regime in the past.

Scholars of this persuasion treat the history of the old Russia in

[1] *Translator's note.* The reference is to Mr. Lewin's review of a book by Oliver H. Radkey, *The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia: A Study of the Green Movement in the Tambov Region 1920–1921. Slavic Review*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1977) pp. 682–83.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a correspondingly peremptory manner. They permit themselves the most arbitrary selection of phenomena, facts and persons, and accept unreliable or simply false versions of events. Even more striking is their almost total disregard for the spiritual history of a country which has been in existence for a thousand years, as though (as Marxists argue) this has had no bearing upon the course of its material history. It is regarded as essential when studying the history and culture of China, or Thailand, or any African country, to feel some respect for the distinctive features of that culture. But when it comes to the thousand years of Eastern Christianity in Russia, Western researchers by and large feel only astonishment and contempt: why ever did this strange world, an entire continent, persistently reject the Western view of things? Why did it refuse to follow the manifestly superior path of Western society? Russia is categorically condemned for every feature which distinguishes her from the West.

Richard Pipes' book *Russia Under the Old Regime*[2] may stand as typical of a long series of such pronouncements that distort the image of Russia. Pipes shows a complete disregard for the spiritual life of the Russian people and its view of the world—Christianity. He examines entire centuries of Russian history without reference to Russian Orthodoxy and its leading proponents (suffice to say that St. Sergius of Radonezh, whose influence upon centuries of Russian spiritual and public life was incomparably great, is not once mentioned in the book, while Nil Sorsky is presented in an anecdotal role). Thus, instead of being shown the living being of a nation, we witness the dissection of a corpse. Pipes does devote one chapter to the Church itself, which he sees only as a civil institution and treats in the spirit of Soviet atheistic propaganda. This people and this country are presented as spiritually underdeveloped and motivated, from peasant to tsar, exclusively by crude material interests. Even within the sections devoted to individual topics there is no convincing, logical portrayal of history, but only a chaotic jumble of epochs and events from various centuries, often without so much as a date. The author willfully ignores those events, persons or aspects of Russian life which would not prove conducive to his thesis, which is that the entire history of Russia has had but a single purpose—the creation of a police state. He selects only that which contributes to his derisive and openly hostile description of Russian history and the Russian people. The book allows only one possible conclusion to

[2] Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be drawn: that the Russian nation is anti-human in its essence, that it has been good for nothing throughout its thousand years of history, and that as far as any future is concerned it is obviously a hopeless case. Pipes even bestows upon Emperor Nicholas I the distinction of having invented totalitarianism. Leaving aside the fact that it was not until Lenin that totalitarianism was ever actually implemented, Mr. Pipes, with all his erudition, should have been able to indicate that the idea of the totalitarian state was first proposed by Hobbes in his *Leviathan* (the head of the state is there said to have dominion not only over the citizens' lives and property, but also over their *conscience*). Rousseau, too, had leanings in this direction when he declared the democratic state to be "unlimited sovereign" not only over the possessions of its citizens, but over their *person* as well.

As a writer who has spent his whole life immersed in the Russian language and Russian folklore, I am particularly pained by one of Pipes' "scholarly" techniques. From among some 40,000 Russian proverbs, which in their unity and their inner contradictions make up a dazzling literary and philosophical edifice, Pipes wrests those half dozen (in Maxim Gorky's tendentious selection) which suit his needs, and uses them to "prove" the cruel and cynical nature of the Russian peasantry. This method affects me in much the same way as I imagine Rostropovich would feel if he had to listen to a wolf playing the cello.

There are two names which are repeated from book to book and article to article with a mindless persistence by all the scholars and essayists of this tendency: Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, to whom—implicitly or explicitly—they reduce the whole sense of Russian history. But one could just as easily find two or three kings no whit less cruel in the histories of England, France or Spain, or indeed of any country, and yet no one thinks of reducing the complexity of historical meaning to such figures alone. And in any case, no two monarchs can determine the history of a thousand-year-old nation. But the refrain continues. Some scholars use this technique to show that communism is possible only in countries with a "morally defective" history, others in order to remove the stigma from communism itself, laying the blame for its incorrect implementation upon Russian national characteristics. Such a view was voiced in a number of recent articles devoted to the centenary of Stalin's birth, for instance in a piece by Professor Robert C. Tucker.[3]

[2] Robert C. Tucker, "Stalin, The Last Bolshevik," *The New York Times*, December 21, 1979, p. A35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tucker's short but vigorous article is astounding: surely this must have been written 25 years ago! How can a scholar and student of politics persist to this day in misunderstanding so fundamentally the phenomenon of communism? We are confronted yet again with those familiar, never-fading ideals of the revolution, which the despicable Stalin ruined by ignoring Marx in favor of the abominable lessons of Russian history. Professor Tucker hastens to salvage socialism by suggesting that Stalin was not, after all, a *genuine* socialist! He did not act in accordance with Marxist theories, but trod in the footsteps of that wearisome pair, Ivan the Terrible from the sixteenth century and Peter the Great from the eighteenth. The whole Stalin era, we are to believe, is a *radical reversion* to the former tsarist era, and in no wise represents a consistent application of Marxism to contemporary realities; indeed, far from carrying on the Bolshevik cause, Stalin contributed toward its destruction. Modesty prevents me from asking Professor Tucker to read at least the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*, and better still all three. But perhaps that would refresh his memory of how the communist police apparatus which would eventually grind up some 60 million victims was set up by Lenin, Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky, first in the form of the Cheka, which had unlimited authority to execute unlimited numbers of people without trial; how Lenin drew up in his own hand the future Article 58 of the Criminal Code, on which the whole of Stalin's Gulag was founded; and how the entire Red Terror and the repression of millions of peasants were formulated by Lenin and Trotsky. *These* instructions, at least, Stalin carried out conscientiously, albeit only to the extent of his limited intellectual abilities. The only respect in which he ventured to depart from Lenin was his destruction of the Communist Party leadership for the purpose of strengthening his own power. But even here he was merely enacting a universal law of vast and bloody revolutions, which invariably devour their own creators.

In the Soviet Union it used to be said with good reason that "Stalin is Lenin today," and indeed the entire Stalin period is a direct continuation of the Lenin era, only more mature in terms of its results and its long uninterrupted development. No "Stalinism" has ever existed, either in theory or in practice; there was never any such phenomenon or any such era. This concept was invented after 1956 by intellectuals of the European Left as a way of salvaging the "ideals" of communism. And only by some evil figment of the imagination could Stalin be called a "Russian nationalist"—this of the man who exterminated 15 million of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

best Russian peasants, who broke the back of the Russian peasantry, and thereby of Russia herself, and who sacrificed the lives of more than 30 million people in the Second World War, which he waged without regard for less profligate means of warfare, without grudging the lives of the people.

Just what "model" could Stalin have seen in the former, tsarist Russia, as Tucker has it? Camps there were none; the very concept was unknown. Long-stay prisons were very few in number, and hence political prisoners—with the exception of terrorist extremists, but including all the Bolsheviks—were sent off to exile, where they were well fed and cared for at the expense of the State, where no one forced them to work, and from whence any who so wished could flee abroad without difficulty. But even if we consider the number of nonpolitical prisoners at forced labor in those days, we find that it amounted to less than one ten-thousandth of the population of Gulag. All criminal investigations were conducted in strict compliance with established law, all trials were open and defendants were legally represented. The total number of secret police operatives in the whole country was less than that presently available to the KGB of the Ryazan oblast alone; secret police departments were located only in the three major cities and even there surveillance was weak, and anyone leaving the city limits immediately escaped observation. In the army there was no secret intelligence or surveillance whatsoever (a fact which greatly facilitated the February Revolution), since Nicholas II considered any activity of this type an insult to his army. To this we may add the absence of special border troops and fortified frontiers, and the complete freedom to emigrate.

In their presentation of pre-revolutionary Russia, many Western historians succumb to a persistent but fallacious tradition, thereby to some extent echoing the arguments of Soviet propaganda. Before the outbreak of war in 1914, Russia could boast of a flourishing manufacturing industry, rapid growth and a flexible, decentralized economy; its inhabitants were not constrained in their choice of economic activities, significant progress had been made in the field of workers' legislation, and the material well-being of the peasants was at a level which has never been reached under the Soviet regime. Newspapers were free from preliminary political censorship (even during the war), there was complete cultural freedom, the intelligentsia was not restricted in its activity, religious and philosophical views of every shade were tolerated, and institutions of higher education enjoyed inviolable autonomy. Russia, with her many nationalities, knew no deportations of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entire peoples and no armed separatist movements. This picture is not merely dissimilar to that of the communist era, but is in every respect its direct antithesis. Alexander I had even entered Paris with his army, but he did not annex an inch of European soil. Soviet conquerors never withdraw from any lands on which they once have set foot—and yet these are viewed as cognate phenomena! The "bad" Russia of old never loomed ominously over Europe, still less over America and Africa. She exported grain and butter, not arms and instructors in terrorism. And she collapsed out of loyalty to her Western allies, when Nicholas II prolonged the senseless war with Wilhelm instead of saving his country by concluding a separate peace (like Sadat today). Western animosity toward the former Russia was aroused by Russian revolutionaries in emigration, who propounded crude and simplistic views inspired by their political passions; these were never counterbalanced by responses or explanations from Russia, since no one there had any conception of the role of "agitation and propaganda." When, for example, on January 9, 1905 tragic events culminated in the death of about a hundred people during a St. Petersburg demonstration (no one was arrested), this came to be regarded as an inerasable stigma, a shameful episode which amply characterizes Russia. Yet the Soviet Union is not constantly reproached for the 17th of June 1953, when 600 demonstrators in Berlin were killed in cold blood and 50,000 more arrested. Indeed, such episodes seem to inspire respect for Soviet strength: "We must seek a common language."

Somehow, over the years, the friendship which existed between Russia and the young, newly formed United States in the eighteenth century has been forgotten. Hostility toward Russia gained ground from the early twentieth century on. We are still witnessing its consequences today. But today these are much more than just remote sentiments; they threaten to lead the entire Western world into a fatal error.

IV

With American scholars demonstrating such a fundamental misunderstanding of Russia and the U.S.S.R., the blunders perpetrated by politicians come as less of a surprise. Although they are ostensibly men of action, their heads are ever under the sway of current theories and their hands shackled by the exigencies of the moment.

Only the combined effect of these factors can account for the notorious resolution on the "captive nations" (PL 86-90), passed by the U.S. Congress on July 17, 1959 and subsequently renewed:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the manifest culprit, the U.S.S.R., is nowhere identified by name; world communism is referred to as "Russian"; Russia is charged with the subjugation of mainland China and Tibet and the Russians are denied a place on the roll of oppressed nations (which includes the nonexistent "Idel-Ural" and "Cossackia").

Ignorance and misunderstanding have clearly spread far beyond this one resolution.

Many present and former U.S. diplomats have also used their office and authority to help enshroud Soviet communism in a dangerous, explosive cloud of vaporous arguments and illusions. Much of this legacy stems from such diplomats of the Roosevelt school as Averell Harriman, who to this day assures gullible Americans that the Kremlin rulers are peace-loving men who just happen to be moved by heartfelt compassion for the wartime suffering of their Soviet people. (One need only recall the plight of the Crimean Tatars, who are still barred from returning to the Crimea for the sole reason that this would encroach upon Brezhnev's hunting estates.) In reality the Kremlin leadership is immeasurably indifferent to and remote from the Russian people, a people whom they have exploited to the point of total exhaustion and near extinction, and whom, when the need arises, they will mercilessly drive to destruction in their millions.

By means of his essays, public statements, and words of advice, all of which are supposedly rooted in a profound understanding of Soviet life, George Kennan has for years had a major detrimental influence upon the shape and direction of American foreign policy. He is one of the more persistent architects of the myth of the "moderates" in the Politburo, despite the fact that no such moderates have ever revealed themselves by so much as a hint. He is forever urging us to pay greater heed to the Soviet leaders' pronouncements and even today finds it inconceivable that anyone should mistrust Brezhnev's vigorous denials of aggressive intent. He prefers to ascribe the seizure of Afghanistan to the "defensive impulses" of the Soviet leadership. Many Western diplomats have abandoned painstaking analysis in favor of incurable self-delusion, as we can see in such a veteran of the political arena as Willy Brandt, whose "Ostpolitik" is suicidal for Germany. Yet these ruinous ventures are the very ones honored with Nobel Prizes for Peace.

I would note here a tendency which might be called the "Kissinger syndrome," although it is by no means peculiar to him alone. Such individuals, while holding high office, pursue a policy of appeasement and capitulation, which sooner or later will cost

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the West many years and many lives, but immediately upon retirement the scales fall from their eyes and they begin to advocate firmness and resolution. How can this be? What caused the change? Enlightenment just doesn't come that suddenly! Might we not assume that they were well aware of the real state of affairs all along, but simply drifted with the political tide, clinging to their posts?

Long years of appeasement have invariably entailed the surrender of the West's positions and the bolstering of its adversary. Today we can assess on a global scale the achievement of the West's leading diplomats after 35 years of concerted effort: they have succeeded in strengthening the U.S.S.R. and Communist China in so many ways that only the ideological rift between those two regimes (for which the West can take no credit) still preserves the Western world from disaster. In other words, the survival of the West already depends on factors which are effectively beyond its control.

These diplomats still fall back on their precarious assumptions about an imaginary split within the Soviet Politburo between nonexistent "conservatives" and "liberals," "hawks" and "doves," "Right" and "Left," between old and young, bad and good—an exercise of surpassing futility. Never has the Politburo numbered a humane or peace-loving man among its members. The communist bureaucracy is not constituted to allow men of that caliber to rise to the top—they would instantly suffocate there.

Despite all this, America continues to be fed a soothing diet of fond hopes and illusions. Hopes have been expressed of a split in the Politburo, with one particular version claiming that it was not in fact Brezhnev who occupied Afghanistan! Or else leading experts have offered the fancy that "the U.S.S.R. will meet its Vietnam," be it in Angola, Ethiopia or Afghanistan. (These experts and their readers may rest assured that the U.S.S.R. is at present quite capable of gobbling up five more such countries, swiftly and without choking.) And again and again we are asked to set our hopes on détente despite the trampling of yet another country. (There is indeed no cause for alarm here, for even after Afghanistan the Soviet leaders will be only too happy to restore détente to the status quo ante—an opportunity for them to purchase all that they require in between acts of aggression.)

It goes without saying that America will never understand the U.S.S.R. or fully grasp the danger it poses by relying on information from diplomats such as these.

But politicians of that ilk have lately been reinforced by recent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

émigrés from the Soviet Union, who have set about actively promoting their own spurious "explanation" of Russia and the U.S.S.R. There are no outstanding names among them, yet they earn prompt recognition as professors and Russian specialists thanks to their sure sense of the kind of evidence that will find favor. They are persistent, outspoken and repetitious contributors to the press of many countries, and the more or less concerted line which they take in their articles, interviews and even books may be briefly summed up as follows: "collaboration with the communist government of the U.S.S.R., and war on Russian national consciousness."

While these individuals were still in the U.S.S.R. they generally served the communist cause in various institutes, or were even actively employed for a number of years in the mendacious communist press, without ever voicing opposition. Then they emigrated from the Soviet Union on Israeli visas, without actually going to Israel (the Israelis term them "dropouts"). Having reached their destinations in the West, they immediately proclaimed themselves experts on Russia, on her history and national spirit, and on the life of the Russian people today—something which they could not so much as observe from their privileged positions in Moscow.

The most energetic of these new informants do not even blame the Soviet system for the 60 million lives it destroyed, or reproach it for its militant atheism. They condone its wholesale repression, while proclaiming Brezhnev a "peacemaker" and openly urging that the communist regime in the U.S.S.R. be given maximum support as the "lesser evil," the best alternative open to the West. Yet they simultaneously accuse the Russian national movement of this same kind of collaboration. The significance of the current spiritual processes in Russia is seriously misrepresented to the West. Western public opinion is being encouraged to respond with fear and even hatred to any revival in Russian national awareness, a sentiment which has been crushed almost to extinction by 60 years of communist power; in particular, contrived and disingenuous attempts have been made to link that revival with the government's calculated encouragement of anti-Semitism. For this purpose Soviet people are portrayed as nothing but a herd of sheep, utterly incapable of forming their own conclusions about their fate over the last 60 years or of understanding the cause of their poverty and suffering, entirely dependent upon official explanations from the communist leaders, and hence quite content to accept the anti-Semitic excuses which the government foists

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upon them. (In actual fact, the average Soviet citizen has a far shrewder understanding of the inhuman nature of communism than has many a Western essayist and politician.)

Several of these émigrés also indulge in rather uninformed digressions into earlier periods of Russian history, in close conformity with the above-mentioned myopic school of American historiography. Of the many members of this group we could here mention Dimitri Simes, or Alexander Yanov. For 17 years on end Yanov was a loyal communist journalist, who never spoke out against the regime, but now he glibly regales his credulous American readers with distorted pictures of Soviet life or else skips lightly over the surface of Russian history, studiously avoiding its fundamental principles and blowing out one soap bubble after another. Simultaneously, and on almost consecutive pages, Yanov imputes to Russian national awareness two mutually exclusive tendencies: messianism (a bizarre fabrication), and isolationism, which for no apparent reason he regards as a threat to the rest of the world.[4]

Given that a hostile and distorted portrayal of old Russia has been a tradition in American historical scholarship, seeds such as these are capable of bearing poisonous fruit.

The efforts of these tendentious informants have been supplemented and reinforced over the last year by a number of articles written by American journalists and in particular by the Moscow correspondents of American newspapers. The gist of these articles is more of the same: the grave threat which any rebirth of Russian national consciousness is said to pose to the West; an unabashed blurring of distinctions between Russian Orthodoxy and anti-Semitism (when it is not explicitly claimed that the two are identical, they are obtrusively juxtaposed in consecutive phrases and paragraphs); finally there is the extraordinary theory according to which the rising forces of national and religious consciousness and the declining, cynical communist leaders have but a single dream—to merge together into some sort of "New Right." The only puzzling question is what has been stopping them from doing just that for all these years? Who is there to forbid it? The truth of the matter is that religious and national circles in the U.S.S.R. have been systematically persecuted with the full force of the criminal code.

At first glance one is struck by how closely accounts by émigré

[4] Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR*, translated by Stephen P. Dunn, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

informants and by free American correspondents coincide: if two independent sources report one and the same thing, then there must surely be something to it. But one must take into account the circumstances under which all Western correspondents have to operate in the Soviet Union: authentic Soviet life, especially life in the provinces and in the rural districts, is hidden from their view by an impenetrable wall; any trips they make out of the city are purely cosmetic, and are carefully stage-managed by the KGB; moreover, it is extremely hazardous for ordinary Soviet people in the provinces to engage in conversation with a foreigner, other than at the KGB's behest. Typical is Robert Kaiser's admission that in the four years he spent as Moscow correspondent of *The Washington Post* he had heard no mention whatever of the massive Novocherkassk uprising of 1962! The Western correspondent relies for his information upon the following: a careful screening of the vacuous and sterile official Soviet press; off-the-record comments and speculations gleaned from Western diplomats (the sources coincide!); and chance encounters with middle-level representatives of the Soviet elite (but as human material this is too shoddy and unreliable to merit serious attention). Their chief source, however, is the conversations they have with those few Muscovites who have already irrevocably violated the ban on fraternizing with foreigners; usually these are representatives of the same Moscow circles to which the aforementioned émigré informants once belonged. They are the chief source of information used in strident doom-laden articles about the worldwide menace of Russian nationalism. And this is how some anonymous anti-Semitic leaflet in a Moscow gateway is taken up by the Western press and invested with universal significance. But it also explains why the sources so often agree: an image of the world is formed in accordance with its reflection in a single splinter of glass. In physics this is known as systematic instrument error.

But when some information happens to point in a different direction, when it fails to tally with what the Western press is presently looking for in Moscow, then it is simply suppressed. A case in point is the extremely important interview which Igor Shafarevich gave to Christopher Wren of *The New York Times*, but which was not published in the Western press. In the same way Western scholars and the Western press have been ignoring the *Herald of the Russian Christian Movement (Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia)*, a Paris-based journal which has been appearing for half a century; yet the journal enjoys great popularity in cultivated circles and is in fact published with their direct partic-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ipation. Acquaintance with this journal would give Western commentators quite a different picture, far removed from the horrors they are wont to describe.

Only this absence of informed opinion can account for the warped view that the main problem in the U.S.S.R. today is that of emigration. How can the problems of any major country be reduced to the issue of who is allowed to depart from it? Here and there in the Russian provinces (Perm was a recent example) strikes involving many thousands of starving workers have been dispersed by force of arms (paratroops have even had to be dropped onto the factory roof)—but is the West alert enough to note all this and to react to it? And what of the far-reaching process which is now underway in Russia and which is scheduled for completion in 10 to 15 years, a process threatening the very survival of the Russian people? It aims at nothing less than the final destruction of the Russian peasantry: huts and villages are being razed, peasants are being herded together in multi-storied settlements on the industrial model, links with the soil are being severed; national traditions, the national way of life, even apparently the Russian landscape and the national character—all are disappearing forever. And the reaction of the meager Western news media to this murderous communist onslaught on the very soul of our people? *They have not so much as noticed it!* In the first revolution (1917–20) Lenin's curved dagger slashed at the throat of Russia. Yet Russia survived. In the second revolution (1929–31) Stalin's sledgehammer strove to pound Russia to dust. Yet Russia survived. The third and final revolution is irrevocably underway, with Brezhnev's bulldozer bent on scraping Russia from the face of the earth. And at this moment, when Russian nationhood is being destroyed without pity, the Western media raise a hue and cry about the foremost threat to the world today—Russian national consciousness. . . .

v

Moscow is not the Soviet Union. Ever since the early 1930s general living standards in the capital have been artificially boosted above the national level—by plundering the rest of the populace, particularly in rural areas. (The same is partially true of Leningrad and of certain restricted scientific settlements.) Thus for more than half a century the population of Moscow has had its diet artificially augmented and has been artificially maintained at a psychological level quite unlike that of the pillaged country at large. (The Bolsheviks learned the lesson of 1917, when the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

February Revolution broke out in hungry Petrograd.) As a result Moscow has come to be a special little world, poised somewhere between the U.S.S.R. and the West: in terms of material comfort it is almost as superior to the rest of the Soviet Union as the West is superior to Moscow. However, this also means that any judgments based on Moscow experiences must be significantly corrected before they may be applied to Soviet experience in general. Authentic Soviet life is to be seen only in provincial towns, in rural areas, in the labor camps and in the harsh conditions of the peacetime army.

For my part, I spent the entire 55 years of my Soviet life in the remoter areas of the U.S.S.R., never enjoying the privileges of residence in the capital. I can thus draw upon my experiences without having to make any such correction, and my comments will consequently pertain not to Moscow, but to the country as a whole.

To begin with, the West's vision has been obscured by the false cliché according to which the Russians are the "ruling nationality" of the U.S.S.R. They are no such thing and never have been at any time since 1917. For the first 15 years of Soviet power it fell to the Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians to bear the crippling, devastating blow of communism (the declining birth rates of recent years have their roots in that period), and in the process their upper classes, clergy, cultural tradition and intelligentsia, as well as the main food-producing section of the peasantry, were wiped out almost without trace. The finest names of the Russian past were outlawed and reviled, the country's history was systematically vilified, churches were obliterated in their tens of thousands, towns and streets were renamed in honor of executioners—a practice to be expected only of armies of occupation. But as the communists felt more firmly in control they dealt similar blows to each of the remaining national republics in turn, acting on a principle equally dear to Lenin, Hitler and the common thug: always crush your enemies one by one. Thus in the U.S.S.R. there simply was no "ruling nationality": the communist internationalists never had need of one. The decision to retain Russian as the official language was purely mechanical; one language after all had to serve in this capacity. The sole effect of this use of Russian has been to defile the language; it has not encouraged Russians to think of themselves as masters: just because a rapist addresses his victim in her own language, this does not make it any less of a rape. And the fact that from the end of the 1930s the communist leadership came to be increasingly composed of men of Russian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Ukrainian origin did absolutely nothing to raise those nations to hegemony. The same law operates throughout the world (in China too, and in Korea): to cast in one's lot with the communist leadership is to repudiate not only one's own nation, but humankind itself.

But the bigger sheep yields more fleece, and so throughout the Soviet period it has been the RSFSR[5] which has borne the main brunt of economic oppression. Fearing an outbreak of national resistance, the authorities were a little more cautious in applying economic measures to the other national republics. The inhuman *kolkhoz* system was installed everywhere; nevertheless, the profit margin on a hundredweight of oranges in Georgia was incomparably more favorable than that on a hundredweight of Russian potatoes harvested with greater expenditure of labor. Each of the republics was exploited without mercy, but the ultimate degree of exploitation was reached in the RSFSR, and today the most poverty-stricken rural areas of the U.S.S.R. are the Russian villages. The same is true of Russian provincial towns, which have not seen meat, butter or eggs for decades and which can only dream of even such simple fare as macaroni and margarine.

Subsistence at such an abysmally low level—for half a century!—is leading to a biological degeneration of the people, to a decline in its physical and spiritual powers, a process that is intensified by mind-numbing political propaganda, by the violent eradication of religion, by the suppression of every sign of culture, by a situation where drunkenness is the only form of freedom, where women are doubly exhausted (by working for the State on an equal footing with men and also in the home, without the aid of domestic appliances), and where the minds of its children are systematically robbed. Public morality has declined drastically, not due to any inherent failing in the people, but because the communists have denied it sustenance, both physical and spiritual, and have disposed of all those who could provide spiritual relief, above all the priesthood.

Russian national consciousness today has been suppressed and humiliated to an extraordinary degree by all that it has endured and continues to endure. It is the consciousness of a man whose long illness has brought him to the point of death and who can dream only of rest and recuperation. The thoughts and aspirations of a family in the depths of Russia are immeasurably more modest

[5] The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is the official designation of that portion of the country which remains when the 14 outlying national republics are excluded.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and timid than the Western correspondent can possibly gather from his leisurely Moscow chats. This is how their thoughts run: if only the petty local communist despot would somehow quit his uncontrolled tyranny, if only they could get enough to eat for once, and buy shoes for the children, and lay in enough fuel for the winter; if only they could have sufficient space to live even two to a room; if only a church would be opened within a hundred miles of where they live; if only they weren't forbidden to baptize their children and bring them up knowing right from wrong; and if only they could get father away from the bottle.

And it is *this* yearning on the part of the Russian hinterland to rise and live like men, not beasts, to regain some portion of its religious and national consciousness, which the West's glib and garrulous informants today label "Russian chauvinism" and the supreme threat to contemporary mankind, a menace greater by far than the well-fed dragon of communism whose paw is already raised, bristling with tanks and rockets, over what remains of our planet. It is *these* unfortunates, this mortally ill people helpless to save itself from ruin, who are credited with fanatical messianism and militant nationalism!

This is just a phantom to scare the gullible. The simple love of one's mother country, an inborn feeling of patriotism, is today branded "Russian nationalism." But no one can possibly incite to militant nationalism a country which for 50 years has not even had enough bread to eat. It is not the average Russian who feels compelled to hold other nations captive, to keep Eastern Europe encaged, to seize and arm far-off lands; this answers only the malignant needs of the Politburo. As for "historical Russian messianism," this is contrived nonsense: it has been several centuries since any section of the government or intelligentsia influential in the spiritual life of the country has suffered from the disease of messianism. Indeed, it seems inconceivable to me that in our sordid age any people on earth would have the gall to deem itself "chosen."

All the peoples of the Soviet Union need a long period of convalescence after the ravages of communism, and for the Russian people, which endured the most violent and protracted onslaught of all, it will take perhaps 150 or 200 years of peace and national integrity to effect a recovery. But a Russia of peace and national integrity is inimical to the communist madness. A Russian national reawakening and liberation would mark the downfall of Soviet and with it of world communism. And Soviet communism is well aware that it is being abrogated by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian national consciousness. For those who genuinely love Russia no reconciliation with communism has ever been possible or ever will be.

That is why communism has always been most ruthless of all in its treatment of Christians and advocates of national rebirth. In the early years this meant wholesale execution; later the victims were left to rot in the camps. But to this very day the persecution continues inexorably: Vladimir Shelkov was done to death by 25 years in the camps, Ogurtsov has already served 13 years and Osipov 12; this winter the completely apolitical "Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights" was smashed; the independent priests, Father Gleb Yakunin and Father Dimitri Dudko, have been arrested, and the members of Ogorodnikov's Christian seminar have all been hauled off to prison. The authorities make no attempt to hide the fact that they are crushing the Christian faith with the full force of their machinery of terror. And at this moment, when religious circles in the U.S.S.R. are being persecuted with such unmitigated ferocity—how fine and edifying it is to hear Russian Orthodoxy reviled by the Western press!

The present anti-Russian campaign by those who provide the West with its information is beginning to flourish even in the foremost American newspapers and journals and it is of the greatest value and comfort to Soviet communism (although I do not wish to insist that the whole campaign is necessarily Soviet-inspired).

For the West, on the other hand, this campaign stands the facts on their head, inducing it to fear its natural ally—the oppressed Russian people—and to trust its mortal foe, the communist regime. The West is persuaded to send this regime lavish aid, which it so badly needs after half a century of economic bankruptcy.

VI

But even a humbled, defeated and despoiled nation continues to exist physically, and the aim of the communist authorities (whether in the U.S.S.R., in China or in Cuba) is to force the people to serve them unfailingly as a work force or, if need be, as a fighting force. However, when it comes to war, communist ideology has long since lost all its drawing power in the U.S.S.R.; it inspires no one. The regime's intention is thus obvious: to take that same Russian national sentiment which they themselves have been persecuting and to exploit it once more for their new war, for their brutal imperialistic ambitions; indeed to do so with ever

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

greater frenzy and desperation as communism grows ideologically moribund, in a bid to derive from national sentiments the strength and fortitude they lack. This is certainly a real danger.

The informants discussed earlier see this danger, indeed they recognize nothing *but* this danger (rather than the true aspirations of the national spirit). Hence, at their bluntest they abuse us in advance as chauvinists and fascists, while at their most circumspect they argue as follows: since you can see that any religious and national renascence of the Russian people may be exploited by the Soviet authorities for their own vile purposes, you must renounce not only this renascence but any national aspirations whatever.

But then the Soviet authorities also try to exploit the Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. in order to fan the flames of anti-Semitism, and not without success. ("See that? They're the only ones allowed to escape from this hell, and the West sends goods to pay for it!") Does it follow that we are entitled to advise Jews to forego the quest for their spiritual and national origins? Of course not. Are we not all entitled to live our natural life on the earth and to strive toward our individual goals, without heed for what others may think or what the papers may write, and without worrying about the dark forces that may attempt to exploit those goals for their own ends?

And why should we speak only about the future? We have our recent past to draw on. In 1918–22 throughout Russia, throngs of peasants with pitchforks (and even in some recorded cases bearing only icons) marched in their thousands against the machine guns of the Red Army; in bolshevism they saw a force inimical to their very existence as a nation. And in their thousands they were slaughtered.

And what of 1941–45? It was then that communism first succeeded in saddling and bridling Russian nationalism: millions of lives were affected and it took place in full view of the rest of the world; the murderer saddled his half-dead victim but in America or Britain no one was appalled; the whole Western world responded with unanimous enthusiasm, and "Russia" was forgiven for all the unpleasant associations her name aroused and for all past sins and omissions. For the first time she became the object of infatuation and applause (paradoxically, even as she ceased being herself), because this saddle horse was then saving the Western world from Hitler. Nor did we hear any reproaches about this being the "supreme danger," although that is in fact precisely what it was. At the time the West refused even to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entertain the thought that the Russians might have any feelings other than communist ones.

But what were the real feelings of the peoples under Soviet dominion? Here is how it was. June 22, 1941 had just reverberated into history, Old Man Stalin had sobbed out his bewildered speech, and the entire working population of adult age and of whatever nationality (not the younger generation, cretinized by Marxism) held its breath in anticipation: Our bloodsuckers have had it! We'll soon be free now. This damned communism is done for! Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia gave the Germans a jubilant welcome. Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine and the first occupied Russian territories followed suit. But the mood of the people was demonstrated most graphically of all by the Red Army: before the eyes of the whole world it retreated along a 2,000-kilometer front, on foot, but every bit as fast as motorized units. Nothing could possibly be more convincing than the way these men, soldiers in their prime, voted with their feet. Numerical superiority was entirely with the Red Army, they had excellent artillery and a strong tank force, yet back they rolled, a rout without compare, unprecedented in the annals of Russian and world history. In the first few months some three million officers and men had fallen into enemy hands!

That is what the popular mood was like—the mood of peoples some of whom had lived through 24 years of communism and others but a single year.[6] For them the whole point of this latest war was to cast off the scourge of communism. Naturally enough, each people was primarily bent not on resolving any European problem, but on its own national task—liberation from communism.

Did the West see this catastrophic retreat? It could not do otherwise. But did it learn any lessons from it? No; blinded by its own pains and anxieties it has failed to grasp the point to this very day. Yet if it had been unflinchingly committed to the principle of *universal* liberty it should not have used Lend-Lease to buy the murderous Stalin's help, and should not have strengthened his dominion over nations which were seeking their own freedom. The West should have opened an independent front against Hitler and crushed him by *its own* efforts. The democratic countries had the strength to achieve this, but they grudged it,

[6] *Translator's note.* A number of countries and territories were annexed by the U.S.S.R. in 1939–40. These included Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia (carved out of Poland in 1939), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preferring to shield themselves with the unfortunate peoples of the U.S.S.R.

After 24 years of terror no amount of persuasion could have enabled communism to save its skin by saddling Russian nationalism. But as it turned out (deprived of outside information in the hermetically sealed communist world we had no way of anticipating this) another, similar scourge was bearing down on us from the West, one, moreover, with its own special anti-national mission: to annihilate the Russian people in part and to enslave the survivors. And the first thing the Germans did was to restore the collective farms (whose members had scattered in all directions) in order to exploit the peasantry more efficiently. Thus the Russian people were caught between hammer and anvil; faced with two ferocious adversaries they were bound to favor the one who spoke their own language. Thus was our nationalism forced to don the saddle and bridle of communism. At a stroke communism seemed to forget its own slogans and doctrines, remaining deaf to them for several years to come; it forgot Marxism, whereas phrases about "glorious Russia" never left its lips; it even went so far as to restore the Church—but all this lasted only until the end of the war. And so our victory in this ill-starred war served only to tighten the yoke about our necks.

But there was also a Russian movement that sought a third path: attempting to take advantage of this war and in spite of the odds to liberate Russia from communism. Such men were in no sense supporters of Hitler; their integration into his empire was involuntary and in their hearts they regarded only the Western countries as their allies (moreover they felt this sincerely, with none of the duplicity of the communists). For the West, however, anyone who wanted to liberate himself from communism in that war was regarded as a traitor to the cause of the West. Every nation in the U.S.S.R. could be wiped out for all the West cared, and any number of millions could die in Soviet concentration camps, just as long as it could get out of this war successfully and as quickly as possible. And so hundreds of thousands of these Russians and Cossacks, Tatars and Caucasian nationals were sacrificed; they were not even allowed to surrender to the Americans, but were turned over to the Soviet Union, there to face reprisals and execution.

Even more shocking is the way the British and American armies surrendered into the vengeful hands of the communists hundreds of thousands of peaceful civilians, convoys of old men, women and children, as well as ordinary Soviet POWs and forced laborers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

used by the Germans—surrendered them against their will, and even after witnessing the suicide of some of them. And British units shot, bayonetted and clubbed these people who for some reason did not wish to return to their homeland. Yet more amazing still is the fact that not only were none of these British and American officers ever punished or reprimanded, but for almost 30 years the free, proud and unfettered press of these two countries unanimously and with studied innocence kept its silence about their governments' act of treachery. For 30 years not a single honest pen presented itself! Surely this is the most astonishing fact of all! In this single instance the West's unbroken tradition of publicity suddenly failed. Why?

At the time, it seemed more advantageous to buy off the communists with a couple of million foolish people and in this way to purchase perpetual peace.

In the same way—and without any real need—the whole of Eastern Europe was sacrificed to Stalin.

Now, 35 years later, we can sum up the cost of this wisdom: the security of the West today is solely dependent upon the unforeseen Sino-Soviet rift.

VII

The selfish and ruinous mistake that the West committed during World War II has since been repeated time and time again, always in the fervent hope of avoiding a confrontation with communism. The West has done its utmost to ignore communist mass murder and aggression. It promptly forgave East Berlin (1953) as well as Budapest and Prague. It hastened to believe in the peaceful intentions of North Korea (which will yet show its true worth) and in the nobility of North Vietnam. It has allowed itself to be shamefully duped over the Helsinki agreement (for which it paid by recognizing forever all the communist takeovers in Europe). It seized on the myth of a progressive Cuba (even Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen have not sufficed to disenchant Senator McGovern), and put its faith in the alleged key to salvation represented by Eurocommunism. It solemnly participated in the interminable sessions of the sham Vienna Conference on European Disarmament. And after April 1978, it tried for two years not to notice the seizure of Afghanistan. Historians and future observers will be amazed and at a loss to explain such cowardly blindness. Only the appalling Cambodian genocide has exposed to the West the depth of the lethal abyss (familiar to us, who have lived there for 60 years), but even here, it seems, the Western conscience is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

already becoming inured and distracted.

It is high time for all starry-eyed dreamers to realize that the nature of communism is one and the same the whole world over, that it is everywhere inimical to the national welfare, invariably striving to destroy the national organism in which it is developing, before moving on to destroy adjacent organisms. No matter what the illusions of détente, no one will ever achieve a stable peace with communism, which is capable only of voracious expansion. Whatever the latest act in the charade of détente, communism continues to wage an incessant ideological war in which the West is unfailingly referred to as the enemy. Communism will never desist from its efforts to seize the world, be it through direct military conquest, through subversion and terrorism, or by subtly undermining society from within.

Italy and France are still free, but they have already allowed themselves to be corroded by powerful communist parties. Every human being and any society (especially a democracy) tries to hope for the best, this is only natural. But in the case of communism there is simply nothing to hope for: no reconciliation with communist doctrine is possible. The alternatives are either its complete triumph throughout the world or else its total collapse everywhere. The only salvation for Russia, for China and for the entire world lies in a renunciation of this doctrine. Otherwise the world will face inexorable ruin.

The communist occupation of Eastern Europe and East Asia will not come to an end; indeed, there is an imminent danger of a takeover in Western Europe and many other parts of the world. The prospects for communism in Latin America and Africa have already been clearly demonstrated; in fact any country that is not careful can be seized. There is of course the hope that things will turn out differently: that the communist aggressors will ultimately fail, like all aggressors in the past. They themselves believe that their hour of world conquest has arrived and, scenting victory, they unwittingly hasten—to their doom. But to achieve such an outcome in a future war would cost mankind billions of casualties.

In view of this mortal danger, one might have thought that American diplomatic efforts would be directed above all toward reducing the threatening might of these imperialistic "horsemen," to ensuring that they will never again succeed in bridling the national feelings of any country and drawing upon the vitality of its people. Yet this path has not been followed; in fact, the opposite course of action has been pursued.

American diplomacy over the last 35 years presents a spectacle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of sorry bumbling. The United States, only recently the dominant world power, the victor in World War II and the leader in the United Nations, has seen a steady, rapid and often humiliating erosion of its position at the U.N. and in the world at large. It has continually declined vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.: a process which even its Western allies have come to condone. Things have reached the point where American senators make apologetic visits to Moscow in order to ensure that the debates in the Senate are not taken amiss in the Kremlin. The whole thrust of American diplomacy has been directed to postponing any conflict, even at the cost of progressively diminishing American strength.

The lesson of World War II is that only desperate, pitiless circumstances can bring about any cooperation between communism and the nation it has enslaved. The United States has not learned this lesson: the Soviet and Eastern European governments have been treated as the genuine spokesmen of the national aspirations of the peoples they have subjugated, and the false representatives of these regimes have been dealt with respectfully. This amounts to a rejection—in advance, and in a form most detrimental to American interests—of any future alliance with the oppressed peoples, who are thereby driven firmly into the clutches of communism. This policy leaves the Russian and the Chinese people in bitter and desperate isolation—something the Russians already tasted in 1941.

In the 1950s an eminent representative of the postwar Russian emigration submitted to the U.S. Administration a project for coordinating the efforts of Russian anti-communist forces. The response was formulated by a high-ranking American official: "We have no need of any kind of Russia, whether future or past." A conceited, mindless and suicidal answer as far as American interests are concerned. The world has now come to the point where without the rebirth of a healthy, national-minded Russia, America itself will not survive, since all would be annihilated in the bloody clash. In that struggle it would be ruinous for America to fail to distinguish, in theory and in practice, between the communist aggressors and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. so tragically drawn into the conflict. It would be disastrous to fight "the Russians" instead of communism and thereby force a repetition of 1941, when the Russians will again grasp at freedom and find no helping hand.

The day-to-day implementation of current American foreign policy has served to support this perverse and pernicious surrender of the Russian national consciousness to its communist taskmaster.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And now, after 35 years of failure, American diplomacy has gambled on another shortsighted, unwise—indeed mad—policy: to use China as a shield, which means in effect abandoning the national forces of China as well, and driving them completely under the communist yoke. (In the interests of this policy it was even deemed acceptable to contribute Taiwan as a down payment.)

This act of betrayal is a blow to the national feelings of both Chinese *and* Russians. ("America is openly supporting our totalitarian oppressors and equipping them against us!")

I hardly dare ask where that leaves the principles of democracy. Where is the vaunted respect for the freedom of all nations? But even in purely strategic terms this is a shortsighted policy: a fateful reconciliation of the two communist regimes could occur overnight, at which point they could unite in turning against the West. But even without such a reconciliation, a China armed by America would be more than a match for America.

The strategic error of not realizing that the oppressed peoples are allies of the West has led Western governments to commit a number of irreparable blunders. For many years they could have had free access to the oppressed people via the airwaves. But this means was either not used at all or else used incompetently. It would have been an easy matter for America to relay television broadcasts to the Soviet Union via satellite, but it was easier still to abandon this project after angry protests from the Soviet regime (which knows what to fear). It goes without saying that this medium would require a proper appreciation for the needs and intellectual concerns of the suffering people to whom it is addressed. And it also goes without saying that offensive commercial broadcasts are not what is needed—this would merely be an affront to the hungry viewers, and would be worse than nothing.

The defective information about the U.S.S.R. that reaches America brings about a mutual lack of communication, and as a result Americans too find it difficult to understand what they look like from the other side. A case in point is the Russian section of the Voice of America, which seems to go out of its way to repel the thoughtful Russian listener from any understanding of America, to alienate his sympathies and even to shock and distress him.

The West is incapable of creating balanced and effective broadcasts to the Soviet Union precisely because information about the U.S.S.R. is received in the West in skewed and distorted form. The Russian section of the Voice of America, with its large staff and considerable budget, serves American interests poorly, in fact

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

frequently does them great disservice. Apart from news and topical political commentary, hours of the daily program are filled with trite and inconsequential drivel which can do nothing but irritate the hungry and oppressed millions of listeners whose paramount need is to be told the truth about their own history. Instead of transmitting this history to them (with frequent repetition to compensate for the difficulties of radio reception), together with readings from those books the very possession of which is punishable by imprisonment in the U.S.S.R., instead of bolstering the anti-communist spirit of these potential allies of the United States, hours of radio time are filled with frivolous reports on enthusiastic collectors of beer bottles, and on the delights of ocean cruises (the fine food, the casino and discotheque are described with particular relish), with biographical details about American pop singers, any amount of sports news which the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are not prevented from knowing anyway, and jazz, which they can pick up without difficulty from any of the other foreign stations. (Hardly more felicitous is the policy of broadcasting accounts by recent Jewish immigrants to the United States, who tell in great detail about their life, their new jobs, and about how happy they are here. Since it is common knowledge in the U.S.S.R. that only Jews have the right to emigrate, these programs serve no purpose except to further the growth of anti-Semitism.) It is clear that the directors of the Voice of America are constantly trying not to arouse the anger of the Soviet leadership. In their zeal to serve détente, they remove everything from their programs which might irritate the communists in power. There are plenty of examples of such political kowtowing to the Central Committee of the CPSU, but I will cite two instances from my own experience, simply because they are easier for me to document. My statement concerning the arrest of Aleksandr Ginzburg on February 4, 1977 consisted of only three sentences, of which the following two were cut by the censors at VOA:

> This reprisal affects people in the West far more than it might seem at first sight. It is a significant step in the unremitting and all-inclusive policy of securing the Soviet rear in order to facilitate the offensive operation which it has been conducting so successfully over the last few years and which can only be intensified in the future: an assault on the strength, spirit, and the very existence of the West.

My statement to the 1977 Sakharov Hearings in Rome was completely rejected by VOA because of the following passage:

> . . . [I would like] to hope that the spine-chilling accounts heard from your rostrum might pierce the deafness of material well-being which will respond

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only to the trumpet of doom but heeds no lesser sound. May they penetrate the awareness of those shortsighted individuals who are content to relax and to bask in the venomous melodies of Eurocommunism.

The chaste guardians of the VOA could not permit such words to reach the ears of its listeners in the East, or, for that matter, in the West. But this is not the worst of it: at times the Voice of America dances to the tune called by the communist regime or indeed becomes indistinguishable from a Moscow radio station. A recent broadcast apropos of Tito's illness announced that there was also "joyful news" to report from Yugoslavia: in the days of their leader's illness, thousands of citizens are eagerly joining the Party! Is this really any different from the insulting Leninist-Stalinist drivel that blares forth every day from Soviet loudspeakers? Such a broadcast can only cause Soviet listeners to doubt the mental competence of those who transmit it. And the religious program almost completely excludes Orthodox services, which are what Russian listeners most need, deprived as they are of churches. In the meager time-slot available to religion as a whole, Orthodoxy is curtailed (as it is curtailed in the U.S.S.R.) because it is "a religion uncharacteristic of the U.S.A." This may be so, but it is surely characteristic of Russia! And the broadcast *is* conducted in Russian.

If we add to this the fact that the broadcasts are presented in a language difficult to acknowledge as Russian (replete with crude grammatical errors, poor syntax, inadequate enunciation, and misplaced stress), then it is fair to conclude that every reasonable effort has been made to turn away Russian listeners from this radio station.

This is an inept utilization of the mightiest weapon that the United States possesses to create mutual understanding (or even an alliance) between America and the oppressed Russian people.

It is true that other Western Russian-language radio stations have similar defects. The BBC, too, shows a marked eagerness not to offend communist sensibilities and a superficial understanding of the Russian people of today; this leads to an inability to select what is genuinely important for its listeners, and many valuable hours of broadcasting time are taken up with worthless and irrelevant twaddle.

VIII

For the multinational human mass confined today within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, there are only two possibilities:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either a brutally imperialistic development of communism, with the subjugation of countries in many parts of the globe, or else a renunciation of communist ideology and a shift to a path of reconciliation, recovery, love of one's country, and care for one's people.

As a Russian, I find little consolation in the thought that Soviet communism might after all suffer defeat in the pursuit of the first alternative, and that a certain number of today's bosses (those who fail to make a getaway) will face a military tribunal on the Nuremburg model. There is no comfort in this thought because the human cost of achieving this outcome would fall most heavily on the deceived and afflicted Russian people.

But how to make the second alternative attainable? It is extraordinarily difficult to achieve such an outcome with indigenous strength alone in the conditions of a communist dictatorship, especially because the rest of the world, in its blindness, shows little sympathy for our attempts to free ourselves from communism, and at best washes its hands of us.

When I came to understand this problem, I decided seven years ago to undertake an action which it was within my limited powers to accomplish: I wrote my *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, where I call on them to shake off the communist delirium and to minister to their own devastated country.[7] The chances of success were naturally almost nil, but my aim was at least to pose the question loudly and publicly. If not the current leaders, then perhaps one of their successors might take note of my proposals. In the *Letter* I attempted to formulate the minimum national policy which could be implemented without wresting power from the incumbent communist rulers. (It would surely have been entirely unrealistic to expect them to relinquish their personal power.) I proposed that they should discard communist ideology, at least for the time being. (But how painful it would be to renounce this weapon, insofar as it is precisely to communist ideas that the West yields most readily! . . .)

In the sphere of foreign policy, my proposal foresaw the following consequences: We were not to "concern ourselves with the fortunes of other hemispheres," we were to "renounce unattainable and irrelevant missions of world domination," to "give up our Mediterranean aspirations" and to "abandon the financing of South American revolutionaries." Africa should be left in peace; Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Eastern Europe (so that

[7] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these puppet regimes would be left to face their own people without the support of Soviet divisions); no peripheral nation should be forcibly kept within the bounds of our country; the youth of Russia should be liberated from universal, compulsory military service. As I wrote: "The demands of internal growth are incomparably more important to us, as a people, than the need for an external expansion of our power."

The reaction of the addressees to my proposal was hardly surprising: they didn't bat an eye. But the reaction of the Western and in particular the American press simply astonished me. My program was construed as conservative, retrograde, isolationist, and as a tremendous threat to the world! It would seem that the consciousness of the West has been so debilitated by decades of capitulation that when the Soviet Union, after seizing half of Europe, ventures into Asia and Africa, this evokes respect: we must not anger them, we must try to find a common language with these progressive forces (no doubt a confusion with "aggressive" here). Yet when I called for an immediate halt to all aggression, and to any thought of aggression, when I proposed that all those peoples who so wished should be free to secede, and that the Soviet Union should look to its domestic problems, this was interpreted as and even noisily proclaimed to be reactionary and dangerous isolationism.

But at the very least one should be able to draw a distinction between the isolationism of the world's chief defender (the United States) and the isolationism of the world's major assailant (the Soviet Union). The former withdrawal is certainly a grave danger to the world and to peace in general, while the latter would be highly beneficial. If Soviet (and today also Cuban and Vietnamese, tomorrow Chinese) troops would cease taking over the world and would go home, whom would this endanger? Could someone explain this to me? I cannot understand to this day.

Furthermore, I never proposed any kind of total isolationism (involving cultural and economic withdrawal, for instance), nor did I call for Russia to sequester herself as if there were no one else on the globe. To my nation—an organism gravely ill after 60 years of communism and after 60 million human victims (not counting war casualties)—I offered the only advice that can be offered to someone so seriously afflicted: stop wasting your valuable strength on fighting and pushing around healthy people; concentrate on your own recovery, conserving to this end every grain of the nation's strength. "Let us find strength, sense and courage to put our own house in order before we busy ourselves with the cares of the entire planet"; "the physical and spiritual

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

health of the people must be the goal." I envisaged an ascent from the material and moral abyss in which the people find themselves today. Children were to be preserved from having their heads stuffed with ideology, women were to be shielded from back-breaking physical labor, men saved from alcohol, and nature protected from poison; the shattered family upbringing was to be restored; schools were to be improved and the Russian language itself saved before it could be destroyed by the communist system. To achieve all this would require some 150 to 200 years of external peace and patient concentration on internal problems. Whom could this possibly endanger?

But this letter was a genuine address to very real rulers possessed of immeasurable power, and it was plain that the very most one could hope for would be concessions on their side, certainly not capitulation: neither free general elections nor a complete (or even partial) change of leadership could be expected. The most I called for was a renunciation of communist ideology and of its most cruel consequences, so as to allow at least a little more breathing space for the national spirit, for throughout history only national-minded individuals have been able to make constructive contributions to society. And the only path down from the icy cliff of totalitarianism that I could propose was the slow and smooth descent via an authoritarian system. (If an unprepared people were to jump off that cliff directly into democracy, it would be crushed to an anarchical pulp.) This "authoritarianism" of mine also drew immediate fire in the Western press.

But in the *Letter* I qualified this concept then and there: "an authoritarian order founded on love of one's fellow man"; "an authoritarianism with a firm basis in laws that reflect the will of the people"; "a calm and stable system" which does not "degenerate into arbitrariness and tyranny"; the toleration of all religions; a renunciation "once and for all, of psychiatric violence and secret trials, and of that brutal, immoral trap which the camps represent"; "free art and literature, the untrammelled publication of books." I doubt that anyone can offer any temporary measures more beneficial than these to take effect after we emerge from our prison.

As concerns the theoretical question whether Russia should choose or reject authoritarianism in the future, I have no final opinion, and have not offered any. My criticism of certain aspects of democracy is well known. I do not think that the will of the English people was implemented when England was for years sapped of its strength by a Labor government—elected by only 40 percent of the voters. Nor was the will of the German people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

served when the left bloc had a majority of one seat in the Bundestag. Nor is any nation served when half the electorate is so disillusioned that it stays away from the polling booths. I cannot count among the virtues of democracy its impotence vis-à-vis small groups of terrorists, its inability to prevent the growth of organized crime, or to check unrestrained profiteering at the expense of public morality. And I would note that the terrifying phenomenon of totalitarianism, which has been born into our world perhaps four times, did not issue from authoritarian systems, but in each case from a weak democracy: the one created by the February Revolution in Russia, the Weimar and the Italian Republics, and Chiang Kai-shek's China. The majority of governments in human history have been authoritarian, but they have yet to give birth to a totalitarian regime.

I have never attempted to analyze this whole question in theoretical terms, nor do I intend to do so now, for I am neither a political scientist nor a politician. I am simply an artist who is distressed by the painfully clear events and crises of today. And in any case the problem cannot, I think, be settled by any journalistic debate or any hasty advice, even if it were buttressed by scholarship. The answer can only emerge through an organic development of accumulated national experience, and it must be free of any external coercion.

Here I would like to point once more to the respectful consideration which scholarship has always accorded the various unique features in the cultural development of even the smallest nations of Africa or Asia. And I would simply ask that the Russian people not be denied the same kind of treatment and that we not be dictated to, just as Africa is not. The Russian people have a 1,100-year-long history—longer than that of many of Russia's impatient teachers. Over this long period the Russians have created a large store of their own traditional social concepts, which outside observers should not dismiss with a sneer. Here are a few examples. The traditional medieval Russian concept of justice (*pravda*) was understood as justice in the ultimate sense.[8] It was an ontological rather than a juridical concept, something granted by God. The social ideal was to live justly (*pravedno*), that is live on a higher moral plane than any possible legal requirement. (This of course does not mean that everyone lived up to such precepts, but the

[8] *Translator's note.* In modern Russian, this word means "truth." In medieval Russia, this term signified "justice," "right," "righteousness," as well as "law" in the broad sense. The first Russian code of laws (eleventh century) was called *Pravda Russkaya.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideal was accepted by all.) A number of Russian proverbs reflect this concern:

> The world itself weighs less than one just word (*odno slovo pravdy*).
> The Lord resides in justice (*v pravde*), not in strength.
> If all men lived justly (*po pravde*), no laws would be needed.

According to another traditional Russian concept, the truth cannot be determined by voting, since the majority does not necessarily have any deeper insight into the truth. (And what we know of mass psychology would suggest that the reverse is often true.) When representatives of the entire country gathered for important decisions (the so-called Assemblies of the Land), there was no voting. Truth was sought by a lengthy process of mutual persuasion, and it was determined when final accord was reached. While the decision of the Assembly was not legally binding on the tsar, it was morally incontestable. From this perspective, the creation of *parties*, that is of segments or parts which fight for their *partial interests* at the expense of the other segments of the people, seems an absurdity. (Indeed, this is less than worthy of mankind, at least of mankind in its potential.)

It is no accident that the powerful regime before which the free world trembles (including the free Western leaders, legislators, and journalists), has made no effort more concentrated and ferocious in 60 years than its attempt to eradicate Christianity—the world-view of its subjugated country. And yet they have proved incapable of destroying it!

And at this time the latest informants hasten to persuade the West that this ever-vital Christianity is in fact the greatest danger.

IX

Any public statement with social or political overtones always elicits a great deal of comment, much of it sober and scrupulous, but the distorted reactions are invariably the loudest; they acquire hysterical headlines and attempt to imprint themselves on the memory, not without occasional success. My way of life, my work habits and principles of behavior usually preclude any response on my part to all this cacophony. But now that I have touched upon some issues of consequence, I would like very briefly to comment on a number of distortions.

Apropos of my *Letter to the Soviet Leaders* and on other occasions since then, I have been repeatedly charged with being an advocate of a theocratic state, a system where the government would be under the direct control of religious leaders. This is a flagrant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

misrepresentation; I have never said or written anything of the sort. The day-to-day activity of governing in no sense belongs to the sphere of religion. What I do believe is that the state should not persecute religion, and that, furthermore, religion should make an appropriate contribution to the spiritual life of the nation. Such a situation obtains in Israel and no one condemns it; I cannot understand why the same thing should be forbidden to Russia—a land that has carried its faith through ten centuries and earned the right to it by 60 years of suffering and the blood of millions of laymen and tens of thousands of clergy.

At the same time I was accused of propounding some kind of "way back"; one must think a man a fool to ascribe to him the desire to move against the flow of time. It was alleged that I am asking the future Russia "to renounce modern technology." Another fabrication: I had in fact called for "highly developed technology," albeit "on a small, non-gigantic scale."

The path that I do propose is set forth in the conclusion of my Harvard speech[9] and I can repeat it here: there is no other way left but—*upward*. I believe that the luxury-laden, materialistic twentieth century has all too long kept us in a subhuman state, be it of hunger or of excessive satiety.

The Harvard speech rewarded me with an outpouring of favorable responses from the American public at large (some of these found their way into newspapers). For that reason I was not perturbed by the outburst of reproaches which an angry press rained down upon me. I had not expected it to be so unreceptive to criticism: I was called a fanatic, a man possessed, a mind split apart, a cynic, a vindictive warmonger; I was even simply told to "get out of the country" (a fine way of applying the principle of free speech, but hardly distinguishable from Soviet practice). There were indignant questions about how I dare use the phrase "our country" in reference to the one that banished me. (The point of course is that the communist government, not Russia, had deported me.) Richard Pipes brought up the "freedom of speech which so annoys Solzhenitsyn." In fact it was stated plainly enough for all who can read that I had in mind not freedom of speech, but only the irresponsible and amoral abuse of this freedom.

But the most widespread allegation was that I "call upon the West" to liberate our people from the communists. This could not have been said by anyone who had made a conscientious effort to read and comprehend the text. I have never made any such appeal

[9] *A World Split Apart*, Harper & Row, 1978.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

either in my Harvard address or at any time before that, indeed never once in all my public statements over the years have I appealed for help to a single Western government or parliament. I have always maintained that we shall liberate *ourselves*, that it is *our own* task, difficult as it may be. To the West I have made but one request and offered but one word of advice. First the request: Please do not force us into the grip of dictatorship, do not betray millions of our countrymen as you did in 1945, and do not use your technological resources to further strengthen our oppressors. And the advice: Take care lest your headlong retreat lead you into a pit from which there is no climbing out.

After the Harvard speech some members of the press asked with feigned surprise how I could defend the "right not to know" (as a rule they cut the quotation short, omitting: "not to have their divine souls stuffed with gossip, nonsense, vain talk"). My answer is already expressed in that omitted passage. They pointed out reproachfully that this is the same Solzhenitsyn who when in the U.S.S.R. struggled for the right *to know*. Yes, I did struggle for the right of the whole world to know—about the Gulag Archipelago, about the popular resistance to communism, about the millions of dead, about the famine of 1933, and the treachery of 1945. But we who have lived through these grim years are pained when the press offers us gratuitous details about a former British prime minister who has undergone surgery on one testicle, about the kind of blanket Jacqueline Kennedy uses, or about the favorite drink of some female pop star.

A more serious misunderstanding arose from the passage where I said that the deadly crush of life in the East has developed greater depth of character than the well-ordered life of the West. Some bewildered commentators interpreted this as praise for the virtues of communism and an assertion of the spiritual superiority of the Soviet system. Of course I meant no such thing. This is no more than the ancient truth that strength of character comes from suffering and adversity. Oppressed and driven as they are by constant poverty, it is inevitable that many of our people are crushed, debased, warped or dehumanized. But evil which bears down openly upon men corrupts less insidiously than does the furtive, seductive variety of evil. Direct oppression can give birth to a contrary process too—a process of spiritual ascent, even of soaring flight. Russian faces seldom if ever wear a token smile, but we are more generous in our support of one another. This is all done voluntarily and informally, and such sacrifices are in no sense tax-deductible, indeed no such system even exists in our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country. Taking risks for the sake of others is part of the moral climate in which we live, and I have more than once had occasion to witness the transformation which people from the West have undergone after living and working for a long period in Soviet conditions. It was reported that one American reader had offered his daughters one hundred dollars each to read the second volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*—but that the girls had refused. In our country, on the other hand, people read it even under threat of imprisonment. Or compare two young people—one a cowardly terrorist in Western Europe turning his bombs against peaceful citizens and a democratic government, the other a dissident in Eastern Europe stepping forth with bare hands against the dragon of communism. Compare, too, young Americans anxious to avoid the draft with the young Soviet soldiers who refused to fire upon insurgents—in Berlin, in Budapest or in Afghanistan—and who were summarily executed (as they knew they would be!).

I can envision no salvation for mankind other than through the universal exercise of self-limitation by individuals and peoples alike. That is the spirit which imbues the religious and national renaissance currently underway in Russia. It is something that I put forward as my fundamental belief in an essay entitled "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," published five years ago in America.[10] For some reason my opponents avoid mentioning this essay or quoting from it.

Not long ago *The New York Review of Books* carried a prominent and ominous headline—"The Dangers of Solzhenitsyn's Nationalism." But neither the journal nor its informants had the wit to indicate in the essay thus advertised where exactly these dangers lay. Well then, I shall help them out with some quotations from my published writings.

From my *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*:

> I wish all people well, and the closer they are to us and the more dependent upon us, the more fervent is my wish. (p. 7)
>
> One aches with sympathy for the ordinary Chinese too, because it is they who will be the most helpless victims of the war. (p. 16)

From my essay on "Repentance and Self-Limitation" in *From Under the Rubble*:

> We shall have to find in ourselves the resolve . . . to acknowledge our *external* sins, those against other peoples.(p. 128)

[10] In *From Under the Rubble*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With regard to all the peoples in and beyond our borders forcibly drawn into our orbit, we can fully purge our guilt [only] by giving them genuine freedom to decide their future for themselves. (p. 135)

Just as it is impossible to build a good society when relations between people are bad, there will never be a good world while nations are on bad terms and secretly cherish the desire for revenge. . . . Among states too the moral rule for individuals will be adopted—do not unto others as you would not have done unto you. (pp. 134, 137)

So there you have the danger of "Solzhenitsyn's nationalism." This is the threat of the Russian religious and national revival.

X

Today Afghanistan, yesterday Czechoslovakia and Angola, tomorrow some other Soviet takeover—yet even after all this, how good it would be to go on believing in détente! Could it really be over? "But the Soviet leaders haven't repudiated it at all! Brezhnev was quite clear about that: it was in *Pravda*!" (Thus Marshall Shulman and other like-minded experts.)

Yes indeed, the Soviet leaders are quite prepared to carry on détente, why shouldn't they be? This is the same détente that the West basked in so contentedly while millions were being exterminated in the jungles of Cambodia. The same détente that so gladdened Western hearts at a time when a thousand men, including 12-year-old boys, were being executed in one Afghan village. (And this was surely not a unique case!) We Russians immediately recognize an episode like this. That's the Soviet way of doing things! That's the way they slaughtered us too from 1918 on! Détente will continue to stand Soviet communism in very good stead: for the purpose of stifling the last flicker of dissidence in the Soviet Union and buying up whatever electronic equipment is necessary.

The West simply does not want to believe that the time for sacrifices has arrived; it is simply unprepared for sacrifices. Men who go on trading right until the first salvo is fired are incapable of sacrificing so much as their commercial profits: they have not the wit to realize that their children will never enjoy these gains, that today's illusory profits will return as tomorrow's devastation. The Western allies are maneuvering to see who can sacrifice the least. Behind all this lies that sleek god of affluence which is now proclaimed as the goal of life, replacing the high-minded view of the world which the West has lost.

Communism will never be halted by negotiations or through

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the machinations of détente. It can be halted only by force from without or by disintegration from within. The smooth and effortless course of the West's long retreat could not go on forever, and it is now coming to an end: the brink may not have been reached, but it is already the merest step away. Since the outlying borders were never defended, the nearer ones will have to be held. Today the Western world faces a greater danger than that which threatened it in 1939.

It would be disastrous for the world if America were to look upon the Beijing leadership as an ally while regarding the Russian people as no less a foe than communism: by so doing she would drive both these great nations into the maw of communism and plunge in after them. She would deprive both great peoples of their last hope of liberation. The indefatigable denigrators of Russia and all things Russian are forgetting to check their watches: all of America's mistakes and misconceptions about Russia might have been purely academic in the past, but not in the swift-moving world of today. On the eve of the global battle between world communism and world humanity, would that the West at least distinguished the enemies of humanity from its friends, and that it sought an alliance not of foes but of friends. So much has been ceded, surrendered and traded away that today even a fully united Western world can no longer prevail except by allying itself with the captive peoples of the communist world.

Vermont
February, 1980

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

David A. Andelman

YUGOSLAVIA: THE DELICATE BALANCE

The grand old man of Balkan politics, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, no longer rules. At this writing, the founder of nonalignment, the originator of the first new brand of socialism since Lenin, the friend, or at least the colleague, of world leaders from Stalin and Roosevelt through Khrushchev and De Gaulle to Hua and Carter, lies mortally ill. At home he attempted, at the very least, to forge a united nation from a host of competing, often antagonistic ethnic groups, each with its own aspirations in terms of economic and cultural development, religion, language and political awareness. Here, too, his success has been tempered by a gnawing realization that perhaps this very success has contained less than meets the eye, that perhaps it was merely Tito's own personal charisma and personal loyalty to an ideal that produced a progressive, prosperous and united Yugoslavia.

The future of Yugoslavia, in short, contains many pitfalls and dark passions all waiting to be exploited by the opportunists, at home and abroad, who have long lain in wait for this time.

II

From the moment of its formation more than 60 years ago, one nation or another has wanted something from Yugoslavia. An amalgam of the leavings of the Hapsburg monarchy and a disparate set of the most backward peoples of the Balkans, Yugoslavia, long before its present leadership or its present communist system appeared on the scene, was a particularly tempting and apparently vulnerable prize. The Ottoman Turks prized its trade routes, and its roads carried their troops to the gates of Vienna. Hitler and Mussolini coveted its Adriatic ports and its rail lines leading down through the Balkans toward Greece.

But there is more to Yugoslavia's value today than its unquestionably strategic geopolitical position. For Yugoslavia has become a symbol: of resistance to the Soviet Union; of a system of

---

David A. Andelman served as East European correspondent of *The New York Times*, based in Belgrade. He is now with the *Times*' New York staff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economics and government of value throughout the Third World; of cohesion, continuity and the existence of a ruling communist party that is unique because of geographical proximity to the Soviet bloc and its refusal nonetheless to take its lead from Moscow.

Many countries, for their own peculiarly selfish reasons, have sought out ties with Yugoslavia. And for its part, Yugoslavia has not been loath to exploit them in its effort to gain support in the large portion of the world that calls itself nonaligned. But now another period of transition has arrived at a time of particular sensitivity for the various forces with the most immediate interest in Yugoslavia.

Today, a quiet, but intense, three-cornered power struggle for Yugoslavia between the Soviet Union, China and the United States is underway with a variety of other clearly not disinterested players—Europe, both East and West, and the Third World—watching nervously for the outcome. It is a diplomatic, political, economic and perhaps ultimately military struggle with stakes growing steadily in an era of collapsing détente. It is a struggle that encompasses many of the same elements of the triangular relationship that are at play in other parts of the world.

III

At home, Yugoslavia has not for decades been quite so vulnerable or so ill prepared to resist such a struggle.

Its economy is in an increasingly desperate condition. Led by imported oil and gas prices which have risen 60 percent in the past year, inflation hit nearly 30 percent in 1979 and is expected to surpass that figure this year. The country's hard-currency debt has ballooned to more than $13 billion, and it has renegotiated some $1.1 billion during the past year. Its balance-of-trade deficit reached a postwar record of $6.3 billion last year.

In the government-owned Centroproms, the national chain of food shops, and in the smart boutiques that line the Kneza Mihajla promenade in Belgrade or Boulevard Revolucija in Zagreb, shortages have begun to develop for the first time in such staples as butter and milk and in luxury dresses, suits and shoes that Yugoslavs have come to accept as their due. Long lines have shown up at gasoline pumps for the first time since the immediate postwar years, and more and more stations have their gas hoses slung casually over the pumps, indicating the tanks are dry.

In this respect, Yugoslavia has always been vulnerable. Unlike neighboring Romania, it has no substantial domestic supply of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oil, and within the last two years its production of natural gas has failed to keep up with rising demand. Last year, according to State Department figures, Yugoslavia produced 79,000 barrels per day of crude oil, but consumed 359,000 barrels per day. Also last year, when a major new oil pipeline opened from the island of Krk across Croatia into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, officials conceded some difficulty in finding enough Middle Eastern crude to carry. Yugoslavia's principal suppliers of crude oil—Iraq and Libya—are highly unstable and fickle partners that could, during some future crisis, be swayed through economic blackmail by the Soviet Union, which is also becoming a significant supplier of crude oil to Yugoslavia.

Last year, the Soviet Union agreed to supply Yugoslavia with 2.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually for the next six years. An east-west natural gas pipeline network, originating in the Soviet Union and designed to carry 3.5 billion cubic feet of gas per year into Yugoslavia, is broadening, after the opening of the first spur early last year. At the same time, Yugoslavia, with no desire to become significantly dependent on such a politically dangerous source of petroleum as the Soviet Union, has been searching the Middle East for new suppliers of crude oil. Early last year, President Tito swung personally through four Middle Eastern countries, including two major oil producers, Kuwait and Iraq, where, Yugoslav diplomats disclosed, most of the talk was of oil.

At the same time, like Poland's, Yugoslavia's agriculture, which is largely in private hands, is peculiarly sensitive to difficult climatic conditions. In 1978–79, imports of corn jumped from 100,000 metric tons to 1.2 million metric tons, while in 1979–80 imports of wheat have jumped from 200,000 metric tons to one million metric tons to fill a gap produced by bad weather and late spring thaws. As a result of sharp swings in production of wheat and especially corn, which is the most widely used livestock feed, imports of red meat jumped from 35,000 metric tons in 1977 to 51,100 metric tons in 1978 and rose again to 53,000 metric tons in 1979, according to U.S. Department of Agriculture figures.

Fundamental problems are developing as well in the vaunted system of socialist self-management, the decentralized system of worker management of industry and commerce. Edvard Kardelj, the principal theoretician of Yugoslav communism, invented "self-managing socialism" 30 years ago as the philosophical justification for the break with Moscow and the Cominform. Recently, the system has been forced to absorb more than one million *Gastarbei-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ter, or guest-workers, returning suddenly from West European countries whose own inflation-ridden economies are no longer able to employ them. Factories are swollen with the underemployed, who are empowered to vote themselves salaries comparable to those they received in Germany or France, regardless of the ability of their enterprises to cover the costs. Endless "worker self-management" meetings sap the energies of workers and managers alike.

Fundamentally, though, the weight of the Yugoslav system appears to be shifting, particularly in the more developed regions of the north and west, away from the traditional reliance on agriculture toward industry. Between 1966 and 1975, the contribution of agriculture to the gross material product fell from 26.4 to 19 percent while that of industry rose from 34.4 to 39.5 percent. Major joint-venture manufacturing projects have begun with Dow Chemical and General Motors as well as a variety of West European industrial and chemical corporations. The first nuclear generating plant is under construction. Export-oriented food processing enterprises are attempting with considerable success to marry the strengths of the agricultural and industrial sectors. And Yugoslav heavy industry is now producing at home the quality dishwashers, stoves, refrigerators and automobiles that once could be bought only abroad.

There are, however, limits to all this development. A severe shortage of trained engineers and technocrats and the reluctance of the most highly qualified and highly educated youths of the cities to embark on an assembly-line career, no matter how much technical skill may be required, is a factor clearly limiting future expansion of the economy. With the increasing mechanization of the countryside, large numbers of workers are also being driven off the farm. But with little training and no skill, they, too, are glutting the already saturated, unskilled industrial establishment.

In short, Yugoslavs have become accustomed to a lifestyle that may be increasingly difficult to sustain. This consumer-oriented economy, perhaps the most advanced in Eastern Europe, is heavily dependent on the import of luxury goods from the West and raw materials for which there is increasing competition on the world market. It is dependent, too, on the free access to foreign travel that is an equally serious drain on the brittle economy.

IV

Even more potentially disruptive to the long-term stability of Yugoslavia are the traditional, deeply embedded centrifugal forces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generated by the country's multi-ethnic composition.

Despite the 35-year effort by Marshal Tito to promote unity behind a single Yugoslav identity, the ancestral enmities between the various component nationalities of Yugoslavia, particularly the Serbs and the Croats, have barely cooled. These are deeply felt, highly emotional, even irrational animosities—the Catholic Slovenes and Croatians with their heritage of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Orthodox Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians, the Muslim Bosnians with their heritage of rule by the Ottoman Turks. The differences are as fundamental as alphabets and cultures—the Cyrillic used in the eastern republics and the Latin alphabet in the western provinces.

There are disparities, too, in lifestyles and incomes. According to World Bank figures, the positions of the two poorest regions, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, relative to the wealthiest, Slovenia and Croatia, were "considerably worse" in 1975 than in 1954.[1] Today, while the average income per household is less than 6,000 dinars (about $315) per year in Kosovo, it is more than 16,000 dinars (about $840) per year in Slovenia.

Each region still competes for the lion's share of development projects and foreign exchange allocations, ministerial appointments and foreign ambassadorships. These posts are selected as much on the basis of ethnic origin as individual accomplishment. Each republic has its own semi-autonomous central bank and set of republican ministries that mirror the national ministries in Belgrade, often duplicating functions and responsibilities.

Even the army, long considered the single "all Yugoslav" force within Yugoslavia, has not been immune to such pressures. Two years ago, on Army Day, President Tito called attention to this conventional wisdom, praising the army for its unity and proclaiming its potential usefulness as a national cement in the post-Tito era. But a 1978 study by A. Ross Johnson of the Rand Corporation called attention to the "continued Serb-Montenegrin over-representation among field grade officers. The percentage of Croats and Slovenes, in particular, among the officer corps as a whole declined over the postwar period."[2]

All these factors have combined to produce enormous tensions through the years. Since the tough crackdowns and purges within the Croatian Communist Party that followed the 1971 riots in

[1] Martin Schrenk, et al., *Yugoslavia, A World Bank Country Economic Report*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 286.

[2] A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch*, Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, January 1978, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zagreb by students demanding greater local autonomy for their republic, much of this enmity has been suppressed. But these emotions unquestionably remain on the most personal levels. And they are deeply feared at the highest level of the Yugoslav ruling hierarchy. Last year, when Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav dissident who served as one of the country's ruling quadrumvirate until his fall from favor in 1954, sought to promote a condominium between Serb and Croat intellectuals, the secret police summoned him for a stern warning. Six months later, unchastened, he was arrested and fined for contributing to a new, underground literary publication, *Casovnik.*

Last September, after reports of student unrest at the University of Kosovo, President Tito personally went to the province to calm emotions. He was shown on Yugoslav television riding through the streets to tumultuous cheers from young and old alike. But there was the unspoken question: What would happen when Tito was no longer there?

There are other tensions that even Tito was unable fully to quell. Some, such as the age-old question of the place of the Macedonian people, are fanned by external pressures. The authorities in Sofia have long used the large Macedonian minority straddling the borders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as a pressure point on the Yugoslav leadership. Years ago, Macedonian was abolished as a recognized language of Bulgaria and there have been repeated demands from the Bulgarian leadership for the territory of Yugoslav Macedonia to be incorporated into the Bulgarian nation. Clearly, Yugoslav Macedonians as well as the central government in Belgrade have resisted any such demands. But it is a constant source of agitation and propaganda.

Similarly, in Kosovo, the large Albanian minority has proved a source of friction with neighboring Albania, still ruled by the neo-Stalinist Enver Hoxha. Since China's break with Albania in 1978, the leadership in Tirana has been somewhat more receptive to overtures from the Soviet Union while at the same time promoting its first openings to the Yugoslav government. A road link has already been established between Yugoslavia and Albania, and a protocol was signed last year designed to open a rail link as well through the Yugoslav coastal town of Bar. With his own Albanians eagerly watching the relative progress of the Albanian minority across the border in Kosovo, it is unlikely that Hoxha would promote any further friction. But the Kosovan Albanians, separated from their own countrymen in Albania, still flying the Black Eagle flag of their homeland on their national

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

holidays, remain a potential source of agitation and unrest within Yugoslavia.

In the developed north and west, Slovenia and Croatia are torn by disagreements about how to deal with the less developed regions of the south and east. Many Slovenes and Croats still yearn for their own nation and an end to rule by what they perceive as a Serb-dominated government in Belgrade. They believe, with some justification, that their hard-earned profits and foreign-exchange reserves are being siphoned into the less developed but politically more explosive regions of Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The result is that emotions are riding high in both the rich and the poor regions during a critical period in Yugoslavia's short history.

V

All these forces make Yugoslavia ripe for foreign exploitation. Each major power grouping—the Soviet Union, China, the United States, its neighbors in Eastern and Western Europe, and the nonaligned world—is anxious to tilt Yugoslavia in one direction or another. And tilt is one attitude Tito strenuously resisted during his entire career.

There are those, including some within Yugoslavia, who still believe the Soviet Union is poised on the Hungarian *puszta*, or plain, prepared to hurl its tanks at Yugoslavia in a post-Tito period. Much of Yugoslavia's military preparation has been geared to meet such a possibility. Its concept of a people's army (called "total national defense") envisions millions of Partisan warriors retreating to the impenetrable mountains of the Yugoslav interior to fight a protracted guerrilla war of the type that carried Tito and his Partisans to victory against the Nazis.

Yugoslavia, in fact, maintains one of the largest standing military forces in Europe, with some 259,000 men under arms. Its 7.35 mm. attack rifle, manufactured at home, is of world quality; even China has been considering arming its troops with it. Yugoslav armories produce their own artillery up to medium-sized field pieces, as well as their own motorized vehicles. Its navy is equipped with a home-made fast patrol boat that is also unexcelled. Its air force is planning a joint production project with Romania of an excellent medium-capability jet fighter, powered with Rolls-Royce engines. But for its most sophisticated equipment Yugoslavia has still been forced to turn to foreign markets, with much of its heavy armor, its air superiority fighters, and more sophisticated electron-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ics coming from the Soviet Union. The professional military has been seeking from the United States sophisticated antitank missiles and computer-assisted guidance equipment to fulfill its role as a rear-guard delaying action against any invasion force while the Partisan army deploys itself.

But the more realistic thinkers inside and outside Yugoslavia believe that the Soviet Union can accomplish all it desires without the diplomatic and military convulsions of an outright takeover. The Soviet leadership wants a few simple things from Yugoslavia, most of which have been disclosed publicly in recent years, though most of these disclosures have gone relatively unnoticed in the West.

In December 1976, during a visit to Belgrade, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev asked Tito to permit the Soviet Mediterranean fleet to call for regular refitting and shore leave at Yugoslavia's Adriatic ports, saving the long and potentially hazardous trip back through the Bosporus to the Black Sea Coast. At the same time, Brezhnev requested regular access to Yugoslav airspace for Soviet military aircraft—the most direct routes from the Soviet Union to large parts of the Middle East and northern and southern Africa. And he asked that a Yugoslav officer be attached permanently to Warsaw Pact headquarters for the purposes of "liaison." Yugoslav diplomats disclosed that all these requests had been denied.

But Soviet ships do call from time to time at such Yugoslav ports as Tivat in the Bay of Kotor. And, during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East conflicts, the Yugoslav leadership did allow Soviet military aircraft to overfly Yugoslavia on a limited basis. The Soviet leadership would simply prefer that such access become routine.

During preparations for last year's summit conference of nonaligned states in Havana, Brezhnev told Tito, when he visited Moscow last May, that the Soviet Union wanted Yugoslavia to tone down its criticism of Cuban attempts to shift the nonaligned world toward Moscow. Fidel Castro made no secret of his distaste for Yugoslav attempts to forestall such actions, just as Brezhnev has made no secret over the years of his distaste for Yugoslav criticism of various Soviet adventures abroad. Early last year, when Yugoslavia failed to back Vietnam during the Chinese invasion, *Pravda* accused Yugoslav news media of printing "malicious" views of the conflict that made use of "anti-Soviet banalities." In January, Yugoslav diplomats played a prominent role in winning nonaligned votes in the U.N. General Assembly for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measure condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A somewhat more pliant, and less strident, Yugoslav voice would suit the Soviet leadership. Clearly, it would prefer individuals in a position of authority in Belgrade who are more receptive to the arguments of Soviet officialdom whenever there is a point to be made.

Finally, the Soviet Union would prefer a far more centrally controlled economy within Yugoslavia, greater uniformity of domestic comment and more control over dissenting voices, tighter control over Yugoslav travel and communications with the West—in short, a better example for the Soviet Union's satellites in Eastern Europe. Among workers in other East European nations, there is considerable envy of the freedom and prosperity in Yugoslavia. For example, Hungary embarked last summer on an economic decentralization program not dissimilar to Yugoslav self-management. Described as the next step beyond the New Economic Mechanism first pioneered ten years ago, the new Hungarian system will make profit the principal criterion for success in any individual factory. And each enterprise will be accountable to its own workers for its own production. In short, it is an example, similar to Yugoslavia's, with which the Soviet Union could never be truly comfortable. Yet, for Hungarian and Czechoslovak workers, too, a Yugoslav holiday is charged off as the visit to the "West" to which they are entitled only once every three years.

Thus, many East European neighbors of the Soviet Union are sympathetic to Yugoslav methods of operation. No two East European leaders were closer than Tito of Yugoslavia and Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, who met regularly at towns along their common border. Ceausescu has emulated his elder colleague in seeking to take Romania into the Nonaligned Movement (where it still has only observer status), maintaining close ties with China (the only Warsaw Pact country to do so), and breaking with various Soviet foreign policy positions. Any Soviet attempts to draw Romania back into tighter control within the bloc would be seen by Yugoslavia as very threatening. As a result, Yugoslav officials expressed concern when, after a sudden visit to Bucharest by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in February 1980, the Romanian news media backed down from their opposition to the Soviet invasion, describing it as a call for help from the Afghan government.

It would seem that any changes Moscow might want could be accomplished by diplomatic and political manipulation in which, in any case, the Soviets have been most actively involved. Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KGB agents maintain an extensive operation throughout Yugoslavia, occasionally surfacing by virtue of some particularly heavy-handed blunder. And there are forces within Yugoslavia that are sympathetic to Soviet arguments and threats, although throughout Tito's lifetime they necessarily remained somewhat muted. The Bosnian Communist Party organization is believed by many Western diplomats in Belgrade to be very supportive of Soviet policies. Within the military, there is a small but important group of officers who have received advanced training in Soviet institutions, and who are believed to have acquired some sympathy for Soviet policies and methods along the way. While it is doubtful that even the most sympathetic could be relied upon to set up any sort of Quisling-style government in a post-Tito crisis, their views could nevertheless become a factor at some future date.

At the same time there are deep feelings, strongest in the eastern regions of the country, that are best described as "pan-Slavic." This is the sense that, fundamentally, all Slavs are alike; that Mother Russia has been the historic guarantor of the Orthodox faith; that culture, language and religion are more lasting than any political or ideological differences. This Slavic sentiment, a dark, irrational force, should not be underestimated on the most personal levels.

From the Yugoslav viewpoint, the Soviet Union, too, has its uses. It is, for example, a convenient scapegoat and a bogeyman often invoked to discourage disunity at home—the "foreign devil" which is more immediate for its geographical proximity and the still fresh memory of Stalin's cavalier expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. The U.S.S.R. is also a useful dumping ground for the substandard products of factories in some of the less developed regions of Yugoslavia, whose output would never be acceptable in the West.

VI

Chinese and American concerns have been somewhat more passive and at the same time somewhat less irritating. Each would prefer simply to counter Soviet goals. China, however, has gone about this in a more direct and active manner in the past two years than has the United States.

Since its break with Albania in 1978, China has opened a large diplomatic establishment in Belgrade. In August 1978, it dispatched Chairman Hua Guofeng on a goodwill mission to Yugoslavia and followed this up with a succession of senior political, economic and military delegations. It has made known its inten-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of adopting, or at least testing, major elements of the Yugoslav socialist self-management system in China. In 1978, trade between China and Yugoslavia more than doubled over levels of the previous year—from $89 million to $200 million. But that is still far from the $1.3 billion last year in two-way trade between Yugoslavia and the United States or the $2.76 billion in two-way trade with the Soviet Union.[3]

The Serbo-Croatian service of Radio Beijing has become a popular curiosity in Yugoslavia. And Chinese students are spreading the gospel of Chairman Hua throughout the Yugoslav educational establishment. Chinese films, with Serbo-Croatian subtitles, have begun to appear on Belgrade television, and Yugoslav officials vie with each other for invitations to the packed receptions at the elegant prewar Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The Chinese Ambassador has even promised to bring a chef from Beijing to open a Chinese restaurant in the Yugoslav capital.

All of these Chinese efforts are clearly disturbing to the Soviet Union, which has warned Yugoslavia repeatedly, particularly during the visit of Chairman Hua to Belgrade, of the dangers of flirtation with the Chinese. The Soviet Union clearly perceives Chinese moves toward Yugoslavia as part of an attempt to "encircle" the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union has attempted encirclement of China by promoting its own contacts with Vietnam.

American activities have met with somewhat less success. The military sales program and the program to train Yugoslav officers in American military institutions have both stalled. Sales of American military equipment to Yugoslavia last year were twice the 1978 figure, but still totaled only $356,000, and State Department officials say that figure is not likely to rise substantially this year, despite a desire by Yugoslav military planners for sophisticated electronic communications equipment and surface-to-surface missiles. When the United States decided to charge Yugoslavia for the training some of its officers were receiving at such institutions as the Command and General Staff School, Yugoslavia pulled out of the program.

At the same time, American private bankers have expressed growing reluctance about doing business with the somewhat chaotic Yugoslav banking system; for example, through lack of internal communications, three major Eurodollar issues from three

[3] For a detailed study of the evolution of recent Chinese involvement in the Balkans, see David A. Andelman, "China's Balkan Strategy," *International Security*, Winter 1979/80, pp. 60–79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

different republic banks appeared simultaneously on the London bond market last May. The swelling balance-of-payments deficit and domestic inflation are also not reassuring.

VII

Even among most Yugoslav policy planners there is no question that Yugoslav ties with the West remain substantially stronger than those with the East. Yugoslavia has always considered itself an integral part of Europe, particularly Western Europe, and has for years sought closer links with the European Community. It regularly expressed dismay when talks on stronger trade and tariff links stalled due to West European intransigence or concern over the effects of yet another less developed "southern" member of the Community. Finally, after years of bargaining, a comprehensive trade and tariff agreement between the European Community and Yugoslavia was initialled in late February 1980. The agreement would lower tariff barriers for many Yugoslav products and would provide $250 million in low-interest loans over five years from the Community for Yugoslav development projects.

Greater economic cooperation with Western Europe, particularly the lowering of tariff barriers to Yugoslav goods, could certainly help to alleviate some of the economic problems at home caused by the forced return of the million or more *Gastarbeiter* from Western Europe. The Community as a whole is Yugoslavia's largest trading partner—the $5.1 billion in two-way trade is nearly twice the figure of trade with the Soviet Union.

Still, there is a schizophrenic concern in Belgrade, torn by its desire to tie itself economically closer to the West while at the same time maintaining its credibility as a founding member of the nonaligned bloc. Its economic planners believe it is time Yugoslavia assumed its already justified place in the developed world, while its politicians sense a closer ideological affinity with the Third World, most of whose members are still very much developing nations.

It was Kardelj and Tito, together with Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia, who first developed the nonaligned concept nearly 25 years ago. Tito was the last survivor of this group. But, although the movement has expanded substantially and changed considerably in its orientation, nonalignment remains the ideological centerpiece of Yugoslav foreign policy, which holds that only by maintaining its distance from all major powers can Yugoslavia assure itself of its political independence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

during the many ups and downs of détente.

At the bitterly divisive summit conference of the nonaligned in Havana last fall, Yugoslavia firmly resisted Cuban efforts to tilt the movement toward the Soviet line. Many Yugoslav officials smarted under what they felt to be a degree of isolation during and after that conference that they had never before experienced in their dealings with the nonaligned world. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the situation has reversed itself yet again. The tough anti-Soviet reaction by a large number of the nonaligned nations that had tried to remain aloof in Havana and neutral in East-West affairs has suddenly made the Yugoslav conception of nonalignment more, not less, valid and assures a continuing, important role for Yugoslavia in the movement.

This is not to say that Yugoslavia's role in the nonaligned world may not change in the post-Tito era. On the contrary, the "distancing" Tito has historically practiced in his dealings with both East and West may even accelerate as his heirs try to establish their own nonaligned credentials—something Tito never had to prove.

All of this raises some serious challenges for American diplomacy. While in the past the United States and Yugoslavia have frequently been more at odds over nonaligned policies and goals than over any other issue, Tito also often proved valuable to the United States for his ability to convey American views and aims to Third World leaders. Should the post-Tito leadership of Yugoslavia feel compelled to show still more distance from all major powers, this value could diminish, at least momentarily. But patience is essential.

Meantime, Yugoslav officials fear that much of the restraint imposed on Soviet actions by the détente of the 1970s has been removed by its collapse at the end of the decade. Perceptions are very important in this part of the world. And, until recently, there has been no clear, focused statement by the Carter Administration with respect to its attitude toward a post-Tito Yugoslavia. In October 1976, during his presidential campaign, Mr. Carter said that he would not commit any American forces to the defense of Yugoslavia. Former Secretary of State Kissinger promptly condemned Carter's statement, holding that "a successful attack on either [China or Yugoslavia] would affect the world equilibrium." After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, Carter seemed to be moving toward a clarification of the American position when, at a news conference on February 13, 1980, the President declared:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If we are called upon to give any kind of aid to the Yugoslavian people in the future, we would seriously consider it and do what, in our opinion, would be best for them and for us. I've had frequent conversations with other major European leaders about the need to strengthen our ties with Yugoslavia and to protect them as a nonaligned country without being dominated or threatened successfully by the Soviet Union. We'll take whatever action is necessary to carry out those goals—but commensurate with actual need and commensurate with specific requests from Yugoslavia itself.[4]

The message was well received in Belgrade, broadcast throughout the nation, and replayed on national television in a rare gesture of approval. But the element that was particularly well received was the opinion the President also expressed during the same news conference, that Yugoslavia is "a strong, fiercely independent, courageous, well-equipped nation that can defend itself." This emphasis on Yugoslav self-reliance, on the American determination that Yugoslavia must be left to determine its own future course, should be central to any future American policy. In this case, at least for the present, action is likely to be substantially less important than words.

Clearly, an outright effort by any major power to co-opt Yugoslavia would immediately and directly affect the European equilibrium. Yugoslavia is the only major European country not bound either to the Eastern political or economic framework or to the Western. (Switzerland, for instance, though nominally neutral, is firmly a part of the Western economic framework.) Because of Yugoslavia's integral role in Europe, any change in Yugoslavia's status or attitudes in either direction could substantially alter the entire European dynamic.

Either tough American pledges of armed support for Yugoslavia, which any realistic Yugoslav leadership would unquestionably be forced to reject, or a hands-off policy would be counterproductive. Instead, the Soviet Union must be made to believe that the United States is sincere about removing Yugoslavia from East-West competition. If the Soviet leadership, through quiet, back-channel dialogue, can be convinced of this sincere American attitude, it might accept the muting of its drives in Yugoslavia. At the same time, a forthright explanation of this viewpoint by American officials to the Chinese leadership would be equally reassuring to the Soviet Union. Though Yugoslavia appears to have regained its equilibrium following the first shock of Tito's illness earlier this year, time is running out for both Yugoslavia

[4] *The New York Times*, February 14, 1980, p. A16 (from the President's news conference on foreign and domestic matters).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the United States. In the post-Tito era, some hard choices on political, economic and diplomatic issues will have to be made very soon in Belgrade. Actions and statements by American planners will be weighed heavily in all of these decisions.

VIII

Who succeeds Tito is perhaps less important at home and abroad than the fact that the process has now begun. The longer Tito remained firmly in control of every aspect of Yugoslav life and politics, the longer officials were reluctant to take the hard decisions that must be taken immediately.

Although Yugoslavia has established a "mechanism" for succession—a complex system of two "collective presidencies," one for the League of Communists (the Party), the other for the state—it is a cumbersome, patchwork arrangement that is not likely to withstand the pressure of any crisis. Both presidencies contain at least one member from each of the republics and autonomous regions. Under the concept, each year the leadership of these two groups revolves, placing a new individual in the nominal leadership position.

Yet no collective group with constantly revolving individuals and responsibilities will have the power or prestige to make and follow through on fundamental economic or diplomatic changes and priorities. Foreign countries, particularly those in the Third World who have relied on Yugoslavia for leadership and guidance in their battles against Soviet and Cuban expansionism, will be reluctant to follow a fundamentally leaderless country which is unable even to make a decision on a single, coherent individual for leadership.

As William Hyland wrote recently about the possibility of some collective succession to Brezhnev in the Soviet Union, such a leadership is "inherently unworkable in an authoritarian system with a strong tendency toward centralization. In any case, it is unlikely that this group will repudiate its own record and launch radically new policies."[5] The repudiation in this case would be of Tito, an action that, until another strong individual emerges, will be as difficult in Yugoslavia as outright repudiation of Mao has been in China.

Because there is no single individual clearly on the horizon as a potential successor, the precise scenario for the transition must remain hazy for the present. Should no individual emerge within

[5] William G. Hyland, "Brezhnev and Beyond," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1979, p. 62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a reasonable length of time, there is the serious danger that Yugoslavia will simply be ground down by the weight of an amorphous mass of leadership at the top among whom the bureaucracy must necessarily divide its loyalties, energies and direction, and to none of whom the people of Yugoslavia will owe any allegiance or devote any affection. Indeed, most Yugoslavs, nearly a decade after the concept of a "collective presidency" was first broached, still profess bewilderment or apathy toward its composition and functioning. Few of the members of this presidency are well known outside their immediate home regions. Most are gray, undistinguished party bureaucrats, more successful than most in scrabbling their way to the top while at the same time avoiding the wrath or envy of Tito.

In many respects this will be a generational shift—Tito systematically succeeded in removing all of the "old Partisans" who led the revolution during its formative days in World War II. Some, such as Mose Pijade and Edvard Kardelj, have died. Others, such as Djilas and Alexander Rankovic, the draconian head of the secret police, have been purged. The last remaining few, such as Petar Stambolic and Vladimir Bakaric, will be gone within a very few years. The result is not a jump of one generation, but really of two—to a generation for whom the war and the Partisan struggle is a dimming memory—a generation, in short, with far more worldly ties. These are the technocrats, men such as Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Party, or the foreign policy experts, Milos Minic, the former Foreign Minister, and Alexander Grlickov, who has dealt for years with foreign communist parties, Soviet and West European alike.

The age and experience of each of these individuals and several others is perhaps less important than their national origin. Dolanc, for instance, is a Slovene, as was Kardelj. And the Slovenes, curiously, have long been perceived as the single "neutral" nationality in Yugoslavia—the wealthiest, with the least to gain from any economic or political machinations. So, while Dolanc, a brilliant, liberal and, at 55, youthful technocrat was at one point considered the principal heir apparent to Tito, then suddenly "demoted," it would appear that that shift was merely tactical. Dolanc remains in the principal power position within Yugoslavia as a member of the presidium of the Party and longtime manipulator of the entire Party bureaucracy.

For years Tito hedged his bets on the succession issue, and the Belgrade version of Kremlinologists has long played guessing games on just who might be up or down. After one Army Day

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speech two years ago, when Tito appeared to designate the military as the principal guarantor of national unity after his passing, diplomatic speculation shifted to the powerful Minister of Defense, General Nikola Ljubicic, a close confidant of Tito, as the heir apparent. But shortly thereafter, Branko Mikulic, leader of the Bosnian Party organization and the most prominent conservative in the nation, assumed the one-year post as head of the Party presidium. Attention shifted to him. Last fall, in the annual rotation, Mikulic was replaced by Stevan Doronjski, a 61-year-old Serb from the autonomous region of Vojvodina, a man with no political following. Still more speculation. At one particularly parlous point in Tito's long illness, the two Party leaders called to Tito's bedside were Dolanc and Mikulic. The contrast could not have been more striking. Even on his deathbed, Tito was making no choice, giving no benediction.

Yet any new leadership will be substantially less experienced in foreign affairs than in most domestic matters. Tito never had much interest or expertise in economic affairs and tended to delegate responsibility, with the result that broader decision-making experience developed in these areas than in foreign affairs or relations between the republics, where all ultimate decisions were taken by Tito personally.

Unquestionably, in the near term, all Yugoslavs will cling together as they have already demonstrated during the period of Tito's illness, aware of the overriding necessity for unity or defeat. But a time of troubles can only be postponed. If neither the Soviet Union nor the United States—nor China, for that matter—overplays its hand by trying to upset the delicate balance in Yugoslavia, after several years the cracks may begin to open of their own accord. It is then, when the facade of unity may be challenged by fratricidal disputes between Serb and Croat over development projects or economic priorities, that riots may break out in the streets of Zagreb with no one to mediate as Tito did, countless times in the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Milovan Djilas

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EXPANSIONISM OF THE SOVIET STATE

The possibility that the world will awake with surprise one morning to a radical change—whether hoped for or feared—in the Soviet system of government is so remote that we can only wonder that the prospect continues to tantalize us, provoking a recurrent international concern. Perhaps it is because we are all too aware of the vulnerability of our analyses and hypotheses as they apply to even the most "open" and flexible of political systems that we do not cease to marvel at the opaque intransigence of the "closed," rigid, "perfect" system of the Soviet Union, and its indisputable reality in our time.

The peculiar futility of such speculation seems all the more glaring when we reflect that the Soviet system has presented itself as a monolithic design since its very inception—a structure "closed" and made immutable to time even at the very flush of its coming to birth; one paralyzed by its architects at the outset, and rendered immune to mutation, whether of growth or decay.

In speaking of the rigidity of this closed Soviet system, we should be aware that we are addressing first its internal, organic structure, and not its relations to or with other systems of political or social theory. Any system claiming to embody a substantial social entity will gravitate inexorably toward consolidation, and the elimination or exclusion of change. What is unique about the Soviet system is its promotion of this condition by deliberately "conscious" acts and measures, endorsed and enforced by the state on a scale far larger than that to which other systems of government lay claim. Here we confront what must be seen, within the Soviet order, as the progressive compounding of its "immutability."

Even though it would be possible to draw parallels between the Soviet system and the despotic regimes of Asia and the East, it is the dubious prestige of the Soviet form of government to stand as the most relentlessly implacable and ossified in modern history. The essential elements within that system—ideology, power and

---

Milovan Djilas was, until 1954, Vice President of Yugoslavia, President of the Federal Parliament, and a Member of the Politburo and Central Committee. His publications include *The New Class*, *Conversations with Stalin*, *Land Without Justice*, *The Unperfect Society* and *Wartime*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capital—are indivisibly intertwined. To weaken or mitigate one arm of this triumvirate would place either or both of the remaining two in hopeless jeopardy. For example: to abandon the concept of "collective" ownership would fatally negate the reality of monopolistic power. To permit toleration of "alien" ideologies would throw open to pitiless scrutiny the inefficiency and inadequacy of the very premises on which the commanding ideology rests.

To ensure that no such weakening or chink in this monolithic structure occurs, an ideological class has emerged, a privileged stratum brought to birth to maintain dominant, if not total, control over production of the most basic material goods. This stratum has a stake in the system that cannot be overemphasized; its vigilance in overseeing every component of the whole is constant. Indeed, it may be said to derive from the system not only its conscious strength, but its vital existence.

What complicates all this is the framework of the Soviet system, which rests on a fluctuating unity between the potent Great Russian party bureaucracy, and the lesser, non-Russian national party bureaucracies (Ukrainian, Georgian, etc.). Officially, each bureaucracy concedes to the ideological "unity of the whole" priority over its own individual interests; in actuality, however, each tries to wrest for itself as much autonomy and as large a stake in the national design as possible. The result is predictable: non-Russians, acknowledging the primacy of the "Russian people" and "Russian culture," view the party bureaucracy of the Great Russians as "deserving the most," and inevitably accord it that degree of influence. In turn, and almost as an afterthought or a sop, the Great Russian party bureaucracy indulges (or rewards) the minor and ancillary non-Russian bureaucracies with a limited margin of "free development," permitting them to foster and enjoy certain areas of nationalist feeling and consciousness.

The Soviet state conducts its relations with the East European nations in a similarly elastic way. Ties with communist parties in allied states or "people's democracies" are even more flexible—we can discern their outline in such terms as "socialist community," "proletarian internationalism" and the like. In significant part, the so-called Nonaligned Movement may be said to encompass a spectrum of the relationships—their degree and intensity—which exist between the Soviet bureaucracy and more or less hospitable bureaucracies in other countries.

Nonetheless, such relations will be seen as motivated by and sharing a common, often identical, ideology and goal. That goal, so clearly formulated by Soviet leaders, is the ideology we know as Leninism. Decisively, it establishes the rules of the game, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ground on which that game shall be played. No trend, deviation or alternate direction will be tolerated which does not enjoy the endorsement of that ideological authority—hence the paralysis of Soviet political thought which has endured for so long a time. It should be noted in passing that not a single foreign theoretician—and particularly not a communist one—has ever carved out for himself a significant niche in the pantheon of Soviet political theory. As a consequence, it is not excessive to conclude that Soviet soil is hospitable only to the breeding of essentially barren souls.

II

It would be futile—utterly naïve—to formulate any strategy or hope for change that would promote democratization within the Soviet system. I say democratization because that would embody the only authentic shift or mutation within the monolithic Soviet order—and so far, democratization is almost exclusively a phenomenon of the West.

It is equally misleading, as well as fatalistic, to view the Soviet state of today as the inevitable heir of czarist Russia, with a legacy of moral and political impulses neither inferior nor superior to those active within the regime which preceded it. No one will dispute the czarist heritage of the Soviet Union—it is obvious to all, with the possible exception of some nostalgic or embittered spirits. We are dealing with the same people, whether we designate them czarist or Soviet. I would say, however, that the legacy of czarist Russia is more pronounced in the internal structure of the state—that is, in its bureaucratic and centralizing powers—than it is in the external, imperial tendencies and designs of the U.S.S.R.

Czarist Russia, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was doubtless a state more under the rule of law, and because of that, a country affording a wider margin of freedom than the Soviet Union. Autocracy, after all, is not necessarily synonymous with totalitarian absolutism. Even when the conflicts were enacted within a context of ideological squabbling, it was practical relations that determined the elimination or destruction of old forms, and encouraged the flowering of those that were new or hitherto untried. When confronted with domestic agitation within—or the menace of threats from outside—Soviet power, even under Stalin's leadership, had no choice but to draw upon Russian traditions, and summon to its aid the forces of nationalist impulse. So it was that the ideology of Bolshevism or Marxism-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Leninism supplanted the dogma of Eastern Orthodoxy, and the triumvirate of czar, aristocracy and bourgeoisie yielded to the authority of the oligarchic party bureaucracy. But the people themselves—like their predecessors in the empire of the czars—remained Russians: constant in their mentality and disposition, the nature of their life experience, and in their relations with the outside world.

The recurrent dispute about the points of difference between czarist Russia and its Soviet successor—and especially about the mystique of an "eternal Russia" within the Soviet state—is a frequent source of conflict among Soviet dissidents. When it permeates the political calculations of political theorists in the West, however, it can become even more debilitating—a source of confused vacillation.

Much of the dispute centers on the reality that czarist, Orthodox Russia was also a world power. The salient distinction is that the power and pretensions of the czarist regime did not extend beyond a legitimate desire to protect its Orthodox population, and an aspiration to seek access to the warm-water ports of Europe or the Near East. (Poland is invariably an exception: for czarist, Orthodox Russia, the proximity of a Roman Catholic Poland remained a point of anxiety and suspicious unrest until the very end.) But the expansionism of czarist Russia was almost always directed at more primitive and backward Asiatic areas. The Bolshevik seizure of power changed all that. Yet even the Bolsheviks themselves seemed unaware of the shift, until Stalin, taking the reins, made it unmistakably clear.

Like other forms of Christian belief, Eastern Orthodoxy is a creed transcending national frontiers, and one committed to the burdens of messianic vision and vocation. The crucial distinction is that the hierarchy, clergy and faithful of each Orthodox church enjoy, within their separate national spheres, total autonomy. The unique quality of Russian messianism—so potent that it may almost be viewed as a fever in their Russian blood, at once the source of their glory and of their infirmity—lies in its profound appeal to national culture and consciousness, an appeal far in excess of the messianic impulse which animates other churches within the Orthodox embrace.

In its early phases—the period when Moscow was known as "the third Rome"—that messianic fervor was fed by the lure of vast Asiatic land masses and their measureless populations ripe for conversion. In the period following the French Revolution, Europe awoke sharply to the presence of its formidable rival to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the east, an awareness long in coming. With the establishment of the Soviet state, that same historical messianism—once primarily a religious phenomenon—claimed for itself not only the rational motivation of an ideology, but also relied on an already established organizational base and form. The Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev discerned the essential nature of this transition, when he perceived in Bolshevism a transformed mutation of Russian messianism.

With the dismantling of the czarist state and its reconstitution as a Soviet state, changes occurred not only in the form and exercise of power and ownership but also in what was envisioned as the global destiny of Russia. From the very beginning, the stage had been set for the messianic thrust to operate within a global design, powered by a concrete political foundation. Soviet Russia, as well as the Soviet state, were mobilized as ideological centers of the international communist movement. Stalin and his successors accelerated the process, promoting the evolution of an imperial military center of revolutionary agitation and party oligarchy. We can see now that such an evolution was natural, even inevitable—but determined less by the despotic Asiatic legacy that had preceded it than it was by the nature of the Leninist bureaucratic machine.

For such a bureaucracy, the maintenance of its essential internal monopoly was not possible without the parallel mission of global "liberation"—that is, without expansionism, and expansionism of a predominantly military kind. This new imperative was without precedent in the old czarist Russia, which neither commanded such force nor entertained such aspirations. The Soviet state had been founded upon the infallible assumption that its own consolidation would be accompanied by the inevitable disintegration of the capitalist and colonial worlds. That assumption has, in many ways, been confirmed, although the Soviet Union has by no means abandoned or retreated from its policy of exploitation and expansionism. What has happened is that the Soviet state has assigned to its imperial designs superficially new and even more deceptive variations on a theme.

Within the space of several generations, Russia has grown from a semi-feudal, semi-colonial nation into an industrial superpower, with a ruling class that derives its authority from the military sector while concentrating on the development of heavy industry, which has always been a priority for the architects of the Soviet state. Even though the Soviet Union must acknowledge one of the lowest living standards per capita in the community of major

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powers, it remains the largest producer of steel, oil, coal and quite possibly armaments. With its development of atomic weapons, it has achieved an unassailability that projects it, without qualification, into the status of being the other superpower.

The Soviet Union as we see it today—essentially incapable of internal change, bound by its mandate of external expansion—will survive as long as its ruling class can maintain itself without erosion. That class is quite without illusion that the West, and particularly the United States, is about to abandon the profit motive and the goal of technological progress as fundamental components of *its* ideology. Hence, one cannot anticipate the emergence of somewhat more reasonable and moderate persons and modes of thought among the members of the ruling class. Should such an event occur, it will be predicated upon the fortuitous interplay of power currents, and not upon any sense of the need for a desirable change—such as a more pragmatic or "Western" mode of thought.

The same mentality dictates basic Soviet policy in the matter of aggression—nothing will blunt its imperial thrust toward expansion except vigilant and permanent containment from the outside. The present distribution of military forces in the Western and nonaligned worlds, the internal economic preoccupations and consumer orientation of those same worlds, and the reality of an underdeveloped China afford small hope that, in the near future, the U.S.S.R. will confront any implacable barrier of containment.

With the rise of the Soviet state, the world entered into an epoch of ideological irrationalism and hitherto unimaginable strategies of aggression. The futility of logical, sociological or historical efforts at unraveling this Gordian knot is evident, even when such attempts have afforded us some valuable insights. Those who wish to live in an order of freedom different from that determined by the Soviet design must, in the final analysis, rely on the power of unfettered reason, a clarified intellectual fortitude and the painful necessity of armed readiness.

III

In 1968, at a dinner given in my honor in New York, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger were among those present. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dominated the moment, and we were all more or less in agreement that the Marxist-Leninist ideology could be officially considered moribund. Since then, that ideology has shown no sign of resuscitation or vitality. Yet I think now that a more penetrating analysis on that occasion would have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revealed that an ideology—even one as debased and immoral as the Soviet form—does not exhaust itself quite so simply, nor yield itself with such readiness to inevitable dissolution.

The foundation of the Soviet ideology is utopian, and there will be adherents to a utopian fantasy—even one as ostensibly "scientific" as the Soviet one—as long as there are human beings willing to embrace it with faith and sacrifice. We may also speculate that there will always be a Marxist-Leninist ideology as long as there are Soviet "true believers," and particularly those for whom there are realistic possibilities for the control and monopoly of power within an ideological bureaucracy. The "scientific" base of the ideology is not what commands their loyalty, nor potential discoveries waiting to be disclosed within the matrix of Marxist and Leninist thought. What motivates such persons is an aspiration toward total power and domination of the political apparatus—a reality far more vital and sustaining than the rigor mortis of an intellectual system paralyzed and ossified at its very inception.

In his exclusive reliance on scientific truth, and his conviction that he was creating a social science, Marx called into being an ideology—a doctrine available as an instrument for action. But when he set the final stroke on his creation, he also negated the possibility of criticism. Those Marxists who have succeeded Marx did not and could not add anything essential to his monolithic formulation; they command attention only as popularizers and practitioners. All attempts to "develop" Marxism, to enrich or "open" it, have foundered; the result, invariably, is abandonment. Yet the foundations of Marxist ideology have remained immutable—its persistence confirmed as a "scientific" religion, or pseudo-religion, to be used or adapted in spite of deviations imposed by circumstance.

In this immutability—the conviction that its ideology embodies ultimate scientific truth—lies the apparent paradox of the longevity of Marxism. Marxism is ideologically immortal; the party bureaucracy needs confirmation of its own political immortality—hence the ideal cohesion of ideology and party bureaucracy—until the State withers away! In theory, that same party bureaucracy could subscribe to another, non-Marxist ideology, contingent only on the security that such an alternative would consolidate and affirm its perpetual existence. (During World War II, at Tito's headquarters, I had a conversation with General Korneyev, the chief of the Soviet military mission. He observed that during the early success of Hitler's forces in Russia, the political leadership

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Soviet Union had toyed with the notion of introducing Eastern Orthodoxy as an ideological rallying point. However incomprehensible this may seem to us now, we must recollect that, at the time, the U.S.S.R. was in mortal peril.) The seduction and even genius of Marxism lies in its capacity to lend itself to any contingency, yet retaining all the appearance of immutable truth.

The Soviet system together with other variants of communism reveal their essential hypocrisy when they advance in power and strength. Then, they do not have the need for ideology as an organizing force to the degree that they did in their earlier, more primitive states. What they require, rather, are pretexts—to maintain their internal control and to mislead "foreign" public opinion. Without such pretexts, the Soviet system would be wholly adrift, without foundation. For that alone, ideology is crucial and must be sustained. And the sense of ideological struggle—even combat—will remain an integral part of whatever divisions occur within the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds.

Precisely because the Marxist-Leninist ideology is the commanding doctrine of bureaucratic party power, legitimate divisions among the various communist countries—discrete national developments—ideally should be subdued to a more or less compatible interpretation. So it is that, while all adhere officially to the "scientific method," revisionism remains a constant hazard, and today it is virtually impossible to find anyone in the Soviet constellation who is not a "revisionist" in the eyes of someone else. Yet even as we have seen communism disintegrate as a global movement, its unity of organization in gradual decline, we have observed no flagging in loyalty to the "doctrine." Doctrinal differences, often feigned, are still visible, but they serve now only to conceal the aspirations of one party or another to supremacy and rule. All remain faithful communists, and yet each party claims to be the chosen one.

The most notable instances of this paradox, of course, have been, on the one hand, the rupture between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—a small country struggling to maintain its independence—and on the other, the violent break between the Soviet Union and China—a major power seeking to play an appropriate role on the world stage. There are, to be sure, other examples of communist parties which have refused to follow the official Soviet line. Indeed, I feel that the number of conflicts between communist states will probably increase in the future—we are already witness to the dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between Ethiopia and Somalia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But certain realities are indisputable and of first importance in assessing the present and future situation:

(1) Not a single communist country, or its communist party—even those countries and parties which have quarreled with the Soviet Union—has ever abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology, or the political tenet of a power monopoly. Although communism as we confront it today is not exclusively a phenomenon of Russian origin, its essential nature has not altered. Mere separation from the Soviet "fortress of global communism" does not negate its reality as communism. This observation is especially pertinent in the present situation, because we should not exclude the theoretical possibility that some future communist faction would adopt ideological pluralism as a weapon in its struggle for survival.

(2) Ruptures and fluctuations within communism have not, at least until now, weakened the independent movements. Indeed, they may suggest the nature of even deeper, qualitative national mutations to come.

(3) The solicitation of support from foreign communist parties, while not negligible, has become a less important element in Soviet foreign policy. The disarray of world communism finds the Soviet Union today, under Brezhnev, in a condition of relative internal bureaucratic stability; externally, not only is the climate propitious for expansion—it positively clamors for it. Paradoxically, in the wake of its decline as an international ideology and movement, communism has infused with a new vitality the inevitable tendency of the Soviet state toward global expansion.

IV

In essence, the Soviet state is an imperial military system combining internal inefficiency with a thrust toward expansion, and like all those empires preceding it, condemned by its secrecy and stagnation to decay. Its drive toward expansion can be restrained only by forces that would alter the system—redirect it toward issues and problems that are non-messianic in nature. At present, no such forces are apparent; those minor currents which would foster or promote change through reform are fragmentary, almost nonexistent.

I should remark here that the notion of rot or decay, as well as that of stagnation, is to be interpreted relatively. Certainly, the "system" is changing, perhaps even "improving," as new life may sprout from the decline of living forms; that was evident even during Stalin's pitiless era, when something of life's richness and diversity survived. Yet as long as the system remained closed to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alien or foreign influence, the process of change was arrested. Whenever new rulers, usually to secure their position, permitted a fugitive glimpse of the world outside, they inadvertently opened a Pandora's box of "foreign" ideas and sentiments. Much as Marx predicted, dissident views—in the Soviet Union as well as in other East European countries—multiplied like vermin within the system. In the oppressed countries under Soviet dominion, almost all dissident voices of what I prefer to call the opposition are aimed at Soviet hegemony; in the Soviet Union, they are directed against the system itself. In the present context, I shall limit myself to commenting on the significance of such currents.

It is my view that, given the present balance of world power, the prospects for any emerging new order or radical change in the structure of the Soviet state and its satellites are neither realistic nor propitious. Quite simply: in the absence of that revolutionary turmoil which is an inevitable prelude to military confrontation, and as long as the Soviet system continues to seek fresh opportunities for expansion, it is my conviction that East European countries will find the Soviet yoke unbreakable, and the possibility of any decisive internal change futile.

Yet it would be cruelly myopic and debilitating of the noncommunist world to discount or dismiss as negligible these oppositional currents—and especially those within the Soviet Union—simply because of their lack of power. Nothing ever happens in this world of ours without its echo in the most distant corners. The contemporary West, infected as it is with a profound surfeit of pragmatism, and stifled by concern for its own security and material prosperity, too easily forgets that life on our planet is all of a piece, the suffering and hope of one affecting the destiny of all.

The great significance of dissenting voices in the Soviet Union is that they represent a current of permanent opposition, impossible to uproot. Born out of backwardness and oppression, dissent embodies a negation of the system. It offers concrete, vital proof that all such monolithic systems are transient and that the "scientific" belief in the possibility of building a "perfect society" has failed.

Moreover, in their susceptibility to influences from the outside, these dissident manifestations undermine the fatalistic, slave-like sense of an immutable unity and design in the social order. They hint at the alternative vision of a superior world, without which peoples, as well as nations, may lose or abandon their identity. Doubtless, too, they act as vigilant agents of scrutiny, unmasking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the monopoly of ideological power as a pretext for the exercise of license and unearned privilege. Their presence checks the arrogance of office, compelling rulers to observe at least a minimal civility and respect, and sustaining patriots and idealists in their consistency and determination. Even though the process of fermentation they have initiated is only in its earliest phase—which may explain some of the fragility and contradictory nature of dissident policies and positions—the impact of that process is ultimately to weaken the ideological imperialism of the Soviet Union. Although the internal presence of such forces cannot change the East, they contribute to mobilizing spiritual unity in the West, and as such, they must be seen as one of the harbingers of the future.

V

It is an act of partial and incomplete imagination to single out Yugoslavia as the first socialist state to wrest its autonomy from Soviet dominion. Rather, Yugoslavia should be regarded as an example of how any communist state, or any communist party, in breaking with the Soviet Union, must inevitably acquire its uniqueness and move toward the realization of its potential national destiny.

The "moral crisis" in communist parties, provoked by Stalin's onslaught against Yugoslavia in 1948, developed into a current of national resistance after Stalin's death in 1953. It is appropriately seen as only one of the events that altered the balance of internal powers within any given bureaucratic structure. It also imposed on certain communists the necessity for an adjustment and reinterpretation of their conception of communism; in some instances, it changed the perception of communism itself. Within various communist parties, and under certain conditions, the national component became the dominant one. Internationalism, equated with fealty toward the Soviet Union and hitherto one of the most sacred—if not *the* most sacred—of Marxist-Leninist dogmas, began to crumble.

The new reality was understandably accompanied by the illusion that some countries and parties would undergo radical internal change. This did not happen, even in Yugoslavia, where perhaps the greatest changes occurred. Stalin's adherents in 1948—disillusioned and without a line of succession—could not emerge as supreme in the ruling structure without Soviet intervention—an intervention for which the only pretexts might have been "defense against imperialism," "socialist community" and the like. Such transparent motivations for aggression were out of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the question at the time, and hence the Stalinist old guard had no alternative but to compromise.

What happened was a mellowing of ideological disputes between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In time, ideology became an instrument of pressure and attack, a means of bargaining and jockeying for power in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Yet the essence of the conflict remained constant: the struggle between a great, hegemonic national power and a small state sharply aware of its habitual jeopardy. Tito, understanding this reality, retreated pragmatically from the ideological dispute and continued to maintain firm bonds in interstate relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. If it had escaped this apparent renewal of ideological cooperation, Yugoslavia might have enjoyed a happier fate. But—as a communist state—it could not reject the Soviet acknowledgment of Stalin's "mistakes" without isolating itself within the communist fold.

Yugoslavia's political system, and especially its "ideological loyalty," prevented it from seeking any considerable support in the West, and above all in Europe. Instead, it found a "natural" refuge in affinity with the Nonaligned Movement. Because of its delicate position, Yugoslavia subscribed to and often eagerly initiated "anti-imperialist" declarations, because such calls for agitation and intervention elsewhere posed no real danger to it, while serving to strengthen and confirm its independent neutrality vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The Soviets monitored all these stratagems keenly, especially those involving the less-developed countries and those parties enlisted in the Nonaligned Movement. Emphasis on the anti-imperialist motif had prepared the ground for the Soviets, and they promptly focused on those situations offering them the widest range of opportunities. The Havana Conference of Nonaligned States in 1979 was one such occasion, and with the aid of the "leftist" states, the Soviets penetrated it easily. At the same time that the unity of the movement was preserved symbolically by a universal agreement to adhere to "basic principles"—a condition on which the Yugoslavs had insisted most emphatically—recognition of the pro-Soviet "faction" and justification of pro-Soviet interventions steadily gained ground. The final declarations of nonalignment, drawn up with the active participation of Cuba and Vietnam, incorporated the pro-Soviet ethos and dynamics of revolution.

At present, Yugoslavia confronts a political vacuum. It is hardly threatened by Soviet ideology, since it shares a basic kinship with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it. Yet I would not want to leave an impression that the "ideological danger" for Yugoslavia is negligible, or that the "ideological advantage" of the Soviet Union is insignificant. Both adhere to a monopolistic ideology, and in times of crisis, such as the present one, this may weaken and confuse the smaller state.

The latest tide of Soviet expansionism, which is taking place predominantly through ventures in the underdeveloped countries, took Yugoslavia by surprise. Like many small powers in the Nonaligned Movement, its ability to detect and arrest the subtle erosion of national security had already been critically sapped by an enormous number of empty and indisputably uncontroversial declarations. And expansionism always provides an opportunity for the larger power to create an "ideological fifth column." The need to "bolster socialism" and maintain its monopoly will inevitably accompany internal weakness in the state, one which may lead to the absorption of smaller communist states by stronger ones of more expansionist design. Such was the sequence of events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with respect to the political strategy of the Soviet Union. We can also see it happening now in Afghanistan, as well as in Cambodia vis-à-vis the Vietnam regime. The "leading role" is always assigned to those who symbolically represent national autonomy; but it is shared with those "internationalists" whose criterion invariably is measured by the yardstick of loyalty to the Soviet Union. I see no reason why Yugoslavia should prove an exception to this rule.

Like other states in similar predicaments, Yugoslavia has sought salvation in the traditional balancing of one great power against another. In time of peace, even the great powers will tolerate such policies. But when global equilibrium itself is eroded by the disorders of expansionism, such a balancing act exposes itself to risks, which in turn increase the vulnerability of whatever internal stability exists. Balance derives from position, and that position is as important and delicate as the equilibrium. The fate of Yugoslavia has already taken on more weight with the escalation of Middle Eastern crises; by the same token, its vulnerability increases as each new Soviet military buildup adds to the *dis*equilibrium of Europe. Yugoslavia cannot escape its destiny as a focus of Soviet attention and vital interest. One has only to imagine the presence of the Soviet army on the Adriatic, flanked by an unstable Italy, and a Greece and Turkey habitually at odds. Within that perspective, the critical importance of Yugoslavia to any Soviet domination of the Mediterranean, and ultimately of Europe, becomes obvious.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meanwhile, Soviet attempts to undermine Yugoslav independence continue, although superficially they may appear negligible in the chronicle of global disorders. In the ranks of international communism, factional attacks persist with predictable regularity on what is called Yugoslav anti-Sovietism and "revisionism." Until recently, subversion has been more visible in the Nonaligned Movement, when Cuba and Vietnam joined to censure Yugoslav opposition to the Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia.

But if these Soviet maneuvers are essentially surreptitious, pressures exerted by some neighboring countries are loud, forceful and anything but discreet. The role of principal goad has been assigned to Bulgaria, which is insistent on laying claim to the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as Bulgarian territory. Unlike most other East European governments, the Bulgarian party bureaucracy proclaims its "organic ties" to the Soviet Union with a vocal relentlessness that is embarrassing even to the Soviets themselves. In the initial phases of the Bulgarian assault, the Soviet government was eager to let it be assumed that the Bulgarian claim represented an independent national policy of that country. During these last few years, however, the rules of the game have shifted, as the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact members now overtly support Bulgaria's demand. It has been a long-standing Bulgarian tradition to seek the support of great powers in implementing its goal of aggressive hegemony in the Balkans. Now it would seem that Bulgaria is enraptured with the fantasy of replicating in the Balkans the role assumed by Vietnam in Indochina.

Independently of this, but timing its actions to fortify Bulgarian pretensions, the Albanian government is agitating for annexation of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. So potent is the thrust of this nationalism—however fragmentary—that Yugoslav territories dominated by an Albanian population have seen a mass exodus of the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities. We may expect further unrest and continued Albanian interference to be waiting in the wings for the most opportune moment. And these are only the more serious frictions which might escalate into full-blown conflict between Yugoslavia and its most aggressive neighbors.

In addition to these external crises, we must confront the growing accumulation of internal problems which add to the increasing instability of the present social and political order. The structural crises of the Yugoslav economy are part and parcel of the international economic crisis. However, Yugoslav difficulties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in this area have commanded little attention on the world scene, and, in consequence, little has been done to mitigate them. Agriculture still suffers from the neglect into which it fell through an ideological refusal to strengthen the independence of the individual farmer. That fear has hampered the momentum of the economy as a whole. In the industrial sphere, inefficient and cumbersome management has prevented production from attaining its full capacity. The deficit in trade is chronic, amounting to over $5 billion last year, with an estimated debt of approximately $15 billion. Unemployment—in a population of roughly 22 million—runs above 700,000 despite the reality of over a million Yugoslavs working in Western Europe. Even the controlled channels of information have often reported the inefficiency of governmental and party organs, and their failure to take corrective measures—for example, against a wide disregard for price controls. Even the League of Communists has become less selective, numbering now about 1,800,000 members. This increase in "popularity" has gone hand in hand with a decline in "effectiveness."

The outline of what is already the post-Tito era is visible chiefly in the design of his program for collective leadership within the country. The relations between Yugoslav republics are formally regulated, and divergent tendencies, even when suppressed, may be counted on to emerge again at some time or other—either in the economy or within the sphere of ideas. The campaign to implement collective leadership is said to be progressing smoothly, but that may be an illusion; reports persist of disagreement within the top echelon, suggesting the existence of specific conflicts. A federal system, even if it is based upon the strictest equality, rarely functions efficiently on the basis of political centralism. It is probable that as the tide of internal problems and external dangers rises, differences of opinion will sharpen rather than modify. Moreover, the prospect of durability for collective leaderships has never been a sanguine one. All the more difficult, then, to entertain the hope that Yugoslavia will prove an anomaly—especially in view of anticipated tensions within the communist bloc, the absence of mutually agreed-upon national programs and goals, and the specter of Soviet expansionism, avidly hovering over all.

I have not, in this article, sought to evaluate the significance of Yugoslavia on the world stage, or to posit any opinion as to whatever contribution it might make to European stability. I have described only my personal vision, and shared my views of some possible—but not unavoidable—eventualities which may take place within the somber shadow of an expanding Soviet state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fritz Stern

GERMANY IN A SEMI-GAULLIST EUROPE

> On the all-important question of Germany's future, my mind was made up. First of all, I believed that it would be unjust and dangerous to revise the de facto frontiers which the wars had imposed on her. . . . Furthermore, the right to possess or to manufacture atomic weapons—which in any case she had declared her intention to renounce—must in no circumstances be granted to her. This being so, I considered it essential that she should form an integral part of the organized system of cooperation between States which I envisaged for the whole of our continent. In this way the security of all nations between the Atlantic and the Urals would be guaranteed, and a change brought about in circumstances, attitudes and relationships which would doubtless ultimately permit the reunion of the three segments of the German people.
>
> —Charles de Gaulle
> *Memoirs of Hope*

The Afghanistan crisis has dramatized and intensified antecedent changes and strains in the Western alliance. There was unanimous, if separate, condemnation of Soviet aggression, but there were also divergent, and often acrimoniously divergent, assessments of the causes of aggression and the nature of the challenge. The difficulties of orchestrating a common response or of at least preventing a discordant one suggest a new balance of forces within the alliance and a set of divergent interests.

In essence, the leadership of a weakened America is being challenged by a more independent Europe, led by an ever more important Franco-German condominium. The European, especially the German, commitment to détente is formidable. The Federal Republic, closest ally of both America and France and at the same time the much-wooed, much-threatened, privileged partner of the U.S.S.R., clearly emerges as the principal actor next to the United States. With one overriding loyalty—to the Western alliance—it also feels the pull of its other and conflicting ties.

Fritz Stern is Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University, and the author of *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire* and other works. He lectured and travelled in Western and Eastern Europe in early 1979 on a project for the Ford Foundation, and paid another long visit there in early 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The balance between unity and discord is precarious. There are not only substantive differences between the United States and its European allies; there is—at least on the nongovernmental level—a growing impatience on both sides. The roots of discord go deep; to ignore or underestimate the shifts of power and attitudes might heighten the dangers of drifting apart. In the past, an external threat has always served to unite the alliance. Now we cannot count on the automatic reappearance of solidarity. As the alliance enters a period of likely crisis, it may be useful to try to assess some of the changes of power and spirit that have taken place on the West European side in the recent past.

II

The Western alliance is unprecedented in modern history. A voluntary association of unequal nations, it has survived three decades of intense change and crisis. The alliance reflects a fundamental reality of world politics: the U.S.S.R. presents a danger to Western Europe which only the United States can successfully deter. This has been the heart of the alliance, whatever the strains and competing interests within it.

The edifice of the alliance still seems solid; the political landmarks have proven remarkably stable. Europe remains partitioned between a Soviet-led consortium of malfunctioning and repressive societies on the one side, and an American-protected group of still liberal, still prosperous countries on the other. Soviet prudence and allied deterrence have given Europe a nearly unique respite from war. But the fundamental pillar of that postwar order, weakened for over a decade, was visibly shaken by 1979: the belief in American power, American resolution and American capability.

My impressions, based in part on what I heard and observed in Western and Eastern Europe in the first half of 1979, would lead me to suggest that a growing European apprehension about America hardened at about that time into a new assessment of this country, an assessment that, to some extent, paralleled changes in our own mood. The coinciding, moreover, of a perceived American decline and a resurgent German strength brought about a brief reemergence of what used to be called, and in 1979 was called again, the German Question, the "whither Germany" that by and large we had not heard for so long because Germany was thought to be inflexibly anchored in the Western alliance, a voluntary captive of it. In some quarters, there was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apprehension that German assertiveness bespoke a renewed ambition for finding ways for reunification.

In addition, in many continental countries, including the very ones that we had for so long assumed to be staunch partisans of the alliance, Denmark, say, or Holland, a new sentiment about East-West relations emerged. To its proponents this sentiment is far from appeasement; it connotes a desire that as little as possible should be done to disturb relations between Eastern and Western Europe, that that division in some distant future may yet be healed. These trends suggest a drift of sentiment away from an American-led alliance and toward a growing Europeanization of Europe—though, as we will see, without firmness, without structure, without clearly defined aim even.

We know that perceptions matter, that they inform and shape political decisions. Power, until tested in battle or crisis, is the perception of potentiality. It combines an assessment of capability, which can be quantified, and the assessment of will and cohesion which eludes exact reckoning.[1] In absolute terms, America today is stronger militarily than ever before; even in relative terms, it has parity and the potential for more. But perception and self-perception have changed radically. In 1979 it was widely believed that what used to be called "American exceptionalism" had vanished—or, to put it somewhat quaintly, that *fortuna* had forsaken us.

In assessing Europe's views, we must remember that the Europeans are anything but disinterested observers of America's fortunes. Their perceptions are distorted by the projection of their own interests and fears. They have grown too strong for their continued weakness. For the time being, they are unwilling to make the costly effort of creating their own credible military deterrent. They resent their dependence on the United States for security; increasingly that dependence is becoming a self-inflicted psychological burden. The unease about one's own ineffectuality or lack of autonomy grows worse as one has doubts about the strength and will of one's protector.

For the Europeans, the overthrow of the Shah, coming as it did on the heels of Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Africa, dramatized America's enfeeblement. Perhaps better attuned to calamity than the Americans, and, in any case, more vulnerable to Middle East upheavals, the Europeans quickly perceived the Shah's fall as a political disaster of the first magnitude—which did not prevent

[1] On this issue, see Michael Howard's profound and disturbing essay, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the French from playing their own, almost habitual, game of *sauve qui peut.* In February and March of last year, usually irenic Europeans clamored for some American riposte, for some sign of strength: they were alarmed by what they saw as American passivity. European clamor for action was wrong, I think; the sense of a dramatic change was correct.

And in the face of it, a President who in late February 1979 could say "on balance the trends have not been adverse to our country" invited disbelief. Europeans worried over what they took to be America's post-Vietnam refusal to take risks in defense of vital interests. There was of course a more direct concern as well: if the Shah with his immense strategic and economic assets could so easily be washed away, would other friends or allies of the United States fare better?

Apprehensions and uncertainties compounded real differences of interest and policy. In the economic realm, too, perceptions have changed ever since the early 1970s. The United States, it is argued, remains hideously wasteful; it lives off its deficit, flooding the world with depreciating dollars, endangering the world fiscal system, not for its own profit but out of its inability to solve domestic problems. We have done far too little to reduce our dependence on foreign oil or to curtail our disproportionate consumption. It is not only Helmut Schmidt who is outraged by what—in his milder moments—he calls America's abdication of fiscal leadership or responsibility. The United States, once the pillar of the postwar economic order, is now viewed as its disrupter, pursuing policies inimical to itself and to its allies.

At the same time, the credibility of America's military capability is being questioned.[2] At a point of nuclear parity, the old Gaullist suspicion that the United States would not risk its cities for the defense of Berlin or Hamburg has taken on new plausibility. It is generally thought that the Soviet Union has made significant strides in all aspects of its military power, nuclear and conventional, land and sea power, while the United States has lagged behind in modernizing its forces. Its volunteer army is often thought to be deficient in will and training. Most people do not calculate the relative power of sophisticated weapons; they reckon by trends and demonstrated capabilities. The Soviets have dem-

[2] In a public opinion poll in 1978, 35 percent of Germans asked thought that the Warsaw Pact had a greater military potential; 14 percent saw NATO ahead; 47 percent saw them as equal. See "The American Shield: How Others See It Today," *Public Opinion*, March-May 1979, pp. 10–17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

onstrated their capability, especially their capacity to airlift large numbers of troops with extraordinary speed and precision.

At the same time, Europeans have worried that a weaker United States is pursuing a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union. They believed that the drift of policy and mood was away from détente, that the Carter Administration had begun with considerable skepticism about détente, and that by the end of 1979 a popular anti-Soviet mood had gained much ground in America. The Europeans have been concerned about this cooling of relations—just as they worry about excessive warmth; basically, they would like to set the thermostat themselves. Europeans are skeptical about our policy toward the Middle East; they see Camp David as a dead end and would like the United States to pressure Israel to meet what they increasingly regard as legitimate Arab demands. Some Third World countries, notably in the Middle East, have tried to tempt the Europeans into a greater show of independence. Too close an identification with a maligned and partially weakened superpower may not be the most popular stance at the moment.

There have been strains in the alliance before, doubts about the steadfastness of American policy. But at the present juncture, divergent interests coincide with a new perception of the United States: Europeans now worry not merely over American policy, but over the polity itself. It is no longer a matter of the often ill-tempered irritation with President Carter's style or inconsistency; in 1979 Europeans worried that America may have become a crippled giant, an imperial power with structural flaws that make consistent policy difficult.

For a decade and a half—since the assassination of President Kennedy—Europeans saw successive crises in America as so many temporary dislocations of American power, temporary distempers of an essentially healthy body. In 1979 Europeans began to worry whether there is a constitutional debility in America in which, for example, the continued malfunctioning of relations between executive and legislative leads to constant stalemates on economic policy. Has the separation of powers become a dissipation of power? Are the strains in civil society—underlying racial conflict, economic malfunctioning, criminality and drug addiction—perhaps signs of a profound disability that could weaken American leadership for years to come?

The change in perspective can also be seen in another light: in the immediate postwar period, the United States was a superpower

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that excelled in all realms. Its military might was buttressed by unmatched scientific talent, by a dynamic and unsurpassed economy, by a restrained and steadfast statesmanship, and by a naïve effusion of ideals. American power impressed, but so did, American promise. America has lost some of the model quality. Today it is looked upon as a superpower, selectively strong.

Europe's leaders today are essentially pro-American; their political attitudes were formed in the heyday of American promise. They are not ideologically estranged from America; indeed, they have an affinity for the dynamic rhythm of American life, for its vitality, its openness. They were pained by Carter's public musings last summer that the country was suffering from some kind of malaise, some crisis of confidence. They too believed in American exceptionalism. Disappointed lovers make harsh judges. The present apprehensiveness of thoughtful Europeans recalls what Richard Hofstadter wrote in 1969: "The nation seems to slouch onward into its uncertain future like some huge inarticulate beast, too much attainted by wounds and ailments to be robust, but too strong and resourceful to succumb."[3]

It is important to recognize that the present criticism of the United States is categorically different from earlier moralizing or snobbery. It is often the voices of friends who fear for our future—and for theirs, which is so directly tied to ours. There are Americans who would respond with some vehemence: if you are so concerned about our strength, why not pay the price of greater strength yourself? There will be growing and perhaps self-defeating American impatience at what will be perceived as European reluctance to assume their share of the burden or indeed to assume their proper responsibilities. But our first concern here is to understand European perceptions of America, not to record the strident voices and often justified complaints in the present transatlantic dialogue.

III

The growing doubt about America, the different assessment of détente, the Europeanization of Europe—all these changes seem to approximate de Gaulle's vision. It is odd that this man, so stubbornly rooted in the past, should still cast his shadow across our path. He had always sought a more European Europe, more independent of the United States, about whose reliability *in*

[3] Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, eds., *American Violence*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p. 43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extremis he had some real and some feigned doubts. He had hoped via détente, and by loosening his ties to the United States and creating his own special ties to the U.S.S.R., to widen French maneuverability. He wanted a Europe of national states, each true to its particular historic character and destiny, each jealous of its own interests. This being so, he envisioned a role of leadership for France, possibly transmuted into a kind of Franco-German condominium; he abhorred a federal or an Atlanticized Europe. He thought that France and perhaps the other nations of Europe should seek a more active presence in the Third World, especially in the Middle East, and one independent of the United States. He expected that national interests and historic identity would in time allow for a new relation with Eastern Europe, despite the enmity of two opposing social systems. Given his nationalist premises, he had to believe that Germany could not remain divided forever—though any revision of the status quo could be pushed to a reassuringly distant future. He took France out of NATO's integrated command, secure in the knowledge that the survival of the alliance depended in any case on its will to defend France, however autonomous or selfish French policy might be.

To speak of a semi-Gaullist Europe today is intended in part as irony. De Gaulle expected that his Europe would be born out of will and ambition, out of his kind of leadership and vision. The changed attitudes of 1979 were more the product of drift and apathy, of circumstances imposing policies rather than of policies being consciously fashioned. De Gaulle's Europe was to be a Europe of strong nations, secure in their material recovery; today's Europe huddles in precarious prosperity, its economic vulnerability demonstrated by the oil embargo of 1973 and OPEC's subsequent decisions. Its political regimes are shaky, its sense of purpose is muted, its youth disaffected—"fragments floating in the here and now," as Stanley Hoffmann has called his somber analysis of Europe.[4] A Europe of creeping protectionism is in the grips of a Gaullism by default, a selective Gaullism, without grandeur, an improvised, depressed adaptation to unfavorable circumstances.

Neither the perception of American weakness nor of Soviet strength has prompted a new European resolve or initiative. The political construction of Europe has made little progress. The much-touted popular elections to the European Parliament were intended to infuse new life into the Community, but the campaign itself was marked by apathy or purely national concerns. Even its

[4] Stanley Hoffmann, "Fragments Floating in the Here and Now," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, pp. 1–26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rhetoric was remarkably restrained. The reality is continued difficulties within the EEC, as the new Parliament battles the Commission over the budget, as Britain seeks major adjustments, as the forces of protectionism are everywhere on the increase. The EEC, moreover, is threatened by growth: the prospective adhesion of Greece, Spain and Portugal—whatever the long-term political benefits may be—will further weaken the internal functioning of the Community and further complicate the task of coordinating widely divergent national economies. The building of Europe on EEC foundations is not a part of today's agenda or imagination—another symptom of the semi-Gaullist condition of Europe.

Brussels is not Western Europe; it probably never was. What gives Western Europe a measure of cohesion—aside from the well-functioning machinery of political cooperation—is the unacknowledged condominium of France and Germany, symbolized and facilitated by the close personal ties between French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Today no major European initiative is taken without prior consultation and agreement between Paris and Bonn. The introduction of the European Monetary System, an effort to insulate Europe from the vagaries of the dollar, is but one example of the close collaboration between the two leaders and countries. The EEC provides needed machinery; the constant contacts between Schmidt and Giscard provide the living impulse. The two leaders have a sense of strategy and destiny; if given time, they may yet devise new structures and new supports, including military measures, for a much more independent Europe.

The personal equation of the two men is important, but the link between the two nations rests on deeper bases: on geography, on common interests, on the historical experience of enmity tried and attendant calamity, and finally, on the fact that the world outside appears fragile or inhospitable. The Paris-Bonn axis, dreamt of repeatedly in the last hundred years and hitherto never achieved, must contend with domestic troubles, with various resentments on both sides, but it does have an historic resonance and will not be easily supplanted by any other arrangement.

The Franco-German condominium has helped to contain a striking phenomenon of 1979: the sudden realization that the Federal Republic has come to play a much more important role, not just within the alliance, but on the world stage generally.[5] Even as the decline of America was incremental and at first not seen in any kind of historic dimension, so the new assertiveness of

[5] For one prescient discussion of the change, see David Watt, "The European Initiative," *Foreign Affairs*, "America and the World 1978," pp. 573, 587–88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the FRG was incremental, and it was largely in 1979 that observers became conscious that perhaps a permanent shift had occurred.

The FRG's presence was more fully felt in international organizations, in the councils of the alliance, in the Third World, in the East. In January 1979 at Guadeloupe, for the first time, the "Big Three" were enlarged to include the Germans; it would have been unthinkable not to include them. At that summit they were charged with a special mission in Turkey. German weight increased everywhere—and everywhere was sustained by an economy that seemed impervious to the ills of others. There was talk of "model Germany," of how others should try to emulate rather than resent German success.[6] Somewhere it became clear that West Germany had shaken off its reticence, its embarrassment at its own importance. And once again the Federal Republic had found the perfect leader for the new stance: Schmidt found his role of worldwide authority as natural to his temperament as Adenauer had found his role as reconciler with the West or Brandt his position of contrite authority vis-à-vis the East.

The Germans had not sought this new role. It was Allied, especially American faltering which led Germany to abandon its more modest role, its pretense at being no more than the "paymaster of Europe," the model member of the international scene. There was a vacuum of leadership and gradually the Germans began to discover that they had a role to play. As one diplomat put it: "Greatness was thrust upon Germany." And still the Germans thought to use the French connection in order, at least partially, to conceal that new greatness.

For the first time in history a German state has acquired power in what might be called a fit of absentmindedness. In some ways this still shields Germans from a realization of their own importance. At the very end of 1979, in a public opinion poll, most Germans thought the FRG was still a passive spectator in world affairs, and only 24 percent of those asked expected the FRG to be "the leading power in Western Europe by the end of the 1980s."

But if the German public has not caught up to present realities, its attitude to the past has changed. More and more, Germans have come to feel that the memories of past horrors should no longer constrain them from playing an active role in the world. A

[6] Take as but one example *The New York Times'* account of last year's meeting of the IMF and the World Bank: "But the West Germans also came with a message, which they were not too discreet in stating, that they represented, at least financially, the strongest power in Europe and that the rest of the world, particularly the United States, should accept the kind of discipline that had brought them their success." Clyde H. Farnsworth, "A Message from Germany," *The New York Times,* October 7, 1979, p. F17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

few months ago, Schmidt remarked that the memory of Hitler would continue to haunt Germany for decades to come. Most Germans, I think, would hold with Egon Bahr, Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party, who said in October: "Security for the 1980s—that is an extraordinary challenge to master new dangerous developments, already discernible today, and our participation in solving [these challenges] can be all the more active and uninhibited as the Germans incurred no more guilt in creating them than did all the other peoples." A somewhat unpersuasive statement—since history does not begin afresh at a given moment—but one representative of German sentiments: there is an impatience to be rid of the incubus of the past, to tackle the new problems—uninhibitedly.

In fact, today's West Germans are remarkably free of both nationalist sentiments and historical consciousness; given this simultaneous ebbing of once strong sentiments, it is not easy for them to define their identity or destiny. They are not even particularly conscious of the great and successful transformation they have lived through. Their attachment to the FRG is pragmatic; someday a later generation may look back on these first three decades as a period of unprecedented achievement in German history.

The Federal Republic, founded in 1949 as a deliberate *Provisorium*, has developed into the most democratic and the stablest society that the German nation has ever known. Its successes have been extraordinary: admittedly under favorable circumstances, it has resolved or diminished conflicts at home and abroad that had dogged Germany for the first half of the century or longer. In retrospect one could be tempted to think of this achievement as a triumph of design; in fact, much of it was improvisation, chance, almost somnambulistic success.

The class antagonisms and social divisions of earlier periods have been muted; the belated *embourgeoisement* of a part of the German nation was made possible by the so-called economic miracle of the 1950s, which, when one remembers the availability of foreign aid and of general European recovery, appears less miraculous than the FRG's economic performance since 1973, when its economy had to cope with worldwide contraction, stagflation, oil price explosion and increased competition. Throughout the 30 years, and on every level of government, the FRG has attracted higher political talent than any previous German regime. There have been scandals and failures; there has been justified concern over the initial response to terrorism; there is, I think, growing disaffection among the young—but the political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture as a whole has functioned remarkably well. And the power and resiliency of the West German economy remain extraordinary—though the Germans are worried lest contagion from abroad may yet decisively weaken it.

Reconciliation at home was paralleled by an unprecedented reconciliation abroad—also under a favorable constellation. By the late 1960s, a firmly integrated FRG, responsive to the Gaullist model, embarked on Ostpolitik, and by voluntarily recognizing the inviolability of existing frontiers and acknowledging the de facto statehood of the DDR (East Germany), it attained easier access to the DDR and Berlin. It sought, in the phrase of that time, "to save the substance of the nation."

Ostpolitik did promote reconciliation with the East, especially with Poland. To its proponents, it marked the liquidation of the past; skeptics, including Henry Kissinger and President Pompidou, thought that it could also mark the first step to an uncertain future. As Kissinger has recounted, Pompidou feared subsequent "nationalistic tendencies. . . . German nationalism might break forth again and, if through calamity it had learned patience, it might prove even more dangerous."[7]

IV

In the first few years of its existence, Ostpolitik seemed to justify the hopes of its proponents—reconciliation—and not the fears of its opponents, i.e., drift eastward or a loosening of Western ties.

But success usually imposes choices. Prosperity and power were bound at some point to pose basic questions. What is the national purpose? Can a divided Germany, given its national history, accept a Swiss-like future: prosperous and passive? Is greater concern with its national future not an almost inescapable burden for the FRG—and one that at the moment its neighbors may see more clearly than its own citizens?

In the spring of 1979, there was a sudden rush of speculation about the future orientation of the Federal Republic; it began at home and instantly acquired an independent life outside Germany. Two members of Helmut Schmidt's party, Egon Bahr and Herbert Wehner, both of whom had long favored a still more intensive eastern policy, again hinted at possible alternatives for German foreign policy and gave their utterances added meaning by mysterious travels eastward. *Der Spiegel* devoted a lead story to "the return of the German question"; in a front-page editorial the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* worried about the many rumors concerning

[7] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 422.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German fidelity. In October, Minister-President of Bavaria Franz Josef Strauss reiterated: "We will never accept the partition of the German nation into two states." Michel Jobert, former French Foreign Minister and quixotic super-Gaullist, warned about the possibility that America's China card could push the Soviets toward granting German reunification in exchange for neutralization—thus maligning all three principal partners of France at once. In November, Raymond Aron devoted a column to "German Unity," which he said "has now come back on the agenda." The signs of concern were unmistakable and endemic. By the end of the year, then, the question cropped up almost routinely in the press and in conversations in Western Europe. I heard echoes of it as well in the Soviet Union and Poland.

It seemed as if suddenly many Europeans had awakened to German power, presence and putative grievance—and sometimes confused greater German assertiveness and independence with some kind of imminent, dramatic reversal, some new premium set on reunification. In that extraordinary interlude in European history, that most recent, perhaps that last halcyon period from 1948 to 1973, one had assumed that reunification was a dead issue; indeed, that European peace was built on a permanently provisional solution of the German problem, i.e., the division of a country which in the 70 years of its unified existence had proven too strong for its assimilation into a European equilibrium. In the last year, more and more people have come to realize that the Federal Republic of Germany is not like any other state in the world: it is in fact the strongest state between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the state with the greatest national grievance. True, the Germans have foresworn unification by force; true also that the grievance has been muted, in part because its origin is inextricably linked to German guilt. National division *was* self-inflicted, but that to most Germans it is a grievous anomaly and some form of reunification remains a distinct, unclear and unarticulated goal—surely that should not surprise us.

In 1979 the outside world speculated on the possible adventurism of the FRG, on sudden reversals of fundamental alignments. At such moments, to make the implausible seem more plausible, the old specters of the Treaty of Rapallo or of the Hitler-Stalin Pact are invoked—to demonstrate that in the past such sudden reversals in Russo-German relations had been possible. This is to conjure up risible analogies, galling to Germans who, in any case, mind having their fidelity constantly suspected. (One German diplomat said to me not long ago: "If you suspect your wife long

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enough, she will succumb to temptation"—a well-intended warning that somehow came out as an infelicitous threat.) In 1922 and 1939 Germany sought Russian aid against a hostile West; today the FRG depends on its Western allies for its very existence and for its security against Russian aggression.

But to focus on the remote possibility of a radical *renversement* may be to blind people to the incremental changes that are taking place. The FRG will remain the strongest power of Europe west of the U.S.S.R. Increasingly, it will use its power to enhance or protect its special interests, and these special interests link it to both West and East, if in very different ways. Other powers need to understand the special role that détente and Ostpolitik play for the FRG and the dangers, remote but real, inherent in Germany's relation with the East.

V

As the most vulnerable, the most exposed, and in some ways the most aggrieved member of the alliance, Germany has a special stake in détente. The Soviet Union, the sole threat to the FRG, also holds the keys to maintaining its most important national priorities: the safety of Berlin and the preservation and extension of existing contacts with the DDR. The leaders of the FRG can never forget the other Germany nor can they forget that Berlin is their hostage to the U.S.S.R. *and* to the United States. Berlin marks the limits of independence. It is here that the Soviets can apply pressure which only the Western alliance can effectively counter.

Ostpolitik has succeeded in political, human and material terms, and even the opposition under Franz Josef Strauss has come to accept the substance of it. For the last few years, access to Berlin has not been an issue. Over 200,000 ethnic Germans have been allowed to leave Poland, the U.S.S.R. and other COMECON countries. According to rough German estimates, another three million of these former Germans remain in the East. (In a very real sense, these are hostages waiting to be freed by continued Ostpolitik.) Millions of West Germans have been allowed to visit the DDR, and a larger number of East Germans have traveled west than ever before. In purely humanitarian terms there has been a marked amelioration. Links between the German states on a familial level have grown significantly.

Relations between the two Germanies fluctuate, depending often on the degree of self-confidence that the DDR can muster.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The cultural presence of the FRG in the East is an obvious inconvenience to the Honecker regime, which has responded by a policy of "reinforced borders" (*Abgrenzung*) and by new laws last summer that were meant to inhibit if not interdict contacts between East German citizens and foreigners. In 1978, trade between the two Germanies amounted to DM 8.8 billion. But the FRG's economic presence was also felt in other ways: travel between the FRG and the DDR netted the latter a billion deutsche marks, and the projected Autobahn between Hamburg and Berlin will yield the East Germans another billion marks in hard currency. These sums make an essential difference to the functioning of the DDR economy. The FRG's unheralded aid to the DDR gives that country a margin of comfort—above and beyond what German socialism can provide for its own citizens. The FRG's hidden subventions to the DDR (of indirect help to the U.S.S.R., which imports some of its advanced technology from the DDR) and its open aid to West Berlin, where Bonn hopes that material largesse will counterbalance adverse demographic and cultural conditions, attest to its economic strength. Ostpolitik has made a significant difference to the well-being of both Germanies—and to the relations between them.

The signing of the Eastern treaties also ushered in a period of startling expansion of trade, especially between the FRG and the U.S.S.R. Between 1970 and 1976, while West German foreign trade doubled, its trade with the U.S.S.R. nearly quadrupled in value, while trade with Poland and Hungary increased at almost similar rates. In the first nine months of 1979, its exports to the U.S.S.R. exceeded those of the United States. In 1979, West German trade with the COMECON countries was almost as large as with the United States.

These figures tell but a part of the story. The expanding trade between the FRG and the U.S.S.R. follows the old historic character of German-Russian trade. The FRG has become by far the largest exporter of finished products to the U.S.S.R. of any Western country. In turn, it receives important raw materials from the Soviet Union, including roughly 25 percent of its imported natural gas under a long-term contract of 1974, large amounts of various metals and minerals, as well as 40 percent of its imports of enriched uranium. In all, more than 50 percent of German imports from the U.S.S.R. consist of fuel.

For some sectors of the German economy, exports to the U.S.S.R. have become critically important: in 1973, 48 percent of West German exports of pipes went to the U.S.S.R. In 1979, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exports of Hoechst, Mannesmann and Thyssen to COMECON countries amounted to four billion marks. At the present time, a consortium made up of German BP, Mannesmann and Thyssen is negotiating another long-term agreement for further deliveries of natural gas, and the anticipated cost of such a deal is $11.8 billion. German industry has a stake in the cultivation of the Soviet market—as do its workers. Ostpolitik has proven to be profitable and has built up its own broad constituency at home.

Beyond these hard, substantial facts, there is a kind of boundless lure about the possibilities of cooperation; the Soviets have long toyed with the hope of attracting West German technological expertise and credit that would help them unlock the riches of Siberia—in return for which Germany would get secure access to the newly discovered or exploited energy resources. The earlier natural gas contract, which is to run until the year 2000, suggests a pattern of complementarity. The Soviets are dazzled by German know-how, by German efficiency; if anything, they exaggerate German powers. The West Germans, in turn, dream of a vast market, and both sides can draw on memories of earlier German help to Russian modernization. There remains mutual need, and, on the German side, the race to ward off would-be competitors.

There are compelling reasons, then, for the FRG to try to defend its special stake in détente—quite aside from the political consideration that its survival is of great tactical importance for the present government coalition, which claims a kind of paternity for Ostpolitik. But the FRG will not seek any dramatic reversals; it will continue to cultivate its several ties, to protect its various interests. There is no group in German society that would favor adventurism or a return to what used to be called *Schaukelpolitik*, the perpetual game of tilting and jilting between East and West that characterized earlier periods of German foreign policy, especially during the 1920s. Geography, history and deep-rooted economic realities combine to make Germans conceive of themselves as constituting simultaneously a barrier and a bridge to the East. In the period of the cold war and the gradual rehabilitation of Germany, the role as barrier had priority; in a more nationalistic Europe, with a weakening America, the role as builder or guardian of bridges has come to seem more appropriate.

By whatever standards of past or present, the division of Germany is both unnatural and unalterable. The peace of Europe has been built on it; no one is likely to jeopardize the latter in order to repair the former. But in the minds of some there may be a dim hope: the division of Germany which in the past has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

symbolized and deepened the breach between the two Europes could perhaps also bring about a narrowing or bridging of that breach. For many a European leader, including, I believe, Helmut Schmidt, the eventual emergence of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is a dream—not for today or tomorrow, but as a vision of some future, so distant that it can barely touch policies today, but it could inform sentiment, it does represent a hope. The differences in social systems would diminish, the common interest, and, to some extent, the common past would come to the fore. In such a Europe there could be, not the old notion of West Germany annexing the East, but at least a much greater German cohesion.

VI

In the international revaluation of the FRG the Soviets have played a major role. For years the Soviets branded Bonn the hotbed of "revanchism." This was part of the prescribed orthodoxy of the Eastern bloc, and probably the one ideological plank that Russians, Poles and Czechs accepted alike. In the last few years the Kremlin abandoned that line and in its more active Westpolitik the FRG has become its central partner. In June 1978 Leonid Brezhnev formally acknowledged that relations between the FRG and the U.S.S.R. had become "one of the factors of stabilization and détente in Europe." In October of that year, the U.S.S.R. sent its top German specialist, Vladimir Semionov, as Ambassador to Bonn. Brezhnev's visit in May 1978 and his dramatic appeal from East Berlin in October 1979—announcing a unilateral reduction in the level of Soviet troops in the DDR and threatening the FRG if it accepted the American proposal for theater nuclear weapons—demonstrated the special place that Bonn occupies in Soviet policy. Both Bonn and Moscow will try to preserve something of that special tie—if only as some hope for the future.

The relationship between the U.S.S.R. and West Germany is of singular intensity; the Soviets know that they hold many cards in their hands and perhaps they hope that a more nationally inclined Germany will be drawn ever closer by the play of mutual advantages—until a point of no return is reached. For years the Soviets and the Germans have regarded each other as principal enemies and as possible partners. The Soviets have tried to woo and bully the West Germans, have made finely calibrated use of the carrot and the stick. They have used every opportunity recently to make the stick appear more formidable and the carrot more enticing.

Both partners have greatly benefited from a decade of close relations. For the Soviets, the FRG's economic and technological

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presence has been of great significance. But there are political considerations as well: by drawing the FRG and its European partners closer to the U.S.S.R., the Soviets must hope that the distance between the Europeans and the Americans widens. In the recent past, the Soviets have emphasized their historic roots in Europe and the common European interests: détente, SALT, trade—as against the hawkish, unpredictable, truculent Americans.

But the Soviets have paid for their revaluation of the FRG, and not only in regard to their own ideological purity. By accepting the implications of Ostpolitik they have opened the door to a certain interpenetration of the two alliances. They have allowed for a greater presence of the FRG in the Eastern empire, most especially in Poland and Hungary. Above all, they have complicated their own relations with the DDR, which remains their principal outpost and the main military bastion of the Warsaw Pact. The DDR itself is becoming more important to the Soviets (in Africa, in COMECON, in trade) and hence its continued internal insecurities, characterized by flickerings of dissidence and by a faltering economy, must be worrisome to the Soviets. The closer relations between Moscow and Bonn have a certain exemplary, hence limiting, effect on the DDR as well.

Up to a point, the Soviets will exploit every possibility of mischief as regards the Western alliance. But would the U.S.S.R. really want to see the FRG as the dominant power of a Europe that had regained a large measure of military autonomy, i.e., of a Europe where American influence and American constraints had significantly diminished? The Russo-German relationship has its clear limits on both sides, and there was cogency and historic resonance to the earlier, implicit Soviet-American bargain: you take care of your Germans and we take care of ours.

VII

It is not the purpose of this essay to chronicle or assess the complex diplomatic discussions that have engaged the United States and the Federal Republic, in particular, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Aghanistan at the turn of the year. One would judge that Helmut Schmidt and his Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, have from the first acted in broad support of an American position that has itself been unfolding in the face of an extraordinarily complex and difficult challenge. The Germans appear to have been clearly more cooperative than the French on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such crucial issues as a united policy on the export to the U.S.S.R. of high-technology items of conceivable military application. And on the question of the Olympics—despite some German irritation over the lack of consultation before the President committed himself firmly on January 20, and despite some differences in timing—I believe that the ultimate German position has been foreshadowed by Mr. Genscher's statement of early February: "We expect solidarity from the U.S. in Berlin, and we will not deny it in the question of the Olympics."

At the same time, the Federal Republic has joined with the rest of the European Community in urging the exploration of Soviet feelers concerning an ultimate neutralization of Afghanistan. Most Germans adhere to the position that détente in the European framework must be disrupted as little as possible. And there seems to be a German consensus that a sensible division of labor within the Alliance could preserve solidarity while recognizing special interests and capabilities.

The FRG has never doubted that an adequate defense is the absolute precondition for détente. Helmut Schmidt has been vociferous in demanding a balance of forces in Europe; to pursue détente under any other condition would be an invitation to blackmail and disaster. Agreement on principle between the Germans and the Americans has never guaranteed agreement on specifics, and there has often been the suspicion on both sides—lately particularly on the American side—that the other partner is not doing enough. For all the temptations of détente and for all the apprehensions of an eastward drift, the Germans know that the Western alliance and the American nuclear shield are the sole guarantee of German security, despite the extraordinary progress that the Bundeswehr has made. Doubts about the credibility of the American shield are not going to tempt the Germans to abandon it. They are not likely to commit suicide out of fear of death. The continued presence of allied troops on German soil embodies allied determination to preserve the status quo against any would-be disrupters, *à tous azimuts* (from any direction). Allied troops, then, serve many functions and provide a kind of built-in reality principle that has few historical analogues.

Throughout 1979, the FRG worked closely with the American government to bring about the NATO decision of December on the production and deployment of theater nuclear weapons in Europe, with a large component to be based on German soil. It was a highly successful and sophisticated diplomatic effort, and demonstrated the strength of the alliance in military matters and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Germany's commitment to sustain allied power. The West German government had to fend off opposition from within its own ranks and it had to withstand the most insistent threats and blandishments from the Soviets. For the Soviets it was a critical decision: they are genuinely fearful of nuclear weapons on German soil aimed at Soviet targets. But the FRG's decision was unambiguous and a portent of its likely attitude on other defense matters. The German public seems to understand the simultaneity of contradictory elements in its relation with the U.S.S.R.: détente and defense, cooperation and resistance.

Ostpolitik has built up its own momentum. To most Germans it has ceased to be an option and has become a national necessity. But its successful pursuit depends on continued Western integration. It is once again a complicated hand that history has dealt the Germans: they must have Western support in order to carry out a policy that at times will bring them into disagreement or even conflict with their Western protectors. Since the Afghan crisis broke, the German Question as such has faded temporarily into the background. But the FRG will not go back to the cold war denial of the reality of the DDR, to any effort at isolating it. At most, the Germans will put the pursuit of closer contacts on ice, waiting for a phase in which the U.S.S.R. would once again and on acceptable terms allow a policy of greater flexibility.

It is perhaps an irony of history that the greatest calamity that could befall the FRG today would be a collapse or even a decline of the West. Of their own accord the Germans are not likely to drift into an Eastern orbit or to succumb to what has been infelicitously called self-Finlandization. Only a West in disarray could make such adventurism or such defeatism plausible.

So in the end the question of Germany's future is inextricably related to the success of the United States, and of the West as a whole, in meeting the Soviet challenge. The task of coordinating allied policies at a time when the nature of the challenge is in dispute and when the principal allies, the United States, the FRG, and France, are responding to different pulls will prove hard, perhaps uniquely hard. It is already clear that the United States, deeply alarmed at the Soviet threat, will increasingly look to its allies and will find them uncertain, of many minds and tempers. Whatever common strategies can finally be agreed upon by governments, it is likely that in the public realm, including, in American terms, in congressional quarters, a certain impatience with lagging allies will build up. It does not require "the imagination of disaster" to think that a semi-Gaullist Europe could

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confront a sullen, exasperated America—to the (foolish) delight of the Soviets, who have always banked on a conflict among their enemies.

Of the centrality of German-American relations there can be no doubt. But these relations have changed as well: the United States has lost some of its power and the FRG, pushed into responsibility, has learned to exercise it. The agenda of potential disagreements is long. But at some point, the FRG will always support a steadfast America—with whatever misgivings. It is likely that the Germans will remain our strongest partner, and Helmut Schmidt our best ally, not despite but because of his often uncomfortable candor. But we must not confuse solidarity with an absence of tensions. We need to remember that the Germans have hostages in the East that none of the other allies has. The United States must continue to assess realistically Germany's interests and options; it must reckon with Bonn's ties to Paris and Europe—and with the narrowness of the majorities that both Schmidt and Giscard must put to the test of elections in the fall of 1980 and the spring of 1981 respectively. Washington cannot afford the presumption of instant assent by Bonn—nor can the Germans indulge too much in procrastination. Perhaps better means of consultation can be devised so that substantive disagreements are not gratuitously exacerbated; but consultation can also be a prescription for paralysis.

We helped to fashion this uniquely successful German polity; we remain its principal defenders. Both sides need to tend these relations at a time when the FRG's new prominence will make them more difficult and potentially more rewarding. But beyond these generalities lies a more awesome charge. We must recover our credibility, not measured by military means alone, but by the implementation of an energy program that goes beyond rhetoric and minutiae, by the adoption of an economic strategy that will effect radical reforms. Nothing would sustain and benefit the alliance more than a domestically strong America; nothing would endanger it more than an enfeebled America. Credibility, too, begins at home.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Shimon Peres

A STRATEGY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The olive tree, the oldest tree in the world, whose leaves form the symbol of peace, grows in the Middle East. Also to be found there is a concentration of the most modern weaponry of our epoch, weapons being used right now in warfare.

Peace, like a tree, is a process of growth; it demands great patience, continuous nurturing and the surmounting of many obstacles. Enmity, on the other hand, like a storm brewing, can emerge unannounced. The Middle East is diverse enough to harbor the two processes at one and the same time, and it remains sufficiently magical to attract the opposing forces in the world in the spheres of ideology, strategy and energy.

Important mutations have, nevertheless, occurred, introducing an entirely new situation. One is the change that has occurred in geopolitical priorities: it is the Persian Gulf, a region of about 400 kilometers square, that has taken importance over the warm water of the Mediterranean. Control of the oil and water of the Persian Gulf has a critical influence on the economy of the free world—on the price of gasoline in the United States, on Europe's economic condition, in determining Japan's ability to function—while the Strait of Hormuz has become more of a temptation for the U.S.S.R. than the Mediterranean basin. Energy has become more important than geography.

The Persian Gulf is populated by Muslim states ruled by kings, sheikhs and generals. Not a single Gulf state can be certain of its stability, and almost all are caught up in the contradictory processes of precipitate enrichment and swift modernization on the one hand, and of political backwardness and fragile social structure on the other.

For the first time in the second half of the twentieth century—and this is another change—one of the most important states of the region, Iran, has been captured by a fanatical religious preacher: Ayatollah Khomeini. Employing the most modern means of communication, with cassettes and television cameras, religious fanaticism, resembling the uncompromising spirit of

---

Shimon Peres is Chairman of the Labor Party of Israel. He is the author of *Tomorrow is Now*, *From These Men*, and *David's Sling*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

medieval times, has been resurrected. It has a magnetism of instant "purification and catharsis" and the brutal romanticism of the communist revolution; but this time, as extra insurance, it has the Almighty as well on its side. What will draw young people more—the call of Khomeini's slogans or the promise of progress which, for example, the Saudi kingdom has embarked on? It is too early to answer this question with any certainty. But it must be recognized that the question is a totally new one, of a threatening nature for all the states in the region.

II

The Soviet penetration into the Middle East which began about a quarter of a century ago, riding on the back of the double-humped camel—the Arab-Israeli conflict and nationalist and social unrest—has been extended and augmented. Now it appears to be a comprehensive strategy employing a variety of tactics and not just an improvisation by rival Kremlin forces—apparently the Navy now has a strong voice, an innovation for the land-oriented Russians.

The direction of this strategy can be discerned: its aim is to construct a large periphery encompassing the Persian Gulf and relying on a growing presence in the Middle East. The new Ethiopian regime has granted the Soviets a naval base enabling them to control the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. The Soviets have helped to build a Soviet-style Southern Yemen Republic, threatening the integrity of Saudi Arabia. The other Yemenite Republic is now also receiving Soviet arms, adding to the already existing threat.

Meanwhile, the use of the Red Army to invade Afghanistan, 300 miles from the Persian Gulf, has contributed a new dimension to the strategy which weighs heavily on a broken Iran and its vicinity. The fact is that for the first time since the Second World War, the Red Army has been sent in to conquer a country which is outside the recognized Soviet orbit—surely a source of concern to the other countries neighboring the U.S.S.R. Combined with this, the Soviets are careful to maintain their ties with Syria, supporting Libya and flirting with Iraq in an indefatigable effort to deepen their presence in all these countries.

The real change is not the Soviet ambition, but the means it has introduced: for the first time, a Soviet presence is assured by the participation of Cuban troops. There are 15,000 Cuban soldiers and officers in Ethiopia. It is hard to know who initiated the Cuban participation. Was it Fidel Castro, who described himself

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as not just a "Latin American," but also a "Latin African," or was it Leonid Brezhnev, who is investing about three billion dollars per annum to subsidize the Cuban economy? In any case, the result is clear: Soviet anchorage is based on a foreign force, not just on penetration into local structures.

Then again, new to our experience, a "little Cuba" has been created in the form of a People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Arab states never hesitated to consume Soviet arms and experts. But in this case a Soviet model has been built on the sands of the Arabian peninsula. As Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic Republic, so has Abdul Fatah Ismail, the leader of the Southern Yemen Republic, declared his country a "Marxist-Leninist" state.

III

These changes have brought about another, unavoidable one: some of the Arab states, led by Egypt, have reached the conclusion that the Arab-Israeli conflict has lost some of its critical importance because there are greater, more urgent challenges of a threatening nature to their independence and integrity. There is a need to change priorities. Religious fanaticism on the one hand, and Soviet subversion on the other, are not merely external threats which can be halted at a formal border. They require the mobilization of national potential and the attention of the political leadership in order to prevent the collapse of the existing political structure.

Egyptian President Sadat, probably the greatest Arab leader in recent times, was the first to recognize the changing winds. Soviet momentum which began in Ethiopia could be extended to Somalia and Sudan, the source of the Nile. Then there is Libyan President Qaddafi, with a huge arsenal of modern arms trying to draft pilots and tank operators from Syria or North Korea, supported constantly by Soviet advice and promises. Sadat, like his predecessor Nasser, has always taken strong measures against the Muslim Brotherhood, which preceded Khomeini's revolution; yet it is hard to judge if it has disappeared completely from the scene.

Saudi Arabia, with all its wealth, must feel unhappy with the developments in North and South Yemen, which present a constant threat to the Kingdom both from within and without. What effect would be caused by fanatic Muslim propaganda, which accuses the princes of "sins in Mecca, not only in Paris"? These questions could also be posed in Kuwait, Abu-Dhabi, Bahrain and other princedoms.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraq cannot remain aloof in the light of what is happening in Iran and Afghanistan. It cannot go hand in hand with Syria, which has remained tied, for the moment, to its Soviet tutelage. Nor can it ignore the uneasiness which events in Iran could insert into its delicate composition; for Iraq is comprised of three almost equal parts, the Kurds, the Shi'ites and the Sunnis.

Another change has occurred in the Middle East: the peace between Egypt and Israel. When President Eisenhower sent his former Secretary of the Treasury, Robert B. Anderson, to mediate between the then Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, and the then Egyptian President, Nasser, Ben-Gurion suggested to Nasser that they meet and that "within hours" the problems would be settled. At that time, Nasser replied that after "those hours" there would not be an Egyptian leader left alive to meet with the Israelis. Sadat has demonstrated that imaginative statesmanship can surmount unfounded prophecy.

Today, meetings between Egyptian and Israeli leaders have become routine and peace has begun to appear as a living reality. The results have not been long in coming. The Egyptian economy has improved, tapping revenue from old and new oil fields, reopening the Suez Canal and exalting Egypt's prestige worldwide. Israel has relinquished a lot, including the oil fields, but it is enjoying, for the first time, the sensation of peace, something it has dreamed of since its inception.

These changes have obviously altered the "balance of concerns" in the Middle East. No longer can a Mediterranean country limit its horizons to the Middle East, nor can it lower its eyes to the Arab-Israeli conflict only. The Arab-Israeli conflict has lost some of its centrality, but it has not lost its importance. Local tensions call for a great effort to solve it as soon as possible so as to free regional, national and international energies to face the new challenges confronting a deeply worried world. Paradoxically, these new challenges have provided a better opportunity to maintain the momentum for peace than before, even though the region is more divided than ever. The camp of peace has not overcome the rejectionist front; it is not the rejection which is new in the situation, but the movement toward peace. The question is how to proceed with the negotiation in order to realize this new vista of peace.

IV

To define what sort of peace Israel on its side is looking for we first have to answer the key question: What sort of Israel do we want?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Labor Party of Israel believes that the Zionist movement has been driven by a double dream—the return of the dispersed Jewish people to their historic homeland and the construction of a new society based on universal and Jewish ideals of social justice. The objectives from the outset were for the Jews to be able to cultivate their own land, to operate their own industry, to defend their borders without exploiting other peoples. We hoped to free ourselves from dependency on others and were determined not to have other people dependent on us. We do not wish to dominate the Arabs against their will, nor would we like them to serve as an unskilled labor force, having succeeded, after so many years of exile and alienation, in having Jews till the land and becoming manual workers in industry and construction.

When the state of Israel was established, Palestine was in effect divided demographically into the part settled by the Jews and those sections settled by the Arabs. The political division followed the demographic one. The United Nations decided on the establishment of two states within this fairly small area of about 31,000 square kilometers. Israel complied with the U.N. compromise; the Arabs rejected it. Had the Arab states and the terrorist forces of the *mufti* of Jerusalem not launched their onslaught on us, it is quite likely that two states would exist today west of the Jordan River: one Jewish and one Arab.

But war was raging before the state had been proclaimed, and we had to fight for our lives. The war left the country divided, but instead of becoming an Arab state the West Bank came under the domination of the Arab Legion (Jordanian Army) and the Gaza Strip came under the control of the Egyptian Army. This partition remained intact between 1948 and 1967. When the Six Day War broke out in June 1967, the then Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, appealed to King Hussein not to enter the war against us. "Don't touch us and we won't touch you," the King of Jordan was told. But Hussein was tempted by Nasser's premature boastings claiming feigned victories. He joined the war, losing the West Bank in his defeat, as the Egyptians lost the Gaza Strip and the Sinai.

The lesson of 30 years of Israel's existence, of the four wars that have been imposed on us, has taught us that we face a continuous challenge to our security. We have learned the hard way that even countries that voted at the United Nations for Israel would not be prepared to go to war to ensure our existence. Israel must always be capable of defending itself without the assistance of foreign troops. The policies of Israel were guided for almost three decades

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the dual aspiration of being true to the moral foundations of the Jewish heritage not to rule over another people, while at the same time retaining a geographic structure which will give us secure borders and the capability of defending the integrity and security of Israel without relying on the call of foreign troops.

This brought us to the conclusion that, within the framework of a peace settlement, we would be prepared to relinquish parts of the West Bank on the condition that they remain demilitarized; that no foreign army ever again cross the Jordan River and menace the gates of Jerusalem, as happened in 1948 and in 1967; and that we gain defensible borders to deter a surprise attack on us, as happened in 1973.

We believe that peace is a contribution to security. While not ignoring our historic rights over the whole territory, our sights are set on the security and peace of the future. The map we have in mind thus implies territorial concessions for the sake of peace and retaining strips of land vital for security.

In the negotiations which started with Egypt in the wake of Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the government of Israel agreed to surrender all of the Sinai. It was agreed that large sections would remain demilitarized or manned by limited paramilitary forces. The peace agreement with Egypt freed the area from the most recurrent and ominous threat to peace, namely the participation of the Egyptian army in another war. Yet we were left with the most complex problem on the road to a comprehensive peace: the solution of the Palestinian problem and the destiny of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

V

As to the solution of this problem, there appear to be at least two views in Israel. Prime Minister Menachem Begin has suggested an autonomy plan for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. His initial proposal, with some alterations inserted at the insistence of Egypt and the suggestion of the United States, has become part of the Camp David Accords. Yet the autonomy plan designed at Camp David is of a general nature and the differences between Israel and Egypt on the direction of autonomy were either excluded or glossed over. These are now emerging and being discussed in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel with the participation of the United States. The cleavage remains wide. Will the self-governing authority have administrative responsibility only, or legislative as well? What sort of election will be used to elect the authority—geographic or ethnic? Who will control government lands during the autonomy period

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and what will be the nature of the security arrangements to satisfy both Israel and the Arabs? And, autonomy being an interim solution for five years, what will follow it? An attachment of the West Bank to Israel, as Mr. Begin would like, or a separate Palestinian entity, as the Egyptians suggest?

The Labor Party, recognizing the difficulties ahead of time, had its doubts as to whether autonomy could be realized. Yet when we form a government once again, we shall clearly feel bound by the commitments of our predecessors, even though we criticized their plan. But if the negotiations on autonomy fail, then the road to a comprehensive peace may be blocked unless alternative paths are proposed.

I should add that even if autonomy is realized—either in accordance with the version presented by Mr. Begin or that of Mr. Sadat—we feel that we shall be far from a satisfactory solution. If it is realized as Mr. Begin would like it, then Israel will change from being a Jewish state into a binational community. A binational state would not only put an end to the Jewish people's aspiration for a state of their own, but could prolong the Israeli-Arab conflict for many years to come.

If Mr. Sadat's version is implemented, then an additional Palestinian state will emerge next to Jordan, itself already in reality a Palestinian state because a majority of its citizens are Palestinians. An additional Palestinian state will continually menace both the Jordanian kingdom and the security of Israel, and consequently the peace and stability of the whole area. There is no purpose in replacing one conflict with another. If a Palestinian state is established, it will insist on the establishment of a Palestinian army. This army would necessarily be encamped on the West Bank, constantly threatening Israel's narrow waistline on the coastal plain, an area whose entire width is no more than eight or nine miles. The threat does not have to be a purely military one; it could be one of terrorist incursions, sabotage and hijackings. The tragedy of Lebanon could be repeated on the West Bank all over again.

Most Arab leaders do not necessarily insist on the establishment of a Palestinian state. President Carter publicly declared after his talks with various Arab leaders that none of them had advocated the creation of a Palestinian state. In discussions I have had with him, President Sadat himself made it clear that he distinguishes between the situation in Sinai and that on the West Bank. Between Sinai and Israel, he said, there was a recognized international border. By contrast, no such boundary line ever existed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the West Bank. In his opinion, following the agreement with Egypt, there is no reason to expect a threat to Israel's security from the south, since Egypt, like Israel, has declared a policy of "no more war," whereas the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could constitute a security problem for Israel.

Among the formulations that Egypt presented at Camp David there was one suggesting that in determining the future boundaries of the West Bank, the two main considerations should be the aspirations of the Palestinians and the security of Israel. Those of us who do not advocate the incorporation of the Administered Territories and their residents into the state of Israel, are theoretically facing a dilemma: either to hold negotiations with Jordan, or to hold them with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Clearly, if we want to conduct negotiations with Jordan, we must refuse to do so with the PLO; while whoever suggests holding talks with the PLO inevitably pushes Jordan out of the framework of possible negotiations.

We are firm in our conviction that the option of opening negotiations with the PLO does not really exist. The PLO may have improved its public relations image in some parts of the world. Nonetheless, it remains an organization capable of uniting for its public relations and its acts of terrorism, but not competent to hold meaningful negotiations for a positive settlement. The PLO is a coalition of a number of separate armed factions, without majority rule and without the authority of disciplined leadership. The common denominator of these factions is political immobility. Each group is supplied with arms, money and instructions by different Arab countries, and the divisions which exist in the Arab world are reflected in their own midst.

George Habash, a leader of one of these armed factions, considers terror as a "strategy, not as tactics"—a strategy aimed at the annihilation of Israel. He would not submit to PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat if Arafat tried reaching peace with Israel. He is supported by Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, whose own attitudes are no less extreme than Habash's. Nayef Hawatmeh, who heads a different organization, is attached to Syria. Neither he nor his patron would agree with the Egyptian peace initiative. Arafat himself admitted in a recent conversation that Syria, the country which supports him in Lebanon, is not actually interested in a peaceful settlement to the conflict, since it is competing with Egypt for hegemony in the Arab world. In contrast to Sadat's flag of peace, Syria hoists the banner of war with Israel. Arafat is facing a real dilemma: either eliminating terror and getting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involved in the peace process, or letting terror destroy any chance he may have of a political option.

To date, he has preferred the negative denominator within his organization, and there appears to be no chance whatsoever within the existing PLO structure of him doing otherwise. The Covenant of the PLO calls for the return of the entire land of Palestine—i.e., Israel and the West Bank—to Arab domination. Interlocutors who claim that Arafat may be satisfied with a less ambitious goal, namely that Israel withdraw to the pre-June 1967 borders, that it abandon East Jerusalem, and concede the establishment of a Palestinian army, may not realize that they sponsor a scheme that would prejudice Israel's capacity for self-defense and would leave it without defensible borders.

Arafat expressed his desire for "a flag, a uniform and a prison." Arafat's flag is ultimately aiming to replace both the flags of Jordan and Israel with his own. A Palestinian army, stationed in the proximity of Israel, would be accompanied by the armed terrorist organizations already existing in Lebanon. And the prison he referred to will house all those who disagree with the PLO's most extreme postures. In the choice between a unified kingdom and a divided dictatorship, a unified kingdom is preferable for negotiations and peace. On many occasions the Kingdom of Jordan has offered responsibility, while the PLO has contributed only tragedy to Jews and Arabs alike. A PLO state on the West Bank could never settle the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The open space of Jordan could. A PLO state would prolong, not end warfare; it would build a base for the continuation of the struggle, not work for reconciliation.

VI

Consequently, the Labor Party would have taken a totally different road. Instead of conducting negotiations on autonomy, we would have preferred to hold negotiations on territorial compromise based on U.N. Resolution 242. Negotiations based on 242 might have facilitated Jordan's participation in the peace process along with representatives of the Territories. Representatives of the Territories find themselves in a quandary. They cannot join the negotiations in the face of joint opposition by Jordan and the PLO. The PLO would not participate in any sort of negotiation with Israel, and Jordan will not hold negotiations on the basis of autonomy since that plan does not allocate it a major role. On the other hand, Jordan has already agreed in the past to accept Resolution 242, though in accordance with its own interpretation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The accession of Jordan into the peace process would open the door for the West Bankers to participate in the talks.

Negotiations with Jordan might lead to the creation of one overall framework comprising the Kingdom of Jordan and those parts of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip which Israel would ultimately relinquish. Such a framework might embrace two to three million Palestinians (over a million in Jordan, over 700,000 in Judea and Samaria, and over 400,000 in the Gaza Strip), and thus constitute a large Jordanian-Palestinian entity in which the majority of all Palestinians reside. This new arrangement would lean on one Jordanian-Palestinian army (into which even today many Palestinians have already been drafted) with one central army and one central authority, all based in Amman. Negotiating with this authority could lead Israel to withdraw from the Territories with the assurance that they would remain demilitarized. A united Jordanian-Palestinian entity would be able to husband a self-sustaining economy and offer prospects of prosperity to its inhabitants and cooperation to its neighbors.

For the time being, King Hussein may be reluctant to return to the West Bank. He may have good reason not to show eagerness to enlarge his kingdom by adding 1.2 million Palestinians. But he, too, must take into account that by not returning to the West Bank, Jordan might confront a very unpleasant situation—the establishment of a Palestinian state hostile to Jordan. It might be the cause of continuous unrest among the Palestinians in Jordan who constitute a majority, and it would put Jordan itself into double jeopardy, with an unfriendly Iraq to the east and a hostile Palestinian state to the west. Iraq, which is arming itself at a rapid rate, has always cast an eye in the direction of Jordan. Its appetite for Jordan has not diminished with its growing strength, while a Palestinian state would try to achieve what Jordan has always resisted and prevented, namely the unification of the West Bank with the Kingdom of Jordan, not under Hashemite rule, but under that of the PLO.

The connection between the West Bank and Jordan is not arbitrary, but ethnic and historic. Ethnically, most of the citizens of Jordan and all the West Bank residents originate from the same national source—Palestinian Arabs. They speak the same language, practice the same religion, come from the same vicinity and are connected by close family and tribal ties. Historically, the King of Jordan bears responsibility for the fate of the West Bank residents. He granted them all Jordanian passports when his army took over in 1948, and he has not canceled their validity. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

residents have not relinquished their Jordanian citizenship despite PLO pressure, and, in fact, only recently Jordanian passport officers have been reassigned to the West Bank.

The King has also experienced good-neighborly relations with Israel: the boundary between Jordan and Israel has been the most tranquil border since 1967, despite being the longest between Israel and any other Arab state. Both countries act in their own way against terrorist penetration along this border. Across the Jordan River (which is also the border line) there are open bridges over which people and goods pass as if there were normal peaceful relations between the two states. And when Syria attempted to invade Jordan in 1970, Israel cooperated with the United States to frustrate the attempt. While ceremony is lacking between our two countries, practical measures have created a promise for the future of good neighborliness.

Jordan is certainly sensitive to the many changes which have taken place in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—many of them not necessarily favoring the longevity of monarchies. In the mosques of Jordan one can hear voices in support of Khomeini. A Palestinian army that may acquire Soviet arms and invite Soviet experts would threaten Amman as well as Jerusalem. With all the grievances that Hussein harbors against Sadat and Sadat holds against Hussein, and that the King of Saudi Arabia holds against the two of them and the two of them against him, all these leaders know that in reality there is no realistic alternative for any of them but the existing setup. Any change in a radical direction would undermine the peace and stability of the region.

VII

If Jordan agrees in principle to negotiations with Israel on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, how should these negotiations toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East be conducted?

It seems to me that a Geneva Conference could consummate but not initiate an agreement. Once international rivalries are superimposed on the regional disputes, it merely exacerbates the conflict and deepens the gap which already exists from the outset. The United Nations is a parliament with a clear anti-Israel majority and Israel has no chance whatever of expecting a fair and impartial hearing. The true meaning of a Geneva Conference, under U.N. auspices, would be to bring in the U.S.S.R. as an additional mediator. The U.S.S.R. is seeking to strengthen its own position in the Middle East and it wants gains, not compromises.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since 1954 it has followed a clearly pro-Arab line and has tried to win the Arab heart, undeterred by identifying its policies with the most extreme Arab line and paying little attention to the merits of the case.

In peace negotiations, only those interested in peace should participate. The negotiations between Egypt and Israel bore fruit because Egypt decided to embark in the direction of peaceful settlement, while Israel has been striving for peace from the very beginning. The United States, which acted as an honest broker, has considered peace in the Middle East as a major interest and goal. Washington in 1980 is more aware of the problems of the Middle East and its intricacies than any other capital in the world. Unlike Moscow, Washington has close ties with Israel.

Meanwhile, Europe, which traditionally was deeply involved in the affairs of the Middle East, has narrowed its interest to the supply of oil and the promotion of business with the Arab world. Its approach to the Middle East is parochial and commercial rather than global. Europe is under the impression that by merely putting demands to Israel, Israel will ignore its own national interests and concede. Israel is ready to pay a price for peace, but not to become the price itself. For that reason, Israel is more attentive to American than European opinion, particularly as the United States has traditionally responded to Israel's needs in the field of defense. As long as there is a massive supply of Soviet arms to the Arab countries, it is the United States that can and does guarantee the vital balance of power that contributes to preventing war in the Middle East.

The best framework for the continuation of the peace process in the Middle East is the one originally and successfully launched by former Secretary of State Kissinger between Egypt and Israel, namely a face-to-face negotiation with the United States participating. The prospects of King Hussein's involvement in the negotiations are predicated on active encouragement by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

By May 1980 the negotiations between Egypt and Israel on the essence of autonomy have to be completed. If they are concluded positively there will be the need for elections in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to elect an Autonomy Council. Five years later it will be necessary to determine the permanent map of the region.

But it is doubtful whether the autonomy negotiations will be completed on time, and even if both sides agreed to wait a few more months, it remains questionable whether those extra months would basically change anything. The gap is not in timing but in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

content. Yet without an agreement there could be a freeze in the development of the relations that have just begun between Egypt and Israel in a promising manner for both countries.

To overcome the possible crisis, I believe that an alternative script should be drafted that will keep the wind in the sails of the negotiations. It would be a step-by-step policy, some steps transitional, some permanent.

The first step is to relate the autonomy to the Gaza Strip. The situation in Gaza is less complicated than the one in the West Bank. It is not hampered by the subject of Jerusalem and it covers a relatively compact area 35 kilometers long and ten kilometers wide, densely populated by 420,000 people, almost all of whom are Palestinian Arabs. The negotiations concerning the Gaza Strip could be started without the immediate participation of Jordan, since the residents there are not Jordanian citizens. In spite of possible PLO opposition, a local leadership could emerge. Egypt has no territorial ambitions in the Gaza Strip, and to ensure the security needs of Israel no major territorial changes are necessary. The Gaza Strip has only one real city, Gaza itself, and the city as well as the Strip have already experienced some measure of autonomy.

If autonomy is realized in the Gaza Strip, it will enable Egypt to claim that the negotiations between itself and Israel have gone beyond the purely Egyptian-Israeli context, relating now to the solution of the Palestinian problem. Israel, in my view, should not be interested in administering the lives of such a sizable Palestinian community. Israel can assure security in the Gaza Strip without the continuation of the military government. The withdrawal of the military government from the Gaza Strip would be within the realm of one of the important paragraphs in the Camp David Accords.

The controversial issues regarding the essence of autonomy are not necessarily relevant to the Gaza Strip. Thus, for example, there is almost no problem as to who will control government lands there, since there is very little available land in Gaza. There is no problem as to who will control the water resources, since the Gaza Strip must import water from Israel, and Israel will continue to supply it with the amount of water presently supplied.

A provisional Autonomy Council can be chosen by electorates, mayors and *mukhtars*, or local leaders, of the towns and villages. The issue of who will serve as the source of authority is something that can remain open until it is agreed upon at the conclusion of the overall autonomy negotiations. The Gaza Strip should be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

granted broad economic aid enabling it to solve the housing problems—something which the government of Israel has already started—and to enlarge the economy by the development of fisheries and agriculture. Education in Gaza, both elementary and vocational, is already comprehensive, and it is the school system that elevates refugee life to respectable levels of normalcy.

Should the autonomy model in the Gaza Strip prove successful, it could become a model which would encourage the completion of the negotiations with regard to Judea and Samaria. In other words, autonomy in the Gaza Strip, even of a provisional nature, can be established even before the conclusion of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt concerning the full autonomy plan. And while in the future it will be linked to Jordan, at present it may allow for the necessary time for Jordan to come in.

A second step would be to hold municipal elections in Judea and Samaria. These elections could be tacitly coordinated with King Hussein, who maintains and has to maintain his ties with West Bank towns and villages. The terms of the present mayors are over and new elections are necessary anyway. Despite the municipal nature of these elections, they will enable the residents of the Territories to elect accepted representatives from among themselves. At some time in the future, these Mayors could be the kernel of a negotiating team on the future of the Territories within a framework to be decided, as part of the Jordanian delegation.

Then the time would be ripe for the third step—King Hussein would be invited to participate in the negotiations. There is no need to change the formal basis of the Camp David Agreements, since the Agreements have two doors open to negotiation: in addition to the autonomy plan, it is based on Resolution 242, which Jordan has in the past accepted. The negotiation with Jordan could be bilateral—Jordan-Israel with the participation of the United States—or of a wider scope, with the participation of Egypt and representatives of the Palestinians residing on the West Bank and delegates from the Gazan autonomous councils.

The negotiations can start without preconditions from either side. They may be concerned with an interim agreement or with a comprehensive one. I tend to believe that there will be a need for an intermediary accord since, for the time being, there is no Jordanian map that stands a chance of being accepted by Israel and vice versa. Negotiations with Egypt went through three stages—the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement, the 1975 Interim Agreement, and finally the 1978 Peace Agreement—and the reason for these gradual negotiations stemmed from the same

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems presently facing Israel and Jordan, namely the difficulty in reaching an overall agreement in one leap in the face of the width of the initial chasm. The negotiations can start not just from the territorial angle, but also from the functional one. On different occasions Jordan has indicated a readiness to go for a shared government over the Territories as a transitional arrangement.

Another step, parallel to or perhaps prior to the others, should be the arrival at an understanding among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United States, so that King Hussein can come to the negotiating table with considerable Arab and Western support. I estimate that today the conditions for such an understanding are better than ever before: Jordan will not be the first Arab state to reach a peace agreement with Israel, since Egypt preceded it; nor will Jordan have to agree to a new base, for it can be done on the basis of Resolution 242. Egypt does not have the desire or capacity to represent the residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. And it is most likely that Cairo would prefer that this be done by the King and not by Arafat.

VIII

To conclude, one should not underestimate the difficulties on the path to attaining peace in the Middle East, but the chances for this peace have also grown. The Middle East is subjected to enormous external pressures, and if it does not get organized in time to face them, the danger is imminent that the Middle East will be severely damaged by Soviet pressure and religious fanaticism.

For many years it seemed that it was impossible to begin bringing about peace in the Middle East. Today, peace is a reality between the two strongest Middle East states, Egypt and Israel. In order for this reality to grow, it must be nurtured at particular moments and in ways which can help it quickly prosper. The vitality and strength of the olive tree have not disappeared.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Elliot L. Richardson

POWER, MOBILITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

In the late summer of 1979 the Norfolk (Va.) *Ledger Star* based a lead story on the leak of a classified communication from the naval command there (CINCLANT) to units of the Atlantic fleet, laying out procedures to be followed by the U.S. government in protecting traditional high-seas freedoms. Three days later *The New York Times* picked up the story, running it on the front page under the headline, "U.S. Will Challenge Coastal Sea Claims That Exceed Three Miles." The United States, said the *Times*, "ordered the Navy and Air Force to undertake a policy of deliberately sending ships and planes into or over the disputed waters of nations that claim a territorial limit of more than the three miles accepted by the United States and 22 other nations." A decision had been taken, the story said, to "show a more active interest ... because simply protesting diplomatically about such limits would not be effective."[1]

On the day that the *Times* story appeared, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was in the fourth week of its Resumed Eighth Session at the U.N. headquarters in New York. Launched at Caracas in 1974 and representing 160 countries—eight more than the U.N. itself—the Conference had succeeded during the intervening years in making remarkable progress on the most ambitious agenda ever attempted by a multilateral law-making forum. Substantial consensus had been reached on issues ranging from navigation and overflight, the conservation and management of fisheries resources, the protection of the marine environment, and the exploitation of oil and gas in the continental shelf, to marine scientific research and a carefully balanced system of compulsory dispute settlement. The results were embodied in a text containing nearly 400 articles of which fewer than ten percent remained controversial. By far the most

[1] *The New York Times*, August 10, 1979, p. A1.

Ambassador at Large Elliot L. Richardson is Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference and heads the U.S. delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. He has also served as Under Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troublesome issues still unresolved concerned the regime for deep seabed mining, which necessitated designing a new kind of international institution responsible to the world community as a whole. Only a handful of other substantive issues still awaited resolution. Delegates were at last beginning to believe that an effort which had come so far might yet confound the skepticism that had always surrounded it.

Reaction to the CINCLANT leak ranged from surprise to indignation. Many delegates assumed that the timing of the leak had been deliberately calculated to put pressure on the Conference. The Coastal States Group—87 countries in all—hurriedly convened an executive session to deliberate upon a response. Beyond assuring everyone that the leak was not premeditated, the U.S. delegation noted that the procedures in question were intended merely to give consistent and non-provocative application to the view of international law we had long maintained—that so long as there was not universal acceptance of some clear definition of the territorial sea other than the historic three-mile limit, the United States was bound to assert its own view.

These assurances, however, did not succeed in heading off statements and counter-statements in the closing plenary session of the Conference. During the next few weeks two heads of government, several foreign ministers, and numerous other officials—in varying tones of voice—denounced, protested and deplored.

Back of these reactions lay a long history. The leak served as an abrupt reminder of why the Conference had been convened in the first place—rapidly expanding coastal-state claims over ocean space and the impact of these on traditional freedoms of maritime travel and the movement of military and peacekeeping forces. In effect, the old alliance among peacekeeping power, the global peacetime mobility of military forces, and a universal system of ocean law has been disintegrating.[2] Its renewal, under terms appropriate to the present, remains an essential task of the Conference, and one in which not only the United States but all nations have a major stake.

Ironically, it was an American President, Harry Truman, who unwittingly started it all when in 1945 he proclaimed the jurisdiction of the United States over the seabed resources of the continental shelf. Though scarcely comparable to the attempt by Spain and Portugal in 1494 to divide all the world's oceans between

[2] For a fuller discussion of the background of the Conference, see John Temple Swing, "Who Will Own the Oceans?", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 527-546.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

themselves in accordance with precepts enunciated by Pope Alexander VI, the Truman Proclamation constituted the first major breach in modern times of the classic principles of ocean law laid down by Hugo Grotius in 1609. National sovereignty had since then been confined to a narrow band of territorial sea only three nautical miles, or one marine league, in width.

Three years later Chile and Peru, followed by Ecuador, outdid President Truman by claiming maritime zones extending 200 miles from their coasts and embracing the water column as well as the seabed. These claims were soon backed up by the seizure of U.S. tuna boats in those waters, a practice which had become chronic by 1969 when, as the new Under Secretary of State, I was obliged to oppose congressional requests for the assignment of U.S. naval escort vessels to the protection of our tuna fleet. It was by then clear that the combined impact of rapid technological advances in the exploitation of ocean resources and the increasingly assertive claims of coastal states to the benefits of such exploitation demanded some new accommodation between coastal-state jurisdiction and high-seas freedoms. Neither the First U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 nor a second conference held in 1960 was able to reach agreement on the seaward limit of coastal state claims, whether three miles or beyond.

It was beginning to be clear a decade later that the only way of reconciling the number and variety of claims that had by then emerged would be through the convening of a new international conference charged with drawing up a comprehensive charter for all uses of the oceans. When the first substantive session of the Law of the Sea Conference got underway in 1974, 76 countries had claimed territorial seas ranging from 12 miles to 200 miles, and since then the number has increased to 101. (Roughly three-quarters of these states now claim a 12-mile territorial sea.) In addition to new territorial limits, certain of these claims call for prior notification to or authorization by the coastal state for the passage of warships or nuclear-powered ships, thus significantly restricting the traditional right of innocent passage.

Further confusing the picture, a number of island countries—Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and others—have asserted the equivalent of sovereignty over the waters embraced by their islands. This has raised what has come to be called the archipelagic problem.

The world's independent coastal states now number 135. The United States is one of only 23 that still adhere to the traditional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

territorial-sea limit of three nautical miles. Like the trading nations in whose interests Grotius' legal doctrines were enunciated, we have traditionally seen our military and commercial interests as requiring maximum freedom of movement for our ships and planes. Any expansion of the territorial sea carries with it the potential impairment of such freedom because it is a firmly established principle of international law that other countries enjoy only a right of "innocent passage" in territorial waters. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state, and such passage is not subject to the consent of the coastal state. As adapted in recent times, however, innocent passage does not embrace any right of overflight or of submarines to travel submerged.

More than 100 straits around the world are more than six but less than 24 miles wide. So long as the territorial sea on each side of a strait is confined to three miles, a high-seas route remains in which full freedom of navigation and overflight will continue to exist. But extension of the territorial sea on both sides to 12 miles would eliminate these high-seas corridors, and the bordering states would then be able to contend that the straits remain subject only to the right of innocent passage. On that argument, the legal right to overfly a strait could be gained only with coastal state consent, submarines would be obliged to travel on the surface, and surface vessels would be subject to varying assertions of coastal-state regulatory power. All the world's most important straits would be subject to these restrictions; for example: the Strait of Gibraltar separating the Atlantic Ocean from the Mediterranean Sea; the links between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as well as the gateways to the Indonesian archipelago; the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; and the Bab el Mandeb strait connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez. The result could seriously impair the flexibility not only of our conventional forces but of our fleet ballistic missile submarines, which depend on complete mobility in the oceans and unimpeded passage through international straits. Only such freedom makes possible the secrecy on which their survivability is based.

In addition, by prior action or relying upon the consensus in favor of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone which emerged at the Law of the Sea Conference in 1975, a number of states now claim resource jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea out to 200 miles, either, as in the case of the United States, as a fisheries conservation and management zone or in the more expansive form of an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exclusive economic zone. The content of these 200-mile zone claims varies widely, but they invariably include authority over fishing and marine scientific research. In addition, a few purport to restrict navigation and overflight, and these claims may be hard to distinguish from some of the more extensive territorial sea claims. Roughly 40 percent of the entire surface of the world's oceans, an area greater than all the earth's land mass, lies within 200 miles from shore. All the important seas—the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Japan among them—are consumed by coastal zones less than 200 miles in width. If this vast area ever comes to be regarded by coastal states as subject to their sovereignty for purposes of regulating navigation and overflight and related activities, the result would be to curtail drastically what Professor Bernard H. Oxman has aptly called "the sovereign right of communication."

II

Hardly had the Norfolk leak highlighted the chaotic state of the law of the sea than an extraordinary sequence of events—the seizure of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as the Vietnamese threat to Thailand—underscored the importance of the capacity to project force to any part of the globe where significant U.S. interests or responsibilities are challenged. Those of us who had never agreed that the Vietnam experience made this capacity unnecessary suddenly found ourselves in the overwhelming majority. President Carter announced the abandonment of the Nixon Doctrine, the Marine Corps got a new lease on life, and the Congress increased appropriations both for the Navy's shipbuilding program and the Air Force's airlift capability. Although belatedly, public attention focused on the vulnerability of the Middle Eastern oil fields and the fragility of the supply lines carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe, Japan and North America.

Clearly the classical uses of sea power have assumed fresh importance. On their way to stations in the northwest Indian Ocean less than 200 miles from shore, U.S. Navy task forces transit the Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Lombok or Sunda. To back up friends, to warn potential enemies, to neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, to exert influence in ambiguous situations, to demonstrate resolve through a deployment of palpable force—all these are tasks that naval power is uniquely able to perform. For these purposes the advantages of naval power over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

land or air power are clear. As Hedley Bull wrote in 1976 for the International Institute of Strategic Studies:

> The first of these advantages is its flexibility: a naval force can be sent and withdrawn, and its size and activities varied, with a higher expectation that it will remain subject to control than is possible when ground forces are committed. The second is its visibility: by being seen on the high seas or in foreign ports a navy can convey threats, provide reassurance, or earn prestige in a way that troops or aircraft in their home bases cannot do. The third is universality or pervasiveness: the fact that the seas, by contrast with the land and the air, are an international medium allows naval vessels to reach distant countries independently of nearby bases and makes a state possessed of sea power the neighbor of every other country that is accessible by sea.[3]

Although the number of U.S. overseas bases and military personnel stationed abroad has been reduced in recent years, this reduction has not been accompanied by a corresponding contraction in the scope of our vital overseas interests. The reduction has served, rather, to increase the necessity for alternative means for protecting those interests. Our economic well-being, meanwhile, is continually more dependent on overseas trade and more vulnerable to distant political developments. The combined result is to compel increased reliance on the strength, mobility and versatility of our armed forces. To fulfill their deterrent and protective missions these forces must have the manifest capacity either to maintain a continuing presence in farflung areas of the globe or to bring such a presence to bear rapidly. An essential component of this capacity is true global mobility—mobility that is genuinely credible and impossible to contain.

While this is not the place to undertake a discussion of the force capabilities demanded by global mobility, some of its requirements are illuminated by a glance at the proposed Rapid Deployment Force. Designed to provide a capability for deploying task groups of varying size and structure to any region in the world, the Rapid Deployment Force will draw on a central "reservoir" composed primarily of units based in the continental United States from which forces can be dispatched to deal with a specific contingency. This reservoir will be composed of Army divisions, a Marine amphibious force, and appropriate Air Force and Navy units. The size and composition of the force selected will depend on such factors as the realities of geography and the nature of potential threats. Phased deployments initiated with small, "show-

[3] "Sea Power and Political Influence," in "Power at Sea I: The New Environment," Adelphi Paper No. 122, Spring 1976, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the-flag" forces could be supplemented by a second, larger force with greater capability.

The efficiency with which any such combination of units can be brought to bear depends to a significant degree on legal and political factors. The naval units must be able to sail and take up station without at any time being obliged either to defy some challenge to their right to do so or to make a vast detour in order to avoid such a challenge. The Air Force units have a similar need for direct and untrammeled routes to a crisis area. In the words of Professor Geoffrey Kemp, "Since one of the great attributes of air power is speed, any factor that works to delay flight time, such as rerouting or the need to ask permission to overfly, would naturally downgrade its value."[4]

The assurance that our forces can be rapidly deployed without having either to defy some other state or to seek its permission enables us to calibrate our responses precisely to the situation at hand. It maximizes the value of the Navy's unique ability to position itself at sea near foreign countries without entering the territory of friend or foe. It permits the movement of forces and supplies past the coasts of other countries irrespective of their view of the mission. This flexibility, combined with the logistical capacity of our air forces to deliver matériel rapidly, can enable our friends confidently to refrain from steps that would otherwise accelerate localized arms races.

The same events that have revived awareness of the need for global mobility have also, though less obviously, increased the importance of universally accepted rules of law governing the rights and obligations of maritime powers and coastal states. The existence of such rules is significant primarily for the deterrent or preventive function of our military forces as distinguished from their combat function. Once a crisis verges upon armed conflict no major nation is likely to let the movement of its forces be deflected solely by another country's disagreement with its view of the applicable principles of international law. Yet foreign perceptions of these principles can affect both our willingness and our ability to carry out deterrent or preventive missions. Because their purpose is not to create conflict but to forestall it, such missions require rules of law compatible with the routine deployment of ships and planes.

The erosion of the traditional rules and the trend toward

[4] "U.S. Naval Power and the Changing Maritime Environment," a paper presented at the 4th Annual Seminar of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy of the University of Virginia, January 1980, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expanding claims of coastal state jurisdiction have progressively increased the risk that deployments to distant regions of the globe will encounter some form of challenge by third states along the way. Whenever it arises, this prospect faces us with an uncomfortable choice. One alternative is to go full speed ahead, thereby generating hostility and exposing us to political and economic costs. More and more countries, moreover, in order to patrol their 200-mile zones and protect themselves against unfriendly neighbors, are acquiring a variety of patrol boats, maritime patrol aircraft, ship-to-shore cruise missiles, inshore submarines and small destroyers. Many of these countries also have mine-laying capabilities. A decision to disregard their claims of sovereignty must therefore take into account military as well as economic and political risks. And if we make it our consistent policy to damn the torpedoes, the costs will be cumulative. The result will be expensive not only to our bilateral relationships but to our reputation as a well-intentioned and law-abiding member of the world community. We should not be surprised when those whose claims we have ignored take advantage of a chance to get even.

A second alternative is to behave in a manner designed to avoid these costs, but this too can be expensive, although in other ways. If we hang back from acting upon our own understanding of the applicable principles of international law, we pay a price in terms both of constraints on the mobility of our forces and of the credibility of our will to use them. An additional cost is the further erosion of the very principles we proclaim, for the survival of any principle of customary international law depends upon the consistency of its observance in practice. Nor does the achievement of consistency come easily in the face of constant pressures to give priority to the preservation of cordial bilateral relations. Cables that have crossed my desk in recent months have appealed for the blurring or delay of activities of the kind referred to in the CINCLANT communication on such grounds as the "adverse effect on other matters on which we are seeking their support," "jeopardy to important American economic interests," "repercussions on sensitive bilateral developments," and the like. One ambassador went so far as to recommend the outright cancellation of routine overflights of the 200-mile zone.

It is conceivable, of course, that to escape this dilemma we might attempt to negotiate bilateral or regional agreements giving us the right to send warships and military aircraft through other states' claimed waters and airspace. Apart from the fact that any such bargain is likely to survive only as long as relations between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the parties are good, what can we give on our side of the bargain? Merely to offer the reciprocal right to operate off our own coasts would seldom be sufficient, since few countries have an interest in acquiring any such right. The more likely price would be some form of political, military or economic concession—even, perhaps, acquiescence in a user charge proportioned to tonnage or the risk of pollution. And this, of course, would be a threat of concern not only to warships. Still another possible consequence would be to stimulate the major maritime powers to compete with each other for influence over strategically located coastal states in order to obtain preferential treatment for the highest bidder's military and commercial traffic.

There is only one way to prevent the costs both of conflict and of inaction. It is to create a common understanding and a common acceptance of rules compatible with the routine global deployment of air and naval forces. This cannot be done, quite obviously, merely by invoking what we may genuinely believe to be superior legal arguments in support of our view of the controlling principles of international law. It requires building a new consensus embracing the strategically significant coastal states. Until this has been done, foreign perceptions will continue to dictate the scope of the operational risks and costs encountered by the military forces of the United States in the performance of their deterrent role.

III

As between the superpowers, consensus on the importance of the law of the sea to global mobility has not thus far been a problem. Although somewhat backhandedly, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, the chief architect of the Soviet Union's growing naval might, has publicly saluted the peacekeeping contribution of our and our allies' navies:

> Owing to the high mobility and endurance of its combatants, the navy possesses the capability to vividly demonstrate the economic and military might of a country beyond its borders during peacetime. This quality is normally used by the political leadership of the imperialist states to show their readiness for decisive actions, to deter or suppress the intentions of potential enemies, as well as to support "friendly states." . . . Consequently, the role of a navy is not limited to the execution of important missions in armed combat. While representing a formidable force in war, it has always been an instrument of policy of the imperialist states and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime owing to its inherent qualities which permit it to a greater degree than other branches of the armed forces to exert pressure on potential enemies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without the direct employment of weaponry.[5]

As this is written Admiral Gorshkov's words are being reinforced by the sincerest form of flattery: the construction of a Soviet global fleet. Currently numbering about 372 surface warships, the Soviet Navy is rapidly gaining in strength and versatility. Its first 37,000-ton ASW aircraft carrier joined the fleet only four years ago. The second was commissioned in 1978, a third will become operational in 1981, and a fourth is probably under construction. It has also been reported that the Soviets are building a 50,000–60,000-ton catapult-equipped nuclear-powered carrier. A new and powerful class of nuclear-powered cruisers—almost pocket battleships—is being added to other classes of cruisers in being and under construction, and a support system capable of sustaining fleet units at great distances is under development. Although not yet a match for the U.S. Navy on an overall basis, the Soviet Navy has acquired impressive sea-control capabilities.

Like the United States, the Soviet Union attaches importance to the successful outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference because it is aware that the superpowers have troubles enough in an increasingly pluralistic world without being forced into marginal conflicts over the peacetime movement of their military forces. Ever since the traditional rules came under attack, both countries have had a common interest in finding a way of reconciling the freedoms of navigation and overflight important to themselves and other major maritime countries with the national control of coastal resources and international control of seabed resources important primarily, though not exclusively, to developing countries. Both countries played active and supportive roles in the series of steps beginning in 1967 and culminating in 1973 which led the United Nations to conclude that any such reconciliation could only be accomplished through a comprehensive treaty. The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea got under way the same year. Although the Conference has since then dealt with issues ranging all the way from piracy to vessel-source pollution, its participants have understood from the outset that the accommodation of navigational and resource interests must be at the core of any eventual "package deal."

A common interest in conflict avoidance, of course, does not by itself compel an identity of legal positions on law of the sea issues. Indeed, the differences between the superpowers' geographical

[5] *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, October 1974, No. 9/859, p. 59 (translation of an article by Admiral Gorshkov in *Morski Sbornik*, November 2, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situations could have been the basis for different perceptions of their national interests. It is a fact, in any case, that the Soviet fleets cannot be deployed on a global scale without having to pass through constricted waterways and the 200-mile zones of other countries, almost none of which are pro-Soviet. The Soviet Northern fleet—icebound half the year—can reach the Atlantic only by way of the claimed zones of Scandinavian countries. To reach the Pacific from its home ports on the Sea of Japan the Soviet Pacific fleet must mainly depend on the Straits of La Pérouse and Korea. The Black Sea fleet can reach the Mediterranean only through the Bosporus and gain open ocean only through Gibraltar or Suez and the Bab el Mandeb. The Baltic, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, moreover, are entirely subdivided among actual or potential 200-mile zones.

U.S. fleets, by contrast, have direct access to the open oceans on both coasts and can reach the territories of allies such as Japan, Britain, France and West Germany without having to cross any 200-mile zones except those of allies. These sharp differences between the situations of the two superpowers have led some analysts to conclude that the differences in the superpowers' legal positions should have been equally sharp. This school of thought sees the guarantees of transit passage of straits and freedom of navigation and overflight in 200-mile zones as bringing significant advantages to the U.S.S.R. without any commensurate benefit to us or our allies. Its disciples argue that the expansion of coastal-state jurisdiction at the expense of high-seas freedoms would leave the Soviet fleets hemmed in by alien waters without any corresponding detriment to our side. In their view, the expansion of Soviet naval ambitions strengthens the case for letting the U.S.S.R. suffer the constraints on its mobility that a more coastally oriented world system would entail.

Despite their evident force, these arguments have never been persuasive to U.S. policymakers. On the contrary, we and our allies have always insisted that any enlargement of the territorial sea must be contingent on the equivalent of high-seas passage through straits and that any recognition of coastal-state rights over the resources of adjacent waters must preserve high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight in and over such waters. Successive secretaries of state and joint chiefs of staff have been unanimous in advocating these fundamental propositions. Why? Have we misconceived our true interests?

The answers derive from four factors which, in the aggregate, are no less compelling for us than the Soviet Union's geographical entrapment is compelling for it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

First, we have our own reasons for needing unchallenged rights of navigation and overflight—not as acute as the Russians' perhaps, but substantial nevertheless. We need access to the Mediterranean and mobility within it. We need access to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. We need to be able freely to traverse archipelagic waters like the Philippine Sea, the Java Sea, and the vast areas of the Pacific within 200 miles of some island. As the hasty shuttling of fleet units in response to the Iranian and Afghan crises recently demonstrated, our Navy is not now—and will not soon be—capable of maintaining a strong simultaneous presence in both the Southwest Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It must therefore be able to move fleet units from one area to the other by the most expeditious possible routes, and that requires the use of such major straits as Malacca, Singapore, Lombok and Sunda.

Second, the absence of any universally accepted legal foundation for the freedoms of navigation and overflight through straits and 200-mile zones could lead to unpleasant and otherwise unnecessary strains on our relations with our allies. Even the friendliest state is subject to its own set of indigenous political constraints and pressures, and, particularly at the stage when a crisis is developing, it is inevitable that these constraints and pressures will from time to time lead to perceptions of national interest divergent from ours. Indeed, we saw just such an outcome during the Middle East crisis of 1973 in which some of our allies, invoking attributes of sovereignty long sanctified by customary international law, denied us the use of their bases and airspace. If, in addition to the rights they already derive from the established legal attributes of territorial jurisdiction, our friends were also to acquire the power to grant or withhold permission to transit straits and 200-mile zones, their exercise of this discretion would immediately become fair game for their political opponents at home and vulnerable to pressure from abroad—for instance, by oil producers.

Third, it must be assumed that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to go to great lengths to ensure the mobility of its air and naval forces. The less secure the right of Soviet planes and ships to transit strategically important chokepoints in conformity with legal principles established by global agreement, the greater will be the Soviets' incentive to acquire equivalent results by other means. In the contest for control of strategic waterways thus made inevitable, the least the United States would seek to accomplish would be to neutralize whatever combination of carrots and sticks was employed by the Soviet Union, lest we find ourselves acquiescing in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet control. And the latter, indeed, must be recognized as a substantial possibility in any situation in which the U.S.S.R.'s interest in the transit of a vital chokepoint is in fact more intense than our own. For if the U.S.S.R. has no assurance that such an interest will be respected under binding legal arrangements, it will feel compelled to bring to bear whatever resources may be necessary to win control over the chokepoint. If we have a lesser interest, our willingness to match and resist the Soviets may be correspondingly less. For us to choose in such a situation to force the Soviets to seek direct control rather than to rely on legal arrangements could only mean that we would prefer to indulge the satisfactions of rivalry than to cut our costs. We would do better to heed the example of Winston Churchill at Potsdam in 1945 when he parried Stalin's demand for bases to protect the Soviet right of passage through the Bosporus by offering instead legal guarantees of that right.[6]

Fourth, any extent to which Soviet military forces are more dependent than those of the United States on the free transit of straits and economic zones is offset by our greater need to bring the requirements of mobility into accord with principles of international law which we alone cannot create. As the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again demonstrated, the handful of bosses who make decisions for the U.S.S.R. can disregard public opinion both at home and abroad. The government of the United States, on the other hand, is powerfully constrained by public opinion. Any serious question about the legality of our actions can undermine both our capacity to act and the ability of our allies to support us. We cannot change this responsiveness to law and public opinion and would not even if we could.

IV

A Law of the Sea treaty creating a widely accepted system of international law for the oceans would—if the rules it contains adequately meet U.S. needs—be the most effective means of creating a legal environment in which our own perception of our rights is essentially unchallenged. We would then, for the first time since the Grotian system began to disintegrate, be assured rights of navigation and overflight free of foreign control, free of substantial military risk, and free of economic or political cost.

The negotiating text now before the Third United Nations

[6] Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 6, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953, p. 635.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conference on the Law of the Sea,[7] if incorporated in a widely ratified Law of the Sea treaty, would provide this assurance.

First, by establishing a 12-mile maximum limit for the territorial sea, the text would deny validity to assertions of sovereignty by coastal states beyond 12 miles. The result would be to roll back existing claims of territorial jurisdiction wider than 12 miles.

Second, the text provides for free and unimpeded passage through straits used for international navigation in accordance with the concept of "transit passage." Transit passage is the freedom of navigation and overflight for the purpose of continuous and expeditious passage of the strait. The right of free passage applies to all ships whether on the surface or submerged and includes the movement of ships and aircraft in military formations as required by the circumstances. The text emphasizes the rights of transiting states, placing on them only reasonable obligations that do not impair, *inter alia*, the execution of military missions. Although the coastal state is not permitted to control transit, the legitimate interests of the coastal state are protected. For example, it may enforce internationally approved maritime safety and pollution measures, except against vessels entitled to sovereign immunity, when the violation causes or threatens major damage to the marine environment of the strait.[8]

Third, the text would guarantee freedom of navigation and overflight through archipelagos on terms equivalent to transit passage through straits, with the difference that the sea-lanes, instead of being determined by the configuration of the land, would be defined by courses and distances, with a right of deviation up to 25 miles on each side of this axis. Subject to the free transit of these sea-lanes by other states, an "archipelagic state" would have rights over the waters embraced by baselines joining the outermost points of its outermost islands equivalent to the rights of a coastal state over its territorial waters.

Fourth, in giving coastal states sovereign rights over the living and nonliving resources of a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone,"

[7] *Official Record* (A/CONF 62/WP.10/Rev. 1), United Nations Third Conference of the Law of the Sea, April 28, 1979. This is called for convenience ICNT, Rev. 1.

[8] Although it has been suggested that the very existence of flag state obligations might support the inference that the states bordering straits had been given a right unilaterally to determine that violations have occurred or to seek to enforce the obligations, Professor John Norton Moore persuasively refutes this notion. Indeed, as Professor Moore makes clear, both the language of the text and its negotiating history compel the conclusion that the elaboration of the obligations of transiting ships and aircraft does not, except in the limited situation noted above, give enforcement powers to states bordering a strait. The coastal state, therefore, may not suspend or hamper any critical element—submerged passage, surface navigation or overflight—of transit passage. *American Journal of International Law*, January 1980, p. 77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the text preserves for other states "the freedom of navigation and overflight" and "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. . . . "[9] In the group which negotiated this language it was understood that the freedoms in question, both within and beyond 200 miles, must be *qualitatively* and *quantitatively* the same as the traditional high-seas freedoms recognized by international law: they must be qualitatively the same in the sense that the nature and extent of the right is the same as the traditional high-seas freedoms; they must be quantitatively the same in the sense that the included uses of the sea must embrace a range no less complete—and allow for future uses no less inclusive—than traditional high-seas freedoms. In order to carry out the qualitative aspect of this understanding, the text[10] identifies the safeguarded freedoms as those "referred to in Article 87," which is the article on "Freedom of the High Seas." The quantitative aspect is satisfied by the phrase "such as," which makes clear that the reference to specific uses is illustrative but not exhaustive. Article 87 similarly defines "freedom of the high seas" by setting forth a non-exhaustive list of freedoms.

Fifth, under the text the United States would have the right to bring suit against a state that interferes with navigation or overflight. The existence of this opportunity would help relieve us of having to choose between acquiescence and defiance each time a claim is made that could erode high-seas freedoms. It would give us an important new option in our efforts to control and discourage such claims. While disputes concerning military activities as such would be subject to an optional exclusion, the possibility of suit on claims in general would strengthen the advocates of reason and restraint within foreign governments.

V

Significant though the benefits of a Law of the Sea treaty would be, their value to the United States is not unlimited. Although substantial improvements have been made in the deep seabed mining provisions of the negotiating text, which I characterized as "fundamentally unacceptable" when they emerged in July 1977,[11] this part of the current text still has serious deficiencies.

[9] ICNT, Rev. 1, Article 58.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Statement of July 20, 1977, Press Release of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, No. 57(77).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the essential structure of the regime for mining manganese nodules on the seabed beyond the 200-mile economic zone on the continental margin is no longer in issue. It is built around a basic compromise between the position of the developing countries, which wanted all exploitation of seabed resources beyond these limits and constituting "the common heritage of mankind" reserved for the international equivalent of a government monopoly, and the position of industrialized countries, which advocated a licensing system for all qualified seabed miners, whether private corporations or state entities.

Under this compromise, generally known as the "parallel system," both companies and an international seabed mining entity known as "the Enterprise" would have the opportunity to engage in deep seabed mining under the aegis of an International Seabed Authority. Many of the thorny problems that have had to be addressed in order to make both halves of the system workable—the powers of the International Seabed Authority, start-up financial assistance to the Enterprise, the mandatory licensing of technology for the benefit of the Enterprise, the types and amounts of payments by contractors to the Authority, the provisions for the adjudication of disputes, and countless subsidiary matters—are at or near the point of consensus.

The seabed mining issues not yet resolved, however, confront the Law of the Sea Conference with formidable difficulties. Among those that will have to be addressed in the two five-week meetings scheduled for 1980 are protection of major economic interests from an unsympathetic majority vote in the Authority's principal managerial body (the Council), certain features of the production ceiling on seabed minerals which protects land-based producers of the same minerals, and several subsidiary aspects of the obligation to sell technology. If these difficulties cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United States and other countries whose companies are preparing to engage in seabed mining, none of the other benefits of the treaty can make it acceptable to us. We would thus be forced to sacrifice not only the guarantees of freedom of navigation and overflight discussed in this article but other gains as well, including effective protection of the marine environment, a stable regime for marine scientific research, and a workable definition of the outer limits of coastal-state jurisdiction over the oil and gas resources of the continental margin. It would be an outcome preferable, nevertheless, to being bound by a system incapable of attracting the private investment without which the wealth of the deep seabeds will continue to lie

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in total darkness miles beneath the surface of the ocean.

But even if the remaining deep seabed mining issues are satisfactorily resolved within the framework of the basic compromises already made, there will still be those who insist that these very compromises concede too much to Third World demands. They may contend that we should prefer an outcome under which a treaty satisfactory in all respects other than seabed mining is completed but never comes into force. This, arguably, would leave us free to conduct deep seabed mining either under our own legislation or under a "mini-treaty" negotiated among interested states outside the U.N. Conference framework, and restricted to seabed mining, while at the same time letting us benefit from the assimilation of the draft Law of the Sea treaty's navigational provisions into customary international law. Such a strategy would give us—would it not?—the benefit of both worlds.

The idea has attractive features, and it is not surprising that spokesmen for some of the seabed mining companies have attempted to win converts to it. In the real world, however, this is simply not the way in which things are likely to work out. The changes in customary international law that have gained the most momentum from consensus in the Law of the Sea Conference are those that enlarge coastal-state claims. While these expansive principles may not need the treaty's entry into force in order to be ultimately absorbed into customary international law, the same cannot so confidently be said of the limitations and qualifications on coastal states' rights that the treaty would attach to them. The provisions for transit passage through straits qualify the extension of the territorial sea; the provisions for sea-lanes through archipelagos limit the concept of archipelagic waters; the provisions preserving high-seas freedoms in the exclusive economic zone restrain coastal-state claims of control; the provisions for geographic limits bar claims beyond those limits. These provisions can spell the difference between enjoying and losing high-seas freedoms of navigation, overflight and related uses in 40 percent of the world's oceans. It is hard to see, moreover, how countries with territorial sea claims exceeding 12 miles can, in fact, roll them back except as a consequence of a global treaty that actually comes into force.

Such are the probabilities without reference to the retaliatory measures that would surely be provoked by what would be seen as a barefaced attempt to have it both ways. Even if we discount the more extreme consequences that some representatives of other nations have warned us about—coastal-state claims dividing up

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the seabed itself, for example—we cannot so easily dismiss the likelihood that the navigational provisions we care most about would be cut back, dropped out, or ignored. It would be a mistake, finally, to assume that seabed mining under unilateral legislation—or even a "mini-treaty"—would be free of problems. Neither national legislation nor a "mini-treaty" could ever purport to grant a seabed miner exclusive rights of access to his mine site against the rest of the world.

We would, it is true, have to accept some of these same undesirable consequences if we cannot get compromises on the remaining seabed mining issues good enough to justify our signing and ratifying the treaty. But that would be because we had concluded that the net balance among all U.S. interests affected by the treaty was adverse. The same result, quite obviously, will not follow if the resolution of seabed mining issues is on its own merits better than no treaty: we would then gain, rather than risk losing, benefits in other areas, including navigation.

Any treaty that can win widespread acceptance is bound to have costs as well as benefits. Its measure is not whether it is as good as the constitution for ocean space we would write if we alone were responsible for its terms. Its measure is whether it serves all our interests as well as or better than those interests would be served in a treatyless world.

Among the interests that will have to be weighed in the end is our interest in the avoidance and prevention of conflict. We—as part of the world community—are strengthened by the strengthening of the rule of law. The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have given us sharp reminders of the relevance to our interests of widely accepted legal standards. In responding to those crises we have worked hard to build supportive coalitions based not on a similarity of political outlook or mutuality of economic or military concerns, but on a common awareness of the importance to all members of the world community of respect for the rule of law.

A successful outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference and the widespread adoption of the resulting treaty would extend the rule of law—including an agreed regime for third-party settlement of disputes—over two-thirds of the earth's surface. In so doing, it would give powerful encouragement to the determined pursuit of other rational accommodations among the ever more complex issues forced upon the world by the imperious realities of its inescapable interdependence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ross Terrill

CHINA ENTERS THE 1980s

The mood in China as the 1980s begin, and a post-Mao policy line is consolidated, is one of cautious hopefulness. There is a fervent desire for progress, blended with an acute awareness of the limits on future possibilities. Of all the differences since the great but oppressive Mao Zedong was embalmed in 1976, there are four which stand out.

First, people high and low see economic growth as China's highest priority. In the factories the slogans are about output, product quality and competitions between teams of workers: the conversations in the canteens are about pay packets and what to spend them on. Some private enterprise is returning to the cities, to provide much desired special products and services, and to alleviate an increasingly serious unemployment problem. The spirit of industry has been galvanized by the assertion from on high that profit and market response are the only valid measures of industrial performance.

In most of the countryside political and bureaucratic pressures on the farmers have been eased, to spur them to grow more by growing what they want to grow. In town and village alike, hard work and initiative (as well as birth control) are being rewarded in cash; one-sixth of an industrial wage can hinge on a bonus, and one-fourth of a farm income can come from private cultivation. Even the young urban dissidents are part of the age of economics. They have been selling their leaflets—unlike dissidents in the rest of the Marxist world, who tend to give their literature away; even Wei Jingsheng, the outspoken young editor who was jailed for "counterrevolutionary activity" last year, said at his trial: "We publish our magazines for the purpose of... making China more prosperous and powerful."

One cannot but recall how Mao in 1965 reminded André Malraux of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's remark, "Communism means the raising of living standards," and then sneeringly dismissed it: "and swimming is a way of putting on a pair of

---

Ross Terrill, author of *800,000,000: The Real China, Flowers On An Iron Tree, The Future of China*, and other books, has been a frequent visitor to China, first in 1964 and most recently in 1980. He has just completed a biography of Mao Zedong (Harper & Row). Copyright © Ross Terrill.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trunks." "Politics in command," which was Mao's update of Confucian social moralism, has given way to "production in command." The government tells the citizens to work hard and to reach for material rewards; "politics in command" effectively discounted both.

The traditional materialism of the Chinese has reappeared, then, as the shackles of an overplanned economy have been pulled back a little. Under Mao, China as a nation stood up. In these post-Mao years the Chinese individual is trying to stand up and claim a place in the sun.

A second change is nothing less than the castration of Marxism. One aspect is theoretical: class struggle is no longer talked about or believed in. A practical aspect follows: the tentacles of ideology have been untwined from one realm after another of Chinese life.

People may go to the opera or watch an evening of television without hearing any Marxist message. In the schools the running battle between "red" and "expert" has been won resoundingly by professionals who say education means the learning of expertise or else it means nothing. Even topics such as management science and the analysis of World War II's nature and causes have been approached without Marxism as the compass. The mask of ideology has been pulled back from the face of Chinese civilization. Indeed, this is true visually: the decline of slogans and banners frees the eye to notice more of the architecture, social ways, harmonies and chaos of Chinese daily life.

The change here, to borrow terms from political science, looks like a de-escalation from totalitarianism (where nothing is value-free) to authoritarianism (where the power of the state is not coincident with the sovereignty of an ideology). A 1961 speech of Zhou Enlai, resurrected in 1979, sums up the new line: scientists, writers and other professionals don't have to be interested in politics, the former Premier said, as long as they do their work well and do not actively oppose socialism.

The political process itself is taking on a post-ideological flavor. No figure is being built up—as Hua Guofeng was during 1977—as a Red Emperor in Mao's image. Premier (and Communist Party Chairman) Hua is now merely termed "China's most senior leader." Budgets are published; differences of opinion are recorded in a relaxed way; long speeches are given without any quote from Marx, Lenin or Mao. Politics as a near-religious ritual, in which a demigod above tossed out the Word to adoring masses below, is being replaced by politics as a pedestrian adjustment of interests.

"Seek truth from facts" is now said by Beijing to be the essence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Marxism. Mao, during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, told the Red Guards that "It is right to rebel" was Marxism's summation. Karl Marx might have found shortcomings in both formulations; yet the change from one to the other is enormous in its implications. An ideological crisis that had been building up in China for some years, caused by a ritualistic continuance of applying class categories to realities that have little to do with class, has been largely diffused. The year 1979 was perhaps the first since the Liberation of 1949 in which *no* class-related political campaign was in progress whatsoever. One cannot but note that this de-emphasis of ideology has undermined some of the logic of China's denunciation of Soviet society.

A third point—again noticeable from the top of society to the grass roots—is a determination to replace the arbitrariness of the late Mao era with some steps toward a government of laws rather than a government of men. It is in this context that we should see both the "Democracy Wall" phenomenon of 1978–79 and the spate of legislation introduced by the government during 1979; the two are linked in an ambiguous way.

When Wei Jingsheng railed against "the elevation of leaders to the position of deities," Deng and others in the Politburo knew what he meant, for they themselves suffered in the 1960s from the whims of Emperor Mao. Mao's senior victims, hardly less than the poster-writers and editors of private magazines, appreciate the attractiveness of a steady period under law.

The urban dissident movement speaks of "democracy"; but to few Chinese does the word connote the Western idea of a periodic choice at elections between competing parties. The center of gravity of the concerns of the dissident movement is constitutionalism: fixed rules which permit the citizen to know where he stands; accountability of officials to those rules. A few bold spirits have asked for the replacement of a Marxist system by a Western-type democratic system. At the other extreme are posters which detail personal grievances. But the vast majority of posters and articles in the unauthorized magazines demand adherence to the Constitution and other laws, due process, and a less stifling mental atmosphere in which criticism is not subject to overnight redefinition as "counterrevolution."

So far the constituency of sympathy within the government for the dissidents has been important, and 1979 was a year of notable, if flawed, steps toward constitutionalism-within-Marxism. Rules and regulations are in. The political gymnastics of tossing halos or dunce caps on the heads of supporters or foes is happily out.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Everyone is equal before the law" was one of the new-style official Communist Party slogans for the celebration last October of the 30th anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

A fourth major change—the only one bearing directly on foreign policy—is a wider opening of the door to non-Chinese ideas and presence. This is not the same as the pro-Western tilt of Chinese foreign policy (which Mao himself wrought as he turned against Russia). New is the level of openness to international economic forces, and to foreign cultural influences.

Foreign trade has more than doubled since Mao died. Beijing is borrowing abroad. Export zones, foreign advertising, foreign bank offices, joint ventures have all suddenly come into existence. Chinese in city parks come up to tourists to practice their foreign language skills, declaring that "foreigners are no longer considered enemies," and the urban bookstores and theaters are dizzily cosmopolitan by past standards. A senior British official in the Hong Kong government shook his head and mused, "Can this really be the same country?" as he compared dealing with China in 1979 with the same enterprise in the 1960s.

China, for so long its own world, seems to be holding out its hand for an indefinite season of give and take with the rest of the world. For years the PRC leaders, including Mao, looked abroad for technique (and during the 1950s would have liked more of it than the West was then interested in offering). But the post-Mao leadership is also looking outside China for some of the *ideas* for China's development. Self-reliance as a philosophy, as distinct from self-reliance as the mother of certain necessities, has just about died in its tracks.[1] The Chinese are now so eclectic in their approach to modernization—even recently drawing some ideas from South Korea and Bulgaria—that people who have spoken of a "Chinese model" should rethink the matter.

II

The Chinese tend to exaggerate, and it needs stressing that many things have *not* changed since the death of Mao and the fall of the so-called Gang of Four ultra-leftists. In some ways the new mood of frankness and realism brings into sharper relief fundamental facts which still stand in the path of change.

China is still a vast, poor, agricultural country. Some of the current restiveness is due to an awareness of the gap between the

[1] Three years ago I wrote in these pages of the signs of such a trend in "China and the World: Self-Reliance or Interdependence?", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

living standards of China and those of other countries which the Chinese people hear about through overseas Chinese and other channels. Yet no Chinese government, however brilliant, dedicated or capitalist-minded, could possibly bring the per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of the more than one billion Chinese people to US$1,000 by the year 2000.

In the dialogue which dissatisfied young Chinese, some of them returned from study abroad, are starting to have with foreigners, there is an insistent stress by them on two sober realities: the backwardness of rural China and the unbudgability of one-party dictatorship. In comparative historical perspective we are justified in saying that the second reality is heavily dependent on the first. As one young Beijing resident put it in a recent letter, "With the bulk of the population backward, there can be no genuine democracy for all."

For all the switch to production as top priority, the Chinese have not turned overnight into economic animals. It does not seem to an observer that the average Chinese laborer in 1980 works as hard as his counterpart in Hong Kong or Japan or Singapore. Despite a stress on merit in the rhetoric, the dead hand of seniority still has many an institution in its grip, and sons can still inherit factory jobs from their fathers. A high official in an important Beijing organization greeted his visitor with a wave of his arm toward a honeycomb of corridors. "Our organization, like so many in China, has too many people—and very few of them are really trained and capable." In some respects the ideological relaxation is bringing to the fore a disturbing underlying slovenliness and couldn't-care-less attitude in parts of Chinese society.

Even more important, resistance exists to the age of economics. It comes from figures at the center and in the leadership of certain provinces who sympathize with the fallen ultra-leftists, from some of the alienated young "1960s generation," from some rural leaders who see advanced industry, not agriculture, as modernization's beneficiary, and from some lower level officials all over the nation who for one reason or another have a vested interest in upholding Maoism.

As for China's international economic involvement, there has been a tendency to overstate its dimensions and the degree to which it is likely to shape tomorrow's China. China's foreign trade is still small, and in per capita terms staggeringly so (US$25). The main task of the Chinese economy must continue to be to produce food (from seven percent of the world's cultivated land) for its own people (22 percent of the world's population). For all the talk

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and anxiety about China going into debt, Beijing's policies toward borrowing are extremely cautious. The same modesty is evident in China's involvement in the international movement of persons; the total number of foreign students the PRC, with one billion people, has abroad in all countries is less than the number Hong Kong, with five million people, has in the United States alone.

In a word, only a small tip of the vast Chinese iceberg touches international waters. China's modernization will not, like South Korea's and Taiwan's and Singapore's, hinge heavily on international factors.

Nor has there been any change in the hyper-nationalism and the military-mindedness of China's outlook. China has become very pro-Western, but not very internationalist, or notably devoted to a vision of a peaceful world.

There is a heavy-handed self-righteousness about China's absolute, take-it-or-leave-it hostility toward Vietnam, which makes it very difficult even to discuss the matter with Chinese officials. If one feels that China as the much larger country should have been able to find political–diplomatic means of keeping Sino-Vietnamese tensions within bounds, there is little sign on the Chinese side of self-doubt, or of awareness of the ultimate futility of using military force to express anger toward a truculent small nation.

China spends perhaps as much as nine percent of its GNP on defense—its military bill is much larger than West Germany's and several times larger than Japan's—which is a great deal for a backward society determined to improve quickly its standard of living. Doubts as to this priority may well grow among the Chinese. Yet for some time to come China, which has not forgotten its century of humiliation before foreign assault, is going to seem an old-fashioned nation in the absoluteness of its nationalism, in its maintenance of a siege mentality, and in its hearty confidence that wars can be fought and won. It was symptomatic that during the Sino-American summit in Washington after normalization, President Carter stressed "peace" when analyzing the new relationship, while Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping stressed "defense."

There was an aspect of anti-war dissent to Wei Jingsheng's challenge—his passing on of casualty figures from the China-Vietnam clash to a British journalist greatly angered certain Chinese authorities. Yet in no major nation does a strong anti-war movement seem less possible than in China.

Behind this old-fashioned belief in the verities of nationalism and the acceptability of using force lies a fundamental point of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social experience: despite the new cosmopolitanism of urban China, the overall gap between China and "non-China" is still relatively vast. Chinese schools do little to promote internationalist values. Marriage between a Chinese and a non-Chinese is almost unheard of. From deep within China the outside world is perceived—if at all—only as an abstraction for China to match and surpass.

The sense of identity with people of other nationalities, which is the source of any feeling of international obligation, is not very strong among the hills and rivers of China. The knitting together of peoples through direct experience of each other's way of life, which is the basis for any hope we can have for international order, is not a process in which the Chinese are to the fore.

III

All in all there is a dappled character to the current Chinese scene. One hears many Delphic utterances from on high. Positions are taken whose apparent implications are shied away from. Wise and even exciting policies are introduced though the justifications offered for them ("cleaning up the mess left by the Gang of Four") do not always convince. Beijing bristles with promises and good intentions, yet one senses a number of painful trade-offs just around the corner.

A key statement of basic purpose in the post-Mao era is a vow to "create a political atmosphere in which both centralism and democracy will reign, discipline and freedom, unity of purpose and a universal feeling of satisfaction and high spirits." Each pair of values embodies a contradiction; Beijing is trying to contain it, "walking on two legs" with a gingerly care that suggests at times a lack of full confidence in either leg.

Judicial organs are to be "independent"; yet also under the supervision of the Communist Party. Ultra-leftism was a disaster; but "bourgeois" institutions would be just as bad. You may speak up and say what you wish; however if your views are "counter-revolutionary" you will be arrested.[2] Skepticism is good because "blind faith" has led China into disasters; but not skepticism toward "scientific truths." The Chinese people must "emancipate their minds"; but this "definitely does not mean doing things according to one's own whims." Liu Shaoqi, the former head of state who was purged in 1968, has just been rehabilitated; yet the man who purged him, Mao Zedong, will not be directly blamed

[2] A counterrevolutionary "thought" is no concern of the law, a senior judge told a visitor, but a counterrevolutionary "public statement" is considered to be the equivalent of a counter-revolutionary "deed."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the deed. Officially it is said that contact between Chinese and foreigners is a good thing; yet some Chinese experience bullying and surveillance after mixing with foreigners.

The young Beijing resident referred to above wrote in his letter that "Some people are beginning to question the virtues of socialism"; yet even he felt the need to tack on a qualification: "not the genuine Marxist socialism." If the Chinese twin ideas of *yin* and *yang* did not exist they would need to be invented to describe the present hospitality toward thesis and antithesis alike.

The Politburo seems determined to maintain a knife-edge balance. Is it out of a wise prudence, taking into account both the hopes and the limits on future possibilities; or is it a sign that incompatibles are wrestling beneath the surface of Chinese politics?

The prospects for political stability hinge on many factors, including the performance of the economy, how fast the social tensions of modernity develop and how much longer Deng stays fit and alive. Perhaps the most important clue, though, comes from an accurate explanation of the changes in China during the late 1970s.

One explanation is the official Chinese line that the Gang of Four held "a portion of the power" for "about a decade," and that now they have fallen and so ultra-leftism is dead, and things are better. There is some truth in this analysis, but not the whole truth. The Gang was a cohesive force only briefly; Mao's wife and her Shanghai associates were not the giant-killers in the 1960s that it is now convenient to say they were; above all they owed their "portion of the power" to Mao and all fell within weeks of Mao's death. The Gang of Four was not an independent force for very long if at all.[3]

Or it can be asserted that the politics of this vast land of one billion people are subject to a law of swing of the pendulum. There was the steady period of the First Five Year Plan; the Great Leap Forward; a retreat to moderate policies in the early 1960s; the utopian lunge into the Cultural Revolution; a return to pragmatism after 1969; and so on. It is true that there is in China—as in many other countries—a structural tendency to zigzag between innovation and consolidation. Yet each burst of leftist

[3] One worker at the New China News Agency privately expressed his disgust to a visitor that a draft article on Peng Dehuai, who fell foul of Mao in 1959 and died in 1974, had stated that the former Defense Minister "was persecuted and harried to death by the Gang of Four." The worker protested to his boss about the absurdity of the phrase. As a result the anachronistic reference to the Gang of Four was cut out of the article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assertiveness in the PRC's history can be traced to the will of the man Mao Zedong. If people as mediocre as one or two of the Gang of Four could capture "a portion of the power" one may well expect extremists to do this repeatedly. If there is a law of swing of the pendulum, then today's pragmatism will bring on tomorrow's ideological zeal.

But the real explanation for the changes in China over recent years is the absence of Mao. After the great helmsman died, certain pressures that had been building up for years found fulfillment: pressures for an end to patriarchalism; for some intellectual experimentation free from the inhibiting shadow of a political figure who came to monopolize the mental space of the nation; for a more serious focus on economic tasks, instead of endless political hoopla; for more relaxed dealings with the international marketplace of products and ideas.

A permanent change has occurred, a shift, irreversible I believe for years, in the direction of a demythologizing of politics. So in the upper reaches of the political system, at least, the prospects for a steady period are good.

Conflicts there will be. There are still wisps of ultra-leftism even at senior levels—voices which mention "class enemies," talk a lot about the dictatorship of the proletariat, fail to denounce the Cultural Revolution, replace "seek truth from facts" with the milder "use practice as the criterion to measure truth"—and even when philosophical differences do not arise there are differences about how to allocate resources, or how to slice up the pie of production.

Yet the conflicts will not be handled as morality plays in the style of the late Mao. No single figure today embodies both doctrine (*jiao*) and power (*zheng*) as Mao, the revolution's architect, did; the two drift apart and a leader may lose power without it having to be said that he has lost truth as well. During 1978 and 1979 the Politburo has shown a readiness to live with differences, and to see them in single-issue terms, rather than as an encounter between darkness and light.

The way the legacy of Mao himself is being handled sets the tone. He is still honored; yet almost all of his large initiatives from the late 1950s until his death have been gently deplored. "Chairman Mao's Policy Has Come Back" was the headline on a recent article that reported the dismantling of Mao's rural policies of limiting private plots and private markets. Many fine policies are now said to have been "undermined during the Cultural Revolution." To say *by* the Cultural Revolution, which would be more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

candid, would point a finger at Mao; "during" allows the convenient inference that the Gang of Four made a mess of Mao's basically sound Cultural Revolution.

All this creates a disturbing gap between what is said and the implications of what is said, and intolerable strains may result. Perhaps Chinese political culture can no longer sustain ritual and indirection in its time-honored way. Perhaps the years 1976–79 were only a Chinese equivalent to the years 1953–56 in Russia, a prelude to a coming vicious dethronement. I doubt it. The Chinese way in these matters, for all the recent changes, is not the same as the Soviet way. Nor does China have a Lenin to fall back upon, as Moscow did, if it were to denounce Mao as Khrushchev denounced Stalin. Mao, as the Stalin and Lenin (and Marx) of the Chinese Revolution, is probably an indispensable symbol of the PRC's legitimacy.

In Chinese conditions, the double policy of praising Mao while burying him seems a better solution than sudden root-and-branch denunciation. Partial criticism (Deng has said Mao was 70 percent right and 30 percent wrong) works to prevent the kind of bottling up of resentment that occurred in the Soviet Union from 1953 until 1956, and it minimizes the chances of a pro-Mao backlash by Mao loyalists.

The near future will necessarily bring a resolution of some policy issues which now sit on a knife-edge. How much inequality will Beijing allow—between a worker and his boss, between city wages and those in the surrounding countryside, between levels in prosperous Manchuria and those in a poor province like Shanxi? Now that class struggle is said to be a thing of the past, when will the slippery, ultimately class-derived term "counterrevolutionary" be replaced by terms which concretely define what is unacceptable behavior under the rule, not of ideology, but of law? In every sphere of Chinese life there are such issues, which will soon have to be clarified by reference not merely to the settled, comfortable myths of a receding past but to new realities.

An acid test for "socialist legality" will be whether the members of the Gang of Four are accorded due process, despite the passions their case arouses and the political usefulness of caricaturing them as the incarnation of evil, when their trial takes place soon. It is not a good sign that a senior judge, after assuring a visitor of the regained independence of China's judicial organs, answered a question about the trial of the ultra-leftist quartet (which he expects to take place during 1980) by saying that "the disposition of the Gang of Four case will really be up to the Party leaders."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And the year 1980 may well reveal whether Deng can really remain the driving force without holding the top Party and state posts; or whether Hua, given structural realities and the deeply ingrained habit of rural Chinese to think of politics in terms of a leader—be he emperor or chairman—may rapidly show that a paper tiger can turn into a real tiger. There were signs during 1979 that Hua was growing in stature within the Politburo and the nation, though Deng's associates continue to rise on all sides of Hua in the upper reaches of the Communist Party hierarchy.

The prospects for the urban dissident movement are excellent so far as survival goes, but poor for success in bringing about basic change in China's political system. Mao's passing makes patriarchal ways unpopular and hard to defend. Part of the government is happy to see a bold vanguard pushing for more "socialist legality." And a social development—the rise of a quasi-middle class (based on access to knowledge rather than on relation to property)—is the root cause of the dissident movement. So we have as yet probably seen only the beginning of political dissent in China.

On the other hand, the dissident movement inevitably comes into conflict with even the more liberal-minded members of the Politburo. When Deng calls the dissidents "anarchists," we are reminded that he himself is an authoritarian. The Vice Premier is not *so* much opposed to Mao's arbitrariness that he favors an independent judiciary and full equality before the law, or is prepared to forfeit the reserve weapon of calling troublemakers "counterrevolutionaries," much less to dismantle the one-party system. Moreover, modernization in some respects requires *more* discipline, law and order, and centralization than China knew under Mao.

In the excitement of Beijing's liberalizations, one should recall that many of the measures are no more than a return to the legal, economic and political policies of the 1950s, and that the 1950s saw China set in place large portions of the Stalinist system. Above all, the "Democracy Wall" phenomenon is limited in being an urban growth in a nation of peasants. China cannot have a political system—I suppose it would not be "democratic" for it to do so—tailored only to the desires of an aspiring urban middle class, which is far removed from the earthbound 80 percent who till the fields.

The voices of those who seek to go "too far" toward democracy, and away from one-party dictatorship, will go on being heard; "Democracy Wall" is more modest in 1980 than it was, and it has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been moved out of Beijing's heart, but it still exists. But those voices are likely to be heeded only when one part of the Politburo finds them useful as a weapon against a more conservative part. And only their "centrist," constitutionalist demands seem likely to have any success; not their "extreme," democratic demands.

IV

For the economy, the passing of Mao carries much less significance and the picture, hinging on many variables, looks uncertain. It will take much more than the absence of Mao to achieve the ambitious goals of China's four modernizations. For all the recent loosening up, the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy are pretty much what they have long been. The country has vast natural resources, an able and increasingly educated work force, a substantial industrial base, and a populace whose consumer demands are kept within firm limits.

On the negative side, one notes a shortage of capital, a massive population which it is the main task of the economy simply to feed, an inability to raise the present proportion of cultivated land (11 percent) except at exorbitant cost, weak transportation and other infrastructures, and the bureaucratic rigidities of a planning system that is still basically Marxist.

Productivity went up in 1978 and 1979, due to incentives, technological improvements and a better spirit in the nation generally, and China's credit-worthiness abroad has risen high; these are recent positive developments. Expectations have also soared, however, and Beijing's new liberal economic planners may be sowing the seeds of a serious inflation problem.

Still, economic results have been good since the new policies have been given a chance. For 1978, grain output was up seven percent over 1977, industrial output 13 percent, and foreign trade 30 percent. Although these figures will not quite be matched for 1979, when the full results are assembled in April, China may well expect a six percent rate of growth of GNP over the coming years, which is high for such a populous agricultural country, and which would see the size of the Chinese economy double in about 12 years.

Broadly, China, already the world's sixth largest economy, is in absolute terms becoming a formidable economic force in Asia, but the life of the average Chinese is going to remain austere by the standards of Asia (not to speak of the West). One may wonder whether the undoubted stoicism and potential for discipline of the Chinese people will be sufficient, in changing times, for this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contradiction to be borne without dissatisfaction that will eventually produce its own new phase of political radicalism.

It is hard, in the face of many variables, and with China's new policies still in their infancy, to make firm projections as to possible social dislocations ahead. But certain trends and factors can be weighed. As ideological tensions subside, sociological tensions are bound to intensify, some of them as a result of the very successes of modernization.

Dissatisfied youth: As many as 30 million high school graduates find themselves in the countryside, where they do not wish to be. Together with many others in the towns, they form a "lost generation" which missed out on proper training during the political distractions of the 1960s, and feels resentful of the "post-Mao generation" which sails past it as expertise wins out over redness. The general problem will not go away, for China has 210 million young people in primary and high schools and only one million in tertiary schools, and will not for decades be able to much modify this acutely tapered educational pyramid. One also notes that *half* the 35 million members of the Communist Party joined during the Cultural Revolution; perhaps the values of that period have not really disappeared without a trace.

There is such a generation gap in China today that the leftist dissatisfied youth could well be found one day struggling alongside those, like Wei Jingsheng, who seem rightist, on the common ground of opposition to privilege and frustration at not being able to set foot on any upward path. The crime, the aping of the West, the romanticism in artistic circles—all making a significant appearance among urban young people—cannot be catalogued in terms of Left or Right. Nor is the feeling that some young people are indulgent, naïve and impatient confined to hard-nosed bureaucrats and Maoist remnants; liberal officials and intellectuals, who suffered for their nonconformity during the 1960s, are often sharply critical of "these arrogant youth with too high expectations," to quote an academician who spent the 1960s in prison. Some day a new burst of political radicalism may arise among disgruntled and/or idealistic educated youth.

Regional assertiveness: The loosening up of the economic planning process, the growth of the "frontier" areas of western China, the go-ahead given to Shanghai and other advanced industrial bastions to do their own thing and not fear that they may be blamed if they move out ahead of the rest of the nation, are all going to result in new conflicts of interest and outlook in the China of tomorrow. In particular, one watches for two developments: a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

growing gap between minority races and the Han peoples who have been set in their midst to lead the industrial and mineral development of the southwest, west and northwest; and possible anxiety among the Mandarins of north China as south China, with its cultural links to the overseas Chinese, spearheads China's economic involvement in Asia, and Canton develops some of the traits of a Southeast Asian city.

City-village tensions: No other major nation, unless it be India, suffers from a greater gulf between urban and rural life than does China, and the current modernization policies will widen it. That farmers were paid sharply higher prices for their grain and pigs in 1979 does not alter the fact that purchasing power (not to speak of access to knowledge and culture) is far greater in the 192 cities where 80 million Chinese live than it is in the villages where 800 million live. The specter of unemployment, moreover, hangs much more over rural China than it does over urban China. While the communes are ideal rag-bags for the underemployed, the mopping up of surplus labor can only be done at a cost to rural living standards. There are too many variables for one to predict some sporadic peasant revolt, 10 to 15 years from now, against the urban, modernizing, seaboard part of China, but of all the dangers facing China this may be the greatest.

Additional strains loom, from traffic problems to environmental threats, from the coming age imbalance of the Chinese population once the present policy of one-child families yields its fruits, to the social injustices and corruptions that will inevitably attend the unlocking of wages and prices after decades of stability. And yet there is some cause for optimism regarding China's social stability.

Because China's population is so vast, because the rate of economic growth must of necessity be well short of breakneck, and because the commitment to egalitarianism is still strong compared with most Third World countries, the way of life of most of the Chinese people is not going to be sharply transformed in the 1980s. This may prove frustrating to many Chinese but it also means a reduced chance of drastic social dislocations.

And recall that Chinese society enjoys great cohesion based on three powerful factors. There is a bone-deep nationalism that holds the Chinese together over and above agreement or disagreement as to the merits of communist rule. Cultural confidence—even the sobered Chinese of today have no real inferiority complex toward anyone—and cultural particularity are forces for stability in a modernization process. They should enable the Chinese to engage in post-Mao eclecticism without going too far and losing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their moorings. Chinese civilization has long paid special attention to the very social modes which become of crucial importance during periods of economic change. China is still Confucian enough to encompass all economic mechanisms and formal state structures with informal social networks that express family and civic morality.

A final factor making for cohesion as the nation develops is the strongly secular character of China, even rural China. For most of China's history its major religions have been functional and accommodating. And its lesser religions, such as Islam, have too few adherents to swing weight in the nation as a whole. One cannot expect to see in China what has appeared in Iran and to greater or lesser degree in many parts of the developing world: a religion-based backlash movement reasserting traditional values against modernity's intrusions.

Even though China's social future may not be very Maoist, then, it will be rooted in long-tested Chinese verities. The dislocations of modernization will be softened by the ingenious resources of Chinese civilization.

V

In foreign and domestic policy alike, China seems to have moved out of the pristine (and often inconsequential) world of black and white choices. More enmeshed with the real world, seriously bent on economic development without diversions, Beijing paradoxically finds its options narrowing as technical issues and the manipulation of complex balances dominate its heavy agenda.

One sees a China, after 30 years of its Marxist dynasty, at a moment of great hopefulness internally; yet involved in the tricky side effects of a massive switch of emphasis from politics to economics; aware of how fundamental some of its unresolved problems are and how much smaller its purse is than its shopping list; open to the West and its ways as the PRC has never been before; experiencing internationally the limits of power and the burdens of success; gaining influence and at the same time losing its moral exceptionalism; finding (both at home and abroad) that the weight of Nature (man's selfishness, sheer biological momentum, race distrust) is often greater than the persuasions of Nurture (the ideas put into children's heads, international revolutionary solidarity, schemes of reason and morality); having to accept that while an elite was prepared to die for communism, the masses do not always seem prepared to work for communism; discovering

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that if making a revolution is not like a dinner party (as Mao said), neither is modernizing a land of one billion people, and neither is the cut and thrust of dissent as one generation ridicules the sacred values of another.

There is a hint of Sun Yat-senism in the air of Beijing; in both the pragmatic modernizing zeal of the Honolulu-educated organizer, and also in his sometimes unrealistic blending of incompatibles. As Maoism recedes the historical goals of the Chinese Revolution in its larger sense, first stated by Sun, are reasserting themselves: to lift the Chinese masses out of backwardness; to catch up with the West; to make China a great world power as befits a great civilization.

From the American side (and that of quite a few other nations) the approach to China is today marked by a welcome new realism. "Normalization" has proved something of an anticlimax, in many good ways and one or two not so good. We see a China less exotic and more quotidian than we used to. Its uniqueness does not seem clear-cut after all; China takes its place as part of our age, grappling soberly, like other nations, with issues of growth and justice at home and with the anarchy of a fragmenting world.

China is much closer to the West than six months ago (Mao's own split with Russia was the real starting point of an evolution that the Afghanistan crisis has brought to a new peak), and in some ways China promises to be a staunch partner in the containment of a U.S.S.R. whose intentions it has perhaps read more accurately than the West has. Yet whether we and the Chinese can actually *do* things together, rather than merely analyze a crumbling world in largely similar terms, is yet to be proved. The possibilities of it, from the Chinese side, and the limits, will stem from the domestic realities which my pages have probed.

It is well to be realistic, for the Chinese have become more realistic about themselves. In the long term Beijing cares deeply about the changing world political map; yet for some years it would like to focus on domestic development. Our new friend is more nationally minded than we are, less inclined to be an international do-gooder; a ponderous land stirring only slowly from a siege mentality, not yet possessed of many positive ideas about a safer and healthier world, or resources to spare in the quest for it. China is with us, but any "joint" international responsibilities will be ours much more than China's. The Chinese are trying to solve China's problems, and given the dimensions of these, they can hardly be expected to solve many of the world's problems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

David Fromkin

THE GREAT GAME IN ASIA

Throughout the nineteenth century, Great Britain was obsessed by the fear that one of the other European powers would take advantage of the political decay of Islamic Asia.

At first it was France. Then it was Russia that moved along the caravan routes of the old conquerors and threatened to establish a new world monarchy on the ruins of the ancient ones. British governments were worried by the implications of the continuing march southward by the Russian empire in Asia. In the early part of the century, the focus of strategic concern was Constantinople. Later, as czarist armies overran Central Asia, attention shifted to Persia, to Afghanistan and to the mountain passes of the Himalayas. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was a common assumption in Europe that the next great war—the inevitable war—was going to be the final showdown between Britain and Russia.

The history of Russia's attempt to move into Afghanistan, Iran and other neighboring countries; of how Britain tried to stop Russia from doing so; and of how the war between the two of them did not take place, gains interest and possible significance from the American decision in our own time to contest Russian expansion on much the same battlefield.

II

Supposedly it was a British officer who first called it the Great Game. He played it exuberantly, and lost it in the terrifying way in which one lost in Central Asia: an Uzbek emir cast him for two months into a well filled with vermin and reptiles, and then what remained of him was brought up and beheaded. The phrase "the Great Game" was found in his papers and quoted by a historian of the First Afghan War. Rudyard Kipling made it famous in *Kim*, and visualized it in terms of an Anglo-Indian boy and his Afghan mentor foiling Russian intrigues along the highways to Hindustan. These activities of the rival intelligence services are what some writers mean by the Great Game; others use the phrase in the broader sense in which it is used in this article to describe the whole of the Anglo-Russian quarrel about the fate of Asia.

The nature of that quarrel has been variously described. The Great Game arose from a complex of disagreements between Britain and Russia, and the weight to be assigned to each of the causes of the rivalry between them is still a subject of dispute among historians.

In the beginning, in 1791, when the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, opposed czarist annexation of Ochakov, a strategic port town belonging to the Ottoman Empire, it was for fear that Russia might become too powerful and might upset the existing balance of power. But for a long time thereafter, that fear was forgotten as Britain and Russia both fought for their lives against

---

David Fromkin is the author of *The Question of Government* and the forthcoming *The Independence of Nations.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Napoleon. It was not until 1815, in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, that British fears of Russia began to revive. At that time Russia appeared to be the strongest land power in the world. Ever since the reign of Peter the Great she had planned to become a great maritime power too. Foreign observers saw the military strength of Russia through a magnifying glass, and this exaggeration of Russian strength gave rise to exaggerated fears.

Perhaps the most unrealistic of these fears was that the Russians would march across Asia to attack the British position in India. Originally this had been Napoleon's idea. It was typical of his genius to see that the series of triumphs in the eighteenth century that had led Britain to establish her power on the far side of the world had brought with them a certain vulnerability, in that the British lines of communication and transportation had become long and thus especially subject to disruption. Although Napoleon succeeded in persuading the mad Czar Paul of Russia that he should swoop down across these lines to attack the British in India, it was not within the range of Russia's capabilities at that time to undertake such a campaign. Thus, Russia was not able to exploit Britain's vulnerability. The Russian armies pulled back when the Czar Paul died, and the road to India was not attacked. But Napoleon's conception was so vivid that decades later it sprang back to life in the minds of the British leaders who had defeated him.

It was odd that it should do so, because until then—with the abortive personal exception of Czar Paul—it seems never to have occurred to the rulers of either Russia or Britain that Russia's expansion southward in Asia bore any relation to British interests. The grand dukes of Moscow had begun their campaigns of expansion into Asia centuries before Britain had arrived in India, and the wars that they waged with such frequency against the empires and khanates of Asia would have taken place even if Britain had never existed. Moreover, even the frontiers across which the Russians marched in western and central Asia at the beginning of the nineteenth century were far distant from the Indian border.

The British did not take any particular interest at that time in the areas into which Russia was expanding. They neglected to study the geography and politics of Persia, Afghanistan or the Himalayas. As to western Asia, it was assumed that Russia would someday take over Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire, but the few people in Britain who thought about it were not alarmed by the prospect.

Indeed, until the wars of the French and American Revolutions, Russia was regarded by the British as their natural ally; and despite the several difficulties that arose between them in the years between 1789 and 1815, this was the opinion that most Britons seem to have held at least until the end of the Napoleonic wars.

It was only at the end of the 1820s, when Russia seemed to be abusing the prerogatives that flowed from her military strength by annexing substantial additional territories from the Ottoman and Persian Empires, that British leaders became sufficiently alarmed to view this continuing expansion southeastward in Asia through Bonaparte's eyes. Books appeared in England discussing the Russian threat to India. In 1829 Wellington, then Prime Minister, corresponded with the President of the India Board about the invasion route the Russians might follow in the event that they planned to move into Afghanistan and from there to attack India.

From that time on, there always was a body of opinion in Britain that saw

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in every Russian move in Asia a threat to Britain's interest in India, no matter how farfetched that might seem to be as an analysis of the motives behind the Russian move in question. Later, and especially after the Indian Mutiny, British leaders developed a related fear that the mere threat of a Russian attack would encourage the Indians to rise up and expel the British, whether a Russian attack actually ever materialized or not.

In 1830 Lord Palmerston became the British Foreign Secretary and began his long career as the shaper of British world policy. It is his name that is associated with the traditional British policy of upholding the territorial integrity of the Ottoman and other Islamic rulers in Asia against encroachment by any of the European powers—which in practice meant, by Russia. Thus Islamic Asia was called into service as a vast buffer against Russian expansion. Palmerston's chief object in doing so is said to have been his fear that if the Asian regimes collapsed, the struggle between the outside powers to pick up the valuable pieces would lead to a general and disastrous European war—the nineteenth-century equivalent of what today would be a world war, in that all of the great military powers of the time would have been drawn into it.

But there are other explanations, too, for Palmerston's policy. In 1832 Great Britain moved further in the direction of democracy, by enactment of a Reform Bill that somewhat enlarged the franchise; while Russia in the 1830s and 1840s, by her brutal repression of popular revolts in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere, moved further in the direction of establishing herself as the world's chief enemy of freedom. The ideological differences between the two countries became an increasing cause of friction between them. Britons in ever greater numbers came to object to Russia not merely for what she did but for what she was. The Russophobia soon outgrew the particular political differences between the two countries, and became a cause in its own right of Britain's determination to stop Russian expansion in Asia, despite Lord Palmerston's wise advice that Britain should have neither perpetual friends nor perpetual enemies. Historians have been at some pains to explain the genesis and development of this unique phenomenon; but whatever the explanation, it is undeniable that one of the real factors determining British policy throughout much of the nineteenth century was "an antipathy toward Russia which soon became the most pronounced and enduring element in the national outlook on the world abroad."[1]

Another factor that began to assume genuine significance was an economic one. In the beginning, a British presence was established in Islamic Asia for strategic national security reasons; but once that presence was established, patterns of trade began to develop modestly at first, but then more importantly. After the Anglo-Turkish Trade Treaty of 1838 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, trade with the Ottoman Empire in particular became a matter of major economic importance for Great Britain, and the Turkish market became Britain's third best customer in the world. Russia's designs on the Ottoman Empire thereupon became a threat to Britain's economic as well as her political interests. Moreover, while Turkey was an open market for British manufacturers, Russia had erected a high tariff barrier that excluded British goods, so that Russia became an enemy on free-trade grounds.

[1] John Howes Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unarticulated was another point. The configuration of the southern seacoast of Asia is such that narrow stretches of land and water can dominate and choke off traffic at quite a number of points so that Britain, as a sea power with worldwide interests, required that the whole of the coastline be held in friendly hands.

Russian efforts to take over Persia, with its seacoast, were therefore a threat to England's commerce and position in the world.

Britain, then, by the middle of the nineteenth century had at least nine reasons for opposing the continuing Russian expansion in Asia: (1) it would upset the balance of power by making Russia much stronger than the other European powers; (2) it would culminate in a Russian invasion of British India; (3) it would encourage India to revolt against Britain; (4) it would cause the Islamic regimes of Asia to collapse, which in turn would lead to the outbreak of a general war between the European powers in order to determine which of them would get what share of the valuable spoils; (5) it would strengthen a country and a regime that were the chief enemies of popular political freedom in the world; (6) it would strengthen a people whom Britons hated; (7) it threatened to disrupt the profitable British trade with Asia; (8) it would strengthen the sort of protectionist, closed economic society which free-trading Britain morally disapproved of; and (9) it would threaten the line of naval communications upon which Britain's commercial and political position in the world depended. To these the British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Lord Salisbury added a tenth toward the end of the century, when he observed that England would have to stop Russia from acquiring Constantinople because, having made such an issue of it for so long, England would lose her reputation as a formidable power if she finally yielded the point. An eleventh reason for British opposition to Russian expansion in Asia emerged only in the first part of the twentieth century, when it was discovered that there was oil in the areas that Russia threatened, and that the possession of oil was of considerable military and economic importance.

III

Sometimes as a cold war and sometimes as a hot one, the struggle between Britain and Russia raged from one end of Asia to the other for almost a hundred years. From west to east on the map, the principal battlefields were the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire, the khanates of Turkestan in Central Asia, and the mountainous areas, such as Afghanistan, that stretch around the frontier of India.

In defense of the Ottoman Empire, Britain prevailed. She kept Constantinople and the Straits out of Russian hands; and in the Crimean War (1853–56) and at the Congress of Berlin (1878) Britain undid the results of Russian wartime successes against Turkey.

Britain was ineffective, however, in defending the Persian Empire. In decades of fighting in the first half of the nineteenth century, Russia conquered the Transcaucasus frontier and made final her annexations of Georgia, Circassia and parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Observing that Russia was more to be feared than was Britain, the Persian shahs fell under the influence of their czarist neighbor, and by the turn of the century Russian hegemony in Persia was almost complete. If the reason that Russia did not exploit the situation by establishing a position on the Persian Gulf coast was a fear of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

British reaction to such a move, it nonetheless can be said that Britain salvaged at least her minimum security needs from a losing situation.

And, in the last half of the nineteenth century Russia threw herself into the conquest of Central Asia: the khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand in western Turkestan, and the Turkoman tribal region then called Transcaspia. Britain did nothing other than protest.

Britain reacted violently, however, to any hint of Russian meddling in the areas on the frontier of India. In reaction to the presence of Russian agents there, Britain twice invaded Afghanistan, in the First Afghan War of 1838–42 and the Second Afghan War of 1878–80; and when Russia encouraged Persia to move against Afghanistan, Britain took decisive action—in 1838 and in the Anglo-Persian War of 1856–57. When Russian border patrols reached the Afghan frontier, in the Penjdeh crisis of 1885, Britain and Russia themselves nearly went to war.

At the end of the nineteenth century, it was discovered that there was another way in which Russia could get at Britain in Asia. Exploration teams reported that it would be possible to invade India through mountain passes in the region of the Pamirs, the "roof of the world." Advancing over the high plateaus, the Russians got there first and claimed it as their own; and when a British expedition finally arrived to investigate, the Russians turned it back. Not long after the British and Russian governments reached an agreement in 1895 to compromise in this Pamirs crisis—the Russians kept the line of the frontier, but the British were given the mountain passes—information was received of further Russian intrigues in the high Himalayas, this time in Tibet, where the Dalai Lama sought to throw off the last vestiges of Chinese authority. The British government of India heard of contacts between the Russians and the Dalai Lama in 1900 and 1901, apparently made with a view toward offering Russian aid and establishing Russian influence. To counter these developments, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, dispatched a British mission in 1903–04 which fought its way to Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, and, as the Dalai Lama fled, established British control.

What was so especially frightening about the Russian expansion in Central Asia was its persistence and seeming inevitability. The Russians were constantly fighting on their frontiers, against mountain and desert tribesmen if not against regular armies. Even in periods of nominal peace the fighting continued, as it did in the 1830s and 1840s in the Caucasus, where tens of thousands of czarist officers and troops received their firsthand schooling in warfare.

When they failed, they kept trying until they succeeded. In 1840 a Russian campaign to conquer Khiva met with disaster because Khiva was too far away and the logistical support of the expedition was inadequate to meet that challenge. The next time the Russians took great care in the preparation of their expedition; and on June 10, 1873, Khiva fell to them.

As each region was conquered, the Russians brought in logistical support, built roads and railroads, and organized themselves in such a way as to facilitate their going on to conquer the next adjoining territory. Even though this was not done in pursuance of some overall master plan for the conquest of Asia, to the outside world it bore the aspect of the carrying out of such a program.

Again and again, the Russians claimed that their military incursions were merely punitive expeditions, sent out to secure the frontier against attack; but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the territories into which the expeditions were sent were always annexed, and then themselves had to be defended by the sending of expeditions into the territories beyond them. The Russian government often claimed that these conquests were undertaken by overly ambitious Russian officers on the spot, in violation of orders from the czar and his ministers; and by and large, present-day Western historians accept the validity of these claims. Skeptics are in a position to point out, however, that the territories conquered in alleged violation of orders from St. Petersburg were never returned to their rulers, that the officers who supposedly violated orders were promoted, and that the officers who succeeded them in command continued to carry out the expansionist policies of which their government claimed to disapprove.

Perhaps the Russian advance would have seemed less menacing if it had taken place all at once. The conquest of Central Asia, for example, was a gradual encroachment over the course of many decades which must have seemed to contemporaries to be a series of separate conquests: a particular oasis occupied in one year, a certain city conquered the next year, a tribe of alleged marauders brought under control the year after that. Moreover the Russians seemed constantly to be pushing outward in all directions and to be prepared to keep on going until somebody stopped them.

There is another aspect to the situation, however, which the British Prime Minister Lord Melbourne pointed out in the 1830s when he was shown a map of Russian expansion and urged to take alarm at it. He said that "a map of England with her acquisitions during the same period would make a very respectable figure and colour no inconsiderable portion of the globe."[2] Viewed through distrustful eyes, the course of British expansion in Asia would indeed have been a cause for alarm.

How much this is so may be illustrated by a comment made long afterwards. On March 14, 1933, Jawaharlal Nehru, the future Prime Minister of India, wrote one of a series of letters outlining the history of the world for his teenaged daughter Indira, who grew up to become Prime Minister herself. In the letter in question, he discussed the traditional rivalry between Russia and England in Asia, and wrote that "the possession of India especially brought the British right up to the Russian frontier, and they were continually having nightmares as to what Tsarist Russia might do to India."[3]

In the nineteenth century Britain rounded out her position in India by the conquest of Sindh and other frontier areas, by the "forward policy" of conquering Afghanistan, and by the maintenance of a network of representatives and intelligence agents all across Asia. If the czar's government pictured these India-related activities as taking place on, in Nehru's words, "the Russian frontier," they were bound to see them as a dangerous series of acts of aggression. But the British government did not see them that way at all.

IV

What the British government did see—and the British public did not—was how Britain, in its struggle against Russia, could support the independence and territorial integrity of regimes such as the Ottoman and Persian Empires,

[2] Philip Ziegler, *Melbourne: A biography of William Lamb, 2nd Viscount Melbourne*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976, p. 319.

[3] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, New York: The John Day Company, 1942, p. 594.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which were cruel and unjust, denying their subjects even the most elementary of human rights. It was natural to wonder why Britain would risk war to keep in power rulers of whom all civilized persons must disapprove. Palmerston's enthusiastic response was to attempt to reform the regimes that Britain supported. It was an attempt that met with little success; and by the end of the century British leaders despaired of making any significant improvement in the governments of their Asian allies: if it could not be done in Turkey, Persia was not even worth trying, and the khanates were hopeless from the start.

A more traditional attitude, usually associated with the Tory Party and with the Foreign Office, was to consider the question of which foreign governments to support in the light of British interests rather than in the light of moral principles. If limited to the question of Asian policy at that time, this is a point of view with which it ought to be difficult to quarrel, for there was no effective alternative which British officials were aware of. Britain was obliged to deal with the governments that did or that might exist. That left her with a choice between deplorable allies and a deplorable adversary, a choice between evils, between a sultan who committed atrocities against Armenians and a czar who committed atrocities against Jews. Moral considerations were inapplicable in such a situation, and to introduce them into the discussion of foreign policy therefore was to mislead.

Yet there were many in Britain at that time—as there are in the United States today—who were not happy supporting a foreign policy not grounded in moral principle. The result was that a British political leader could not be sure that he would be able to rally enough domestic support to pursue a foreign policy that was in the best interest of his country.

For Russia, the introduction of the moral issue into foreign policy was a source of strength. She could use the rhetoric of liberation to justify her incursions into the territory of her neighbors, and not worry about the pull of her own domestic public opinion when she annexed or otherwise dominated the provinces that she then conquered, supposedly to free them, but in fact merely to bring them under her own rule.

Even abroad, the introduction of moral considerations into foreign policy issues worked against Great Britain. In 1907, when Britain settled her differences in the area by yielding most of inhabited Persia to Russia, the Persians attacked Britain but not Russia, for "tyranny was accepted from the Russians as natural to them, whereas Great Britain was expected to behave in accordance with her liberal traditions."[4]

V

The real issue was whether Britain could afford to preserve the Islamic regimes of Asia not in the moral sense but in the political and economic ones. The very qualities that made it so attractive to Britain to make a buffer zone of these decaying empires brought drawbacks. The empires made an ideal buffer zone because they were too feeble to threaten or to hurt the Great Powers; but that meant that they were also too feeble to defend themselves against Russian encroachments, and that Britain would have to do it for

[4] Sir Reader Bullard, *Britain and the Middle East, From Earliest Times to 1963*, London: Hutchinson University Library, 3rd rev. ed., 1964, p 59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them. Thus, they drained British resources rather than adding to them. By the last half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman and Persian Empires were not able to meet even the internal challenges to the viability of their governments, which became especially clear when the administration of their finances fell apart. Successive British cabinets failed to supply a solution to these problems and failed to persuade the governments in question to take their own remedial action.

The sultans of Turkey, in particular, knowing how much the British needed to prop them up, exploited that need in such a way as to avoid making the needed reforms. They felt free to resist the demands of foreign creditors and of foreign powers because they felt that Britain would be obliged to defend them against any attempts at enforcement. How to deal with this sort of blackmail by a weak client state is a problem that Britain was not able to solve in the nineteenth century any more than the United States has been able to do so in the twentieth century.

Especially frustrating was the case of Persia which at Russian instigation moved against British interests in protecting the integrity of Afghanistan. Britain thus was obliged to take military action against Persia, while at the same time trying to preserve the strength and integrity of Persia as against the Russians. To be forced to attack a country one intends to defend is a paradox—a paradox not unfamiliar to the government of the United States today as it attempts to decide how to deal with an Iran that has held Americans as hostages.

Another familiar aspect of that problem sprang from the rivalry of the countries Britain undertook to protect against Russia. The problem of how the United States should deal with the Greek-Turkish and Arab-Israeli conflicts, while at the same time shielding all of the countries in question against the Soviet Union, was foreshadowed by Britain's problem of what to do about Persian attacks against Afghanistan when both of them were countries she wanted to defend.

Attempts by Palmerston and other British leaders to persuade Persia that Russia was her real enemy fell on deaf ears. Whereas in Europe, if Russia had attacked and defeated several weaker countries, those countries would have banded together against Russia, the Asian regimes with which Britain was dealing at the time were too weak to be capable of any such response. In their world the weaker bowed to, instead of combining against, the stronger.

Yet if a country was willing to stand up for its independence against Russia, it also was likely to stand up against Britain, and the British therefore distrusted it. Such was the case of Afghanistan, against which Britain unwisely fought two wars in the nineteenth century and a third war in the twentieth century. These were dreadful, bloody debacles, and at some point in one of the disastrous retreats through the passes leading from Kabul to Jalalabad, some surviving British officer must have wondered whether it would not have been a better thing if it were a Russian army that the fierce Afghani were allowed to hack to pieces rather than a British one. Indeed, the young Disraeli had pointed out after the First Afghan War that Afghanistan could provide the finest possible barrier against Russian invasion if only Britain would stop interfering in its affairs.

The moral of this seems to be that it is best to leave to a local power the responsibility for defending both its interests and one's own. It is, of course, a defect of this policy of acting through regional surrogates—such a policy as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was adopted for the United States by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the 1969–73 Administration—that a power strong enough to act in such a capacity is likely to have ambitions of its own. The effective alliance that Britain finally contracted in order to defeat Russia in Asia was the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which freed the Japanese to fight the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. In the short run this was a success for Britain, in that Japan destroyed Russian power in the Pacific; but then, some decades later, Japan also went on to destroy in the Pacific the power and presence of Great Britain.

To the mind of so skeptical and clear-sighted a statesman as Lord Salisbury, the most reliable policy for England was one that she could carry out herself without having to rely on others. Some of the strategic elements necessary for doing so were either available or already in place. In 1798 Nelson had won control of the eastern Mediterranean for the British navy; and in that same year the first of a series of agreements was negotiated between Britain and the local rulers along the Persian Gulf coast which, during the nineteenth century, assumed the form of a virtual British protectorate of the entire coastal route to India. Partly by accident and partly by design, Britain also ended up occupying Egypt and the Suez Canal. In order to further his plan for Britain to take her fate into her own hands, Salisbury also obtained Cyprus from Turkey, explaining that it was in Turkey's own interest that British forces should have the use of a location of such strategic importance.

But Salisbury's hopes were dashed when it proved impossible to have British officials take charge of the administration and obtain a sort of protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. It was the 1880 elections, bringing Gladstone back into power, that, in Salisbury's view, destroyed the possibility of accomplishing such a program. Gladstone, who was on record as believing that the Turks were antihuman, washed his hands of the Ottoman involvement. The Turks, unable to stand on their own, turned to the new power of Bismarck's Germany as their protector. When Salisbury resumed his tenure of the Foreign Office in 1885, he lamented that the change could not be undone. Gladstone's government had given away the British influence at Constantinople—"They have just thrown it away into the sea," he exclaimed, "without getting anything whatever in exchange."[5]

What this meant was that while British interests still required that Russian expansion be stopped on the Ottoman and Persian frontiers, London was not able to guide Ottoman and Persian rulers so that they would take effective measures to ensure their own survival, in their own interest and in Britain's. In large measure, then, by the end of the nineteenth century Great Britain had lost control of the elements upon which her destiny as a power in Asia depended. If, for example, Russia were to descend from the interior of Asia upon the Persian coast, it was not clear how Britain, with only her fleet, could counterattack.

Lord Curzon, having become Viceroy of India, made a show of strength by a naval tour of the Persian Gulf coast. Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, warned off Britain's adversaries by proclaiming in 1903 that "we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified post on the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to our interests and

[5] Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1921 Vol. II, p. 326.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."[6] President Jimmy Carter recently made a remarkably similar pronouncement about the Persian Gulf; and then as now, the question raised by such a pronouncement is that of what substantive strength lies behind the warning.

For Britain, a naval power whose homeland was far from Asia, the question was where and how she could bring her own particular strength to bear upon an adversary moving out from the interior of the great Eurasian land mass. In a more general sense, the question was how to bring British political objectives in line with the resources and strategies that were available to accomplish them.

VI

At the beginning of the Anglo-Russian rivalry, after the Napoleonic Wars, it appeared that England and Russia were the two remaining Great Powers in the world, but that they were powers of a completely different kind. Britain was something new, as the greatest maritime and commercial power the world had ever seen. Russia appeared as a giant empire of the traditional type with a land army that overshadowed all other land armies in the world. It was not entirely clear how the two countries could get at one another, unless the British landed or the Russians put out to sea. The leaders of Great Britain never really came to grips with the fact that British power was inadequate in kind as well as scale to accomplish many of the strategic objectives that Britain had set herself. If Russia had been as militarily effective as she was believed to be, there would have been no way for mere wealth and a fleet to have stopped the czarist armies in the interior of Eurasia.

The wealthy British had subsidized their continental allies to do much of their land fighting for them in the Napoleonic and other European wars, but the rotting Islamic empires that were their allies in Asia lacked the fighting power to do the job. Moreover, for London to incite them into fighting losing campaigns from which Britain had no ground forces to extricate them would weaken rather than strengthen the British cause. Indeed when Britain failed to defend Persia in the Russo-Persian War of 1826–28—a course of inaction which Britain was fully justified in taking because Persia had started the war and the 1814 mutual defense agreement obligated Britain to defend Persia only against aggression—the Shah concluded that Britain was an unreliable ally, and in effect he went over to the Russian side.

Although Britain's economic strength was great, competitors existed, and by the second half of the nineteenth century France, Italy and Germany were able in large part to supplant her in the financial and commercial life of the Islamic world. However, Britain did maintain a network of representatives and intelligence agents all across Asia; and because the Russians were not as strong as they were thought to be, this network was able to play a role in helping to deter or stop the Russian advance.

The point at which it was believed that Britain could exercise maximum pressure was Constantinople. From there her warships could enter the Black Sea and with impunity bombard the coast of the Crimea, as was done in the Crimean War. However, if the Russian forces then withdrew from the coast

[6] Bullard, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the interior, there was little that Britain could do; she could land troops on the shore as an invasion force, but there was no reason to suppose that a small expeditionary force of this sort could conquer the vast land mass of Russia when even the great Napoleon with all his forces could not do so. Fortunately for the British and for their French allies, the Russians obliged them by not retreating when the Crimean War invasion took place, thus allowing the allied powers, despite their own abysmal military performance, to inflict a shattering defeat on the Russian Army.

It was only Russia's strategic blundering that had made victory in the Crimean War possible; and England's leaders ought to have seen that, unless against all odds such blunders were repeated, it would be difficult if not impossible to project Britain's power into the areas where Britain proposed to contain Russian expansionism. As Lord Salisbury said in another context, it was not possible for the British Navy to sail over the Taurus mountain range.

The brilliant success of Salisbury's diplomacy kept his countrymen from following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion. In the war-fevered year of 1878, as Britons whipped up their martial enthusiasm with the Jingo song in their music halls, Salisbury won Britain's greatest victory at the Congress of Berlin by the sheer force of his intellect. As A.J.P. Taylor has written, "Great Britain won a bloodless victory with a music-hall song, a navy of museum pieces, and no land forces at all.... Moreover, she won without a reliable continental ally.... The resounding achievement of 1878 weakened the effectiveness of British policy in the long run; for it led the British public to believe that they could play a great role without expense or exertion—without reforming their navy, without creating an army, without finding an ally."[7]

It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that Britons were shown that it was not possible to run a successful foreign policy on the cheap. The chief powers of Europe had formed themselves into rival blocs that excluded and were to a certain extent directed against England. The Boer War had exposed the weakness of Britain's military resources and her lack of preparedness. Russian railroad construction in Asia had come close enough to India so that the threat of invasion finally became plausible. In a seminal essay, Sir Halford Mackinder, the prophet of geopolitics, outlined the implications of some of the changes that had occurred in the world. The development of the railroad and other means of rapid land transportation, he wrote, had transformed the relationship between sea power and land power. Formerly it was a navy that made a country's armed forces mobile. Now the speed of railroads gave the advantage to land powers operating on interior lines, for they were able to concentrate their forces by sending them rapidly along the straight line which constitutes the shortest distance between two points, while a seagoing adversary must sail all around the circumference and arrive at the field of combat too late. Mackinder taught his followers to look at the map with new eyes and thus to see that Russia occupies the pivot area controlling the Eurasian continent, where most of mankind lives, and that this pivot area was inaccessible to Britain's kind of power. It was a gloomy message that he preached: in effect he said that Britain had placed her bet on yesterday while Russia had placed hers on tomorrow.

[7] A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954, p. 250.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Britain was saved from the necessity of having to invent a new strategy to support her nineteenth century objectives because new developments obliged her to abandon most of these objectives. The rise of new powers—Japan, Germany and the United States—transformed the structure of world politics, making what had been a bipolar world into a multipolar one. In this new world England, her weakness exposed by the Boer War, and Russia, her weakness exposed by the Russo-Japanese War and by the Revolution of 1905, no longer appeared to be threats to one another. As Walter Bagehot wrote, the fear of Russia was an idea that belonged to "the pre-Germanic age."[8] It was Germany that Britain had to fear now, and that Russia had to fear as well.

In 1907 Britain and Russia entered into a treaty that composed their differences in Asia. Tibet was neutralized; Russia abandoned her interest in Afghanistan and left control of its external policy to Britain; and Persia was divided into three zones, with Russia taking over the substance of the country and England its seacoast. Most historians use the same phrase in describing the effect of this treaty. They write that the Game was over.

But it is not entirely true. The Russians went beyond what was allowed under the Persian terms of the treaty—British officials claimed they were not reporting all of the treaty violations to their own people, for fear of the effect on the necessary Anglo-Russian alliance against Germany. After the Russian Revolution, Russia disappeared from the areas in contention for about four decades, so that her willingness to abide by the other terms of the 1907 agreement was not put to the test. By the time that the Soviet Union appeared on the scene, the British already were packing to go home, so that again the matter was not put to the test. The United States has now taken over, in large part, the British position in terms of influence and interest in the Middle East and southern Asia, and the question of ultimate Russian intentions in that area of the world is still unresolved.

VII

It has often been complained that Russian political intentions are difficult to fathom because of the closed nature of her society. As a seventeenth century British visitor to Russia remarked, "Such is the disposition of the Russes that they will not indure to have the secrets of their state bee made knowne."[9] Moreover, even when the private communications of Russian government leaders are made known, as were those of some of the czarist ministers after the Bolshevik revolution, it is more difficult than it is with most countries for foreign observers to judge how much weight should be assigned to the advice of particular ministers.

Nonetheless, Western historians in the past half-century seem to have established that the Russian government did not harbor many of the wilder ambitions that were ascribed to them during the nineteenth century. They tend to believe that, as against the British, Russian policy in Asia was essentially defensive. It is thought that when Russia put pressure on Britain in such sensitive areas as Afghanistan, the Pamirs and Tibet, it was to keep the British from attacking the Russians once again in the Black Sea. "To keep

[8] Walter Bagehot, *The Collected Works*, London: The Economist, 1974, Vol. 8, p. 306.

[9] Samuel Purchas, quoted in M.S. Anderson, *Britain's Discovery of Russia, 1553–1815*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

England quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia; that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian policy," wrote George Curzon nearly a century ago, in words that historians quote with approval.[10] The British fear that the Russians intended an invasion of India is dismissed as a baseless nightmare, which the Russians from time to time took advantage of in order, again, to distract the British from attacking them in Europe.

At the beginning of the Great Game, British fears of an attack on India were certainly unwarranted. Russia at that time lacked the financial resources, the transportation facilities, the ability to develop supply routes and even the maps, through hitherto uncharted sections of Central Asia, that a successful invasion of India would require. Later, after Russia had developed some of these capabilities, it still was not clear why Russia would want to invade British India except to counterbalance a British move against Russia in some other part of the world. British fears, in this respect, then, were irrational. The obsessive nature of these fears is suggested by a prediction that one of the leading English statesman of the twentieth century made about the politics of the twenty-first century: in a book published in 1930, Lord Birkenhead predicted that in 2030 A.D. India would still form an integral part of the British Empire, but that Russian agents still would be scheming to subvert that rule and to win India for Russia.[11]

Western historians who have exposed the extent to which the leaders of both powers were motivated by unrealistic fears have been able to provide an explanation of the rivalry between Britain and Russia in terms of mutual misunderstanding. According to one of the most recent and brilliant studies of the period by a British historian, "It is apparent now that the lasting hostility between Britain and Russia was based on a quite unreal fear in each of the other's supposed aggressive intentions."[12] This is an elegant explanation, and one that would have provided a text upon which an eighteenth century philosophical ironist might have amplified to preach the folly of human political behavior. For ourselves it might well provide a useful reminder of how often Russian strength has been exaggerated and Russian intentions misunderstood; and of how much of the time Russia acts out of mistaken fear of our intentions rather than out of aggressive intentions of her own that are directed against us.

But while this provides an explanation of the Great Game which is in some respects true, it is not the whole truth. Russia may not have intended to engage in expansionism as against England. Undeniably, however, the czarist empire engaged in expansionism as against the Islamic Asian regimes on the Russian frontier—and intended to do so. On a regular basis Russian forces prepared to invade these neighboring areas, did invade them, conquered them, and annexed them. By definition this is expansionism. And in the context of nineteenth century opinion this was not a policy for which the Russians necessarily had to apologize.

New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States were frequently cited as examples of successful expansionism that served the cause of civiliza-

[10] George N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question*, London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1967, p. 321.

[11] F.E. Smith, Lord Birkenhead, cited in I.F. Clarke, *The Pattern of Expectation, 1644–2001*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1979, p. 242.

[12] G.D. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1971, p. 126.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. As Theodore Roosevelt wrote at the end of the nineteenth century, in a passage not untypical of the views held by many Americans and Europeans at that time:

> The most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhuman. The rude, fierce settler who drove the savage from the land has all civilized mankind under a debt to him. American and Indian, Boer and Zulu, Cossack and Tartar, New Zealander and Maori—in each case the victor, horrible though many of his deeds are, has laid deep the foundations for the future greatness of a mighty people. . . . it is of incalculable importance that America, Australia and Siberia should pass out of the hands of their red, black and yellow aboriginal owners, and become the heritage of the dominant world races.[13]

For the United States to conquer or occupy everything in its way, until it had filled out a continent and created a commonwealth that stretched from one ocean to the other, was a national destiny that seemed manifest. There was no reason for the Russians to think that their destiny was any less clear.

The Russian Imperial Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, set out his country's aims and objects in 1864 in terms that were not dissimilar to those used by British and American leaders with respect to their own objectives. He argued that the need for secure frontiers obliged the Russians to go on devouring the rotting regimes to their south. He pointed out that "the United States in America, France in Algiers, Holland in her colonies—all have been drawn into a course where ambition plays a smaller role than imperious necessity, and the greatest difficulty is knowing where to stop."[14]

What was clear was that the Russians were not going to stop of their own accord anywhere near their then existing frontiers. In 1828 a high British official wrote of the Russians in Persia, Armenia and Mesopotamia that "they will be compelled, as we were in India, to make new conquests to secure those they have already made."[15] A half century later, the author of a classic American travel book about the then-recent Russian conquests in Turkestan wrote that "as far as one can foresee, Russia will be compelled in the future to advance still further."[16] A decade and a half later, after Russia had made further conquests in Central Asia, George Curzon visited the region and was convinced that the czarist advance had to continue, and that Russia was "as much compelled to go forward as the earth is to go round the sun. . . ."[17] Not even Soviet historians, who have access to the czarist archives, claim that czarist expansion in Asia was undertaken for the purpose of thwarting Britain. It had begun before the British came to Asia, and would have continued whether the British had arrived or not.

Had Britain not acted against the threat of Russian expansion, it is possible that internal weaknesses would have inhibited the growth of the Russian empire anyway. It is not possible to prove whether that would have been true or not. But no responsible British statesman, even had he been fully aware of

[13] Edmund Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*, New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1979, p. 464.

[14] Arthur Swinton, *North-West Frontier: People and Events, 1839–1947*, London: Hutchinson, 1967, p. 142.

[15] Lord Ellenborough, President of the India Board, citing the views of Sir J. Malcolm. J.A. Norris, *The First Afghan War, 1838–1842*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1967, p. 24.

[16] Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, p. 284.

[17] Curzon, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the true extent of Russian weakness, could have gambled that such weakness alone would prove sufficient to halt the Russian advance.

If one assumes that Russia would have consolidated her hold on all of those areas in which she endeavored to assert her influence had not Britain presented her from doing so, it was a formidable empire indeed that the English kept from being created. On the basis of such an assumption it can be said that, had it not been for British opposition, Russia in substance and perhaps in form would have taken all of Persia, including its coastline. Whether and where Russia would have chosen to stop in annexing other coastal areas along the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean is a matter for speculation. Mesopotamia, Afghanistan and Tibet would have come into the Russian sphere of influence, even if they were not formally annexed into the Russian empire. Constantinople and the Straits would have fallen into Russian hands, though the fate of other Ottoman lands, such as Arabia and Syria, would have been less easy to discern.

Such an expansion of the Russian empire by its very nature would have endangered the British world position, whether or not the Czar and his ministers intended that it do so. A Russian empire that stretched from the Balkans and the Mediterranean on the west to the Pacific on the east, and that stretched so far that its next neighbor on the north was the Arctic and, on the south, Antarctica, would have overshadowed the countries of Europe to such an extent that the balance of power would surely have been overthrown. From the British point of view, therefore, the dangers to which Russian expansionism gave rise were real ones; and England was right to seek to contain the Russian advance.

From the Russian point of view, the British threat was equally real. The British opposed them everywhere, created alliances against them, and, in the Crimean War, invaded them. Whereas it was not true that Russian expansion was directed against Britain (for Russia was merely conquering neighboring areas that she coveted), British expansion most definitely was directed against Russia. Britain did not covet for herself territories such as Afghanistan—into which she intruded herself and that she defended against Russia—nor did she take any great interest in them for their own sake; for as Lord Salisbury wrote, "nobody pretends that it matters to us whether they are held by Hottentots or Esquimaux."[18] All that Britain cared about was that Russia did not get them.

Canadians and Australians were allowed to fill out their continents from ocean to ocean. The United States was allowed to do it; no European power took a stand on the Mississippi, claiming that if the Americans went on, they would make themselves the most powerful country in the world, and that such a development had at all costs to be prevented. Only the Russians, in Asia, were singled out. And it was not irrational of them to fear the designs of Great Britain, which had deliberately placed herself between the advancing Russian armies and the warm seacoasts of the south. Russians had said that it was their historic destiny to reach the Indian Ocean, but Britain had prevented them from achieving it.

The Great Game in Asia, then, was played for real stakes, and not merely for the imaginary ones—the unjustified fears and mutual misunderstandings upon which historians nowadays tend to focus. Of the many causes of the

[18] Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Anglo-Russian rivalry, some were irrational and some lapsed with time and circumstance, but the initial cause, suggested by Pitt in 1791, remained valid as long as the Game was played—the danger that Russian expansion would overthrow the balance of power and result in czarist domination of Eurasia if not the entire planet. Queen Victoria claimed that "it is a question of Russian or British supremacy in the world".[19] That may be too simple a way of putting it, but it is not very far from the truth.

[19] Clayton, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES

To the Editor:

It is depressing to read another article by George Ball in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* (in your Winter 1979/80 issue) which attempts, unconvincingly, to attribute the still unachieved general solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute to Israel and Israel alone and, once again, to attack the Jewish lobby for its supposed ability to derail American policymakers from forcing a change in Israeli attitudes. As astute and able a writer as George Ball knows better than that. Nevertheless, he appears unwilling to admit the error of his oft-stated opposition to anything short of an immediate overall peace—which is not attainable under present circumstances—and to blame Israel and American Jewry for that set of circumstances. His unsolicited appreciation of Jewish civic and political involvement in American life which he sets out to cushion his attack on the unity of American Jews in their commitment to and support for Israel, makes for sad reading, and, in this writer's view, is not worthy of the author.

The issue of the Palestinians, which Mr. Ball stresses, of course needs to be resolved as rapidly as possible. But it is not the central or prime issue in the quest for peace in the Middle East, and never has been. Intra-Arab rivalry has been the dominant causal factor in the long opposition to Israel's existence, and remains today the central reason why the Camp David accords have not been accepted by other confrontation states in the region and the Arab world at large. The Palestinians make a handy public excuse to mask this ferocious division of interest among the Arabs, and resolution of their status would not alter the nature of this rivalry.

It is worthwhile to recall that the Palestinians have suffered grievous bodily harm at the hands of Jordan and Syria when they threatened the political interests of those two states. Saudi Arabia finances the Palestinian cause but remains deeply alarmed at the prospect of an independent PLO-dominated state which, inevitably, would seek to destabilize the royal family. The involvement of the PLO in the current Iranian upheaval and its connection to the group which invaded the Mosque at Mecca underlines this very real fear. Syria and Iraq threaten the lives of each other's leaders, and Egypt and Libya enjoy much mutual distrust. Just recently, Yassir Arafat and Muammar Qaddafi engaged in a nasty public quarrel. Were Israel absent from the map of the region, these intense hatreds, underscored by religious division among the Muslims, would persist and a general Middle East peace would be as elusive as ever. The existence of Israel neither created nor exacerbated these divisions, and American pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank in favor of a PLO state would in no way mitigate the damage to stability in the region which such division produces.

Mr. Ball also raises the false canard that the unresolved Palestinian problem is the cause of ever-increasing oil prices. The turmoil in Iran is sufficient in itself to negate that argument. Nor can it be demonstrated that the Saudis determined OPEC pricing, any more than Venezuela or Nigeria, on the basis of the Palestinian problem. Pricing relates to excessive Western dependence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on OPEC oil and little else. The failure of the United States to deal with this issue, and the general decline in American military strength in the area, are at the heart of our unhappy relations with much of the Arab world—not our failure to thwart the Jewish lobby in Washington and to coerce Jerusalem. Israelis, as well as many others, have lost respect for America for these reasons, and not because of the dependency relationship Ball struggles to identify. Moreover, Israel and no other nation offers the possibility of serving our strategic and military needs in the region, something the Pentagon has always comprehended even if the concept eludes Mr. Ball.

Without any proof whatsoever, Mr. Ball concludes that the PLO will change its fundamental character if Israel makes major concessions to it. Having been presented with the opportunity numerous times in the past few years, the Palestinian National Council has consistently reiterated the Palestinian National Covenant as its fundamental organic law, with its stated purpose of eliminating the Jewish state, and has refused, even under American and Saudi pressure, to alter or modify this text one iota. There is simply no basis for believing the multiple PLO factions are prepared at this time to live in peace with Israel. Moreover, the Soviet Union, whose role in this drama is totally ignored by Mr. Ball, would seek to prevent such a rapprochement, since the PLO is, without question, its best instrument for destabilizing the very area on which the West is dependent for its economic survival.

Mr. Ball's analysis, in toto, reflects a failure of understanding of the Arab world and the means by which American interests in the Middle East can be best safeguarded. Few Americans worry about a crisis in Israeli-American relations, as Mr. Ball concludes, for the basic interests of the two nations are largely convergent. Many, however, do worry about simplistic, if not naïve, prescriptions which would directly serve the purposes of the Soviet Union and would place our own vital concerns in serious jeopardy.

RITA E. HAUSER
New York, N.Y.

To the Editor:

One of the finest moments of George Ball's distinguished career occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis, while he was Under Secretary of State. Mr. Ball opposed the proposal that we bomb Cuba. "If we did that," he said, "we should wake up a different country." His article on Israeli-American relations in your Winter 1979/80 issue does not meet the standard he supported in 1962. Like all Mr. Ball's writing, the article has high specific gravity, and merits careful consideration, but it does not do justice to the complexity of the Palestine problem. Chaim Weizmann once said that the Palestine problem was peculiarly difficult because it was not a conflict between right and wrong, but between two rights—the rights of the Jews in Palestine, and the rights of the Muslim, Christian and other peoples and groups who live there. This is the dimension of the controversy Mr. Ball misses.

I agree with Mr. Ball that U. S. policy in the Middle East (and elsewhere) should be based only on our national interests, and that one of our national interests in that region is to facilitate the negotiation of peace between Israel and its neighbors in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Unfortunately, Mr. Ball's application of these premises to the history and dynamics of American Middle East policy generally, and of the Arab-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israeli conflict in particular, is flawed by a number of errors which lead him, in my view, to sterile and dangerous conclusions. In the name of Realpolitik and our manifest interest in the oil-producing states of the Middle East, Mr. Ball would have the United States abandon Resolutions 242 and 338, which are among the most important and constructive achievements of American Middle East policy since 1945, and force Israel to swallow his prescription for peace, in order to placate radical Arab opinion and prevent another oil embargo. As a matter of Realpolitik, Mr. Ball's prescription would not work. It is too temperate for radical Arab opinion, which opposes the existence of Israel on the ground that the Balfour Declaration and all that flowed from it are illegal. But there is a more fundamental objection to Mr. Ball's program. If we did try to follow his advice, we should wake up a different country.

I shall confine this comment to two of Mr. Ball's errors which I regard as central to his argument: (1) his fundamental misreading of Resolution 242 and his neglect of Resolution 338; and (2) his failure to consider, or indeed even to mention, the bearing of the Palestine Mandate on the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—an omission which leads him to erroneous conclusions about Israeli settlement policy on the West Bank.

One of Mr. Ball's basic theses, repeated at many points in his article, is that Israel is responsible for the absence of peace between itself and Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Israel's offense, Mr. Ball charges, is that it has taken what he calls a "hard-line" position in refusing to withdraw from any of the territories it occupied in 1967 and 1973 until the Arab states in question make peace. If Israel were more flexible, Mr. Ball tells us, its Arab neighbors and the PLO would long since have made peace.

Mr. Ball's claim happens to be wrong at the level of detail: during 1974 and 1975 Israel did withdraw both in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights without peace or even an agreement to make peace, like the later Camp David accords with Egypt. And the provisions of the Camp David agreement for limited autonomy on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are another Israeli concession without peace. The error in Mr. Ball's argument is, however, more basic: under Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 Israel is *not required* to withdraw from a single square centimeter of the territories it occupied in 1967 (and 1973) until the Arab states in question have made peace. In 1967 and 1968, I was Chairman of the interdepartmental crisis-management control group which prepared, proposed and supervised the execution of our Middle East policies in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I can attest from first-hand experience that the principle of "no withdrawal without peace" is the heart of Resolution 242.[1]

The reason for the policy of Resolution 242 is obvious in the history of the conflict over Israel's right to exist. The Arab states contested the propriety of

[1] The principle was later made mandatory in the "decision" of Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, which commands the states involved in the dispute "immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire" to negotiate the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 "in all its parts." These issues are reviewed in my articles, "The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973," *American Journal of International Law*, April 1975, pp. 272–89; "Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1970, p. 64; "The American Stake in Israel," *Commentary*, April 1977, p. 32; and in my letter in "Correspondence," *American Journal of International Law*, October 1977, pp. 745–47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Palestine Mandate from the beginning, and refused to make peace with Israel after the 1948 and 1956 wars. The Armistice Agreements of 1949 were not obtained, as Mr. Ball suggests, by American diplomacy, but by an Israeli attack pressed until Egypt finally accepted the command of Security Council Resolution 62 to negotiate an armistice, and came to Rhodes. Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai in 1957 were made pursuant to an elaborate international agreement negotiated by the United States on behalf of Egypt, which at the time refused to negotiate directly with Israel. Under that agreement, Israel withdrew to the Mandate boundary. In exchange, Egypt promised, *inter alia*, to keep the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal open to Israeli shipping; to prevent guerrilla attacks on Israel from Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip; and ultimately to make peace. All these undertakings on Egypt's part were violated, the last being the closing of the Strait of Tiran in May 1967, the nominal cause of the Six Day War. The United States and other nations had agreed in 1957 that if Egypt ever closed the Strait of Tiran, the Secretary General would act, and if he failed, that Israel would be entitled to use force in self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.[2]

Against this background of broken promises, the United States, its NATO allies, and many other nations agreed in 1967 not to repeat the procedures of 1949 and 1957 by pressing Israel to withdraw without peace. Secretary of State Dean Rusk often commented in those days that when Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran, "he cut our throat from ear to ear." After five months of strenuous negotiation, the Security Council agreed to Resolution 242 as a "package deal"—no withdrawals *whatever* without peace. Ambassador Dobrynin said that this was the only time in the history of the cold war when the Soviet Union used the phrase "package deal" in a "positive sense."

The other key feature of the territorial provisions of Resolution 242 is that when peace is made, and Israel does withdraw, it need not withdraw to the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949, which reflect nothing but the position of the armies at the end of the fighting in 1948–49, or the boundaries of the British Mandate. The Resolution calls instead for "secure and recognized boundaries" to be established by agreement. The Armistice Agreements themselves state that the demarcation lines are not political boundaries, but can be modified by agreement when the parties move from armistice to peace.

There are two reasons for the "secure and recognized boundaries" provision of Resolution 242—considerations of equity and security, on the one hand, and the unsettled legal status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, on the other. Mr. Ball rather patronizingly dismisses Israeli claims to the West Bank as based on "an Old Testament grant more than 2,000 years old." This comment avoids the real issue: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, like the internationally recognized territories of Israel and Jordan, were parts of the Palestine Mandate. The decision to establish the Mandate, the Mandate said, recognized "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and . . . the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country." The purpose of the Mandate was "the establishment in Palestine of a national

[2] Mr. Ball's treatment of the 1957 understanding on the basis of which Israel withdrew from the Sinai is both inadequate and incomplete. The United States and the Security Council treated the Israeli position in 1956 as quite different legally from that of Great Britain and France, and insisted on the assurance given by Nasser to Israel before seriously pressing for Israeli withdrawal. Moreover, President Eisenhower's position was by no means as clear-cut as Mr. Ball makes it seem.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The Mandatory government was required to facilitate Jewish immigration and "close settlement" in Palestine, subject to the provision that the Mandatory government could "postpone or withhold" the application of these (and related) articles of the Mandate in the area of Palestine east of the Jordan River. This was done when Britain established Transjordan as an autonomous province of the Mandate in 1922. In the aftermath of World War II, two sovereign states emerged from the chrysalis of the Mandate—Transjordan, in the part of Palestine east of the Jordan River, and Israel, within the Armistice demarcation lines as they stood on June 5, 1967. But the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have never been accepted internationally as sovereign territories either of Jordan or of Israel. Mr. Ball's failure to deal with these problems is in my view the second basic error in his argument.

The problems of world politics presented by the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unintelligible without reference to the mandate.

Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip between 1949 and 1967 without seeking to annex it, precisely because it was territory of Palestine as defined in the Mandate. Jordan occupied the West Bank between 1948 and 1967 and purported to annex it in 1951. But only Pakistan recognized Jordan's annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem; Great Britain recognized only the annexation of the West Bank, not of East Jerusalem. Here again, the international community deferred to the status of the territories as unallocated parts of the Mandate. Israel has held the area since 1967, and administered it in accordance with the principles of the international law of military occupation, although it takes the position that it is not required to do so by international law, since its own claim to the territory under the Mandate is at least as strong as that of Jordan.

The decisions of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice with regard to Namibia, formerly known as German Southwest Africa, make it clear that League Mandates survive as trusts even when Mandatory powers resign or are dismissed, or the Mandatory administration as such is terminated. Since the Palestine Mandate conferred the right to settle in the West Bank on the Jews, that right has not been extinguished, and, under Article 80 of the Charter, cannot be extinguished unilaterally.

Resolution 242 in fact treats the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as unallocated parts of the Mandate subject to conflicting claims by Palestinian Jews and Arabs represented by the two Palestinian states, Jordan and Israel. And it calls for an agreement of peace between those two states which would resolve what is essentially a territorial dispute between them. Mr. Ball, however, ignores the entire problem. All he says on the subject is that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are, in the view of the American authorities, "a flagrant violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention."

In this, Mr. Ball is clearly in error. The 1949 Geneva Convention, like the 1907 Convention, applies only when one state occupies territory of another. But neither the West Bank nor the Gaza Strip can be characterized as "territory" of Jordan or of Egypt. There is thus no grounds for claiming that Israel is engaged in "individual or mass forcible transfers" of the local population, the problem to which article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is addressed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended to the Security Council that the territories of the Mandate be divided into an Arab and Jewish state, with a special regime for Jerusalem. While the Security Council never accepted the General Assembly's recommendation, and has imposed a long series of "decisions" incompatible with it, the ideas (if not the boundaries) of the 1947 General Assembly Resolution are worth recalling. The 1947 Resolution called for two Palestinian states, linked in a common market (or confederation) which would be open to other states as well; special arrangements for Jerusalem which would take fully into account all the religious attachments to that city; and political and security arrangements appropriate to the situation as it was evolving.

Israel proposed a plan for peace with Jordan based on these ideas through a speech by its then Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, at Strasbourg more than a decade ago. Jordan rejected the Israeli offer then. It remains one of the most promising approaches to a settlement when Jordan decides to fulfill its obligations under Resolution 338.

Mr. Ball does not consider the Strasbourg approach. Instead, he urges that the United States insist on an absolute right of self-determination for the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The self-determination of peoples is certainly an important principle of international politics and law. One of the four "purposes" of the United Nations, according to Article 1 of the Charter, is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." This is the only reference to self-determination in the Charter. In making self-determination an absolute, Mr. Ball deals with only one aspect of a complex problem, and thereby sacrifices reality to an idée fixe.

The Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are often viewed by Arab writers as parts of "the Arab nation," or of the larger entity of Islam. The PLO, which purports to speak for all Palestinian Arabs, rejects Mr. Ball's notion of Palestine, and insists, as I do, that Palestine as a political entity is defined by the boundaries of the Mandate. It consistently maintains that the only just solution for the Palestine problem is a unitary secular state for the whole of Palestine—that is, for what are now Israel and Jordan, and the territory in dispute between them. The PLO has made it abundantly clear that, for it, the step Mr. Ball proposes—a third Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—would be simply a stage in its campaign to liquidate Israel and Jordan, and form a single state in the area, which it would dominate.

Unfortunately—tragically—there is no basis for Mr. Ball's confidence that Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the PLO would make peace with Israel if only the Israelis pursued a "softer" line. For the moment, Jordan refuses even the Israeli Strasbourg proposals, or any variation of them. And Syria, despite the optimism of many, remains where it has been—adamantly opposed to peace.

I agree with Mr. Ball that settling the Palestinian question is an important goal of American policy for the Middle East. But the obstacle to achieving that objective is not what he calls Israel's "hard-line" in insisting on its rights under Resolutions 242 and 338, but the flat refusal of Jordan and Syria to accept the fundamental concept of Resolutions 242 and 338, and make peace.

EUGENE V. ROSTOW
New Haven, Conn.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To the Editor:

The former Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, is persistent in his assumed guardianship of Israel "to save her from herself," as he once wrote. He urges the United States to induce Israel to submit to Arab demands to retreat to the 1949 Armistice borders and establish a Palestinian state in the provinces of Samaria, Judea and the Gaza area. He argues that such a peace would assure Israel longevity. The Israelis and their supporters in America were fortified in their doubts about Mr. Ball's credibility by this article.

Mr. Ball obviously looks at the American position in the Arab-Israeli conflict with a banker's eye, interested in the flow of petrodollars to this country. We might have expected that as a statesman, he would view this matter from a broader horizon, rather than limiting himself to allegations of the financial ledger.

In pointing to Israel's growing dependence on the United States, Mr. Ball argues that Israel's refusal to go along with the United States in appeasing the Arabs is not only bad for America, but "cannot be in the long-term interest of Israel itself." He clearly would deprive Israel of the freedom to judge its political and security requirements. While advocating self-determination for the "Palestinians," he denies it to Israel. It would seem that instead of an Ambassador, he would prefer an American proconsul in Tel Aviv to decree something that not only Israelis, but many Americans would view with aversion as a mockery of colonialism.

Mr. Ball also ignores the fact that the peace he advocates negates many points in the Camp David Agreement, which was, in fact, engineered by the United States. Moreover, should the United States veer away from the Camp David accords, the entire edifice is bound to be in danger of collapsing.

One need not scrutinize Mr. Ball's article too thoroughly to see its one-sidedness. He refers to the Arab invasion of Israel in 1948 as "Israel's first war." He calls the 1956 war "an Israeli attack on Egypt," ignoring the fact that this was the result of Fedayeen invasions emanating from within Egypt, attacking settlements, including defenseless schools. Similarly, in his references to the 1967 war he states that "Israel was looking for an excuse for preemptive action." Again Mr. Ball blames Israel for the war, ignoring the fact that the Arab armies converged on Israel from all sides and that broadcasts from Arab capitals boomed the impending decimation of Israel and its people. He also ignores the fact that in the period between the Armistice of 1949 and June 1967 Arab terrorist attacks, organized and mounted by Arab governments, resulted in the death of over 1,000 Israelis. The Syrian government used the Golan Heights for its artillery attacks on Jewish cities and villages below, in the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee, causing many casualties.

According to Mr. Ball's reasoning the Arabs have right on their side and Israel must return Arab land. Mr. Ball assures us that Prime Minister Begin and his colleagues "have no intention of giving up the West Bank to which they claim title, based on an Old Testament grant more than 2,000 years old." Aside from his belittling 3,500 years of Jewish history in the land, one must wonder at the cavalier attitude of an American statesman toward the Bible. Mr. Ball takes it amiss that the people of the Bible should consider seriously their holy book, the Magna Carta of Jewish existence. It is surprising that he is oblivious to the promulgation of American independence with the biblical, "You shall proclaim freedom throughout the land to all inhabitants thereof" (Leviticus 25:10). It was also the Bible which inspired our Bill of Rights.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, the Bible is not the only codex for Israel's claim to Judea, Samaria and Gaza; it is also supported by international law. The Jewish right to the land called Palestine has been enacted into law by the Mandate the League of Nations gave to Great Britain for the purpose of establishing a Jewish national home. The United States became a party to this by an act of Congress and by a special convention concluded by the United States and Great Britain in 1924, sanctioning this as international law.

Mr. Ball assures us that the Arab states now want peace with Israel, if only Israel would give them back the "occupied territories." The Arabs, however, held these territories from 1949 until June 1967 and nevertheless carried on a war against Israel vowing to destroy it. The decision of Khartoum to accept "no negotiations, no recognition and no peace" with Israel is still adhered to by almost all Arab states except Egypt. Further, the Rabat Summit in 1974 recognized PLO sovereignty over Palestine west of the Jordan. And the PLO made it clear that it stands by its covenant to obliterate Israel and drive out the Jews.

The objection to the Jewish settlements by Mr. Ball has a sinister undertone. One must wonder whether he realizes that what he is advocating is a replica of the Nuremberg law adjudging part of the ancient land of Israel to be "*Judenrein.*"

American interest, Mr. Ball claims, requires solving the Arab-Israeli conflict by giving in to Arab demands. He states that "unless we make prompt and serious progress toward the solving of the Palestinian problem we can expect to see our energy needs increasingly hostage to our Middle East policies." This delusion, of which Mr. Ball is a leading spokesman, must be thoroughly repudiated, for it feeds the American people with a form of quackery which is apt to retard the efforts to find a realistic solution to the energy crisis. To put the solution of the energy problem at the door of Israel is a dangerous subterfuge.

Denis Healey, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer of Britain, in his article in the same issue of *Foreign Affairs*, points out that the problem of oil is economic and very little political. He writes, "the OPEC countries increase the price of oil partly in response to recent inflation in the industrial world, partly to make good the fall in the real prices of oil in the previous two decades, and partly to influence Western policy toward Israel." The truth is that the Arab oil-policy link to Israel is mere cosmetics; it is a form of tribute to the have-nots of the Arab states by their oil-rich brethren for retaining the oil wealth themselves and not sharing it with their poor. Nobody but the would-be credulous could believe that Arab oil will go down in price if Israel should turn over its provinces to Arafat.

Mr. Ball argues that the threat of Soviet domination of the Middle East requires a de facto alliance between the United States and the Arab states, and for this reason Israel must be shoved aside. He obviously did not learn the lesson of the recent events in Iran, Pakistan, Libya and Saudi Arabia. It has been pointedly manifested that it is dangerous for the United States to rely in any way on these unstable states to play a role in protecting America's position in the area. In fact, it is this instability that is responsible for the continuous war between the Arabs and Israel, and it is this instability which also makes these countries vulnerable to Soviet intrigues and incursions. The poverty, backwardness, feudalism and the fear of modernization and Western civilization render these Arab states fertile ground for upheavals and agitation by communism and all kinds of radicals, including fanatic Imams. The sooner

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States is alerted to all this the better it will be for our global position and our credibility in the world.

BEINESH EPSTEIN
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Epstein is a consultant to the Zionist Organization of America.

Mr. Ball replies:

The common theme running through these three criticisms of my article is that Israel would face no serious problems were it not for Arab bloody-mindedness. Israel's current line of policy is, the writers imply, entirely correct; America's responsibility is to write checks and keep quiet—particularly now that, as Ms. Hauser asserts, Israel has "lost respect for America."

The writers' tone is depressingly pessimistic, as though they were resigned to Israel's remaining a garrison state surviving in a sea of hatred. Still, that sad conclusion should be of no serious concern to America since, we are told, the Palestinian issue is of little relevance to U.S. interests. According to Ms. Hauser, it "is not the central or prime issue in the quest for peace in the Middle East, and never has been." Although Professor Rostow does concede that "settling the Palestinian question is an important goal of American policy for the Middle East," he avers that the obstacle to achieving that objective is not Israeli policy but "the flat refusal of Jordan and Syria to accept the fundamental concepts of Resolutions 242 and 338, and make peace."

In Mr. Epstein's view, the disposition of the West Bank should present no problem, since Israel is entitled to the territory as a matter of right, while Professor Rostow more reasonably contends that no one else has a better claim, since the area is a legally unallocated part of the Palestine Mandate. Thus, we should not be upset at Israel's persistent efforts to try to take over the area by progressive annexation through the establishment of more and more settlements—even in the heart of Arab cities. In spite of the officially stated legal opinion of the State Department that the Israeli settlements are a violation of international law, Israel is, according to Professor Rostow, within its rights in its pursuit of creeping absorption.

Both Mr. Epstein and Professor Rostow seem to regard the issue of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as if it were merely a dispute over land titles. But to phrase the issue in such terms is no more accurate than the original Zionist slogan of "a land without people for a people without land." Even without the occupied territories the Israelis already have land—far more than the area conferred by the original General Assembly partition plan—and the West Bank and Gaza Strip are clearly not a land without people, for there are 1,200,000 Palestinians whose ancestors have lived there for centuries. The central issue is the fate of those 1,200,000. Must they continue to live under occupation by the Israeli army, which has ridden herd on them for the last 12 years, while an increasing share of their land and water is preempted by Israeli settlements? None of my critics addresses that question, although Professor Rostow seems wedded to a solution that would somehow return them to Jordanian rule regardless of the fact that few on the West Bank would favor such a solution, that Jordan would never support it against the expressed will of the other Arab states, and that it would not bring peace.

Anyone deeply concerned with Israel's future must be depressed by this collection of negative comments. Implicit in that negativism is the conviction that there is no serious hope for peace, since the writers proceed on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assumption that the Arab states remain unreconstructably determined to bring about Israel's extinction. If, as they insist, Israel, after 30 years of national existence, has made no progress in establishing peaceful relations with the Arabs other than with Egypt—and at least two of them believe such relations precluded by "intra-Arab rivalries"—one must hold a dreary view of the future.

I am far more optimistic about Israel's future than are my three critics. As I made clear in my article, I do not accept the excessively gloomy appraisal of Arab attitudes toward Israel that they have put forward. Such a defeatist appraisal leads to a rejectionist attitude toward any realistic peace initiative. Nor can Americans acquiesce in the only plausible explanation for current Israeli government policy—the belief that if Israel can delay any serious West Bank negotiations sufficiently long to create "new facts" through more settlements, its absorption of the West Bank will become a fait accompli. Not only would the absorption of a million fecund Arabs upset the demographic balance and undercut the concept of a Jewish national state, but it presupposes a degree of U.S. complaisance consistent neither with America's principles nor its interests.

Consider the changing balance of relevant power in the area. Not only is the population of the Arab world expanding at twice the rate of the Israeli population, but the economic and social discomfort of living in a garrison state surrounded by hostile neighbors is leading more individuals to leave Israel than settle there—in spite of elaborate efforts to encourage immigration. Meanwhile, key Arab states continue to get richer while Israel teeters on the edge of bankruptcy.

The unspoken assumption of my critics is, of course, that the United States will continue to keep Israel highly armed and economically functioning by providing a massive annual subsidy and standing ready with airlifts and other assistance whenever conflict should resume. But the main point of my article was to challenge that assumption. So long as Israel continues to flout American warnings and pursues a settlements policy that gratuitously infuriates the Arabs and, so long as it makes no concessions more generous than Mr. Begin's suggestion of autonomy which, as he has progressively watered it down, means little more than the perpetuation of a military occupation that no self-respecting people can possible accept, I find it highly doubtful that America will long continue to play the role of ever-indulgent patron.

That is the question necessarily raised whenever one considers the problem from the point of view of American national interests rather than from a narrowly conceived view of Israeli interests that amounts to little more than a defense of whatever policies are announced by the extremist government in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, many of Israel's most ardent supporters have been so long accustomed to thinking of Israel as the beleaguered garrison state that they are unprepared to face either the promise of peace or the realities of Israel's current predicament.

Locked in that frozen attitude, at least two of my critics dismiss concern about America's relationships with the Arab states as though those relations were unimportant. According to Mr. Epstein, "it is dangerous for the United States to rely in any way or manner on these unstable states to play a role in protecting America's position in the area." "In fact," he argues, "it is this instability that is responsible for the continuous war between the Arabs and Israel." Ms. Hauser plays on that same theme, asserting that "Intra-Arab rivalry has been the dominant causal factor in the long opposition to Israel's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

existence." She goes further by contending that "the Palestinians make a handy public excuse to mask this ferocious division of interest among the Arabs," and that "resolution of their status would not alter the nature of this rivalry."

I find it quite unrealistic to believe that we Americans will continue indefinitely to subsidize Israel's immobilism at an exorbitant cost to our relations with Arab states which—whether we like it or not—do produce half the world's oil. Though Professor Rostow suggests that "events in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan have pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict off center-stage," it has, on the contrary, made the issue all the more relevant. Unless our country is able to establish effective relations of trust and cooperation with the Arab states on the western shore of the Gulf, we shall not be able to mount an effective defense of the Gulf's eastern shore, now menaced by the Soviet Afghanistan adventure. From the point of view of U.S. policy, a solution to that problem has become more, not less, urgent.

One final parenthesis. I am mystified by Ms. Hauser's attack on me for "the false canard that the unresolved Palestinian problem is the cause of ever increasing oil prices"—or Mr. Epstein's condemnation of that same alleged contention as a "form of quackery." I can recommend only that they should both see good oculists, for, in spite of its "quackery" Ms. Hauser's bogus duck is really a red herring. Nowhere in my article did I write, or in any way imply, the nonsensical view that oil prices have up to now been shaped or even influenced by the Palestinian issue. What I did suggest, on page 249, was that the Saudi Arabian government is under pressure from its Arab neighbors to use its oil production for political purposes and that, once the Camp David talks have "ground to a halt with no progress on a Palestinian solution, and we have launched no new negotiating initiative," the PLO and the more activist Arab states will almost certainly increase pressure on the Saudis to reduce the oil flow, just as occurred in 1973. To disregard that prospect is not only to ignore recent warnings but to misconceive the nature and direction of the forces at play in the area.

ARMS FOR MOROCCO? YES.

To the Editor:

In the Winter 1979/80 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, my colleague, Stephen J. Solarz, argued against a Carter Administration decision to sell certain military equipment to Morocco. Although Mr. Solarz analyzed this difficult question with his customary energy, I find myself disagreeing with many of his conclusions. Given his reputation as the Congress' most brilliant student of world affairs, I do so with considerable trepidation.

At the outset, I want to make it clear that I approve of a "globalist" approach to foreign policy. The way we respond to a situation in one area of the world does impact on events and nations elsewhere. How we treat our African friends is definitely noted by our NATO, Middle East and Persian Gulf allies and influences the formulation of their foreign policy equations. If, as Mr. Solarz suggests, the Administration is finally recognizing this international fact of life with respect to its Western Sahara policy, I believe it's about time.

In my opinion, the problem confronting us in Iran and Afghanistan can be attributed, among other things, to a global perception that we have become an undependable ally who no longer can be counted upon in a crunch.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

My colleague seems to be concerned about the amount and type of equipment the Administration is contemplating selling to Morocco. He also appears to make a distinction between offensive and defensive weaponry. Frankly, I cannot see the difference. A weapon is a weapon, and the manner in which it is employed determines whether it is defensive or offensive. In view of recent Polisario incursions deep into Morocco, I think some of the so-called offensive weapons are needed to *defend* Morocco.

I gather the King and his military advisers left Mr. Solarz with the unrealistic impression that with additional U.S. equipment they could win a "quick victory" in the Sahara. As I recall, he met with Hassan in August. Since then, the King appears to have changed his mind, as he stated during a subsequent interview about two months ago that he envisioned "a peaceful solution for the Sahara. . . . I have my peace plan and I do believe that during 1980 we shall reach peace at the Sahara." He went on to add that "If I made public my peace plan now it would achieve the wrong effect. First we have to gain our strongholds in the Sahara, and afterwards we can talk peace." In the same interview, Hassan also declared that "we shall not penetrate Algeria's territory to chase the Polisarios." Such temperate statements are consistent with the Administration's objective of encouraging the King to negotiate a settlement from a position of reasonable strength.

Mr. Solarz's attempt to draw an analogy between our experience in Angola and what could happen in the Western Sahara just does not wash. He implies that we had little prospect for success if we had continued our assistance to anti-communist forces in Angola. At last report, Jonas Savimbi was still going strong, and if Congress hadn't terminated U.S. support, I believe we would now be dealing with a friendly government in Luanda rather than a Marxist regime that enjoys so little popular support it needs 20,000 Cuban troops to sustain it.

In addressing the self-determination question, my friend from Brooklyn cites reports that the "Polisario is *overwhelmingly based* on the indigenous Western Saharan population" (my emphasis). Given the nomadic history of the people we are talking about, I am very skeptical of such a conclusion. Does a nomad call any area his home? In this regard, I note press accounts that the Polisario army has in its ranks tribesmen from Mauritania, Algeria, Niger and Mali. Does not that suggest less than overwhelming indigenous support for the Polisario, as well as the possibility of mercenaries clandestinely paid by the likes of Algeria, Libya, and perhaps even the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. Solarz's revelation that Ethiopia was among those African governments that has recognized the Polisario is a blatant example of that Marxist regime's hypocrisy. I wonder how Mengistu would feel about a self-determination referendum in Eritrea. In my opinion, the Eritreans can make a much stronger historical claim for their autonomy than the Polisario, yet nobody in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the United Nations seems to be focusing on that question. Knowing of my colleague's respect for the principle of self-determination, undoubtedly the African Subcommittee, which he chairs, has already looked into the matter.

As to the 1975 U.N. Visiting Mission's findings on the Polisario, a word of caution is in order. Any organization that passes a resolution equating Zionism with racism warrants having anything it says subject to severe scrutiny.

In discussing the political coloration of the Polisario, Mr. Solarz points out that "Polisario leaders indicated that, in the context of an independent Saharan state, they would be inclined, for economic, cultural and geopolitical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reasons, to look toward the West, not the East, for support. In fact, they are the only major liberation movement in Africa that has not received *direct* Soviet, Cuban or Chinese military assistance" (again my emphasis). The key word here is *direct* and I notice my congressional colleague was careful to use it.

The fact of the matter is, much of the Polisario's military equipment is of Soviet origin and has been transferred to the guerrillas from Algeria and Libya. Maybe that does not tell Mr. Solarz anything, but it does me. It reminds me of recent contentions that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were not receiving any *direct* Cuban assistance, and therefore, one should not rush to any conclusions as to the political orientation of the Nicaraguan regime.

In evaluating this arms sale to Morocco, what Morocco has done to protect and further the interests of the free world must be given weighty consideration. It is an impressive record and includes twice (in 1977 and 1978) sending troops to Zaïre to quash Cuban-backed insurgencies, as well as allowing the United States to maintain strategic air and naval communication facilities on Moroccan soil. In addition, we should bear in mind that King Hassan, who has been a longtime advocate of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, was the first Arab government leader to publicly support the Middle East peace initiatives.

We should also remember that the King is one of the few friends Sadat has in the Arab world, and was instrumental in bringing about Sadat's first visit to Jerusalem. And let us not forget the actions Hassan has taken to protect the security of Morocco's Jewish community. While I am aware of the occasions Mr. Solarz mentions when Morocco "acted in ways that are not compatible with our regional concerns," he must admit that Hassan has taken more politically courageous pro-United States stands in recent years than any other Arab leader except Sadat.

To deny a valued and strategically located friend such a modest arms request would reveal that we have failed to heed the lesson of Iran and Afghanistan. I am confident all of us realize we cannot afford to send any more signals of that sort.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Representative Solarz replies:

I am flattered to discover that my greatly esteemed colleague from Illinois has not only read my article, but also considers it of sufficient importance to merit a lengthy display of his formidable rhetorical powers.

However, Mr. Derwinski's basic argument that we should provide Morocco with new counterinsurgency arms suitable for use in the Western Sahara as part of a "globalist" approach of demonstrating support for our friends fails, in my opinion, to reckon with the fact that most of our friends are opposed to Morocco's position on the Western Sahara. It also fails to come to grips with regional military and political realities which indicate that the best way we can help the pro-Western Moroccan government is to encourage it to negotiate a political solution in the Western Sahara rather than providing it with counterinsurgency equipment to fight an unwinnable and politically debilitating war.

If, as Mr. Derwinski suggests, our NATO, Middle East and Persian Gulf

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allies take note of "how we treat our African friends" in establishing their "foreign policy equations," then we should be very reluctant to assist Morocco's war of annexation in the Western Sahara on behalf of a dubious claim of sovereignty which has been clearly rejected by the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations and our European allies as well. Even most of our old and new friends in the "Crescent of Crisis"—Pakistan, Sudan, Kenya, North Yemen—voted for the recent U.N. General Assembly resolution (which passed by 85–6 with 41 abstentions) urging Morocco to "join in the peace process and terminate the occupation of the territory of the Western Sahara."

Despite the evidence of world opinion and acknowledged experts that the issue in the Western Sahara is one of national self-determination in the context of historical regional rivalries, Mr. Derwinski portrays the Polisario and Algeria as vehicles of Moscow's global challenge to America's friends. In this regard, he appears to be more Catholic than the Pope, since Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, who supports the sale of counterinsurgency equipment, testified recently before the House Africa and International Security Subcommittees that there is no evidence that Algeria and Libya are providing Soviet arms to the Polisario at the request of the Soviet Union. He also observed that the Polisario cannot be classified as "agents of the Soviets," and that the United States has no knowledge of any Cuban military assistance to the Polisario.

I fully agree with Mr. Derwinski that we have a global interest in being helpful to Morocco, a moderate Arab nation, in its time of crisis. But we should not forget that if King Hassan is "one of Sadat's few friends in the Arab world," unlike President Nimeiry of Sudan, President Barre of Somalia and Sultan Quabus of Oman he does not choose to manifest his friendship by maintaining diplomatic relations with Egypt or supporting the Camp David agreement. But the real question is, *how* do you help a government which is mired in an unwinnable war which daily depletes its economic resources, reputation for competence and control of a frustrated army? The dwindling Jewish community in Morocco would particularly suffer if a Moroccan Qaddafi emerged from King Hassan's Saharan quagmire. I have concluded that we can best promote political stability by encouraging the King to negotiate a compromise political solution in the Western Sahara and by maintaining our credentials as an "honest broker" with his Algerian and Polisario adversaries.

Helping a friend in the wrong way could actually create a credibility problem in U.S. foreign policy instead of avoiding one. In Angola we would certainly be better off had we given diplomatic support to African efforts to maintain the transitional coalition government there rather than providing covert paramilitary assistance to weak allies who were also willing to accept South African military support. Nor do I see how the situations in Iran and Afghanistan can be invoked to justify the provision of counterinsurgency arms to Morocco. We certainly sold the Shah all the weapons he wanted, but catering to his geopolitical pretensions hardly helped stabilize his regime. I fully agree that we have to make clear to the Russians that they have gone too far, but I think we should stop them at the Khyber Pass where they are rather than in the shifting sands of the Sahara where they are not.

Finally, in spite of my disagreements with my distinguished colleague, I am encouraged by his seeming recognition that, in a diverse and dangerous world, old-style U.S. military interventionism is not an appropriate response to most of our problems. I agree with his preference for a negotiated settlement in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Sahara and note that he supports only the current "modest arms request" of Morocco. I fear, however, that what Mr. Derwinski points to as evidence of Morocco's peaceful intentions, namely King Hassan's recent claim that he has a secret peace plan for 1980, is strikingly similar to President Nixon's secret plan to end the Vietnam War. Mr. Derwinski fails to point out that in the same interview Hassan declared, "We are establishing another task force and rather soon we shall have another Sahara task force operating in the desert. With those three task forces skillfully using helicopters and tanks we shall gain control of the Sahara." If the King is really interested in a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara dispute, it is hard to see why, after we informed him of our intention to sell Morocco counterinsurgency equipment to encourage it to negotiate, he failed to attend the special OAU ad hoc committee meeting to launch a negotiation and has now rejected that forum entirely. In view of the King's continued intransigence, I would hope that Mr. Derwinski would associate himself with the expression of sentiment of 13 of the 17 members of the House Subcommittees on Africa and International Security, who recently wrote Secretary Vance that, "Barring new and extraordinary circumstances, such as the introduction of foreign troops into the Western Sahara," the armed reconnaissance planes and helicopters in question "are to be made available to the government of Morocco as consideration is given to the extent that Morocco demonstrates good faith efforts to reach a negotiated political solution in the Western Sahara. It is also expected that the Polisario and other parties to the conflict demonstrate similar good faith efforts to reach a negotiated solution."

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAQ

To the Editor:

Applause is in order for Claudia Wright for bringing to our attention in your Winter 1979/80 issue a long-neglected subject ("Iraq—New Power in the Middle East"). The author's analysis destroys a good deal of the erroneous conventional wisdom surrounding Iraq's domestic political situation and diplomacy—outdated impressions that (deplorably) persist to unduly influence the perceptions of U.S. policymakers, as Ms. Wright correctly points out.

However, since we are ultimately concerned with amending American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Iraqis, it is unfortunate that Ms. Wright did not elaborate a course toward that objective. Indeed, the author bypasses a most fundamental argument for the improvement of U.S.-Iraqi relations, that concerning Persian Gulf security, in favor of the highly debatable proposition that a more accommodating position by Washington toward the PLO would evoke a positive reaction in Baghdad.

Focusing on a point of disagreement, however, would not seem to be a profitable approach. This is especially so given the repeated discrepancies of Iraq's own position toward the Palestine question—the curious ambiguities between ideological pronouncements and actual behavior: the meagre military contribution during the past two Arab-Israeli wars, the 1970 Jordanian civil war and the struggle in Lebanon; and the ambivalent position of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein toward Resolution 242. Of course, given its physical remove from the "Zionist entity," Iraq can afford to follow what Ms. Wright euphemistically terms "Hammurabi's ancient prescriptions" with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minimal penalty. There is no reason to assume, for example, that direct American links with al-Fatah would evoke Iraqi support for the peace process or enjoin Baghdad's ties to the more extreme factions of the PLO; indeed, such a development might invite greater radicalism in Iraq's policy toward Israel and "capitulationist" Arab states.

Furthermore, because the issue is so strongly identified with overall Baathist doctrine, the Palestine question is a particularly intractable topic. It can be argued, rather, that a stronger mutuality of interests between Iraq and the United States exists in the area of regional security. For it is in this area that Iraq's enduring national interests and foreign policy concerns have been and must always be focused, regardless of regime orientation or the shadow of Israel. The conciliatory trends in Hussein's policies (exhibited by regional détente initiatives with ideologically disparate Arab neighbors, including security consultations with Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and openly declared aversion to Soviet intrigues) have been injected with new vigor since the renewal of serious tensions with Iran over Khuzistan, the Kurdish provinces and the Gulf islands, as well as heightened anxiety over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Indeed, in February 1979, Hussein offered to end the 12-year break in formal diplomatic relations with the United States "in the interests of the Arab world," although this signal has gone unreciprocated. However, these developments suggest that America should explore the possibility that Iraq's security objectives in the Persian Gulf are not necessarily antithetical to many of the goals expounded by U.S. policy in that vital region of the Middle East.

As expressed in 1975, the United States has seven objectives in the Gulf—none of them opposed to current Iraqi tendencies:

1. *Noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations.* Iraq has ceased promoting subversion in other Arab states and the United States presumably has no further interest in funding Kurdish rebels in Iraq as it had in the past.
2. *Encouragement of regional cooperation for peace and development.* In the context of Iraq's regional détente policy it is expanding economic contacts with its neighbors.
3. *Support for friendly countries to provide for their own security and development.* Now the foremost military power in the Gulf, Iraq pursues a stridently independent foreign policy and is dissociating itself from the Soviets across a broad range of military and economic relations in the interest of "safeguarding the Revolution."
4. *Avoiding superpower confrontation.* This is obviously a mutual objective.
5. *Exchange of goods, services and technology.* Iraq's trade is growing (despite mutual boycott legislation) with the United States, Western Europe, Japan and nonaligned countries.
6. *Continued access to the region's oil supplies.* Iraq in general separates oil from politics; e.g., it did not participate in the 1973 OPEC production cutback attending the Ramadan war, and often shaves prices despite its tough public line at OPEC conferences.
7. *Recycling of oil revenues into the international monetary system.* Iraq's policy is to link imports to crude oil exports—reserves which may very well prove to be the second largest on earth.

To argue, moreover, that "Riyadh may also have concluded that for the security of Gulf waters and the Strait of Hormuz, the new Iraqi naval force, together with its own, would be at least as dependable and no less effective

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than the U.S. Navy" seems rather farfetched. Although Iraq is opposed to all superpower machinations in the Arab world and denounces suggested U.S. security schemes for the region, *privately* the Iraqis are not opposed to indirect U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and would probably tacitly condone an intensified U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area to counter the Soviet presence as a realistic method of ensuring stability and the oil reserves.

If it is true, as Ms. Wright states, that "Iraq does indeed have weight in the Middle East and means to use it," there is no reason why a creative American policy approach could not favorably animate these aspirations in the area of regional security. Renewing full diplomatic relations would be a step in the right direction provided it is one based on a rational calculus of U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf most amenable to accommodation with the Iraqis rather than of those issues which divide us. In these difficult times, the United States could well benefit from diplomacy characterized by nuance in our relations with this vital regional actor.

JOHN BORAWSKI
School of Law
Washington University
St. Louis, Mo.

Ms. Wright replies:

With regard to John Borawski's comments on the policy implications of my analysis, it should be clear that I was not attempting to guide U.S. policy as Mr. Borawski would apparently like to do. I intended only to make clear what the facts of the situation are in Iraq. In Mr. Borawski's letter, however, so many of the facts are wrong that I am tempted even to quarrel with his most general recommendation, for better U.S.-Iraqi relations, if only to clarify the terms on which these can be expected to improve, if at all, in the near future. Responding to his specific points:

1. Saddam Hussein did not offer last year to reopen diplomatic relations with the United States, and it is not correct that this "signal" went unreciprocated. Mr. Borawski has the sequence of events back to front. Iraq was responding at the time—negatively—to overtures which had come from the State Department and from the U.S. delegation at the United Nations. Since early January 1980, there have been rumors of fresh, high-level contacts between Washington and Baghdad. National Security Adviser Brzezinski dropped a hint to this effect to *The Wall Street Journal* (February 8, 1980), and the Cairo and Tehran press have given the story substantial play. In one version, Brzezinski met with an aide of Hussein's on the Jordanian border; in another he went straight to Baghdad to talk to Hussein himself. Other accounts have placed the meeting in Morocco. The rumors have been denied by the Iraqis and are almost certainly untrue. The one recent back-channel communication between the two countries was through Prime Minister Adolpho Suarez of Spain, who visited President Carter to talk about Middle Eastern issues on January 14 and then President Hussein on February 10–12.

2. It is not true that Iraq has "dissociated" itself from the Soviet Union militarily or economically. A close observer would note continuous high-level contacts with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries, oil sale agreements, technology imports, military training and consultations. These relationships have never restrained Iraq from criticizing Soviet policy in Ethiopia, Southern Yemen and now Afghanistan. They also appear to survive short-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lived disputes (such as the one late last year in which Iraqi students were attacked in Bulgaria).

3. Iraq's trade with the United States does not abrogate the terms of the Arab boycott.

4. Before 1976 Iraq's oil policy was hostage to a number of factors beyond its control. The oil concessions were only partially nationalized and the pipelines insecure. Since 1976 Iraqi oil policy has been intimately linked to the regime's political objectives, and its pricing policy aimed at extracting maximum terms with production levels pegged as low as possible. Favorable terms are extended in the form of loans, cash grants, and commodity barter agreements—but not price discounts—to Third World countries. With those European countries, and Japan, which supply Iraq with its machine goods, industrial plant and technology—and which also recognize the PLO—Iraq offers contracts guaranteeing oil supply volumes for a year at a time. Bonuses and increased supplies have recently been granted to France, Spain and India, among others. There is no "price shaving" in these transactions.

5. Iraq does not recycle its revenues into the "international monetary system." It totally avoids American banks, and has only a small stake in the major Euro-Arab banking consortia. It prefers direct investments in the Arab world and mixed currency holdings and gold under its own close control.

6. Privately no less than publicly Iraq's officials are opposed to all forms of direct and indirect U.S. military assistance in the Gulf. They do not condone U.S., Soviet, British or French naval operations in the region, and Saddam Hussein's recently articulated Pan-Arab charter makes this crystal clear. Iraqis do admit, however, that there is little they can do about Saudi Arabia's willingness to invite U.S. military assistance. With Oman, Somalia and Kenya, however, there is much greater Iraqi leverage to forestall the expansion of U.S. military operations in the region.

The Palestine issue is at the heart of Iraqi policy because Israel is seen as an expansionist military power, with conventional and nuclear capability to enforce its will on a widening circle of its neighbors, and because the United States is perceived as condoning, aiding and encouraging this.

In the short term, Iraqi policy aims to bring pressure on the United States to abandon the Camp David framework and substitute a conference at which the PLO would participate as an independent delegation just as it does at the Arab League. This position has been accepted by most of America's European allies as well as Japan, Brazil and India.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

LIFE CHANCES: APPROACHES TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. By Ralf Dahrendorf. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 181 pp. $15.00.

In a brief book the Director of the London School of Economics and former EEC Commissioner addresses large questions on the meaning of history, the "legitimacy" of political power in contemporary societies, and the erosion of the postwar consensus in the Western democracies, and introduces the concept of "life chances"—expanding opportunities for individual choice and growth—as a measure of social change. As the level is one of high theory, clues to his thinking on current international matters are indirect and far between.

CALLING A TRUCE TO TERROR: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. By Ernest Evans. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1979, 180 pp. $19.95.

This study by a Brookings scholar is one of the better products of the growth of books on terrorism. It makes a particular point of explaining this type of violence not as the work of criminals and lunatics but as purposeful political strategy, and faulting the American response for failing to grasp that essential truth and act on it.

THREAT PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. By Raymond Cohen. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, 229 pp. $17.50.

An Israeli scholar adduces illustrative material from six thoroughly researched case studies (between 1875 and 1946) to inform his theoretical discussion of how threats of force are intended and perceived, and how they are related to understood rules of the game in international relations. An original and serious attempt to make theory relevant to practical problems of foreign policy.

DEEP SEABED RESOURCES. By Jack N. Barkenbus. New York: Free Press, 1979, 191 pp. $14.95.

The controversy over manganese nodules at the bottom of the sea, the main reason why the Law of the Sea negotiations go on indefinitely without producing a treaty, finds in Jack Barkenbus its historian and analyst. His study provides the relevant legal and technical data and also describes the state of play in the negotiations, which have turned this question into a basic North-South ideological issue.

NOTE—BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE MCGRAW-HILL BOOKSTORE, READERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY OBTAIN NEARLY ANY BOOK PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE PUBLISHER'S REGULAR LIST PRICE. WITHIN THE U.S., PLEASE ADD 95¢ PER BOOK FOR POSTAGE PLUS APPROPRIATE SALES TAX. IF OUTSIDE, PLEASE ADD $1.50 PER BOOK FOR POSTAGE AND 95¢ PER ORDER FOR REGISTRATION. SEND ORDERS WITH CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: THE MCGRAW-HILL BOOKSTORE, 1221 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICAN COMMUNICATION IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY. By Glen Fisher. Norwood (N.J.): Ablex, 1979, 161 pp. $17.50.
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION. Edited by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller. Norwood (N.J.): Ablex, 1979, 304 pp. $24.50.

Glen Fisher, a sociologist and former government official, accepts the premise that the world has become an interdependent global society with which America inevitably communicates in one way or another; the questions he addresses concern how, what, and to what end. The Nordenstreng-Schiller book is a collection of readings expressing Western and Third World views on the flow of information, with the weight tilted in favor of the latter. The editors have chosen national sovereignty as their unifying theme, which surely limits the scope of Fisher's global society.

THE POLITICS OF EAST-WEST COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE. By Karl E. Birnbaum. Westmead, Hants., (U.K.): Saxon House, 1979, 180 pp. (Brookfield, Vt.: Renouf, distributor, $27.00).

A longtime student of East-West negotiations takes off from "Basket 3" (of the Helsinki Final Act) to explore future prospects for non-official intercommunications. Many of the specifics are provided by interviews with key persons in West and East Germany and in Poland. The evidence permits some cautious and hedged conclusions, and in his own analysis Birnbaum stresses "the imperative of gradualism."

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.N. POLITICS: THE QUEST FOR CODES OF CONDUCT. By Werner J. Feld. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 173 pp. $18.50.

A respected expert in political economy directs his attention to the effort being made in the United Nations to draw up a code of conduct for multinational corporations. Since this endeavor is part of the continuing North-South debate on whether and how the entire world economy ought to be reordered, it is not surprising that the deliberations, which Feld describes in detail, have fallen short of agreement.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

LIMITED WAR REVISITED. By Robert E. Osgood. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 124 pp. $15.00.

Those who read Robert Osgood's pioneering study of limited war published in 1957 will be especially interested in his latest volume. The "lessons" of Vietnam are drawn—as are the limits to those lessons. But most interesting is Osgood's sophisticated discussion of the implications, for the limited use of force, of the Soviet Union's growing tendency to exploit conflicts in the Third World, and the need to contain this trend. This elegant and carefully woven essay should be widely read.

THE WAR GAME: A CRITIQUE OF MILITARY PROBLEM SOLVING. By Garry D. Brewer and Martin Shubik. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, 385 pp. $18.50.

This RAND book is a major study of modeling and gaming in order to simulate actual armed combat. Such activities play a role in establishing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense budgets and military strategy, but they are little understood. The authors seek both to explain this profession to the wider audience and to recommend ways of improving its performance. This is a serious work, and its subject should be better understood by those who discuss today's "war scenarios."

THE FALL AND RISE OF THE PENTAGON: AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICIES IN THE 1970s. By Lawrence J. Korb. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1979, 192 pp. $19.95.

The author, a longtime student of U.S. defense affairs, argues that a combination of the Vietnam War, an overcentralized decision-making process under McNamara, and lack of congressional and public support led to the "decline" of the Defense Department in the late 1960s and early 1970s; he also believes that since the stewardship of Melvin Laird the Pentagon has been on the upswing. To a greater extent than he acknowledges, the Defense Department reflects the politics of the country and the international environment. Nevertheless, there is much informed and valuable analysis in this book, and its relevance has been heightened by the new perspectives on defense arising from the recent Iranian and Afghan crises.

ARMS AND POLITICS, 1958–1978. By Robin Ranger. Toronto: Macmillan, 1979, 280 pp.

As we move toward a necessary reexamination of the aims, means and proper role of arms control, this book is well timed in providing a comprehensive history of the record thus far. The text is knowledgeably grounded in the better writings of the past two decades. One need not fully accept the author's dichotomy between *technical* (American) and *political* (Soviet) approaches to arms control to find this book of considerable value.

FUTURE ARMS PROCUREMENT: USA-EUROPE ARMS PROCUREMENT. By Egon Klepsch. London: Brassey's/New York: Crane, Russak, 1979, 95 pp. $14.50.

The lack of greater progress in weapons cooperation continues to be a matter of concern to Europeans. This report to the European Parliament by the German chairman of the Christian Democrat Group thoughtfully argues the need to include arms procurement as part of the European Community's industrial policy.

THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR. By the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. Montclair (N.J.): Allanheld, Osmun, 1980, 160 pp. $9.95.

This is a detailed investigation of the major effects of nuclear explosions, under several carefully delineated scenarios, on the civilian population and economies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It is designed to add an often missing dimension to discussions of nuclear strategy and SALT. The study finds that the impact of even a "small" or "limited" nuclear attack would be enormous; moreover, the effects that cannot be precisely calculated may be at least as important as those which are predictable.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE SPENT FUEL PROBLEM. Edited by Frederick C. Williams and David A. Deese. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 221 pp. $20.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York: Crane, Russak, 1979, 462 pp. $32.50.

Two valuable contributions to the nonproliferation bookshelf which reflect the growing trend toward specialization within this subject. Williams and Deese deal with the political, institutional and legal aspects of international spent-fuel management; their volume contains contributions on possibilities within five geographic regions and it also has chapters on economic and technical considerations. The SIPRI book is a scientifically oriented discussion of many aspects of the fuel cycle; it is an unusually comprehensive volume.

SWORDS FROM PLOWSHARES: THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY. By Albert Wohlstetter and others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 228 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Originally released several years ago as a research project for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency entitled "Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd," this book remains a useful primer for many aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem.

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR. By Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 400 pp. $24.00.

This fact-rich volume, written by two experienced observers of the Soviet military scene, has sections on almost all aspects of the U.S.S.R.'s defense establishment—the structure of the military services and the high command, their training and education, the military-industrial complex, the relationship between the Communist Party and the armed forces, and the fundamentals of military doctrine and strategy. Extensive use is made of Soviet military bibliographical materials.

SOVIET NAVAL DIPLOMACY. Edited by Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 409 pp. $25.00 (Paper, $9.95).

In recent times there has been much discussion about developing "rules of the game" for regulating the East-West competition in the Third World. This book examines the Soviet practice in the use of naval forces for political purposes. From Moscow's perspective, its naval deployments are seen as having been successful, and the establishment of a forward presence has reduced American freedom of action.

THE ECONOMICS OF THIRD WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE. By David K. Whynes. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979, 165 pp. $13.50.

In the past decade defense expenditures in the developing world have risen sharply, at twice the rate of growth of per capita income. Many ask: Would money not spent on the military be used for social and economic development? The author's assumption is affirmative, but even if one has a skeptical view on this central question there is much to be learned from this careful analysis, by a British economist, of the relationship between military spending and economic development.

ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE MODERN WORLD. Edited by Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy. New York: Praeger, 1979, 375 pp. $26.95.

An extensive collection of essays by 18 authors which examines many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aspects of the topic. The reader will be impressed by the complexity of the role of arms transfers in world politics and the difficulty of making normative judgments. The co-editors conclude with a chapter on the need for further research and theory-making.

A VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS: ESSAYS ON PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By B. T. Feld. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 320 pp. $25.00.
THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR. Edited by Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, 224 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $5.95).

The Pugwash conferences of senior scientists from many countries have made an important impact on arms control thinking since 1957. The first volume here contains a collection of articles by Professor Bernard T. Feld, Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs since 1973. The second volume consists of a number of papers on various aspects of nuclear war prepared for the 30th Pugwash symposium held in Toronto in 1978; many of these, by eminent contributors, are of high quality.

THE FOURTH MAN. By Andrew Boyle. New York: Dial Press, 1980, 504 pp. $12.95.

As full an account of the Philby-Maclean-Burgess Soviet spy group as we are likely to get without the internal documents. Especially notable are the new insights provided on the professional side by James Angleton, whose handling of the "Fifth Man" is far more important to history than the book's touted material concerning the Fourth, Anthony Blunt. From an American point of view the book makes it all too clear why these cases and the British handling of them did so much to destroy the wartime fabric of Anglo-American tight cooperation in secret intelligence.

W.P.B.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

PROGRESS FOR A SMALL PLANET. By Barbara Ward. New York: Norton, 1979, 305 pp. $13.95.

Mastering the problems of our "most tumultuous" epoch requires "the application to the planetary community of certain of the basic principles which govern and harmonize domestic society." This is not the first time Barbara Ward has struck this note, but her new book—written with the verve that marks all her work—is exceptionally comprehensive and synthesizing in its discussion. Economic development is, as always, a central theme, but the bulk of the book concentrates on the demands put on the industralized countries that "tend toward something not much short of a new concept of technological society." Relying on concrete measures that have worked (though often on a limited scale), Ward is optimistic about the technical possibilities but not about the willingness of people or nations to do what they need to do to keep things from getting worse.

LES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES EST-OUEST. By Marie Lavigne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979, 304 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This must be one of the most comprehensive single volumes on East-West economic relations ever written. In succinct, authoritative sections Professor Lavigne of the University of Paris provides a balanced analysis of trade, payments, industrial cooperation, technology, institutions and practices as they have evolved in relations between Western Europe and the United States on the one hand, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe on the other.

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN THE WEST AND EAST. By Leon Zurawicki. Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands): Sijthoff, 1979, 207 pp. $27.50.

Professor Zurawicki of Warsaw examines multinational firms from several perspectives. He sees a need to revise international trade theory to take account of their oligopolistic behavior and the growth of intra-firm transactions. He explains why the Western multinationals are preferred partners for socialist governments but sees why Western governments must enter the picture. His examination of the weaknesses of Eastern policies and practices leads to an emphasis on what could be accomplished by a fuller and more effective use of "socialist common enterprises." While some of the book's points are inevitably familiar, there are enough new perspectives to make this view through the no-longer-iron curtain worth the attention of Western scholars and businessmen.

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: A RADICAL APPROACH. Papers by Stephen Herbert Hymer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 323 pp. $35.00.

We must be grateful to friends and students of Stephen Hymer for putting together 11 of his papers along with commentaries on his life and ideas. They celebrate his passage from the analysis of the multinational corporation as a liberal economist to the study of the world capitalist system as a Marxist. In both capacities he was original, witty and hardworking. His Marxism was more a matter of insights than of dogma, though he was too fond of simplified metaphors about pyramids of power, offices on the upper floors of skyscrapers, and an international capitalist class that outflanked governments and nationalism. As he died at 38, one can only wonder, sadly, where, in a fluid world, his gifts would have carried him in his effort "to invent new wisdom for a new age." The brief biography does not mention that Steve Hymer was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968–69, an important year in his life.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE. By Mark Casson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 116 pp. $26.00.

If developing countries want the benefits of imported technology without so much foreign direct investment, they should increase the incentives to license technology instead of trying to force investors to behave differently. The author, a British economist, makes some ingenious proposals for how this might be done—for example, by widening the coverage of patent protection—but his case for their being workable is none too persuasive.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST. By Irvin Millman Grossack. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, 253 pp. $17.95.

Sharing a widespread dissatisfaction with the current theory of international

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade and investment, Professor Grossack of Indiana sets about trying to make it simpler and more realistic. To do both at once is probably impossible, but his efforts illuminate a number of points, especially when he takes nationality instead of territory as the basis for defining international transactions.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE. By William Diebold, Jr. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/ 1980s Project), 1980, 305 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $6.95).

Nations affect each other's well-being not only by the traditional triumvirate of trade, investment and monetary policy but also by a host of domestic "industrial" policies whose impact abroad is unintentional. As recognition builds of the pervasiveness of each society's effect on others by means of its domestic economic initiatives—a primary purpose and accomplishment of Mr. Diebold's important and sobering book—one is daunted by the difficulty of achieving relief of even those effects of industrial policy which are clearly in nobody's interest. The book examines possible avenues of agreement—by industrial sector (e.g., steel or textiles), or international planning for specific markets such as automobiles. By impressing on the reader the huge capacity for mischief inherent in nations failing to coordinate some internal economic policies, the author demonstrates clearly the importance of the choice between, on the one hand, common action, and on the other, costly nationalistic competition for markets, growth, labor and capital.

J. H. Watts

THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK: CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM. By Joan Edelman Spero. New York: Columbia University Press (a Council on Foreign Relations Book), 1980, 235 pp. $14.95.

The core of this interesting book is a case study of how a moderate-sized American bank plunged into alien activities, fell into the hands of dubious characters, and failed. To this account, Professor Spero of Columbia has added a suggestive analysis of the ways in which this unfortunate case raises broader questions about the international activities of American banks and national and international banking regulations.

THE WORLD COPPER INDUSTRY. By Raymond Mikesell. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1979, 393 pp. $25.00 (Paper, $10.95).

This is a very valuable study of an important, troubled industry. Professor Mikesell, a seasoned economist who has long been familiar with mining, provides a mass of basic information and succinct analyses of such controversial issues as pricing, foreign investment, the market power of producers, nationalization and conservation. The way to bridge the gap between foreign firms and the governments of producing areas, he believes, is through more imaginative contracts and some presence for international financial agencies. Except for two econometric chapters on supply and demand, the book is addressed to the general reader.

TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT. Compiled by the Rothko Chapel. Elmsford (N.Y.) Pergamon Press, 1979, 365 pp. $22.50 (Paper, $8.95).

TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. By Mo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hammed Bedjaoui. New York: Holmes & Meier (for UNESCO), 1979, 287 pp. $16.50 (Paper).

FOR A NEW POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Angelos Th. Angelopoulos. New York: Praeger, 1978, 137 pp.

All want something new but each wants something different. Governor Angelopoulos of the National Bank of Greece calls for a neo-Keynesian Carter Plan to stimulate the world economy by investments in the developing countries. Ambassador Bedjaoui of Algeria argues that a new international economic order needs a new legal and institutional framework and sees majority resolutions based on the U.N. Charter as a good vehicle for change. No one would expect 12 economists from eight countries to agree (although Dudley Seers argues that Marxists and neo-classicists are closer than they believe and that the differences come with neo-Marxists, populists and institutionalists); however, the Rothko Chapel Colloquium is noteworthy for the high intellectual level of most of its papers and the valuable historical perspective on thinking and writing about development which is provided by several.

THE NEW INTERDEPENDENCE: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Gordon K. Douglass. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1979, 132 pp. $16.95.

In the hope that a study of the European Community will throw light on problems of global interdependence, a group of stalwarts, mostly from the Community and the United States, discuss the coordination of policies, the enlargement of the Community, direct parliamentary elections and North-South tensions. With background, continuity and interpretation, Professor Douglass has turned the proceedings of this Pomona conference into a reasonably well-integrated volume.

TOURISM: PASSPORT TO DEVELOPMENT? By Emanuel de Kadt. New York: Oxford University Press (for UNESCO/World Bank), 1979, 360 pp. $14.95 (Paper, $5.95).

Second only to oil as a currency earner for poor countries, tourism has a thin literature, so this volume is welcome. Professor de Kadt, a sociologist from Sussex, provides a good survey; the dozen or so papers prepared for a seminar range from how to plan, through some interesting case studies of a number of countries, to prescriptions for defense mechanisms. The tone is positive, with more emphasis on jobs than culture conflict.

WEALTH OF NATIONS IN CRISIS. By Ronald C. Nairn. Houston (Tex.): Bayland, 1979, 289 pp. $12.95.

If peasants were allowed to get on with the job without the inhibitions that come from instability, ideology, politics, governments, bureaucracy, environmentalists and some other sources, there would be a lot more food in the world. This is the essential message of an argumentative, somewhat garrulous but often entertaining book by an Arizona businessman with land interests in Asia who stems from Ireland via New Zealand, the RAF, Asian diplomatic and military service and a Yale Ph.D. in international relations.

ENERGY POLICIES OF THE WORLD. VOL. III: INDIA, JAPAN, TAIWAN. Edited by Gerard J. Mangone. New York: Elsevier, 1979, 319 pp. $24.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Like the first two volumes in the series (noted in *Foreign Affairs* in April and October 1977), this one presents useful and quite detailed analyses of the energy policies (and problems) of some diverse countries: in this case, India, Japan and Taiwan.

ACCESS TO ENERGY: 2000 AND AFTER. By Melvin A. Conant. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979, 134 pp. $9.75.

The need of almost every country for foreign energy supplies and the asserted sovereign right to withhold them are posed as central issues, creating conflicts that "must be resolved before they spin out of control." There are, however, only faint hints of how this might be done in a book that is primarily a concise, selective, and analytical history of how things came to this pass.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS. By Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 320 pp. $15.00.

An outstanding history and analysis of the shift in power over the conduct of foreign affairs from the Executive to Congress which took place in the 1970s. The authors see the changes as revolutionary and permanent. Time will tell.

AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950–1975. By George C. Herring. New York: Wiley, 1979, 298 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $6.95).

An excellent survey incorporating original research, commanding the almost uncontrollable secondary literature, and avoiding tendentious argument. Designed for the informed reader seeking broad historical background.

THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON. VOL. VIII: AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 1961–1965. Edited by Walter Johnson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, 885 pp. $25.00.

The concluding volume of a splendidly edited collection covers the sad final four years when Stevenson at the United Nations was trying with scant success to make U.S. foreign policy less abrasive and more sensitive to the Third World. The editor was unable to get Stevenson's dispatches as U.N. Ambassador declassified; they are thus excluded.

ENCOUNTERS WITH KENNAN: THE GREAT DEBATE. By George F. Kennan and others. London and New York: Cass, 1979, 218 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $19.50).

A high-level dialogue, which first appeared in *Encounter*, between George Kennan and critics, most of whom accuse him of being insufficiently alarmed about the Soviet Union. Mr. Kennan defends himself with vigor.

DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE: U.S. CONFLICT WITH IRAN, JAPAN, AND MEXICO. Edited by Robert L. Paarlberg. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1979, 173 pp. $11.95 (Paper, $5.95).

Students of bilateral relations between states focus primarily on conflict (traditionalists) or interdependence (modernists). These case studies seek, with limited success, to refine a theory of conflict in conditions of "complex

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interdependence" in which weak states can prevail over strong. The years covered are 1920 to 1975.

FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE: FORTY YEARS' EXPERIENCES OF A CAREER DIPLOMAT. By John Moors Cabot. Washington: Foreign Service School, Georgetown University, 1979, 167 pp.

Even-tempered memoirs, with extensive diary excerpts, of a distinguished Foreign Service officer. The material on Argentina in the days of Peron and on China during the collapse of the Nationalist regime is especially interesting.

OPERATION SUNRISE: THE SECRET SURRENDER. By Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi. New York: Basic Books, 1979, 234 pp. $11.95.

A well-researched and balanced account by an American and an Italian scholar of the surrender of German forces in Italy in 1945.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE SHAPING OF PEACE. VOL. I: CANADA AND THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER, 1943–57. By John W. Holmes. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, 349 pp. $25.00.

The first of two projected volumes deals with Canada's role in the planning and birth of the United Nations and ancillary international organizations. It is written with grace, wit and perception by a distinguished Canadian diplomat-scholar. The subject is important for its own sake and also for its comparative perspective on the ideas and policies of Americans. A major contribution to the growing literature of Canadian diplomatic history.

G. S.

GOOD NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA, 1933–1945. By Irwin F. Gellman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979, 296 pp. $18.50.

Expanding on the theme that Roosevelt used the simplistically titled Good Neighbor Policy to create a regional base for use in influencing other areas, and thus "moved toward internationalism through the only available door," the author discusses in rich detail the fluctuations and the inner life of the policy. Its usefulness in furnishing models for postwar military, economic and cultural legislation is duly noted, and much emphasis is placed upon the motivations and personal qualities of FDR, Hull and Welles, whose association was "a combination of respect and distrust." In retrospect, the Good Neighbor Policy was a product of the Depression and the character of the Democratic leadership.

CASTELLO BRANCO: THE MAKING OF A BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT. By John W. F. Dulles. College Station (Tex.): Texas A & M University Press, 1979, 487 pp. $17.50.

A long and substantial life of the first of the post-1964 military Presidents, amply documenting his unusual talents for political maneuver and negotiation. An interesting foreword by Roberto Campos notes how Castello Branco "skilfully managed to blend the disciplinary and the transformational elements—repression and reform," thus enlisting for the revolution the strong backing of the urban middle class.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by David Collier. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, 424 pp. $25.00 (Paper, $5.95).

Seeking to understand authoritarianism and its relationship to the problems of economic development, the authors provide nine essays on the general nature of the bureaucratic/authoritarian model, the reasons for its emergence, and its possible future evolution. A study by Albert Hirschman on economic determinants is interesting.

CAPITALISM AND THE STATE IN U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. Edited by Richard R. Fagen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, 446 pp. $22.50 (Paper, $6.95).

These 12 essays, academic in tone, tilt strongly against the capitalist world order and the general posture of U.S. policies. The nature of contemporary capitalism and the contemporary state is explored, with critical references to the impeding effect of the U.S. political economy and the corresponding global system upon current political and economic relationships. There is not much on alternative solutions.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE DECLINE OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER: FRANCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1875–1890. By George F. Kennan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 420 pp. $25.00.

A celebrated diplomat turned historian examines the origins of the Franco-Russian alliance and thus offers his own interpretation of European diplomacy at the time. He considers that alliance as fateful, the more so as later statesmen added further miscalculations. The ensuing division of Europe helped to bring on the greatest disaster of our century, World War I. A magnificently written, independently argued history, with an incomparable eye for character and specific situation. Persistent errors of judgment are blamed partly on the rising force of unreasoned nationalism. With our own present explicitly in mind, Kennan deplores the assumption of so many actors of the time that wars were rational instruments of policy, an assumption that drove Europe into the great bloodbath and if still cherished today would bespeak utter recklessness. A fascinating work that has the stamp of the author on every page.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: "A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?" By Hans W. Gatzke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, 314 pp. $17.50.

The book is focused on postwar Germany, with particular emphasis on its relations with the U.S. Readable, sensible, fair-minded, and pleasingly broad, the book serves as a splendid summary by an historian at home in both countries.

RÜCKBLENDEN. AUFZEICHNUNGEN EINES AUGENZEUGEN DEUTSCHER AUSSENPOLITIK VON ADENAUER BIS SCHMIDT. By Wilhelm G. Grewe. Berlin: Propyläen, 1979, 811 pp. DM. 68.

Grewe's memoirs—a mélange of report, analysis and reflection—cover 25 years of service in the German Foreign Office, including years as Ambassador to Washington, NATO and Tokyo, and high posts in Bonn. This restrained

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

account is a useful source, with a somber postscript about prospective Western problems that suggests almost a kind of prescience.

DAS DEUTSCHE REICH UND DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG: VOL. I. By Manfred Messerschmidt and others. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979, 500 pp. DM. 82.

The first of ten projected volumes on Germany and World War II, prepared by four historians. Of particular interest is the careful account of German rearmament plans in the early years of Hitler's rule, with the definite launching of an offensive army stipulated in August 1936. Based principally on Anglo-American and German scholarship, the book is a major contribution to the understanding of Germany's role in provoking the Second World War and tackles, with remarkable candor, the problem of historical continuity from 1871 to 1945.

PROPAGANDA IN WAR, 1939–1945: ORGANISATIONS, POLICIES AND PUBLICS IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY. By Michael Balfour. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, 520 pp. $37.50.

A British historian specializing in German history, and himself a fashioner of British propaganda during the war, reconstructs the organization and substance of wartime propaganda, addressed both to the respective domestic publics and to the enemy. The record of the two belligerents in regard to specific issues is compared: a useful and judicious work.

BRITAIN AND THE JEWS OF EUROPE, 1939–1945. By Bernard Wasserstein. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 389 pp. $17.95.

A major work, based on hitherto unused British government archives, reconstructing the policies of the British bureaucracy under pressures of wartime. Until 1941, the Germans sought to extrude Jews, but the British—for their own raison d'état and not knowing what lay ahead for European Jewry—obstructed Jewish entry from abroad. Despite Churchill's grasp of the magnitude of suffering, most officials found trenchant reasons for passivity. Told with admirable restraint, and with a good sense for historical complexity, the book deserves wide attention because of its far-reaching implications.

THE STRUGGLE FOR GREECE, 1941–1949. By C.M. Woodhouse. New York: Beekman, 1979, 324 pp. $29.95.

A British classicist turned soldier and flown into Greece in 1943 provides an authoritative account of the many struggles within the struggle, of the many factions, for example, within the Greek Resistance and the communist movement. An important contribution not only to Greek history but to that of the postwar era generally. The author, a former M.P., is not unsympathetic to the radical hopes of social reformers but is scathing about the Stalinist brutalities that were committed in Greece, including, of course, within the communist ranks.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF FEDERICO SANCHEZ AND THE COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND IN SPAIN. By Jorge Semprun. New York: Karz, 1979, 271 pp. $14.95.

A gripping memoir by a Spanish Communist, a survivor of a German concentration camp and of postwar underground work, expelled from the party in 1964—for views that have since become rhetorical orthodoxy. A scathing indictment of Stalinism and of Santiago Carrillo, who was its local representative. The book has had a major impact in Spain.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE EUROPEAN LEFT: ITALY, FRANCE, AND SPAIN. Edited by William E. Griffith. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1979, 260 pp.

Informative essays on various aspects of left-wing movements, with differing prescriptions on how Western powers should react to possible communist participation in government. Griffith argues against any support of such a coalition; Richard Löwenthal, whose credentials of opposition to communism are just as impeccable, argues for a more flexible approach. A timely collection, even if the French Communists' rigid anti-socialist, pro-Soviet stand has made a left-wing victory there seem entirely implausible now.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

TESTIMONY: THE MEMOIRS OF DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH. Edited by Solomon Volkov. New York: Harper, 1979, 289 pp. $15.00.

The personal story, presumably authentic, of the Russian composer's struggle with himself and the constraints of the system to which he had to conform. A powerful searchlight that illuminates Soviet society and the relationship between creative art and political power in the Stalinist period and after.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY: HOW IT REALLY WORKS. By Constantin A. Krylov. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1979, 255 pp. $17.95.

A kind of primer on the Soviet economy by an emigré Russian economist, with short lessons on its different aspects and an eye to the real problems not officially acknowledged but visible from a close reading of Soviet publications. The author predicts for the 1980s a series of intense struggles within the Party based essentially on economic issues.

COMMUNIST REFORMATION: NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM AND CHANGE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. Edited by G.R. Urban. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 335 pp. $19.95.

A series of skillfully conducted dialogues in which ten men with special knowledge and experience discuss communism and nationalism in Eastern and Western Europe, with the Prague Spring the center of attention. The talks with four leading Czech actors in that drama shed new light on its meaning and its relation to the rise of Eurocommunism; those with three American officials holding responsible posts at the time are somewhat less thrilling.

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, 384 pp. $20.00.

These eight essays provide, along with names, numbers and organizational data, quite a good brief survey of the ruling parties, and thus of the postwar experience of the countries of Eastern Europe. They are individual studies with no new or striking theme, but the variety of the situations they describe indicates separate roads to wherever the parties are going (although the editor in his introduction tells us not to be deceived by appearances—the Russians are still there).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY: FROM KUN TO KADAR. By Bennett Kovrig. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 525 pp. $10.95.

The most thorough history of the Hungarian Communist Party and portrait of its leadership yet done in a Western language, although not entirely replacing that of Miklos Molnár (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1979). Many secrets, especially about relations with the Soviet Communists, necessarily remain unrevealed, but Kovrig has assembled a great quantity of data, organized it well, and written objectively.

BITTER GLORY: POLAND AND ITS FATE, 1918–1939. By Richard M. Watt. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, 512 pp. $16.95.

An American popular historian writes objectively and well, and from a solid base in the existing literature, about Pilsudski and Poland's period of independence between the wars. Sympathetic to the Poles but not romantic, for the most part he just tells the story as it moves to its inevitable tragic end.

THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY UNDER SELF-MANAGEMENT. By Ljobo Sirc. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 270 pp. $27.50.
WORKERS' CONTROL UNDER PLAN AND MARKET: IMPLICATIONS OF YUGOSLAV SELF-MANAGEMENT. By Ellen Turkish Comisso. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 320 pp. $22.50.

These two books investigate the reality of "socialist self-management" underlying the spate of official and unofficial rhetoric, much of it from enthusiastic outsiders. Sirc, an economist of Yugoslav origin now in Britain, reviews the entire history of the Yugoslav economy since 1945, using official material to illustrate his conclusion that the system has failed by any test of elementary economics or common sense. Ellen Comisso, an American political scientist, begins with general theory (Gramsci and Proudhon), relates it to the Yugoslav experience, and ends with an interesting case study of a single enterprise. Neither book lends support to the idea that the rest of the world has much to learn from the Yugoslav experiment.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE ELUSIVE PEACE: THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By William R. Polk. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 201 pp. $15.95.

William Polk, a professional in history and in diplomacy who is fully at home in the Middle East, manages to simplify without distorting of the region's problems of war and peace, of wealth and poverty, and of adaptation to the modern world, setting them against a background of political and cultural history. His vision is keen and his judgments worth pondering.

MILITANT ISLAM. By G. H. Jansen. New York: Harper, 1980, 160 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $3.95).

The Middle East correspondent of *The Economist* has written a timely study on the resurgence of Islam: history, doctrine, the politics of a dozen Muslim countries, and reflections on the familiar theme of the Islamic world's reaction to the impact of the West. Taking potshots at the most respected Western Islamists and questioning many established ideas, he is informative and stimulating, if not always convincing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE. By Edward W. Said. New York: Times Books, 1979, 265 pp. $12.50.

Edward Said sounds like a Palestinian nationalist and writes like a professor of English literature, and in fact he is both. His book is an eloquent defense of the Palestinian Arab people and their right to self-determination. If he over-argues the case and paints Israel and Zionism without redeeming features, it may be because of the intensity of his conviction, which is not without basis in fact, that the Palestinian Arabs have been ill used by others and ignored or dismissed by the Western world.

DECISION ON PALESTINE: HOW THE U.S. CAME TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. By Evan M. Wilson. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 244 pp. $14.95.

Evan Wilson's close involvement in American policymaking on Palestine in the 1940s gives him a unique vantage point for writing the diplomatic history of those critical years. This is no memoir but a careful, objective and revealing job of research, in which Wilson probes for the national and personal reasons behind the key decisions.

MY HOME, MY PRISON. By Raymonda Hawa Tawil. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980, 265 pp. $12.95.

Raymonda Tawil is an ardent feminist and a symbol of militant Arab Palestinian nationalism. In recounting her life in Israel, in Jordan, and in the Occupied West Bank (where she was put under house arrest), she makes a profession of faith both in self-determination for the Palestine Arabs and in the possible coexistence of a free Arab Palestinian state and a free Israel.

THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. By R. K. Ramazani. Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands): Sijthoff, 1979, 180 pp. $35.00.

In this volume, one in a series on international straits, the author gives us all the necessary geographical, legal and strategic information on Hormuz, the "global chokepoint," plus extended and well-reasoned discussion of the many international problems of the Gulf region. Some of his future "scenarios," however, suffer from having been written before the revolution in Iran.

SOCIAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN IRAQ. By Saddam Hussein. London: Croom Helm, 1979, 123 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $18.00).

Speeches and statements by Iraq's President and supreme leader, from which one gets the flavor of his political philosophy. The pan-Arab theme and the Palestinian cause predominate, but he also comments on what he intends for Iraq, and how he sees relations with the great powers.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: UNITY IN FRAGMENTATION. By Ali Mohammed Khalifa. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 235 pp. $24.50.

A portrait of the UAE describing the factors of integration and disintegration, the constitutional impasse, the personalities of the present leaders, and the all-important regional and global context of the federation's future. Refreshingly candid, inasmuch as the author is a Saudi Arabian official.

ORIGINS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN OIL EMPIRE: SECRET U.S. DOCUMENTS, 1923-1944. Edited by Nelson Robertson. Salisbury (N.C.): Documentary Publications, 1980, 190 pp. $24.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET HISTORY OF THE OIL COMPANIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by William J. Kennedy (pseud.). Salisbury (N.C.): Documentary Publications, 1980, 2 vols. $40.00.

Three volumes of documents from the U.S. archives, covering the years 1923-1949, on negotiations connected with the first American oil concession in Saudi Arabia (obtained by Standard Oil of California) and the origins and early years of ARAMCO. The purpose of the editors, as stated in the introduction to the "Kennedy" volumes, is to reveal the underlying causes, in American economic imperialism, of the OPEC problem and crisis of today.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE SILK ROAD. By Jan Myrdal. New York: Pantheon, 1980, 292 pp. $15.00.

A timely and vivid narrative of a trip through the "pivot of Asia"—the Chinese Pamirs where China meets Russian Central Asia and Afghanistan. Myrdal believes that Russia is still playing "the Great Game" for Asia but that the United States is leaving the table. He sees great continuity in Russian policy: "What is so striking as you travel through what formerly was known as East Turkestan is that Russian policy has been consistent since the days of Peter the Great. Now and then a forced halt; once or twice a diplomatic—and even . . . a military—retreat; but then after some decades a new thrust forward." Despite the author's unqualified enthusiasm for the new China, an enthusiasm which flaws some of his analysis, there are valuable insights into the historical background of the cold war in Asia between Russia and China.

TECHNOLOGY, DEFENSE, AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS IN CHINA, 1975–1978. By Harry G. Gelber. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 229 pp. $18.50.

A useful survey of Chinese economic, defense and science policy since the death of Mao. The chapter on technology is the most interesting. The author describes the enormous setbacks to the development of science and technology during the Cultural Revolution and then lists the various steps that have been taken to chart a new course: the new stress on intellectual excellence rather than political enthusiasm; the new priority given to higher education; the revival of major research facilities; the importing of foreign technology and the sending of Chinese students to study in the West. Gelber also notes some of the serious restraints likely to hamper the efforts: doubts about the permanence of the government line; the effects of the "lost generation" of graduates and postgraduates; the absence of an entrepreneurial class; the barriers to communication with the Western scientific community, and so forth. He concludes that China will still be lagging in the high technology sector by the end of the century.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND CHINA: 1979. Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Washington: G.P.O., 1979, 61 pp.

This is a very interesting report by a delegation of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which visited Japan and China in August 1979. The section on Japan is noteworthy both because of a discussion of various theories about the trade imbalance and, even more, a fascinating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

account of Japanese transportation technology and its potential applicability to the United States. In addition to the famous "bullet train," or *Shinkansen*, which in its 15 years of operation has carried more than a billion passengers at speeds of up to 126 miles an hour on a 641-mile track, the Japanese are now pioneering with new high-speed, magnetically levitated surface transportation systems which, in the opinion of the delegates, hold great promise for the U.S. The section on China has a helpful account of China's energy picture and of the prospects for U.S.-Chinese trade.

EMERGING ROLES OF ASIAN NATIONS IN THE DECADE OF THE 1980's: A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. By Peter P. Cheng and others. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Graduate Studies, 1979, 98 pp. $3.50 (Paper).

The product of a symposium held in October 1978, all the essays are of high caliber, particularly those of Marius Jansen on Japan and Richard L. Park on India. Park suggests that "neither Pakistan nor India can be pleased with the strategic implications of the new U.S.S.R.-oriented government in Afghanistan since the coup of 1978, or with the potential for disorder in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier area of Pakistan, now exacerbated by impending civil war in Iran." External conflicts near or on the South Asian borders to the northwest, he predicts, "will tend to draw India and Pakistan together. . . ."

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by Jae Kyu Park. Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1979, 191 pp.

Based on an international symposium held in Korea in January 1979, this collection of essays, seven of which deal with Asia, is an unusually good introduction to the subject of nuclear proliferation as well as to the Asian strategic scene more broadly. What makes the collection so valuable is that none of the authors treats the proliferation problem as primarily a technical one, a vice common to much discussion of the subject elsewhere. Rather, they place the nuclear problem in its proper political-strategic context. The contributions by Asian scholars and officials are consistently of high quality.

POWER POLITICS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Lalita Prasad Singh. Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1980, 208 pp. $12.50.

A very broad, useful survey of the international relations of southeast Asia. There are solid chapters on great-power rivalries in Indochina in the 1950s and '60s, on Indonesia's regional aspirations and on the more recent outbreak of a new cold war between China and the Soviet Union since the defeat of the United States in Vietnam.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

AFRICAN BUSINESSMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA. By Andrew A. Beveridge and Anthony R. Oberschall. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 382 pp. $22.50.

This pathbreaking study addresses some of the most difficult questions about how the development process works in a richly endowed but poor African country like Zambia. The authors examine indigenous development in the light of international dependency, African entrepreneurship, the rela-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionship between state-controlled enterprises and those privately owned by Africans. Analyzing the complex sources of innovation in this setting, they rate the economic contribution of local businessmen a modest plus for Zambia.

SOUTH AFRICA'S OPTIONS: STRATEGIES FOR SHARING POWER. By Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 196 pp. $17.95.

The Olympian breadth of this analysis—by two South African social scientists, one of whom, Slabbert, is also leader of the Opposition in the South African Parliament—is impressive but ultimately somewhat frustrating. The authors present arguments for and against a federal system and also about parliamentary versus presidential forms of government, using an abundance of precedents from other nations' experience but remaining quite abstract on the application of these forms to South Africa itself.

SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE 1980s. Edited by Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 248 pp. $22.00.

This solid collection offers the best case recently made for serious consideration of South Africa's strategic importance. Despite insistent questioning of the realism of prevailing U.S. policy assumptions, however, no alternatives to the present policy emerge clearly.

THE AFRIKANERS. Edited by Edwin S. Munger. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979, 183 pp. R. 9.50.

THE LIBERAL DILEMMA IN SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by Pierre L. van den Berghe. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 164 pp. $19.95.

In Munger's collection, a group of Afrikaners (including former Broederbond chief Gerrit Viljoen and journalist Willem de Klerk) look at themselves: loyal, defensive (but not apologetic), they are for the most part quite indirect about their relations with blacks. Their politics vary less than their perceptions—sometimes intensely expressed—of the need for change. Van den Berghe's volume is a mixed bag of sociological analysis by liberals and on liberals; the liberals' commitment to non-violence and their confusion about their own position in South Africa come through most clearly.

THE ARAB-AFRICAN CONNECTION. By Victor T. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 130 pp. $20.00.

This study represents the first significant recent effort to deal comprehensively with an increasingly salient set of issues. The result is a competent overview (curiously, researched in part at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) emphasizing Arab-African economic relationships.

FANTASTIC INVASION: NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY AFRICA. By Patrick Marnham. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, 252 pp. $10.95.

In this vividly etched collage of images, Africa emerges victorious, inexorably breaking down or subverting the Western values and institutions left by the departed colonialists. The impression conveyed by this attentive contemporary observer, however, is—in its bleak focus on the nether side of African struggles for survival—as one-dimensional in the end as those of the Westerners who preceded him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice*: United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.*: Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office*: 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities*: 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*: 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 96th Congress, 1st Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

AFRICA

A BILL to terminate sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under certain circumstances. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 2076, Dec. 4, 1979. Washington, 1979. 9 pp. (S.Rept. 96–447.)

CURRENT situation in South Africa. Hearing, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 6, 1979. Washington, 1979. 37 pp.

ECONOMIC sanctions against Rhodesia. Hearings, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 2–May 21, 1979. Washington, 1979. 475 pp.

NAMIBIA. Hearing, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, June 25, 1979. Washington, 1979. 50 pp.

RECENT developments in Rhodesia. Hearing, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, July 23, 1979. Washington, 1979. 18 pp.

REVIEW of President Carter's first report to Congress on Rhodesia. Hearing, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, July 25, 1979. Washington, 1979. 29 pp.

TRADE sanctions against Rhodesia. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, June 12, 1979. Washington, 1979. 35 pp.

U.S. policy and the conflict in the Western Sahara. Hearings, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, July 23–24, 1979. Washington, 1979. 209 pp.

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL Foreign Investment Disclosure Act administration. Hearing, Subcommittee on Family Farms, Rural Development, and Special Studies, Committee on Agriculture, House, July 26, 1979. Washington, 1979. 19 pp. (Ser. No. 96–V.)

AMENDMENTS to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Hearing, Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Senate, on S.1, S.962, & S.1053, May 8, 1979. Washington, 1979. 96 pp.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OCEAN

AUSTRALIA and the Third World: report of the Committee on Australia's Relations with the Third World. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1979. 376 pp.

CHINA and the United States. Report of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, to the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Senate, Oct. 1979. Washington, 1979. 10 pp. (Com. Print. No. 96–35.)

DEFENSE of Japan. Tokyo, Defense Agency, 1979. 266 pp.

IMPLEMENTATION of Taiwan Relations Act: issues and concerns. Hearings. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 14–15, 1979. Washington, 1979. 145 pp.

INDIA: planning for industrialization; industrialization and trade policies since 1951, by Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai. Delhi, Oxford University Press (for the Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), new ed., 1979. 537 pp. Rs 40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commercial Policy and Trade

Export Administration Act of 1979. Conference report, Committee of Conference, House, to accompany S.737, Sept. 26, 1979. Washington, 1979. 59 pp. (H.Rept. 96-482.)

———. Act, approved Sept. 29, 1979. Washington, 1979. n.p. (96-72-S.737.)

Extension and revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969. Hearings and markup, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 15-Apr. 26, 1979, pt. 1. Washington, 1979. 1160 pp.

Manual for the negotiation of bilateral tax treaties between developed and developing countries. N.Y., 1979. 190 pp. (E.79.XVI.3.) $10.00.

Perspectives on trade and international payments: executive summary. Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979. 22 pp. (Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States.)

Disarmament

Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit. Band XV: 1977, comp. by Hanswilhelm Haefs. Bonn, Siegler & Co., 1979. 450 pp.

Military implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty). Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, July 23-26, 1979. Washington, 1979. 2 pts.

Principal findings on the capabilities of the United States to monitor the SALT II Treaty. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate, Oct. 1979. Washington, 1979. 5 pp. (Com. Print.)

SALT and the NATO allies. Staff report, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Oct. 1979. Washington, 1979. 57 pp. (Com. Print.)

SALT II and the costs of modernizing U.S. strategic forces. Staff working paper, Congressional Budget Office, Congress, Sept. 1979. Washington, 1979. 34 pp.

SALT II Treaty: background documents. Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Nov. 1979. Washington, 1979. 80 pp. (Com. Print.)

The SALT II Treaty. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Nov. 19, 1979. Washington, 1979. 551 pp. (Exec. Rept. 96-14.)

Eastern Europe

Mass communication and social change process and practice, by Henry O. Hart. Munich, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, East European Area, Audience and Opinion Research Department, 1979. 70 pp.

Our course: peace and socialism: a collection of speeches, by L. I. Brezhnev. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1979. 245 pp.

Das Potsdamer Abkommen: Dokumentensammlung. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 2d rev. ed., 1979. 351 pp. DM.10.00.

Soviet economy in a time of change. A compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress, Oct. 10, 1979. Washington, 1979. 2 vols. (Jt. Com. Print.)

Soviet naval developments: prepared at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of Information, Department of the Navy, ed. by Norman Polmar. Annapolis, Md., The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979. 119 pp.

Speech given by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the SED Central Committee and Chairman of the GDR Council of State; speech given by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the ceremony held in Berlin on 6 October 1979 . . . to mark the 30th anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic. Berlin, Panorama DDR, 1979. 30 pp.

Financial Policy

Address to the Board of Governors by Robert S. McNamara, President, World Bank, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, October 2, 1979. Washington, World Bank, 1979. 44 pp.

Amending the Export-Import Bank Act and the Trade Act. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate, on S. 339, July 12-19, 1979. Washington, 1979. 183 pp.

Amending the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 with respect to credit to communist countries. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, on H.R. 1908, July 23–24, 1979. Washington, 1979. 121 pp. (Ser. No. 96–24.)

COMPENDIUM of Community monetary texts. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (for the Monetary Committee, European Communities), 1979. 177 pp. $11.00.

CONSIDERABLE increase in foreign banking in the United States since 1972. Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979. 39 pp. (Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.)

EDGE corporation branching; foreign bank takeovers; and international banking facilities. Hearings, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate, July 16–20, 1979. Washington, 1979. 655 pp.

THE EUROCURRENCY Market Control Act of 1979. Hearings, Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, on H.R. 3962, June 26–July 12, 1979. Washington, 1979. 288 pp. (Ser. No. 96–23.)

THE EUROPEAN Monetary System: problems and prospects. Study prepared for the Subcommittee on International Economics, Joint Economic Committee, Congress, and the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, Nov. 1979. Washington, 1979. 152 pp. (Jt. Com. Print.)

REPORT to Congress on foreign government treatment of U.S. commercial banking organizations. Washington, Department of Treasury, 1979. 197 pp.

WORLD inflation. Hearing, Task Force on Inflation, Committee on the Budget, House, July 20, 1979, vol. 6. Washington, 1979. 43 pp.

FOOD AND NUTRITION

INTERNATIONAL Sugar Agreement, 1977. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany Ex. A, 95–2, Nov. 20, 1979. Washington, 1979. 107 pp. (Ex.Rept.No. 96–15.)

THE INTERNATIONAL Wheat Agreement. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, May 8, 1979. Washington, 1979. 93 pp.

PROTOCOLS for the Fifth Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971. Message from the President of the United States, printed for the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Sept. 11, 1979. Washington, 1979. 9 pp. (Exec. FF.)

HUMAN RIGHTS

BASKET III: implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Hearings, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Congress. Washington, 1979.

8. U.S. compliance: human rights. Apr. 3–4, 1979. 498 pp.

HUMAN rights and the Baltic States. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, June 26, 1979. Washington, 1979. 61 pp.

HUMAN rights and U.S. foreign assistance: experiences and issues in policy implementation (1977–1978). Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Nov. 1979. Washington, 1979. 196 pp. (Com. Print.)

PROCEEDINGS of the Round Table on Special Rights and a charter of the rights of the citizens of the European Community and related documents, Florence, 26 to 28 October 1978, comp. by the European Parliament's Directorate-General for Research and Documentation. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1979. 133 pp.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

ACTA final: Secunda Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derecho Internacional Privado, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, 23 de abril a 8 de mayo de 1979. Washington, Secretaria General de la Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, 1979. 138 pp. (OEA/Ser.C/VI.21.2.) $6.00.

LAW of the Sea. Hearings, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House, Feb. 27–June 7, 1979. Washington, 1979. 467 pp. (Ser. No. 96–9.)

MIDDLE EAST

ACTIVITIES of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Hearing, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, June 25, 1979. Washington, 1979. 81 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOOD security issues in the Arab Near East: a report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, ed. by A.A. El-Sherbini. N.Y., Pergamon Press (for the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia), 1979. 241 pp.

THE INTERNATIONAL status of the Palestinian people. Prepared for the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. N.Y., 1979. 32 pp.

PROPOSED arms sales for countries in the Middle East. Hearing, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Aug. 1, 1979. Washington, 1979. 45 pp.

SUPPLEMENTAL aid requests for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 for Turkey and Oman. Hearings, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, May 15–31, 1979. Washington, 1979. 115 pp.

SYRIA: a country study, ed. by Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, G.P.O. (for the Foreign Area Studies, The American University), 1979. 268 pp.

MILITARY POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT of Defense: documents on establishment and organization, 1944–1978, ed. by Alice C. Cole and others. Washington, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 1979. 332 pp.

DOCTRINES, technology and future war: a Swedish view, by Lars B. Wallin. Stockholm, National Defence Research Institute, 1979. 70 pp.

THE EVOLUTION of US Army tactical doctrine, 1946–76, by Robert A. Doughty. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1979. 57 pp. (Leavenworth Papers, 1.)

WHITE paper 1979: the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces. Bonn, Federal Minister of Defence, 1979. 293 pp.

RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY RESOURCES

ALTERNATIVES to dealing with OPEC. Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House, June 20–21, 1979. Washington, 1979. 249 pp.

DEEP seabed hard minerals. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 493, June 13, 1979. Washington, 1979. 200 pp.

DEVELOPMENT of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed. Hearings, Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House, on H.R. 2759 and H.R. 3268, May 1–22, 1979. Washington, 1979. 470 pp. (Ser. No. 96–10.)

ECONOMIC effects of oil import quota proposals. Study prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House, Dec. 4, 1979. Washington, 1979. 27 pp. (WMCP: 96–42.)

LITHIUM, by Richard H. Singleton. Prepared by the Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior. Washington, 1979. 25 pp. (Mineral Commodity Profiles.)

MEXICAN oil and technology transfer. Hearings, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, House, July 31–Aug. 1, 1979. Washington, 1979. 283 pp.

OIL import policy issues. Hearings, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House, July 16–17, 1979, vol. 1. Washington, 1979. 239 pp. (Ser. 96–31.)

OIL imports: a range of policy options. Study prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Nov. 1979. Washington, 1979. 31 pp. (Com. Print 96-IFC 36.)

PROSPECTS for cooperation and trade of energy resources between the United States and Canada. Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979. 33 pp. (Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States.)

REFUGEES

THE INDOCHINESE refugee situation: August 1979. Report of a study mission of the U.S. House of Representatives, Aug. 2–11, 1979, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 16, 1979. Washington, 1979. 81 pp. (Com. Print.)

INDOCHINESE refugees. Hearings, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 5–June 13, 1979. Washington, 1979. 117 pp.

REFUGEE crisis in Southeast Asia: results of the Geneva conference. Hearing, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, July 26, 1979. Washington, 1979. 78 pp. (Senate No. 96–12.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Science and Technology

European oversight trip. Report, Committee on Science and Technology, House, June 1979. Washington, 1979. 175 pp. (Com. Print.)

Key issues in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific exchanges and technology transfer. Report, Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology, Committee on Science and Technology, House, Nov. 1979. Washington, 1979. 46 pp. (Com. Print., Ser. W.)

The Reverse transfer of technology: a survey of its main features, causes and policy implications, study prepared by the Secretariat of UNCTAD. N.Y., 1979. 32 pp. (E.79.II.D.10.) $4.00.

U.S. policies and initiatives for the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development. Joint hearing, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate, and the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology, Committee on Science and Technology, House, July 17, 1979. Washington, 1979. 194 pp. (Ser. No. 96-43.)

United Nations

France and the United Nations. N.Y., French Embassy Press & Information Service, 1979. 80 pp.

Industry 2000—new perspectives. Vienna, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1979. 242 pp. (ID/CONF.4/3.)

Reform of the United Nations: an analysis of the President's proposals and their comparison with proposals of other countries. Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Oct. 1979. Washington, 1979. 105 pp. (Com. Print.)

UNESCO and freedom of information. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, July 19, 1979. Washington, 1979. 69 pp.

United States

Playing the China card: implications for United States-Soviet-Chinese relations. Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Oct. 1979. Washington, 1979. 27 pp. (Com. Print.)

Procurement of naval ships: it is time for the U.S. Navy to acknowledge its shipbuilders may be holding a winning hand, by Brady M. Cole. Washington, Research Directorate, National Defense University, 1979. 52 pp. (National Security Affairs Monograph Series 79-5.)

The U.S. balance of international payments and the U.S. economy: developments in 1978 and early 1979, by the Congressional Budget Office. Washington, 1979. 60 pp.

The United States, China and Japan. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Sept. 1979. Washington, 1979. 46 pp. (Com. Print.)

United States-Japan trade: issues and problems. Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979. 205 pp. (Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.)

U.S. participation in international organizations and programs. Report of a staff study mission, Oct. 6-Nov. 11, 1978, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Aug. 1979. Washington, 1979. 81 pp. (Com. Print.)

Western Europe

Annual report on the development cooperation policies of the Community and its member states, 1977-1978. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1979. 67 pp. $3.50.

In search of consensus, Paris: 1979. Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of Members of Congress and of the European Parliament, Apr. 17-19, 1979, pursuant to H.Res. 981, Oct. 5, 1979. Washington, 1979. 55 pp. (Com. Print.)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act of 1979. Report, Committee on Armed Services, House, to accompany H.R. 5580, Nov. 13, 1979. Washington, 1979. 24 pp. (H.Rept. 96-612 Pt.1.)

———. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, to accompany H.R. 5580, Nov. 28, 1979. Washington, 1979. 17 pp. (H.Rept. 96-612 Pt.2.)

Review of recent developments in Europe, 1979. Hearing, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, July 12, 1979. Washington, 1979. 86 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

25 YEARS of European Community external relations, by Edmund Wellenstein. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1979. 41 pp. $1.00.

WESTERN security issues: European perspectives. Hearing, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 12, 1979. Washington, 1979. 48 pp.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

BRAZIL: human resources special report. Washington, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, The World Bank, 1979. v.p. (A World Bank Country Study.)

CANADA. Paris, OECD, 1979. 64 pp. (OECD Economic Surveys.) $3.00.

CENTRAL America at the crossroads. Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 11–12, 1979. Washington, 1979. 56 pp.

PANAMA Canal Treaty implementing legislation. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, on S. 1024, June 26–27, 1979. Washington, 1979. 503 pp.

QUÉBEC-Canada: a new deal; the Québec government proposal for a new partnership between equals: sovereignty-association. Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1979. 31 pp.

TWENTIETH Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, Aug. 9–17, 1979. Report by the Chairman of the House of Representatives delegation, Sept. 28, 1979. Washington, 1979. 27 pp. (Com. Print.)

———. Report by the Chairman of the Senate delegation, Nov. 1979. Washington, 1979. 38 pp. (Com. Print.)

UNITED States policy toward Nicaragua. Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, June 21–26, 1979. Washington, 1979. 80 pp.

II. OTHER PUBLICATIONS

ADELPHI PAPERS. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979. $2.50 each.

153. Congressional power: implications for American security policy, by Richard Haass. 38 pp.

AFRICA POLICY CROSSROADS CONFERENCE REPORT: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, KHARTOUM, THE SUDAN, NOVEMBER 27–30, 1978, by Jane Wilder Jacqz. N.Y., The African-American Institute, 1979. 68 pp.

AGRARIAN SYSTEMS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, ed. by Dharam Ghai and others. N.Y., Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979. 375 pp.

AID IN AFRICA, by Guy Arnold. London, Kogan Page; N.Y., Nichols Publishing Co., 1979. 240 pp. £5.95.

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF MAJOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH REPORTS, by Jorge Lozoya and others. N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1979. 146 pp. (UNITAR/CEESTEM Library on NIEO.)

AMERICA VOTES, 13: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS, comp. and ed. by Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1979. 384 pp.

ANNUAL OF POWER AND CONFLICT, 1978–79: A SURVEY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE, ed. by Brian Crozier. London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979. 502 pp. $22.50.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, RED SEA, AND GULF: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS, ed. by Enver M. Koury and Emile A. Nakhleh. Hyattsville, Md., Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1979. 100 pp.

ARBEITEN AUS DER ABTEILUNG ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDERFORSCHUNG. Bonn, Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1979.

78. Africa: the role of mass media in promoting rural development—reality and myths, by Reinhold Meyer. 33 pp.

ARMIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST, by Otto von Pivka. N.Y., Mayflower Books, 1979. 168 pp. $12.95.

ASSESSING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN WORLD MARKETS, by John Volpe. Washington, International Division, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1979. 50 pp. $5.00.

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES POLICY PAPERS. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. $6.00 each.

Getting the West out of the oil dilemma: an energy family approach, by Herschel Specter. 39 pp. Oil and turmoil: Western choices in the Middle East, by the Atlantic Council's Special Working Group on the Middle East. 39 pp. The Soviet merchant marine: economic and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategic challenge to the West, by the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Soviet Martime Challenge. 38 pp.

THE ATLANTIC PAPERS. Paris, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1979. $4.75 each. *37.* Uranium, nonproliferation and energy security, by Steven J. Warnecke. 120 pp. *38.* Economic adjustment to an energy-short world: a view from the United States, by Lawrence A. Veit. 78 pp.

BERICHTE. Cologne, Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1979. *18.* Das Konzept der stabilen Abschreckung in den Ost-West-Beziehungen, by Gerhard Wettig. 46 pp. *23.* Sowjetische Nahostpolitik nach Camp David, by Gerd Linde. 32 pp. *24.* Sowjetische Wirtschaft 1978/79: Anhaltende Produktivitätsprobleme, by Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Gertraud Seidenstecher. 45 pp. *25.* Entlassungsfälle in der sowjetischen Arbeitswelt, by Bernd Knabe. 71 pp. *27.* Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Entspannung, by Gerhard Wettig. 58 pp. *28.* Der Jargon osteuropäischer Jugendlicher: Zur sprachsoziologischen, lexikalischen und politischen Einordnung eines Sozialdialekts, by Wolf Oschlies. 65 pp. *29.* Interessen in der ungarischen Gesellschaft: Theoretische und politische Aspekte, by Josef Schmidt. 52 pp. *30.* Die chinesische Minderheit in Vietnam als Element des chinesisch-vietnamesischen Konflikts, by Au Duong The. 39 pp. *31.* Bildungsreform in Bulgarien: Konzeption, Diskussion, Kritik, by Wolf Oschlies. 25 pp. *32.* Entspannungskonzepte in Ost und West, by Gerhard Wettig. 52 pp. *33.* Änderungen im sowjetischen Planungssystem: Rezept gegen Wachstumsrückschlag? by Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Gertraud Seidenstecher. 40 pp. *34.* Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion seit Stalin, by Gerhard Simon. 34 pp. *38.* The Strategic Triangle: Can the US play the "China Card"? by Kenneth Lieberthal. 61 pp.

BEYOND NORMALIZATION: REPORT OF THE UNA-USA NATIONAL POLICY PANEL TO STUDY U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. N.Y., United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1979. 79 pp. $3.00.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY, by William Diebold, Jr. Toronto, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1979. 17 pp. $1.00.

CERTAIN LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Hungdah Chiu. Baltimore, School of Law, University of Maryland, 1979. 49 pp. (Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 5-1979.) $2.00.

CHATHAM HOUSE PAPERS. London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979. *4.* Financing Third World debt, by Christopher Davis. 37 pp. £5.00. *Suppl.* A policy for sterling, by John Forsyth and Francesca Edwards. 22 pp. £2.50.

CHINA AND THE WORLD FOOD SYSTEM, by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, Overseas Development Council, 1979. 115 pp. (Monographs, 12.) $5.00.

COMMITTEES ON LEGISLATURES: A Comparative Analysis, ed. by John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1979. 449 pp.

COMMON SENSE AND GOOD WILL AGAINST ARMS MADNESS AND WAR POLICY. Berlin, Friedensrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1979. 15 pp.

COMMON SENSE IN U.S.-SOVIET TRADE. Washington, American Committee on East-West Accord, 1979. 115 pp. $3.50.

A COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM FOR UPDATING OF INPUT/OUTPUT TABLES, by Svein Berven. Bergen, The Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1979. 56 pp. (DERAP Publications, 88.)

CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY. A CASE STUDY: THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE, ROME, 1974, by Edwin McC. Martin. Washington, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, n.d. 57 pp. $3.00.

CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AT U.S. MULTINATIONALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCHANGE MARKETS, by Thomas G. Evans and William R. Folks, Jr. Washington, Center for Multinational Studies, 1979. 43 pp. (Occasional Papers, 10.) $5.00.

CONTINUING THE REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MAO, by John Bryan Starr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979. 366 pp.

DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACHES IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY, ed. by Paul Gordon Lauren. N.Y., The Free Press, 1979. 286 pp.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, by Rachel McCulloch. Ottawa, Ill., Green Hill Publishers (for the International Institute for Economic Research, Los Angeles), 1979. 57 pp. (Original Papers, 22.) $1.25.

ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE COMMON MARKET, ed. by Peter Coffey. N.Y., St. Martin's Press, 1979. 212 pp.

THE EEC AT THE END OF THE SEVENTIES (WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT), by András Inotai. Budapest, Hungarian Scientific Council for World Economy, 1979. 111 pp. (Trends in World Economy, 28.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE EFFECT OF CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN EUROPE ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN POPULATION SEMINAR, BEOGRAD, 26–29 SEPTEMBER, 1978, ed. by Miloš Macura. Beograd, Ekonomski Institut, 1979. 215 pp. $5.00.

EIN PALÄSTINISCHER TEILSTAAT? ZUR INTERNEN, REGIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN DIMENSION, by Rainer Büren. Ebenhausen bei München, Forschungsinstitut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979. 2 vols.

EINPARTEISYSTEM UND BÜROKRATISCHE HERRSCHAFT IN DER SOWJETUNION, ed. by Boris Meissner, Georg Brunner and Richard Löwenthal. Cologne, Markus Verlag (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde), 1979. 320 pp.

THE END OF THE WAR IN ASIA, by Louis Allen. Brooklyn Heights, N.Y., Beekman/Esanu Publishers, 1979. 306 pp.

ÉNERGIE: COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE OU CRISE; ENERGY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OR CRISIS, ed. by Antoine Ayoub. Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval (for the Groupe de Recherche en Économie de l'Énergie), 1979. 272 pp.

EUROPÄISCH-ARABISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT: RAHMENBEDINGUNGEN, PROBLEME UND AUSSICHTEN, ed. by Udo Steinbach. Bonn, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1979. 137 pp. (Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, 11.) DM.5.00.

EUROPE AND AFRICA: FROM ASSOCIATION TO PARTNERSHIP, by Carol Cosgrove Twitchett. Brookfield, Vt., Renouf,1979. 195 pp. $22.50.

THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM: ITS PROMISE AND PROSPECTS; PAPERS PREPARED FOR A CONFERENCE HELD AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION IN APRIL 1979, ed. by Philip H. Trezise. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1979. 96 pp.

EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION, by Robert E. Baldwin and others. Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff (for the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and the Trade Policy Research Centre, London), 1979. 87 pp. (Commercial Policy Issues, 3/4.)

THE EXCLAVE PROBLEM OF WESTERN EUROPE, by Honoré M. Catudal, Jr. University, Ala., The University of Alabama Press, 1979. 126 pp.

THE FACTORY OF GRIEVANCES: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921–39, by Patrick Buckland. N.Y., Barnes & Noble Books, 1979. 364 pp.

FAILURES IN COVERT OPERATIONS—U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CHILE, by Mark L. Attanasio. A THIRTY YEAR SURVEY: THE IMPACT OF MEDIA COVERAGE ON THE C.I.A., by Charles Kirwin. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS LEVERAGE: UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL 1973–1975, by Mitchell Cohen. Providence, R.I., Brown University, 1979. 129 pp. (Monograph on National Security Affairs.)

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ed. by Günther Doeker, Jens A. Brückner and Ralph Freiberg. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications; Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff. 1979. 3 vols.

THE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY: AN AMERICAN VIEW FROM EUROPE, by Jeffrey M. Schevitz. Bonn, Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, 1979. 49 pp.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FRENCH LEFT, ed. by Simon Serfaty. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 124 pp. (Westview Special Studies in West European Politics and Society.)

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1979, by Raymond D. Gastil and others. N.Y., Freedom House (in cooperation with G. K. Hall & Co.), 1979. 321 pp. $20.00.

THE FUTURE OF U.S. LAND-BASED STRATEGIC FORCES: SUMMARY OF A CONFERENCE HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 18–19, 1979, SPONSORED BY THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY CENTER. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979. 32 pp.

FUTURE U.S.-JAPANESE NUCLEAR ENERGY RELATIONS. Tokyo, The National Institute of Research Advancement; N.Y., The Rockefeller Foundation, 1979. 121 pp.

HEADLINE SERIES. N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1979. $1.40 each.

246. Power and identity: tribalism and world politics, by Harold R. Isaacs. 64 pp.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: REPORT OF A MISSION TO GUATEMALA IN JUNE 1979 ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, by Donald T. Fox. Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1979. 58 pp.

IDEOLOGIES OF LIBERATION IN BLACK AFRICA, 1856–1970: DOCUMENTS ON MODERN AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT, by J. Ayo Langley. London, Rex Collings, 1979. 858 pp. £20.00.

THE IMPACT OF IRANIAN EVENTS UPON PERSIAN GULF & UNITED STATES SECURITY, ed. by Z. Michael Szaz. Washington, American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979. 195 pp. (Studies on Middle East Problems.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGED FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY, by Isaiah Frank, Charles Pearson and James Riedel. N.Y., Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University, 1979. 69 pp. (Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, 1979–1.) $3.00.

INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE U.S.S.R., by Arcadius Kahan and Blair A. Ruble. N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1979. 421 pp. (A Special Study of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center, No. 1.)

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON NUCLEAR ENERGY WORKING PAPERS. N.Y., The Rockefeller Foundation; London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979.
International safeguards 1979, by David Fischer. 35 pp. Nuclear energy and international cooperation; a Third World perception of the erosion of confidence, by Munir Ahmad Khan. 34 pp.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE NEXT DECADE, PORVOO, FINLAND, JUNE 24–29, 1979. Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation, 1979. 51 pp.

DIE INTERNATIONALE ENERGIE AGENTUR: ENERGIEPOLITIK UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHE SICHERHEIT, by Peter Roggen. Bonn, Europa Union Verlag (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1979. 235 pp. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts.)

THE INVESTIGATION OF NAZI CRIMES 1945–1978: A DOCUMENTATION, by Adalbert Rückerl. Heidelberg, C.F. Müller, 1979. 145 pp.

KIELER STUDIEN. Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (for the Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel), 1979.
159. Die Bundesrepublik als Exportmarkt Lateinamerikas: eine handelspolitische Analyse, by Rolf J. Langhammer. 163 pp. DM.54.00. *160.* Deutsche Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika, by Paulgeorg Juhl. 107 pp. DM.43.00.

LONDON, WASHINGTON, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE FRANC, 1936–39, by Ian M. Drummond. Princeton, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1979. 62 pp. (Princeton Studies in International Finance, 45.) $2.50.

MEASURING THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD'S POOR: THE PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX, by Morris David Morris. N.Y., Pergamon Press (for the Overseas Development Council), 1979. 176 pp. (Pergamon Policy Studies, 42.)

A MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF SALT II, by Joseph M. Grieco. Ithaca, N.Y., Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, 1979. 34 pp. (Occasional Papers, 12.)

MULTINATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ATTEMPTS: THE RECORD, THE CASES, AND THE PROSPECTS, by Herbert R. Northrup and Richard L. Rowan. Philadelphia, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1979. 580 pp. (Major Industrial Research Unit Studies, 58; Multinational Industrial Relations Series, 6.) $27.50.

MULTINATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND NONPROLIFERATION: A NEW LOOK, by Myron B. Kratzer. Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation, 1979. 31 pp. (Occasional Papers, 20.)

NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF U.S. AID, by Donald R. Mickelwait, Charles F. Sweet, and Elliott R. Morss. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 247 pp. (Westview Special Studies in Public Policy and Public Systems Management.)

NO NEW NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE BUT STEPS TOWARDS DISARMAMENT: DECLARATION OF SUPPORT ON THE PART OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC; STATEMENT BY PROF. ERICH CORRENS . . . AT AN INTERNATIONAL PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON 26 NOVEMBER 1979. Berlin, The National Council of the National Front of the GDR and The Peace Council of the GDR, 1979. 4 pp.

NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL; THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF WILLY BRANDT. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1980. 304 pp. $4.95.

THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: A MID-TERM REVIEW, by Wolfgang Hillebrand and others. Berlin, German Development Institute, 1979. 94 pp. (Occasional Papers, 56.) DM.8.00.

NUPI NOTAT. Oslo, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1979.
162. Innledningsforedrag om Nord-Sør-problemene på Atlanterhavskomiteen og Norske kvinners nasjonalråds seminar på Leangkollen 6.–8. september, by Tertit Aasland. 8 pp. *163.* U-landenes syn på ny økonomisk verdensordning, by Arne Jon Isachsen. 9 pp. *164.* Strukturen und Perspektiven der politischen Zusammenarbeit in Europa, by Martin Saeter. 12 pp.

NUPI RAPPORT. Oslo, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1979.
42. Fra L/70 til F-16: Norsk samproduksjon av våpen og militaert materiell, by Knut Lindelien. 80 pp.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS. Braamfontein, The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1979.
Eyes on the eighties: the international political outlook for Southern Africa, by John Barratt.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

17 pp. International attitudes on the recognition of Transkei, by Deon Geldenhuys. 11 pp.

PALESTINE IN THE ARAB DILEMMA, by Walid W. Kazziha. N.Y., Barnes & Noble Books, 1979. 111 pp.

THE PALESTINIAN COVENANT AND ITS MEANING, by Y. Harkabi. Totowa, N.J., Vallentine, Mitchell & Co. (c/o Biblio Distribution Centre), 1979. 159 pp.

PAMPHLETS. Taipei, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1979.

223. The new posture of Chinese Communist struggle with the Soviet Union, by Yin Ching-yao. 63 pp. 70¢. *224.* A follow-up report on Chinese Communist crime in drugging the world, by Chang Tse-min. 68 pp. 60¢.

POLAND: A SOCIETY IN CRISIS, by George Schöpflin. London, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979. 20 pp. (Conflict Studies, 112.) $4.50.

POLICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR EXPANDING U.S. EXPORTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY, 1979. Washington, International Division, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1979. 28 pp. $5.00.

POLITICAL INVESTMENTS IN FOOD PRODUCTION, ed. by Barbara Huddleston and Jon McLin. Bloomington, Indiana University Press (in association with the American Universities Field Staff), 1979. 242 pp.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ed. by Stanley Henig. London, George Allen & Unwin and Policy Studies Institute (for the European Centre for Political Studies and the European Cultural Foundation), 1979. 314 pp.

POLITICAL SCIENCES ROMANIAN PAPERS. Bucharest, Institute of Political Sciences and the Study of the National Question, "Ştefan Gheorghiu" Academy, 1979.

European security and the requirements of establishing a new world order, by Dmitru Mazilu. 16 pp. World revolutionary process-essence of historic progress, by Leonte Răutu. 71 pp. Eurocommunism and socialist revolution, by Valter Roman. 27 pp. The democratization of international relations in the light of the principles of justice and equity, by Ovidu Trăsnea. 24 pp. Structural negotiating blockages to disarmament, by Sergiu Verona. 19 pp. Trends and ideas, by Constanin Vlad. 17 pp.

POLITISCHE LABILITÄT DES STAATSMONOPOLISTISCHEN KAPITALISMUS, by Hans Heinrich Angermüller. Berlin, Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft der DDR, 1979. 144 pp. (IPW-Forschungshefte, 3/1979.)

RAPID FOOD PRODUCTION GROWTH IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNDERLYING TRENDS, 1961–76, by Kenneth L. Bachman and Leonardo A. Paulino. Washington, International Food Policy Research Institute, 1979. 98 pp. (Research Reports, 11.)

REFUGEES: A WORLD REPORT, ed. by Lester A. Sobel. N.Y., Facts on File, 1979. 180 pp.

RUNNING ON EMPTY: THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN AN OIL-SHORT WORLD, by Lester R. Brown, Christopher Flavin and Colin Norman. N.Y., W.W. Norton & Co., 1979. 116 pp. (A Worldwatch Institute Book.) $7.95.

RUSSIA IN ASIA AND AFRICA; DOCUMENTS: 1946–1971, ed. by J.A. Naik. Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1979. 664 pp. (Avinash Reference Publications.) $45.00.

THE SALT HANDBOOK, ed. by Michael B. Donley. Washington, The Heritage Foundation, 1979. 151 pp. $3.00.

A SALT SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM—COPING WITH SOVIET DECEPTION UNDER STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS, by William R. Harris. Santa Monica, Ca., The Rand Corporation, 1979. 17 pp. (Rand/P-6388.)

SCHOLARS' GUIDE TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES (CHINA, JAPAN, KOREA, AND MONGOLIA), by Hing N. Kim. Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press (for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 1979. 413 pp. $19.95. (Paper, $8.95.)

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION: A PROFILE, by Ursula M. Kruse-Vaucienne and John M. Logsdon. Washington, Graduate Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy, The George Washington University (for the National Science Foundation), 1979. 90 pp.

SOME INSUFFICIENCIES IN THE THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, by Bertil Ohlin. Princeton, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1979. 17 pp. (Essays in International Finance, 134.) $1.50.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: A STUDY GROUP SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, OCTOBER 1978–MARCH 1979. N.Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1979. 147 pp.

THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE: PERCEPTIONS, POLICIES, PROBLEMS, by Hannes Adomeit. Kingston, Ont., Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1979. 194 pp. (National Security Series, No.3/79.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STRUCTURE AND CHOICE IN AFRICAN POLITICS, by L. Adele Jinadu. Bloomington, Ind., African Studies Program, Indiana University, 1979. 52 pp. (Tenth Annual Hans Wolff Memorial Lecture, 5 April 1979.)

A SURVEY OF THE IMPACT OF MANUFACTURED EXPORTS FROM INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA, by Lawrence G. Franko. Washington, National Planning Association, 1979. 45 pp. (CIR Reports, 6; NPA Reports, 174.) $4.50.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND MANAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPANY CASES AND POLICY ANALYSIS IN BRAZIL, KENYA, KOREA, PERU, AND TANZANIA, by Harvey W. Wallender III and others. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1979. 295 pp.

UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS: THE CHINESE CASE, by Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan and John A. Kringen. N.Y., The Free Press, 1979. 242 pp.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES: INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE, by Goronwy J. Jones. Cardiff, University of Wales Press and Welsh Centre for International Affairs, 1979. 275 pp.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1979, by Martin M. McLaughlin and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council. N.Y., Praeger (for the Overseas Development Council), 1979. 268 pp. $5.95.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRIORITIES, PRACTICE. N.Y., United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1979. 86 pp. $3.00.

U.S. POLICIES TOWARD MEXICO: PERCEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES, ed. by Richard D. Erb and Stanley R. Ross. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979. 56 pp.

U.S. STRATEGIC-NUCLEAR POLICY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: THE 1980s AND BEYOND. A CONFERENCE REPORT, III: SUMMARY OF A CONFERENCE HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 26–27, 1978. Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979. 30 pp.

U.S.S.R. AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION, by M.M. Maksimova. Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1979. 303 pp. Kop.50.

VÄRLDSPOLITIKENS DAGSFRÅGOR. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1979. Kr.9.75 each.
5. Öst-väst-handeln—politisk nyck utan framtid? by Vilhelm Rappe. 29 pp. *6.* U-ländерna och kapprustningen, by Manne Wängborg. 39 pp. *7.* Från Mao till Hua—30 års kinesisk utrikespolitik, by T.G. Wickbom. 35 pp. *8.* Mellersta Östern—ett framtidsperspektiv, by Wilhelm Agrell. 32 pp.

A VIEW FROM YENAN, by John K. Emmerson. Washington, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, n.d. 15 pp. $1.50.

THE WORLD ECONOMY IN CRISIS: HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE FIRST MEETING IN NEW YORK OF THE SECURITIES GROUP'S ADVISORY BOARD, AUGUST 26–27, 1979. N.Y., The Securities Group 1979. 20 pp.

WORLD IN TRANSITION: CHALLENGES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD ORDER, ed. by Henry Hyunwook Han. Washington, University Press of America, 1979. 592 pp.

WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1979, by Ruth Leger Sivard. Leesburg, Va., World Priorities, Inc., 1979. 36 pp.

WORLD POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, ed. by Robert O. Freedman. N.Y., Pergamon Press, 1979. 344 pp. (Pergamon Policy Studies on International Politics.)

WORLDWATCH PAPERS. Washington, Worldwatch Institute, 1979. $2.00 each.
33. International migration: the search for work, by Kathleen Newland. 31 pp.

ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIANS, by Simha Flapan. London, Croom Helm; N.Y., Barnes & Noble Books, 1979. 361 pp.

ERRATA

Winter 1979/80

1. In George W. Ball's "The Coming Crisis in American-Israeli relations": on page 246, line 23, for $7,500, read $3,500.

2. An error in the computer printing process led to the insertion of a line from Steven J. Solarz's "Arms for Morocco?" into Pierre Lellouche's "International Nuclear Politics." The first line of page 339 should have appeared as line 1 on page 289. Thus the text should read: "Third, a change in our arms sales policy toward Morocco would probably halt the improvement that has taken place in our economic and political relationship with Algeria, which is the Polisario's major external supporter. In recent years Algeria has become a much more important economic partner of the United States than Morocco."

3. In Ulf Lantzke's "Expanding World Use of Coal": on page 364, lines 9 and 10; for "oil imports" and "oil exports" read "coal imports" and "coal exports."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1980
TAKING STOCK
at the Trilateral Commission

TRILATERAL RELATIONS

AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE NEW DECADE

Outlook for the 1980s: Robert R. Bowie
The International Economy:
Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Nobuhiko Ushiba
Energy: Ulf Lantzke, Gerard C. Smith,
George W. Rathjens, Ian Smart
Political Trends in America, Europe, Japan:
Gaston Thorn, Yasushi Hara,
Graham Allison
Trilateral '80: David Rockefeller

"Though I have a special personal feeling for Trialogue, *I read it because of what it has to say."*

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
(Formerly the Director of the Trilateral Commission)

"I cannot think of a time when communication between America, Europe and Japan was more urgent: In the pile of publications on international affairs which I receive, I find Trialogue *to fulfill an invaluable role."*

HENRY KISSINGER

This special issue **FREE** if you enter your subscription to *Trialogue* now at our special introductory rate: *One year* (4 issues) at $9; *Two years* (8 issues) at $16.

With your subscription, you also receive, as they appear, the task force reports published by the Trilateral Commission—*AT THE CORE OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK ON POLICY ISSUES.*

Enter my subscription to *Trialogue* for:

☐ **ONE YEAR (4 issues) at $9**
☐ **TWO YEARS (8 issues) at $16**

Offer valid for U.S. and Canadian addressees only.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY, STATE ZIP

SIGNATURE

☐ **BILL ME LATER**
☐ **PAYMENT ENCLOSED**

Make check payable to The Trilateral Commission (North America)

Mail to: The Trilateral Commission
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York, 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLICATIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS





EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS—9th Edition

This compact handbook describes the structure and activities of the United Nations and its family of organizations, concentrating on their work during the 12 years from 1965 to 1977-78. It forms a companion volume to the eighth edition of EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS, published in March 1968, which gives a more detailed account of the activities and evolution of the United Nations during its first 20 years, 1945-65. Together, the two volumes constitute a basic history of the Organization.

9th edition	Sales No. E.79.I.5	Paper	$7.95
		Cloth	$12.50
8th edition	Sales No. E.67.I.2	Cloth	$10.00

A special combination price of both clothbound editions will be $20.00.

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

Room A-3315
New York, N.Y. 10017

Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Timely and Important

MONEY ON THE MOVE

The Modern International Capital Market

By M.S. MENDELSOHN

What is the international capital market? How does it operate? What are the advantages and the drawbacks of lending, investing, and borrowing on this market? What are the tax advantages—and risks—for investors? A leading authority answers these questions, and many more, as he introduces this $100-billion world market—with all its challenges and complexities—to general readers.

"A lucid, organized explanation... written perceptively to reach a wide audience. This will be a valuable teaching volume for those who need to understand the international capital market."—GABRIEL HAUGE, Director and Retired Chairman of the Board, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company

$16.50

PRIMACY OR WORLD ORDER

American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War

By STANLEY HOFFMANN

The Chairman of Harvard's Center for European Studies "provides a sophisticated analysis of current alternatives for American foreign policy—a continued unrealistic focus on leadership with domination (primacy) or the possible leadership for world order." —*Choice*

"Penetrating and sharp in its criticism... uncommonly wise in its prescriptions for the future."
—*The Christian Science Monitor*

"A sane book, a complex book, an important book.... Not to study it would be irresponsible."
—*The New Republic*

Paperback, $5.95

FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A.

A Threat to American Society?

By EARL H. FRY

"The best in-depth examination I have seen of the extent and potential impact of foreign investment in the U.S. A thorough, scholarly look at a complex subject which is deservedly drawing increasing attention in our nation."

—SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Here is the first book to explore: Why the U.S. has become such an attractive haven for overseas money • What impact this massive foreign investment is likely to have on American society and American business • What effect government controls on *foreign investments might have on* American investments abroad...and much more.

$9.95



-from McGraw-Hill

At your bookstore or from
McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, Dept. PL, 35th Floor
1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10020

FAS80

Please send me the following books:

_____ copy(ies) of *Primacy or World Order* by Stanley Hoffmann @ $5.95 each. (Paperback—Rev. 60)

_____ copy(ies) of *Financial Invasion of the U.S.A.* by Earl H. Fry @ $9.95 each. (Rev. 23)

_____ copy(ies) of *Money on the Move* by M.S. Mendelsohn @ $16.50 each. (Rev. 23)

I enclose check or money order totaling $_____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Please add applicable taxes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WASHINGTON, D.C.

A Renaissance of Graciousness

A luxury hotel in the great European tradition. Elegant, quiet, unruffled—never a convention.

THE MADISON

Washington's Correct Address

15th & M Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005

Phone (Toll-free) 800-424-8577

or see your travel agent

Marshall B. Coyne, Proprietor

MANAGING GLOBAL PROBLEMS

by C. Maxwell Stanley
The Stanley Foundation

"Simple, sensible, attainable solutions to the most vexing problems of man on this planet."—*Eugene R. La Rocque, Director, Center for Defense Information*

"A book which should be read by political leaders around the world. It poses the issues and addresses the international frameworks for dealing with them."
—*Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Vice-President, The Arms Control Association*

Dec. 1979. Cloth, $12.50. Paper, $7.95.

University of Iowa Press
Order Dept., Oakdale Campus
Iowa City, Iowa 52242

PRAEGER

entering our fourth decade

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
Issues of Public Policy
ROBERT H. BATES, California Institute of Technology, and **MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE**, UCLA
464 pp. 1980 LC 79-24914 ISBN 0-03-056173-6 $31.95

ZAIRE
The Political Economy of Underdevelopment
edited by **GUY GRAN**, Development Consultant
352 pp. 1979 LC 79-19512 ISBN 0-03-048916-4 $22.95

SOVIET POLITICS IN THE BREZHNEV ERA
edited by **DONALD R. KELLEY**, Mississippi State University
282 pp. 1980 LC 79-24741 ISBN 0-03-046626-1 $21.95
Text Edition: ISBN 0-03-046621-0 $9.95

THIRD WORLD COALITION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ROBERT A. MORTIMER, Haverford College
160 pp. 1980 LC 79-23208 ISBN 0-03-055286-9 $18.95

SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO AFRICAN NATIONS
edited by **WARREN WEINSTEIN**, Pacific Consultant, and **THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN**, SUNY at Plattsburgh
ca. 215 pp. 1980 LC 79-21128
ISBN 0-03-052756-2 ca. $21.95

ELITES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
edited by **WILLIAM I. ZARTMAN**, New York University
ca. 270 pp. 1980 LC 79-22932
ISBN 0-03-055961-8 ca. $25.95

PRAEGER
Praeger Publishers
CBS Educational and Professional Publishing
A Division of CBS, Inc.
521 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017
(212) 599-8400

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Columbia

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe

STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI, EDITOR. "A neat compendium of what has happened to Communism in the satellite area over the past decade."—*Library Journal*

392 pages, $20.00

Foundations of Political Analysis

An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice

ROBERT ABRAMS. The first concise and detailed treatment of collective choice theory, oriented to nonspecialists in the area who need to apply the theory in their empirical and theoretical work.

368 pages, $16.50

Yenan and the Great Powers

The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-46

JAMES REARDON-ANDERSON. A challenging argument that military and political factors, and not ideology, guided Chinese Communist foreign policy at the end of World War II.

240 pages, $15.00

To order send check or money order to **Dept. JN** at the address below, including $1.30 per order for postage and handling.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders:
136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

PUT OUR "BOTTOM OF THE BARREL" CAVIAR AT THE TOP OF YOUR LIST

Let us tell you a secret of the caviar business that will save you nearly 60% of the cost of the unique, genuine Caspian product.

The beautiful black eggs of Russian Beluga Caviar are frequently broken at the bottom of the barrel. This is the caviar that we pack under the Kamchatka label. It may not look quite as pretty as the whole grain caviar, and it doesn't crunch as well. But for splendid flavor it will match ANYTHING YOU CAN BUY AT 4 TIMES THE PRICE.

A case of twelve one ounce jars is a bargain at $50. That includes shipment anywhere in the U.S. or you can order a sampler pack of 3 jars for $13.95 postpaid. Due to supply problem this price is certain to rise.

Join the thousands of satisfied customers who save substantially when purchasing the Kamchatka label. If not fully satisfied, we will make full refund for the unused jars. A catalog with many wonderful delicacies & gift ideas all at discounted prices, will be enclosed with every order.

SEND YOUR CHECK TO

Caviarteria INC
IMP83
CAVIAR CENTER USA
870 Madison Ave NY 10021
PHONE ORDERS (212) 861-1210

AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD MINIMUM $25

Is the United States serious about human rights abroad?

AMERICAN DREAM GLOBAL NIGHTMARE

The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy

By Sandy Vogelgesang

Foreword by Norman Cousins

A foreign service officer and policy planner in the Department of State analyzes recent U.S. policy initiatives on the human rights front, including those involving Iran, Indo-China, and the Soviet Union. She reveals the background of major decisions in this sensitive area, giving the human rights question a human dimension through the case histories of three victims of rights violations. She also views the long-term implications of current U.S. policy and identifies the moral and strategic choices we face in this sensitive area.

$13.95 at all bookstores

Norton
W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC. 500 Fifth Avenue, New York 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the conquests of the ancient Assyrians
... to the origins of World War II—all in the

Library of World History

Take any 3 books for only $1.00 each (values to $72.00)

if you will join now for a trial period and agree to take 3 more books
–at handsome discounts–over the next 12 months



(Publisher's prices shown)

53088. A HISTORY OF THE WORLD. *Hugh Thomas*. The history of brandy ... sugar as a general index of prosperity ... the great inventors. A thoroughly engrossing, peripatetic view of human development in all its facets. **$17.95**

75300. A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE. *Alistair Horne*. The first full history of the Algerian War. Illustrated. **$19.95**

78255-3. THE SHORTER CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY. *C.W. Previte-Orton*. Two volume edition of the standard work of this period. 1200 pages, 300 photographs. *Counts as 3 of your 3 books.* **$72.00**

37391-2. THE CELTIC WORLD. *Barry Cunliffe*. Superb archaeological-historical survey of the Celtic culture—its origins, settlements, arts, religion, military prowess, and disintegration following Romanization. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$39.95**

66400. THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. *Maurice Baumont*. Probes and exposes the foibles, frailties, and confusions of the world's leaders that ultimately led to the holocaust. **$22.00**

60555-2. MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY. *Keith Muckelroy*. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$37.50**

57375. KOLYMA. *Robert Conquest*. The first complete history of the infamous camps of Kolyma taken from first-person accounts and the author's own research. **$10.95**

82771-2. TEMPLES, TOMBS AND HIEROGLYPHS/RED LAND, BLACK LAND. 2 excellent introductions to the complex and fascinating subject of Egyptian history. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$25.90**

41813-2. THE DECLINE OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER. *George F. Kennan*. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$25.00**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

40383. A CONTINENT ASTRAY: EUROPE, 1970-78. *Walter Laqueur.* A controversial analysis of the serious problems facing contemporary Europe. Demonstrates how nationalism will prevent a supra-national stage in Europe's political development. **$15.00**

34315. THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF MESOPOTAMIA. *Seton Lloyd.* The vast archaeological discoveries that comprise our knowledge of the captivating cultures of the ancient Middle East. Over 170 photos, drawings, and diagrams. **$17.95**

36050. THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE: Picture History of the World. *Otto L. Bettmann.* 4460 beautiful two-tone pictures—from the story of the creation to the dawn of the space age. **$19.95**

82270. THE TARNISHED DREAM. *Michael N. Dobrowski.* A startling revelation of the intellectual origins of anti-Semitism in America. **$22.50**

37938. CHINA IN OLD PHOTOGRAPHS 1865-1910. *Burton F. Beers.* 170 photographs offer a final glimpse of a dying civilization. **$17.50**

75080. SAIL THE INDIAN SEA. *Vincent Jones.* Adventures of Vasco da Gama, who used a new method of navigation to open the sea route to India. **$18.95**

32695. AMERICA IN VIETNAM. *Guenter Lewy.* **$19.95**

41298. CRUSADERS AND PRAGMATISTS. *John G. Stoessinger.* The emergence of the United States as a superpower. **$16.95**

78304. SIDESHOW: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. *William Shawcross.* **$13.95**

37262. CAESAR'S INVASION OF BRITAIN. *Peter Berresford Ellis.* An account not only of the Romans' invasions of the first century B.C., but also of the cultural achievements, religious practices, government, economy, and military organization of the British Celts. **$15.95**

42345-2. DISCOVERY OF LOST WORLDS. *Edited by Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr.* The major archaeological finds of the past 300 years. Includes two anthologies of archaeologists' original writings. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$34.95**

41440. DAILY LIFE IN THE WORLD OF CHARLEMAGNE. **$22.00**

50595. THE GREAT EXPLORERS. *Samuel Eliot Morison.* A vibrant story of turbulence, lusty adventure and discovery. **$17.95**

58663. THE LIVES OF THE KINGS AND QUEENS OF FRANCE. *The Duc de Castries.* 1,500 years of France's history presented through the lives of her sovereigns. **$20.00**

45220-2. ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY. *George Macaulay Trevelyan.* Impressive survey of English manners and morals from Chaucer to the end of the Victorian era. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$29.50**

50273. THE GERMAN ARMY: 1933-1945. *Matthew Cooper.* How the German Army could have begun the war with such resounding conquests only to be so quickly defeated. **$17.95**

87890-2. WORLD PREHISTORY IN NEW PERSPECTIVE. *Grahame Clark.* Enormous, global survey of all civilizations from the first palaeolithic gatherings to the Aztecs. *Counts as 2 of your 3 books.* **$29.95**



46260. EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS. *A.W. DePorte.* **$18.50**

34305. ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE LAND OF THE BIBLE. *Avraham Negev.* Civilizations that have existed in the Holy Land from the Stone Age through the Crusader Period. With over 100 photographs. **$12.50**

If reply card has been removed, please write: Library of World History Dept. J-AC2, Riverside, N.J. 08370 to obtain membership information and application.

Yours FREE— for joining now!

9½" x 13½" hardcover atlas featuring over 100 maps illustrating the most significant periods and events in history.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The story behind the first major U.S. bank failure since the Depression

On October 8, 1974, after five months on the brink of collapse, the Franklin National Bank was declared insolvent. In this timely and telling account, Joan Spero reveals:

- The mismanagement and corruption that undermined the nation's twentieth largest bank
- The role of Italian financier Michele Sindona in the Franklin's collapse
- The vulnerability of international banking and how the Franklin failure threatened a worldwide economic calamity
- The lasting effects of the Franklin episode on the international banking system

Joan Edelman Spero

THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK

Challenge to the International Banking System

A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

$14.95 at better bookstores, or direct from:

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

PPS

SELECT THE BEST POLICY TEXTS FROM THE BEST POLICY ANALYSTS

SOVIET NAVAL DIPLOMACY
Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, both of the Center for Naval Analyses. Selected as one of the Notable Navy Books of 1979 by the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis

1979	450 pp	0 08 023905 6 softcover	$ 9 95
		0 08 023906 4 hardcover	$35 00

ETHNIC AUTONOMY—COMPARATIVE DYNAMICS: The Americas, Europe and the Developing World
Raymond L. Hall, Dartmouth College

1979	400 pp	0 08 023682 0 softcover	$10 95
		0 08 023683 9 hardcover	$42 50

COMPARATIVE REGIONAL SYSTEMS: East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries
Werner J. Feld, University of New Orleans, and Gavin Boyd, St. Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia

1980	426 pp	0 08 023357 0 softcover	$12 95
		0 08 023358 9 hardcover	$42 50

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY
Christopher T. Hill and James M. Utterback, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1979	345 pp	0 08 025103 X softcover	$10 00
		0 08 025104 8 hardcover	$25 00

INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN THE U.S.S.R.
Arcadius Kahan, University of Chicago, and Blair A. Ruble, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies

1979	440 pp	0 08 023899 8 softcover	$12 95
		0 08 023701 0 hardcover	$37 50

Prices subject to change without notice. Book prices slightly higher in Canada.

PERGAMON PRESS
College Dept.

U.S. Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523
Canada 150 Consumers Road, Willowdale, Ontario M2J 1P9
U.K. Headington Hill Hall, Oxford, OX3 0BW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MEN, ARMS & FREEDOM



THE ALMANAC OF WORLD MILITARY POWER, Fourth Edition
Cols. Trevor N. Dupuy & John C. Andrews, Grace P. Hayes

In revised format, this edition presents completely updated facts and 35 new countries. Analyses of politico-military policies, strategic problems, and alliances of every nation accompany detailed statistics on armed forces organization, numerical strength, deployment, weapons inventory, etc.

☐ **$40.00, ISBN 0-89141-070-8**

ROMMEL IN NORMANDY
Reminiscences by Friedrich Ruge

Numerous glimpses of the personality of the off-duty Rommel. It's an enlightening picture of the war in the West from the German viewpoint. Publishers Weekly

☐ **$12.95, ISBN: 0-89141-010-4**

INTERNATIONAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS
A Survey of Current Developments in Weapons Systems 3rd Edition

An invaluable reference book on current developments and future trends in the wide field of international weapons developments. A clear and concise compendium of information presented in nontechnical terms.

☐ **$7.95, ISBN: 0-89141-089-9**

BRINGING UP THE REAR
A Memoir
S. L. A. Marshall
Edited by Cate Marshall

In this gutsy, colorful, immensely readable summing up of his exciting life (posthumously edited by his widow, [Marshall] hits the highspots and lowspots that often didn't get into books like "Pork Chop Hill," "Ambush," etc. His ironic account of Hemingway's alleged "liberation" of Paris is a juicy example, while some now-it-can-be-told footnotes to history, about such subjects as Ike vs. MacArthur, add welcome seasoning. Publishers Weekly

☐ **$12.95, ISBN: 0-89141-084-8**

MAIL TODAY!

Presidio Press, P.O. Box 3515, San Rafael, California 94902

Please send the books checked to:

Name _____ Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐Check enclosed *(Please add sales tax and $1.50 postage and handling.)*

Charge my: VISA ☐ MC ☐ AmEx ☐ Number _____ Expires _____

☐Yes, I would like a copy of your current catalog.

Signature _____

PRESIDIO PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Publications of

The International Research Center for Energy & Economic Development

- **Journal of Energy and Development.** Vol. V, No.2 (spring 1980) includes articles on: U.S. energy policy (U.S. Congressman David Stockman); developing countries' adjustment to higher oil prices; Indonesia's energy outlook; future petroleum and alternative energy prices, among others. Book reviews. Annual subscription rates (surface post included): Institutional/general - $24; University libraries only - $18; Student/faculty (personal payment) - $12. ISSN 0361-4476

- **Implications of Regional Development in the Middle East for U.S. Trade, Capital Flows, and Balance of Payments.** Summary report of a National Science Foundation study. About 75 pages. $5. 1977. ISBN 0-918714-01-X

- **U.S. and World Energy Resources.** Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference, University of Colorado, October 1976. 272 pages. $12.50. 1977. ISBN 0-918714-03-6

- **Energy Options and Conservation.** Proceedings of the 4th International Conference, University of Colorado, October 1977. 300 pages. $14.50. 1978. ISBN 0-918714-04-4

- **New Policy Imperatives for Energy Producers.** Proceedings of the 6th International Conference, University of Colorado, October 1979. About 300 pages. $16.50. Available spring 1980. ISBN 0-918714-06-0

ICEED
216 Economics Bldg.
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado 80309 U.S.A.

THE ONLY ANSWER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA?

It very well could be unless the West comes up with realistic policy alternatives in and toward South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Now Rotberg, an acknowledged expert in the history and politics of southern Africa, has set forth a balanced account of what these alternatives may be.

Timely reading for anyone interested in African affairs. $15.00

SUFFER THE FUTURE
Policy Choices in Southern Africa
Robert I. Rotberg

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OIL DIPLOMACY

The Atlantic Nations in the Oil Crisis of 1978-79

"Western policies on oil, and on energy in general, are certain to be a test of Western civilization in the 1980s. In response to the problems emerging from the 1978-79 oil crisis, we must remind ourselves of our interdependence. Not only must we combat the forces that split allies, we must also design policies for common solutions. The interdependence of the West is a fact; it is also a tool for inducing the Western countries to find these common approaches.



Ultimately, each country and Western security as a whole will benefit." — From the introduction by General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Other contributors to this collection of lively essays include Paul Kemezis, Richard Mancke, Hanns Maull, Richard Bissell, Harvey Sicherman, Mason Willrich, Bijan Mossavar – Rahmani, and Alberto Bagnasco. They tell what happened, why, and what it means for the United States and the West.

Foreign Policy Research Institute/3508 Market Street, Suite 350/Philadelphia, PA 19104

$6.00 Paperbound

Please send me ____ copies of **Oil Diplomacy.**

☐ Payment enclosed
$_____

☐ Please bill me.

Residents of Pa., please add 6% sales tax.
Outside U.S.A., add $0.50 per copy.

NAME (please print)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

COUNTRY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Arabs in the Jewish State

ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL MINORITY

By Ian Lustick

In one of the first systematic inquiries into the situation of the Arab population in Israel, Ian Lustick addresses one central question: how to explain the strikingly low level of political activity in the Arab sector. He presents an exhaustive analysis of Israeli control over the Arab minority, examining social, economic, psychological, institutional, and cultural factors.
400 pages, $19.95; Modern Middle East Series, No. 6

Latin America in Caricature

By John J. Johnson

Latin America in Caricature documents more than a hundred years of hemispheric relations in the most graphic fashion possible. John J. Johnson has assembled a visual record of U.S. attitudes toward its "Good Neighbors" to the south through political cartoons collected from leading U.S. periodicals from the 1860s to the present.
336 pages, 131 cartoons, $19.95

For a 20% discount, include this ad with order. Texas residents add 5% sales tax.

TEXAS

066

To order directly send payment to: **University of Texas Press** Post Office Box 7819 Austin, Texas 78712

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL

Addressing the Complex Issues of Population and Socioeconomic Change

readable / authoritative / controversial

Appearing in 1980 Articles: energy, raw materials, and population: the search for a solvable equation / the demographic background of the current turmoil in Afghanistan / why the new Czech pronatalist policies seem to be working / political gains from big cities in poor countries / hard evidence of excess female mortality in Bangladesh / early findings from the 1979 Soviet census / China's new Malthusianism

Plus, in each issue Critical point-of-view pieces on significant policy developments, samplings from historical thinking on population issues, documents of lasting reference value, newly available statistical-empirical information, and critiques of noteworthy new books

Subscription rate One year (4 issues) $12.00 / two years (8 issues) $22.00 / sample back issue $1.00. Please make your check payable to Population and Development Review, and mail with your name and address to: Population and Development Review, The Population Council, One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, NY 10017

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What In The World Is Going On?

Good question! And these days, one that deserves more than just academic analyses.

But chances are, you've been reading the same old pronouncements that have always come before.

That's why in 1980 you need a magazine that presents original thinking rather than the conventional. You need a magazine that is daring enough, young enough, and yet respected enough to bring new commentary into the arena of foreign affairs.

You need FOREIGN POLICY.

In this quarterly journal, you'll learn of America's options . . . where the interests of peace and security lie . . . how we can profit from our mistakes . . . and who the personalities are that set our policies.



In FOREIGN POLICY you will find articles too candid and direct for other foreign affairs periodicals. Recent issues have dealt with the new "anti-Soviet brigade" . . . the deterioration of U.S. intelligence . . . the international scramble over Antarctica's resources . . . a proposal to give Israel a new neutral status . . . as well as on-the-scene reports from Britain, Nicaragua, and West Germany. And more to come.

In short, FOREIGN POLICY provides fresh insights and new perspectives on issues destined to affect our everyday lives.

That's why it has become the magazine to read and refer to in corporate headquarters, Capitol Hill committee rooms, embassies, and the offices of policymakers around the world. Certainly this magazine deserves your attention as well.

But you be the judge, with this guarantee: If ever you are dissatisfied with FOREIGN POLICY, for any reason, you may cancel your subscription and receive a full refund for all unmailed issues.

The price for 1 year (4 issues) is still only $12.00. To begin your subscription simply complete, clip, and mail the coupon below.

Remember, it's lively. It's fast paced and straightforward. It's FOREIGN POLICY. And it's not for everyone. But for all those who wish to sharpen their understanding of foreign affairs in today's complex world, FOREIGN POLICY is made to order.

YES . . . please begin my FOREIGN POLICY subscription for the term I have checked below:

☐ 1 year (4 issues) $12.00, ☐ 2 years (8 issues) $21.00, ☐ 3 years (12 issues) $30.00 (Foreign rates add $2 annually, $10 air mail)

Name _____ ☐ Payment Enclosed

Address _____ ☐ Please Bill Me

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

7AW2 Send to: FOREIGN POLICY, Subscription Department, Box 984, Farmingdale, NY 11737

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When city, state and federal programs run out and even the landlords disappear...what's left?

People. They still live here. Many with no heat. No hope. And no help.

Except for VISTA.

VISTA volunteers are all ages. They work within a community to help people find ways to help themselves. In one VISTA program, a handful of volunteers work alongside residents of New York's Lower East Side. Together, they're rebuilding a neighborhood, reviving a way of life. They've already patched up some tenements. Now they're establishing a block association. Creating a job training center. Organizing education programs. And getting local merchants, churches, the police and sanitation departments involved in neighborhood projects.

In 50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Guam, VISTA is bringing hope by bringing people together to solve community problems. America needs more VISTA volunteers, both urban and rural. Because when the money runs out and programs disappear, sometimes a VISTA volunteer is all that's left.

VISTA

Put yourself where you're needed.

Volunteers In Service To America. Call 800-424-8580 or write VISTA, Washington, D.C. 20525.

A Public Service of This Magazine & The Advertising Council

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Headquarters: 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France

OECD

OECD is the world's largest group of industrialized market-economy countries, comprising nineteen European nations, the U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The Organization publishes a unique and timely range of comparative international data for businessmen, government officials and the academic world.

- **PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN 1980 AND 1985, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MEAT AND GRAIN**
  Report by the Secretary General.
  (September 1979) 97 pp. **$6.50**

- **OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS**
  Each country survey provides a detailed analysis of recent developments in demand, production, employment, prices and wages, conditions in the money and capital markets, and developments in the balance of payments. Also includes short-term forecasts and analyses of medium-term problems. **$3.50** per country.
  Annual series subscription **$60.00**
  By air **$76.90**

- **URANIUM—RESOURCES, PRODUCTION AND DEMAND**
  Updates uranium resource and production estimates and assesses uranium availability. Presents demand forecasts in the light of expected nuclear power growth and describes extent of "speculative" resources. Provides over 40 national reports on resources, production and exploration. OECD-NEA/IAEA (December 1979) 150 pp. **$19.50**

- **CHILD AND FAMILY: DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OECD COUNTRIES**
  A comparative study of census data on the composition of households and families that shows how family structures are changing. Includes detailed statistical tables.
  (September 1979) 218 pp. **$22.00**

- **DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1950-1990**
  Trends in the labor force in OECD countries. Tables.
  (January 1980) 144 pp. **$8.50**

- **DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION—1979 REVIEW**
  Efforts and Policies of Members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The annual report by the Chairman of DAC reflects the new Chairman's views on North-South trade and non-concessional transfers, and on aid to low-income countries. Detailed statistics. Updated yearly.
  (December 1979) 230 pp. **$19.00**

- **MONETARY TARGETS AND INFLATION CONTROL**
  Examines the use of target-oriented monetary management for purposes of inflation control, including analysis of monetary experience in the seven major OECD countries and selected smaller economies during the 1974-78 period.
  (July 1979) 101 pp. **$9.50**

- **INTERFUTURES. FACING THE FUTURE: MASTERING THE PROBABLE AND MANAGING THE UNPREDICTABLE**
  Alternative scenarios for long-term world development in the year 2000. The report addresses such issues as population growth, energy, scarcity of raw materials, and the political and socio-economic constraints to growth that the world will face over the next 20 years.
  (September 1979) 425 pp. **$20.00**

- **INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES**
  Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions.
  (August 1979) 67 pp. **$6.00**
  "OECD Guidelines" 1979 Revised Edition, includes "Code of Conduct."
  (December 1979) 28 pp. **$3.00**

Titles may be ordered individually. For faster delivery at lower cost you can now place a ***Selective Standing Order*** *in your area of interest. All OECD publications are also available on* ***microfiche.*** *Write for free Catalog.*

OECD PUBLICATIONS AND INFORMATION CENTER
1750-F PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 724-1857
Also available through U.N. Bookshop, New York and sales agents throughout the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Economic, Political, and Moral Issues

By Desaix Myers III, with the Assistance of Kenneth Propp, David Hauck, and David M. Liff



Examines the pressures on American companies in South Africa and their responses to those pressures, as well as the possible role of business as agent for social and political change. Supplies the background and context of apartheid, reviews government labor policies, and through case studies examines specific industries. The debate generated within the United States on the problem is also discussed in detail, including descriptions of the positions taken by all the major universities owning stock in companies that do business in South Africa. $17.50

COMMUNISM IN AFRICA

Edited by David E. Albright

Essays that explore various aspects of the thesis that, while other Communist states and forces have engaged in activities on the continent in their own right and according to their own special interests, these activities are significant primarily because of their impact on Soviet enterprises in Africa. $12.95

WHICH WAY IS SOUTH AFRICA GOING?

By Gwendolen M. Carter

Current political developments, especially black politics, analyzed against the backdrop of enduring themes and issues in South African society. Studied in detail are Afrikaner nationalism and the reshaping of the country, the question of the homelands, the transformation of African nationalism into black consciousness, and the role of other racial groups.

(Available June 1980—price to be announced)

Available at bookstores or send $1.50 postage and handling for first book, 25¢ for each additional book, to order from publisher.

Indiana University Press

Dept. F, Tenth and Morton Streets, Bloomington, Indiana 47405

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

David Rowe knows the Near East.

He's an International Trade Specialist with the U.S. Department of Commerce Action Group on the Near East. **Assignment:** Monitor vital political and economic developments and commercial opportunities in 18 Near East and North African countries. Advise American business of new export opportunities. **Education:** Magna cum laude, University of Colorado, economics and political science; Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

"I feel that I'm near the center of what's going on. Washington is a fascinating place to be if you're interested in foreign affairs. In private industry I'd be marketing a product. Here, I'm helping to formulate policy. I'm glad I chose Commerce."

If you'd like more information on a career as an International Trade Specialist or International Economist with the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, send the coupon to:

U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration
Box 14272 Attn: PERS-5A
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

An Equal Opportunity Employer

Please send me more information on a career as an International Trade Specialist or International Economist with the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration.

U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration
Box 14272 Attn: PERS-5A
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The 1980s PROJECT of the Council on Foreign Relations

JUST PUBLISHED

INDUSTRIAL POLICY AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE
WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.
A path-breaking work which examines the measures that governments take to shape their economies. Showing how national actions often create international problems, the author discusses the need for, and obstacles to, coordination among nations of their domestic industrial policies.
320 pages $9.95 (cloth) $6.95 (paper)

OIL POLITICS IN THE 1980s: Patterns of International Cooperation
OYSTEIN NORENG
Describes the world oil market and the political tensions that exist between nations that import and export petroleum. To cope with likely instabilities and prevent potential international conflict, the author urges a negotiated international energy agreement involving commitments on oil supplies and prices be formulated.
192 pages $9.95 (cloth) $5.95 (paper)

GROWTH POLICIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
LINCOLN GORDON
A sober analysis of constraints on growth in the world economy. Shows that shifts in attitudes and social factors are more likely to affect growth than physical limits on resources. Describes changes in national policies and international action needed to head off acute problems in regard to food, energy, and the global environment.
183 pages $6.95 (paper)

AFRICA IN THE 1980s: A Continent in Crisis
COLIN LEGUM, I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, LYNN K. MYTELKA, and STEVEN LANGDON
Explores the potential for communal conflict and international intervention likely to affect Africa's ability to build lasting nation-states and examines relevant social, political, and economic trends. It analyzes the persistent issues of ethnic conflict and cultural cleavage and discusses the potential of current economic development plans.
256 pages $9.95 (cloth) $6.95 (paper)

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s: Superpower Politics and East-West Trade ***May publication***
LAWRENCE T. CALDWELL and WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.
A close look at how political and economic developments in the Soviet Union might affect its international behavior and future U.S.-Soviet relations in a changing international system. Includes an assessment of the strategic thinking of the probable next generation of Soviet leaders, and the role communist countries might play in the world economy.
320 pages $10.95 est. (cloth) $7.95 est. (paper)

CHALLENGES TO INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES: The Industrial West in the Coming Decade
ROBERT J. GORDON and JACQUES PELKMANS
Two economists examine the United States' domestic economic policy, especially anti-inflation and employment measures. They analyze how these policies might become international in scope during the next decade.
192 pages $9.95 (cloth) $6.95 (paper)

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE COMING DECADE: From Wellhead to Well-Being?
JOHN WATERBURY and RAGAEI EL-MALLAKH
Analyzes economic and political currents in the Middle East and evaluates the prospects for sustained economic development, increased regional cooperation, and relations with the industrialized countries.
240 pages $9.95 (cloth) $5.95 (paper)

ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, NIGEL S. RODLEY, BRYCE WOOD and RICHARD FALK with introduction by RICHARD ULLMAN
This study offers guidelines for measuring and comparing the degree to which governments are providing for the social, economic, and political rights of their citizens. It makes recommendations for the monitoring of human rights conditions and suggests ways nations might respond to severe violations of human rights.
228 pages $9.95 (cloth) $6.95 (paper)

McGraw-Hill Book Company
1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10020

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOW AVAILABLE FROM MIT

The Brandt Commission Report



North-South
A Program for Survival
A Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt

"We want to emphasize our belief that the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for mankind. . . . North and South have more interests in common on a medium and long-term basis than many have so far been able to recognize. . . . In this report we stick to the thesis that there *are* growing mutual interests. These require a change in the character of cooperation."—Willy Brandt

With striking unanimity, the eighteen members of the Commission, coming from five continents and different points of the political spectrum, have agreed on a set of bold recommendations. They propose long-term reforms by the year 2000, priority programs for the 1980s, and emergency action to avert an imminent economic crisis. And the threat of war and cost of armaments are an ever-present factor in their considerations.

"Once the report is published, what will become of it? Mr. Brandt would like an early world summit, of perhaps 25 leaders from both rich and poor countries, to consider the report and start putting some of its proposals into action."
—*The Economist*
$4.95, paperback

Books of additional interest

The New International Economic Order:
The North-South Debate
edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati

"Considering the talent assembled it is not surprising that this discussion should be lively and creative or that the participants — who include C. Fred Bergsten, Richard N. Cooper, D. Gale Johnson, Harry G. Johnson, Charles P. Kindleberger, among many others—have many disagreements."—*Foreign Affairs*
$19.95, hardcover
$9.95, paperback

Deepsea Mining
edited by Judith T. Kildow

Examines policy considerations regarding the world's greatest untapped resource—the mineral-rich oceans that are accessible to nations North and South, developed and developing.
$17.50

The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
02142



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WANT TO PUT FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ORDER?

Handsome Library Cases hold all five annual issues of FOREIGN AFFAIRS neatly in order on your shelf—keep copies easily accessible and protected. The FOREIGN AFFAIRS Library Case is durable, distinctively bound in black simulated leather with 16-k gold embossed lettering. We'll print the volume and year numbers free of charge. Just indicate, on the order form, the volumes you want (for example: Vol. 58 will include Fall 79 through Summer 80).

Order cases for all your back issues. And how about gift cases for friends who share your interest in FOREIGN AFFAIRS? Each case $4.95; 3 for $14.00; 6 for $24.00—postpaid. U.S.A. orders only.

Send orders to:
Jesse Jones Box Corp., P.O. Box 5120,
Dept. FA, Philadelphia, Pa. 19141

Please send me ..... FOREIGN AFFAIRS Library Cases, volume nos. ....., at $4.95 each, postpaid. I enclose check or money order for $.....

Name

Address

City State Zip

You must be satisfied or money will be refunded. Allow 3 weeks for delivery. U.S.A. orders only.

mizan press

ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM: Lectures
By Ali Shari'ati; tr. Hamid Algar.

Presents some of the famous Iranian sociologist's major ideas and introduces his coherent and contemporary Islamic world-view based on tauhid. $8.95, paperback $3.95.

MARXISM AND OTHER WESTERN FALLACIES: An Islamic Critique
By Ali Shari'ati; tr. R. Campbell.

Analysis of Marxism and provocative discussion of established religions, bourgeois liberalism, existentialism, and Islam as the philosophy of human liberation. $8.95, paperback $3.95.

IRAN ERUPTS: News and Analysis of the Iranian Movement
Ed. Ali-Reza Nobari; publ. Independence.

Documents that offer a comprehensive picture of the Iranian revolution, its causes, motives and development. Paperback $5.95.

Please add $ .60 postage for the first book and $ .25 for each additional book ordered. California residents add sales tax.

P.O. Box 4065, Dept. A, Berkeley, CA 94704

THE U.S.S.R. IN IRAN

The Background History of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran, Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism, and The Fall of The Shah.

by FARAMARZ S. FATEMI

Dr. Fatemi, born in Iran, is a professor of History and Political Science at Fairleigh Dickinson University. He received his B.A. degree from Earlham College, his M.A. degree from Columbia University, and his Ph.D. from the New School for Social Research.

His family has long been active in Iranian politics, observing them firsthand. His father served in the Iranian Parliament and has also authored several books about Iran. His uncle was at one time Foreign Minister of Iran.

Please send me _____copies of THE U.S.S.R. IN IRAN
[ ] ISBN 0-498-02532-2 @ $6.95 per copy. (Paper)
[ ] ISBN 0-498-02340-0 @ $14.95 per copy. (Hardbound)
Please add $1.00 for postage & handling, plus applicable sales tax.

A. S. BARNES & CO.
P. O. Box 421
Cranbury, New Jersey 08512

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What should we do about:

the Middle East? U.S.-Soviet relations? U.S.-China relations? defense spending? oil? inflation? energy? productivity? government regulation? rising medical costs? education?

Nineteen of the nation's leading experts offer tough-minded answers to the hard questions of today and tomorrow . . .

Contributors:
Barry P. Bosworth
George F. Break
David W. Breneman
Ralph C. Bryant
William W. Kaufmann
Lawrence B. Krause
Hans H. Landsberg
Lester B. Lave
Kenneth G. Lieberthal
Christopher J. Makins
John A. Mathieson
Susan C. Nelson
Joseph A. Pechman
William B. Quandt
Louise B. Russell
John W. Sewell
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
James L. Sundquist
Philip H. Trezise

c. 550 pages
$18.95 clothbound
$8.95 paperbound



At leading bookstores or directly from

BROOKINGS

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JUST REPRINTED
The Book That Predicted Our Current World Crises

CRAZY STATES

A Counterconventional Strategic Problem

In 1971, before acts of terror became everyday news, political scientist Yehezkel Dror sounded a warning to Western nations: more and more, global conditions point to the proliferation of nations and groups with intense commitments to aggressive goals and the willingness to use violent means to realize them; groups who feel their actions are legitimized —even sanctified— by their religious, ideological or political beliefs. With uncanny prescience Dror analyzed the strategic mistakes that lead to "crazy states" and suggests the "counter-crazy" tactics to avert world disaster.

Now reissued, with a new introduction by the author, this dynamic, revealing study no longer deals with the future. As recent world events have proven, **the future is now.**

ISBN 0-527-25140-2 cloth $18.00

Timely, fascinating reading from:

KRAUS REPRINT
Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546

"One very significant book."

— Times Literary Supplement

"Goes more deeply into the Soviet side of wartime diplomacy than any prior work." — *Foreign Affairs*

"A valuable work, containing much new evidence and insight." — *Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., New York Review of Books*

"The author has transcended the simplicity of both the 'cold war' and 'revisionist' versions to produce a convincingly complex picture." — *The Economist*



RUSSIA'S ROAD TO THE COLD WAR

Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945

Vojtech Mastny

$16.95 at better bookstores or direct from
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

NOW AVAILABLE



The Emerging Strategic Environment: Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense. Papers by Leon Gouré, Colin S. Gray and William G. Hyland.

These three papers reflect a growing uncertainty about the stability of the superpower strategic-nuclear relationship in the 1980s. Soviet programs in offensive missiles, air defense and ABM systems, R&D in exotic technologies, and a potential capability to destroy U.S. surveillance and communications satellites are assessed. The authors also evaluate various U.S. strategic options for the 1980s and 1990s, including the MX ICBM follow-on to Minuteman, the B-1 bomber, development of the Trident II SLBM, cruise missiles, revised targeting doctrine, and ballistic missile defense; and they focus attention on the ABM treaty and its prospects, including breakdown, breakout and breakthrough. 75 pp. $6.50.

Soviet Military Strategy in Europe. By Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. Pergamon Press.

The author analyzes the expansion of Soviet military forces and the modifications in Soviet military doctrine from the mid-1960s to the present. Soviet forces are seen to be developing an effective, preemptive, war-fighting capability that combines nuclear, chemical and conventional arms, each to its best advantage. Dr. Douglass calls for a reassessment of current NATO military forces and strategy in order to thwart Soviet military strategy in Europe and reduce Moscow's potential for seeking political advantages from the possession of vast and growing military forces targeted against Western Europe. Approx. 250 pp. $30.00.



Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships: The United States, Western Europe and Japan
by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff analyzes, on a comparative basis, various approaches to problems of energy supply-demand relationships in industrialized states, with special emphasis on the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and the European Community as a whole. This study assesses the impact of the Middle East crisis of 1973 upon relationships among industrialized states, and provides an up-to-date assessment of oil and nuclear power as Alliance issues. 60pp. $6.50.

SALT II and U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces
by Jacquelyn K. Davis, Patrick J. Friel and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

In a timely assessment of the SALT II Treaty, the authors utilize several criteria, such as the effects of the treaty upon U.S.-Soviet strategic stability, relationships between the United States and its allies, and problems of verifying Soviet compliance. Included is a detailed examination of the provisions of the treaty as they relate to the existing and projected strategic force structures of the United States and the Soviet Union. This study also contains an analysis of the implications of the SALT II Treaty for U.S. strategic options in the 1980s. 51pp. $5.00.

Special Reports

The Cruise Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain? By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis. 63pp. $3.00.

Eurocommunism and the Atlantic Alliance. By James E. Dougherty and Diane K. Pfaltzgraff. 80pp. $3.00.

The Neutron Bomb: Political, Technological and Military Issues. By S. T. Cohen. 107pp. $6.50.

The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense. Papers by Jacquelyn K. Davis, Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Michael Deane and John Collins, Approx. 60pp. $6.50.

U.S. Strategic-Nuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense: The 1980s and Beyond. Papers by William S. Schneider, Jr., Donald G. Brennan, William A. Davis, Jr., and Hans Ruhle. 61pp. $6.50.

IFPA

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
Central Plaza Bldg., 10th Fl.
675 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Please send the books I have circled. Payment is enclosed☐ Bill me☐.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

Payment must accompany orders under $10. IFPA will pay postage with prepayment. Please order the Douglass book directly from the publisher, Pergamon Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What is contemporary China really like?

How should the West interpret China's new pragmatism; the dissent; the growing consumerism? Is Mao's ideology dead? These are crucial issues for any one concerned about China policy, economic or business relations.

The answers emerge in this highly readable book which focuses on the analysis of China's urban and rural development since the Revolution.

Rhoads Murphey – an eminent China authority – skillfully pieces together a coherent picture. He also compares China's development to India's. The achievements of these very different political systems present some surprises and have relevance to Third World development.

A must for policy-makers, planners, economists and anyone concerned with business in China.

The Fading of the Maoist Vision
City and Country in China's Development
Rhoads Murphey
$12.95 hardcover, illustrated

Methuen
733 Third Avenue, New York 10017

THE GRENVILLE CLARK FUND AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, INC.

announces the

THIRD GRENVILLE CLARK PRIZE

This Prize will be awarded in the autumn of 1981. Applications or nominations should be received by July 1, 1981, and sent in care of the Fund at 2501 Holmes Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64108.

The intent of the Prize is to commemorate and facilitate outstanding public service by private citizens in the areas of world peace, personal liberty, academic freedom, civil rights and good government. The Prize is $15,000 and will be given every three years until the end of this century.

The first Prize was received by Monsieur Jean Monnet on November 15, 1975, in Paris, France.

The second Prize was awarded the following three individuals on October 20, 1978, in New York City: Mr. Jack Greenberg, Director-Counsel, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., The Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, President, University of Notre Dame, and Mr. Sydney Kentridge of Johannesburg, South Africa.

Members of the Board of Directors

Mary Clark Dimond, President
J. Chrys Dougherty, Secretary
Robert H. Reno, Treasurer

F. William Andres
Norman Cousins
E. Grey Dimond
Leo Gottlieb
Erwin N. Griswold
Anthony Lewis
H. Carl McCall
Jonathan Moore
Louisa Thoron Peterson
Elliot L. Richardson
John K. Schemmer
Samuel R. Spencer, Jr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Planning for War: Political and Military Aspects...

War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914
Edited by Paul Kennedy, *Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University*
Foreword by Fritz Fischer
Investigates the role of military planning and militarism in the prelude to the First World War.
282 pp., bibl. index. 1979 Cloth $28.50

'Luxury' Fleet, The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918
Holger H. Herwig, *Vanderbilt University*
As Wilhelm I had built Prussia's powerful army, so Wilhelm II would create a German Navy: Churchill called it a 'luxury' fleet.
314 pp., illus., tables, maps, refs., index. 1980 Cloth $22.50

The Making of the Second World War
Edited by Anthony P. Adamthwaite, *University of Bradford*
Documents, many of which translated for the first time in English, show the interplay between domestic and foreign conflict.
Paper $8.95
224 pp., map, notes, index. 1979 Cloth $18.95

Keyes Papers
Edited by P.G. Halpern, *Florida State University*
Admiral Keyes' correspondence on naval, diplomatic and military problems between the wars.
Volume I, 580 pp., maps. 1979 Cloth $27.50
Volume II, 464 pp., maps. July 1980 Cloth $27.50

Order from: **Allen & Unwin, Inc.** 9 Winchester Terrace Winchester, MA 01890 (617) 729-0830

"Brilliant and timely— a masterly overview."
—PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

A Continuum Book, $19.50

At your bookstore, or
CONTINUUM · 815 Second Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

Bring Your Library Up-to-Date With This ANS Edition....

J.M. Cleveland MONOGRAPH

The Chemistry Of Plutonium

Approx. 680 pages 6" x 9"-Hardbound $49.00

American Nuclear Society
555 North Kensington Avenue
LaGrange Park, IL 60525 USA

Please take my order for _____ book(s).
☐ Payment in full enclosed.
☐ Bill me and I accept postage and handling charges.

NAME _____
ORG. _____
STREET _____
CITY _____
STATE _____ **ZIP** _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DON'T LET INFLATION BLOW IT!



Use your "Dollars and Sense."
Write for this free booklet, Pueblo, Colorado 81009.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Faculty, students, administrators, business and governmental leaders are cordially invited to become members of the CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY, a non-profit educational corporation chartered by the Board of Regents of the State of New York.

JOIN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

The only national public policy research center with its primary focus on the American Presidency. With historical and analytical perspective, the Center examines both domestic and foreign policy, decision-making, relationships with the Congress, and organization.

Membership includes:

Presidential Studies Quarterly. Distinguished board of editors including Walter E. Beach, Thomas E. Cronin, John A. Davis, Fred I. Greenstein, Theodore M. Hesburgh, Marian D. Irish, Dorothy B. James, Louis W. Koenig, Benjamin E. Lippincott, Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvey C. Mansfield, Richard E. Neustadt, C. Dwight Waldo, and Aaron Wildavsky.

Center House Bulletin

Proceedings
Invitations to annual National Leadership Symposium and National Student Symposium.

Name _____

Mailing Address _____

_____

_____ zip_____

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form, the Center will mail you a membership card and begin a year's membership. Membership is tax deductible in whatever category you elect. Add $2 for foreign postage.

Student	$ 15	☐
Faculty	$ 20	☐
Contributing	$ 25	☐
Supporting	$ 50	☐
Friend	$100	☐

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY
926 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10021

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books from the Council on Foreign Relations—

Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy

Edited by ANDREW J. PIERRE. This symposium by public figures and experts addresses the root issues rather than the details of the latest arms deals. The pros and cons of arms transfers, political, military and economic, are scrutinized as well as the policy dilemmas arising from this ubiquitous aspect of contemporary international affairs.

331 pages, $22.50

American Foreign Relations, 1978

A Documentary Record

Edited by ELAINE P. ADAM. Introduction by Richard P. Stebbins. This eighth volume in the Council on Foreign Relations series presents the major source materials of American foreign policy in the framework of a detailed historical narrative and offers a dependable guide to the international experience of the United States in a troubled year.

600 pages, $29.50

Also available: *American Foreign Relations, 1971-American Foreign Relations, 1977*

Japan and the United States

Challenges and Opportunities

Edited by WILLIAM J. BARNDS. The highly successful relationship forged by Japan and the United States over the past three decades is presently undergoing more basic and possibly more enduring strain than ever before. William J. Barnds, David W. MacEachron, Robert Feldman, William Rapp, Gerald Curtis, Martin E. Weinstein and I.M. Destler identify the causes of the growing difficulties facing the two countries and propose ways to cope with current and future strains to their relationship. "Recommended for the knowledgeable reader."
—*Library Journal*

286 pages, $15.00 cloth $6.95 paper

Eurocommunism and Détente

Edited by RUDOLF L. TÖKÉS. "Written by an international team of eight seasoned scholars, this is by far the most thorough and thoughtful study of Eurocommunism available in any language . . . All the authors are highly sensitive to the extreme complexity, and diversity of the phenomenon of Eurocommunism and cautious when it comes to predicting its future development; but they are not unduly cagy or noncommittal. On the contrary, the reader, a specialist or not, will come away both informed and enlightened."—*Choice*

578 pages, $24.50 cloth $10.95 paper

Now available in paperback:

The Dilemmas of the Dollar

The Economics and Politics of the United States International Monetary Policy

By C. FRED BERGSTEN. "What is most satisfying about the book is its clarity of exposition, its comprehensiveness, its meticulous research, and the deep underlying knowledge that comes through in its combined political-economic discussion . . . this book will be deservedly standard reading for some time to come on the role of the dollar in the world economic system."—Sidney Weintraub, *Journal of Economic Literature*

584 pages, $30.00 cloth, $12.50 paper

Available from your book store, or direct from
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS, Washington Square, New York, N.Y. 10003

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Facts



on Soviet Naval Strength and Strategy

THE SOVIETS AS NAVAL OPPONENTS, 1941-45
By Vice Admiral Friederich Ruge.

The Soviets as Naval Opponents is the first book to analytically detail Soviet naval practices during the Second World War. Admiral Ruge, the distinguished author of *Scapa Flow 1919* and *Der Seekrieg*, has used German war diaries, Soviet publications, and several important works by western historians to form a remarkably accurate picture of Soviet naval activity in the Arctic, Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas as well as in the Pacific Ocean. He notes the tenacity of the Russians in pursuit of political aims that at first seemed far beyond their reach. The Russo-Japanese War years, World War I activities in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, and the period between the wars are also described. 1979/216 pages/illustrated/$16.95

THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE
By Sergei Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.

Admiral Gorshkov, the creator of the modern Soviet Navy, is widely acknowledged as being the most brilliant Russian naval strategist of all time. He has transformed the Soviet fleet into a world sea power for the first time in history. Soviet naval strategy is recognized by experts to be both imaginative and bold, subtle and serious.

In this book Admiral Gorshkov openly discusses the sea power of the State and its importance in the politics and defense of the USSR.

The work examines the main components of sea power including the naval fleet of the present day — a fleet capable of conducting operations and solving strategic tasks in different regions of the world's oceans, either independently or together with other branches of the armed forces. 1979/463 pages/$17.95

Book Order Department Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 21402 **FA**

Please send me the following:

_____ copy(ies) of *Sea Power of the State* ($17.95 ea.)

_____ copy(ies) of *Soviets as Naval Opponents* ($16.95 ea.)

☐ Bill me.

☐ I have enclosed my check or money order for $ _____ , including $1.50 for postage & handling. (Please add 5% sales tax for delivery within the State of Maryland.

Name _____

Address _____

City, State _____ Zip _____

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



We can't afford to run out of ideas.

How many ideas do you suppose it took to develop human communications from smoke signals that covered a few miles to satellites and laser beams that reach from here to the moon? Most of those ideas came from college-trained minds and college-based laboratories. Now these vital sources of ideas are threatened—by shortages of money that are forcing colleges to curtail programs, reduce faculty, limit laboratory work, cut down on book purchases for libraries. We must not let this deterioration continue. We can't afford to run out of ideas. Or we may all be back to smoke signals again before we realize it.

Make America smarter. Give to the college of your choice

Council for Financial Aid to Education, Inc
680 Fifth Avenue, New York, N Y 10019

A Public Service of This Magazine
& The Advertising Council

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Martinus Nijhoff

Worldly Wise.

World Communism at the Crossroads

Communist Military Ascendancy, Political Economy, and Human Welfare

Steven S. Rosefielde, editor
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
This collection of essays documents the newly attained military ascendancy of the Communist bloc, and attempts both to analyze the aspects of communist political economy which have made this achievement possible, and to assess how the issue of human welfare fits into the tapestry of communist development.

1980, cloth, 336 pp.
$19.95/Dfl. 45.00

Multinationals In Canada

Theory, Performance, and Economic Impact

Alan M. Rugman
Concordia University, Montreal
Despite their controversial nature, Rugman finds, after careful economic analysis, that multinational enterprises generally are efficient organizations, rather than ones which exist to exploit nations. New insights into the conflict between host nations and multinationals can be gained by examining the theory of internalization and the actual data on industries' profitability which Rugman presents.

1980, cloth, 208 pp.
$18.95/Dfl. 42.50

The World Bank and the Poor

Aart van de Laar
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
This book presents a thorough, but concise, critical evaluation of the World Bank, its major operational procedures, and some of its other, non-project lending activities. On three points: reallocation of resources to poor countries, reallocation to target population groups, and institutional constraints—the Bank's "new style" policy aims are challenged.

1980, cloth, 269 pp.
$15.00/Dfl. 35.00

Administered Politics

Elite Political Culture in Sweden

Thomas J. Anton
University of Michigan
The dilemma of how reformist policies can be reconciled with the presumed conservatism of public bureaucrats is explored in this study of the Swedish political elite. It is one of the first studies to make use of in-depth interviews in Sweden and other countries, permitting systematic comparisons between Swedish elites and other western elites.

1980, cloth, 203 pp.
$19.95/Dfl. 43.90

To order, or to request a free catalog, please write to:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishing
Suite 44K
160 Old Derby St.
Hingham, MA 02043

Orders from outside North America should be sent to:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers BV
Lange Voorhout 9-11
P.O. Box 566
2501 CN The Hague
The Netherlands

Individual orders must be prepaid.
Prices are subject to change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Free publication gives you straight answers to puzzling energy questions.

The Alliance to Save Energy offers a free publication* that explains what our energy situation is all about.

It spells out how we got into this mess. But more importantly, it tells what you can do to help yourself—and your country—pull out of it.

Knowledgeable authors and energy experts review, in understandable language, our alternative sources of energy. You will learn how coal, solar heating, windpower, and other reserve sources fit into the energy puzzle.

But the compelling question is what we Americans can do *now* to become more energy efficient. Articles on conservation, at home, at work, on the road, will help guide you to ways of saving energy, and saving money.

Every American household and business office should have a copy of "The Energy Puzzle." Send to The Alliance to Save Energy for your copy *now.*

ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY
Box 57200, Washington, D.C. 20006

I want to help save energy. Send me your book.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ *State* _____ *Zip* _____

Ad Council *A public service message from this magazine and the Advertising Council*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Union since Stalin

Edited by Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet
Interpretive essays by leading scholars who address the theme of continuity and change in Soviet politics, economics, society, culture, and foreign policy over the past twenty-five years. Written with both the specialist and the general reader in mind, this volume brings to bear solid new research on the post-Stalin era.
352 pages cloth $22.50 paper $7.95

Communism in Eastern Europe

Edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy
"A first-rate compendium of essays dealing with the individual communist countries of the region—East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. . . . The essays combine brief overviews of historical background with an emphasis upon events in the mid- and late 1970's (a period for which little material is currently available in book form)." —*Library Journal*
384 pages cloth $17.50 paper $7.95

China and the West

Society and Culture 1815-1937
By Jerome Ch'en
A perceptive analysis that illuminates the stresses and strains of China's slow progress to modernization. "Readers in search of a general history of modern China that emphasizes broad patterns of change should look at this latest study of Sino-Western interaction. . . . Ch'en includes a great deal of new and interesting information." —*Library Journal*
480 pages, photo insert $22.50

Available at bookstores or send $1.50 postage and handling for first book. 25¢ for each additional book. to order from publisher.

Indiana University Press
Tenth and Morton Streets, Bloomington, Indiana 47405

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whatever became

of what's-his-name?

In years to come your children might ask that question. You may answer, "He is dead. He was called the bald eagle."
But your children may be asking more urgent questions. They may ask, "What has happened to the trees . . . the oceans and rivers . . . the air we breathe and the foods we eat? . ."
The danger to the bald eagle represents only a small fraction of the hazards we are creating for ourselves, and for the world we live in. The results of short sighted actions by man are endangering us *now*, and must be acted on *now*, to assure that the problems do not grow beyond the point of remedy.

The EDF is a coalition of scientists and lawyers. We intercede in the courts and before government agencies on behalf of you, the bald eagle, and other living things. Our work is not glamorous, but it is essential. We strive to assure an environment which allows for technological progress in a humane context. We urgently need your support.

I would like to support the Environmental Defense Fund.
Enclosed is a contribution of $_____ (Membership $15)

Name _____

Street _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Donations to EDF are deductible for income tax purposes

Environmental Defense Fund
475 Park Avenue South
New York, N.Y. 10016

edf

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



MERCHANTS OF GRAIN
Dan Morgan. "Unique ... scholarly and investigative ... a brilliant and well documented book that clearly illustrates the importance of grain, like oil, as a strategic commodity in world commerce and, therefore, as a matter of foreign policy interest"— SENATOR FRANK CHURCH. The Penguin paperback edition, to be published in July, will include a new afterword in which author Morgan explores the "free trade" question and the use of grain as an economic and diplomatic tool in light of the Iranian and Afghan situations.

0-670-47150-X	Viking	404 pp.	$14.95
0-14-005502-9	Penguin	July	$ 3.95

IRAN: Dictatorship and Development, Second Edition
Fred Halliday. Surveying together for the first time all the socio-cultural, political, and economic forces at work in Iran, this volume, which accurately prophesied the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, provides a rigorous and readable analysis of this harsh and divided country. Six months after the original publication, author Halliday has added an afterword which discusses the Shah's overthrow and offers a prognosis for the new regime.

0-14-022010-0	368 pp.	$3.95

TO CHANGE CHINA: Western Advisers in China 1620-1960, Revised Edition
Jonathan D. Spence. Yale professor Jonathan Spence examines the attempts of the many who have tried and failed over the past 300 years "to change China." This important study, with implications for this new era of Sino-American relations, now includes an introduction and a new concluding chapter by the author.

0-14-005528-2	352 pp.	$4.95

THE BOAT PEOPLE
Bruce Grant. The first complete account of the more than 300,000 refugees who have left Vietnam since 1975. Author Grant traces the roots of the "boat people's" dilemma in Indochina's turbulent history and answers many of the questions their plight has provoked. Illustrated.

0-14-005531-2	248 pp.	$3.50

RISE TO GLOBALISM: American Foreign Policy 1938-1980
Second Revised Edition
Stephen E. Ambrose. The highly acclaimed survey of American foreign policy now completely revised and brought up-to-date with three new chapters on America and the Mideast, Africa, and Carter's foreign policies. The current oil crisis, the situation in South Africa, and Salt II are among the issues discussed and related to the author's larger themes of America's rise to, and maintenance of, her enormous global power.

0-14-021247-7	464 pp.	$4.95

Write for our new History and Political Science catalog.

PENGUIN BOOKS
College Department
625 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE UNITED WAY IS A GIFT WE GIVE EACH OTHER FOR BEING HUMAN.

Sometimes it's not easy being human. Medical libraries are filled with diseases of the body and mind.

And, as if that weren't enough, we humans tend to create many of our own problems.

Drugs. Child abuse. Family squabbles. The list goes on and on. Things we don't *mean* to do, but end up doing to each other and ourselves.

It's all part of being human, and all part of why there's a United Way.

The United Way is an organization devoted to making it easier to deal with the problems of being human. An organization dedicated to making humanity more *humane*.

And since each of us is responsible for keeping the United Way successful, it's like a gift we give to each other for being human.

A gift in the best of human traditions: sharing. Thanks to you.

A Public Service of This Magazine & The Advertising Council

Thanks to you, it works. For all of us. United Way

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Johns Hopkins

Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age

edited by Laurence Martin

What nation will be next to join the nuclear "club"—and when? Can the arms race be kept in check? In this book, Laurence Martin has assembled an international group of experts to assess developments in military strategy in the nuclear age. The book's perspective encompasses such issues as problems in intelligence gathering, roadblocks to disarmament, and the strategy of limited war. The issues the authors take on are tough; their insights are provocative. $18.50

Russia and World Order

Strategic Choices and the Laws of Power in History

George Liska

Looking at Western Europe after deGaulle and at America after Vietnam, Czech-born George Liska argues here for the inclusion of Russia—even a Sovietized Russia—in an enlarged West. A longtime analyst of international relations, Liska argues that the West is presently threatened more by inner decay than by external dangers and more by economic aggression from the so-called South than by the military might of the East. $14.50

The Army Gets an Air Force

Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics

Frederic A. Bergerson

In the early 1970s, the United States Army possessed the third-largest air force in the world, ranked behind only the United States Air Force itself and that of the Soviet Union. How a land army came to acquire its own air corps is the subject of Frederic Bergerson's *The Army Gets an Air Force*. It is a fascinating, highly informed study that illuminates such issues as the workings of the military establishment, the role of politics in the process of technological innovation, the effects of interservice rivalry among the American armed forces, and the role of Army aviation in the length and conduct of the Vietnam War. $14.00

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SHAH

by Amin Saikal

Combining Middle East intimacy and journalistic objectivity, Dr. Saikal, of Afghan origin, presents the most thorough account yet written of the rise and fall of the Shah. Five years in preparation, this book goes beyond the western journalistic evaluations that have flooded the world press. Based on interviews with high Iranian officials, who must remain unnamed, the author sweeps through the rhetoric of governments and the media to present a totally unbiased, fascinating account of Iran's recent volatile history. "This is a lucid explanation of complex events, assessing why Iranians are so hostile to Americans today."
—*Publishers Weekly* Illustrated, $14.50

Also Available:
AFGHANISTAN by Louis Dupree
Updated 1980 Edition
"A true treasure trove from an author who has had a long and intimate acquaintance with the country."—*Foreign Affairs*
778 pages. Illustrated, $9.95 paper; $30.00 cloth

at bookstores or direct from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Princeton, N.J. 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

© 1980 Northrop Corporation



Aerodynamically contoured wing and fuselage of Northrop's F-5F tactical fighter/trainer. The evolution of the F-5 series of aircraft demonstrates Northrop's innovative use of advanced technology to modernize a proven design to meet emerging worldwide needs for self-defense.
Northrop Corporation, 1800 Century Park East, Los Angeles, California 90067.

NORTHROP
Making advanced technology work.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The soybean is almost as old as agriculture itself.

Yet U.S. interest in this protein-rich bean didn't really blossom until the 1920's – the same time that the Continental Grain Company began operations in Chicago.

Continental and soybeans have grown up together.

In 1924, for example, U.S. soybean production was a mere five million bushels – compared to 1.8 billion bushels in the latest crop year.

Today, the soybean is a leading cash crop, and Continental is a major domestic and international marketer of soybeans and their products.

That could be a satisfying end to the story. But the real success of this golden bean is all in the future.

As world demand for proteins, fats and vegetable oils continues to grow, forecasters predict that U.S. production will increase by 20% or more in the next 10 years and that soybean acreage will be comparable to corn within 20 years.

When all this comes about, you can be sure of one thing. We'll be here with the facilities, the people and the wherewithal to serve the growing needs of soybean sellers and buyers alike.

Continental Grain Company, 277 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

Continental Grain

When soybeans first became a successful U.S. crop, Continental Grain was here to market them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED